Resumen

VAN NIEKERK, Anton A. Science and ethics: Perspectives on value and moral considerations in contemporary practice of science. Tydskr. geesteswet. [online]. 2025, vol.65, n.3, pp.841-851. ISSN 2224-7912.  https://doi.org/10.17159/2224-7912/2025/v65n3a5.

There used to be a long-held conviction, undergirded and promoted particularly by Kantian epistemology, that facts and values had to be separated for the sake of attaining truth. Many claim that this insight grounds modern science. This conviction has been markedly challenged by developments in the 20th century, particularly in the ranks of post-empiricist philosophers of science. This paper explores the conviction that opposed modernist philosophy of science - the conviction, namely, that values, morality and ethics have become intellectual orientations without which the valid practice of science is no longer possible. The author analyses key concepts in this regard, particularly "science" and the shifts that this notion has undergone in post-empiricist philosophy of science, as well as the notions of "value", "morality" and "ethics". Attention is paid to the way in which the application of values to science implies that science no longer is the domain of individuals, but, instead, that it increasingly requires to be practised by groups of researchers. Examples, such as the Eddington test of general relativity and the discovery of the Higgs boson particle, are discussed. The acknowledgement of the necessity ofvalues in science also gives rise to the phenomenon of"hyper-authorship". The author concludes with a critical assessment of the notion of "local moralities", as it comes to the fore in highly controversial cases such as the Nevirapine research in the development of HIV/Aids vaccines in Africa, as well as Peter Singer's insistence on ethics' claim to universality. In the world in which we nowadays live, it is increasingly being recognised that the demand of obligation (Afrikaans: "behorenseis") needs to be legitimately addressed to just about all forms of human behaviour. The success of the modern sciences has, in the past, often been accredited to the alleged conviction that true science simply reflects reality "as it is", without the "interference" ofvalues, as was assumed necessary in the image of pre-modern knowledge acquisition. This conviction was markedly challenged by developments in the 20th century, particularly in the ranks of post-empiricist philosophers of science (of which Thomas Kuhn is the best example). This paper explores the conviction that opposed modernist philosophy of science - the conviction, namely, that values, morality and ethics have become intellectual orientations without which the valid practice of science is no longer possible. The author analyses key concepts in this regard, particularly "science" and the cconceptual shifts that this notion has undergone in post-empiricist philosophy of science, as well as the notions of "value", "morality" and "ethics". It is claimed that science is best understood as a tradition of systematic knowledge transfer that originated in the fifth century BCE in ancient Greece, but that is nowadays understood as being markedly different from that day and age. Science, then, as it is nowadays understood, is the outcome of a striving for a body of universally valid insights. The post-empiricist Thomas Kuhn denies that this is ever attainable. The history of science shows, according to the early Kuhn, that science only functions according to incommensurable "paradigms", drawing on "key exemplars" that guide scientific research. Hence, "progress" is, according to Kuhn and other post-empiricists, not really an appropriate depiction of what has been transpiring in the history of science. The abovementioned striving also applies to the notion of rational accountability, the meaning of which remains controversial. In this regard, the author-distinguishes between the classical (groundability), critical (i.e. the testability of claims) and judgement models of rationality. In addition, the striving of science is systematic; the components of scientific theories must "hang together" and are not loose and unrelated but rather indisputable "facts". Science requires that segments of reality be distinguished in terms of separately identifiable "disciplines". As far as values are concerned, the author draws on a definition by JJ Degenaar: "...[A] differential, regulative principle of organisation that indicates desirability or undesirability, and that functions normatively in the reflections, judgements, decision-making processes, actions or actual practices of people" (1986:103-104). Morality, for the author, refers to the universal phenomenon that people subject their actions to the demands of obligation, as has been claimed. In that sense, morality is an observable phenomenon in human society. Ethics, on the other hand, is much more of a philosophical activity in which critical reflection on the nature of value, norms, morality and ethical theories, or approaches to moral argumentation, occurs. An argument as to why moral concerns are essential for practising science is developed. Four supporting arguments are put forward. Firstly, science, as infused by moral persuasions, is less dangerous (it can of course also be highly beneficial!) to society. In sync with this realisation it is generally being accepted that science is nowadays much more, and much better practised, no longer by individuals, but by groups (or "teams") of researchers. Examples, such as the Eddington test of general relativity and the discovery of the Higgs boson particle, are discussed. Secondly, the acknowledgement of the necessity ofvalues in science also gives rise to the phenomenon of "hyper-authorship", that is, groups of research participants who, under the leadership of a "principal investigator" accepts joint responsibility (in fortune or misfortune!) for the eventual publication and dissemination of the research. Thirdly, the author provides a critical assessment of the notion of "local moralities", as it comes to pass in highly controversial cases such as the Nevirapine research in the development of HIV/Aids vaccines in Africa, as well as Peter Singer's insistence on ethics' claim to universality. In the Nevirapine case, researchers such as Dr. David Ho (Taiwan) insisted that it was indeed ethical to test Nevirapine as an ARV for HIV positive pregnant women in many African countries. This meant a dosage significantly shorter and cheaper than the standard of care, which at that stage was high and prolonged dosages of AZT. Ho's argument was that, for most African women eligible for the trial, the general standard of care in their home countries was nonexistent. This position was vehemently opposed by Marcia Angell, the then editor of the New England Journal of Medicine; arguably the most highly acclaimed medical research journal in the world. Angell eventually retired from the editorship because of irreconcilable differences arising from the dispute. Said dispute in this case, clearly referring to the outcome ofdifferences ofopinion about the possibility of "local moralities" - that is, a notion that argues that morality essentially functions and attains meaning within the confines of the value systems of different countries and societies. Fourthly, the universal intent of moral theorising flies in the face of the idea of "local moralities". This is fiercely claimed by Peter Singer, arguably the best known but also among the most controversial bioethicists in the world. He writes: "Theory agrees that an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional group. Ethics takes a universal point of view. " (See more complete quote in the text).

Palabras clave : morality; ethics; knowledge; science; values; local moralities; hyper-authorship; principal investigator; universality.

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