<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
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<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1727-3781</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[PER]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1727-3781</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Publication of North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus)]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1727-37812012000200005</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Decentralisation in Africa: A Critical Review OF Uganda's Experience]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ojambo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A01"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A01">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Toronto  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Heidelberg ]]></addr-line>
<country>Germany</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2012</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2012</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>15</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>01</fpage>
<lpage>21</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1727-37812012000200005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso&amp;tlng=en"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1727-37812012000200005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso&amp;tlng=en"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1727-37812012000200005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso&amp;tlng=en"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Since the rise to power of the Movement government under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni in 1986, Uganda has largely been show-cased as an emerging democracy on the continent. Among other things, Museveni's regime has been acclaimed for the restoration of periodic national elections, the making of the Constitution and the overall promotion of democratic governance, most especially through the adoption of a decentralised system with a commendable institutional and legal framework. Decentralisation is believed to promote service delivery at the local level, accountability for government resources by local leaders, and the involvement of the masses in local planning and the implementation of government programmes. It is now over twenty years since decentralisation was adopted as a system of government but the quality of service delivery and the accountability for government resources at the local level remains just as deplorable as the extent to which the masses are involved in the planning and implementation of government programmes in their localities. This paper examines the challenges that inhibit the realisation of the noble objectives of decentralisation, notwithstanding the apparently impressive institutional and legal framework.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Uganda]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[decentralisation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[democratic governance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[government resources]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[planning]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[ <p align="right"><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>CONFERENCE    PAPERS</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p> <p/>      <p><font face="verdana, arial, helvetica, sans-serif" size="4"><b>Decentralisation    in Africa: a critical review of Uganda's experience</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>H Ojambo</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> S.J.D. &amp; LLM,    University of Toronto. Lecturer, Makerere University; Partner, M/s Ojambo &amp;    Ojambo Advocates, Kampala, Uganda, <a href="mailto:hojambo@law.mak.ac.ug">hojambo@law.mak.ac.ug</a>.    The author extends appreciation for research assistance to Ms. Barbra Nahone    Ajambo. This paper immensely benefited from comments made at the conference    organised by the Africa Law Association (ALA) in cooperation with the Max Plank    Institute (MPI) on "Legal Transformation in North Africa and Decentralisation    in Africa" at Heidelberg, Germany</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p> <hr size="1" noshade>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>SUMMARY</b></font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Since the rise    to power of the Movement government under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni    in 1986, Uganda has largely been show-cased as an emerging democracy on the    continent. Among other things, Museveni's regime has been acclaimed for the    restoration of periodic national elections, the making of the Constitution and    the overall promotion of democratic governance, most especially through the    adoption of a decentralised system with a commendable institutional and legal    framework. Decentralisation is believed to promote service delivery at the local    level, accountability for government resources by local leaders, and the involvement    of the masses in local planning and the implementation of government programmes.    It is now over twenty years since decentralisation was adopted as a system of    government but the quality of service delivery and the accountability for government    resources at the local level remains just as deplorable as the extent to which    the masses are involved in the planning and implementation of government programmes    in their localities. This paper examines the challenges that inhibit the realisation    of the noble objectives of decentralisation, notwithstanding the apparently    impressive institutional and legal framework.</font></p> <p/>      <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Keywords:</b>    Uganda, decentralisation, democratic governance, government resources, planning</font></p> <hr size="1" noshade>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>1 Introduction</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Uganda's experience    with decentralisation is as highly acclaimed as it is criticised. Though regarded    by some commentators as one of the most ambitious forms of devolution of power    among the developing countries, it is also greatly criticised for its failure    to deliver on its promises. According to Steiner, the scale and scope of the    transfer of powers and responsibilities to the local level in Uganda's decentralisation    reform is exceptional among developing countries.<a name="top1"></a><a href="#back1"><sup>1</sup></a>On    their part, James and Francis have described it as "one of the most far-reaching    local government reform programmes in the developing world."<a name="top2"></a><a href="#back2"><sup>2</sup></a>Mitchinson,    in the same vein, contends that Uganda's decentralisation programme "is one    of the most radical devolution initiatives of any country at this time."<a name="top3"></a><a href="#back3"><sup>3</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">But the quest for    the fruits of decentralisation appears to be only increasing. As Tumushabe <i>et    al</i> have lamentably observed:<a name="top4"></a><a href="#back4"><sup>4</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Almost two decades      later, the quality of public service delivery is less than desirable; district      local governments with no financial resources of their own have become mere      agents of the centre while the accountability mechanisms for good governance      and public service delivery are either non-existent or malfunctional.</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Other commentators    view Uganda's decentralisation programme as more of a political gimmick than    a genuine effort to promote democracy and good governance:<a name="top5"></a><a href="#back5"><sup>5</sup></a></font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">...the creation      of the districts did not follow any established parameters, neither was the      process informed by administrative necessity or economic rationale. Instead      the president announced their creation via presidential decrees, often to      reward politicians threatening to withdraw support for the NRM, or punish      those who had.</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The principal objectives    of decentralisation have historically included the promotion of accountability,    transparency, efficiency in governance and service delivery, and the empowerment    of the masses from grass-root levels through the promotion of the participation    of individuals and communities in their governance. Decentralisation is therefore    generally viewed as an effective mechanism of extending and deepening the democratisation    process to the grass-roots in order to promote people's-based development in    the context of a high regard for human rights.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Uganda's scenario    presents a near-perfect fundamental contradiction between form and content.    The great promise of improved accountability, efficiency in governance and the    empowerment of the masses remains elusive in the country, notwithstanding the    apparent commitment to the implementation of the decentralisation programme,    at least at the formal level of the institutional and legal framework. According    to a study<a name="top6"></a><a href="#back6"><sup>6</sup></a>commissioned by    the World Bank, Uganda is ranked second to South Africa in almost all aspects    of decentralisation in Africa. Ironically though, the same country is ranked    among the most corrupt in the world with deplorable service delivery systems.<a name="top7"></a><a href="#back7"><sup>7</sup></a>This    paper thus seeks to examine Uganda's experimentation with decentralisation with    a view to unearthing the subterranean constraints that continue to inhibit the    delivery of the great promises of the system. The paper traces the historical    background to Uganda's decentralisation process, outlines the current structure    of Uganda's decentralisation and closely examines the challenges to the realisation    of the promises of decentralisation.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>2. The rationale    and historical background of decentralisation in Uganda</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Defined as the    devolution of powers in terms of public authority, resources, and personnel    from the central government to sub-national levels, decentralisation can take    different forms. In some cases, decentralisation may denote the transfer of    such power from the central government to a province or state, as in the case    of federal systems, or could refer to the transfer of such powers to lower levels    of government within a unitary system. For the rather obvious reason that Uganda    has a unitary system of government, this paper will focus on decentralisation    in a unitary system and particularly where powers are devolved from the central    government to the lower-level local government. In Uganda's case, the analysis    focuses on the devolution of powers from the central government to the district    and the lower-level local governments, which include the sub-county, municipality,    division and parish.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i><b>2.1 The historical    background of decentralisation in Uganda</b></i></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The history of    decentralisation in Uganda can be traced way back to the colonial days. However,    it was not until the rise of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government    to power under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni<a name="top8"></a><a href="#back8"><sup>8</sup></a>that    decentralisation was accorded the prominence it enjoys in the country today.    It will be recalled that the British, in the execution of their indirect rule    policy, established a hybrid system of administration in most of their colonies    including Uganda, where some powers were granted to the native leaders while    the colonial government reserved overriding powers through the representatives    of the colonial government. In Uganda's case, this system of administration    was exemplified by the <i>African Native Authority Ordinance</i> of 1919,<a name="top9"></a><a href="#back9"><sup>9</sup></a>which    provided for the powers and duties of African chiefs in the colonial administration.    Under the Ordinance, chiefs were appointed at the village, sub-county and county    levels with powers to collect taxes, preside over native courts, and maintain    law and order. These chiefs were, however, accountable to the District Commissioner,    the executive head of the district and the principal representative of the central    government.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The Local Government    Ordinance of 1949<a name="top10"></a><a href="#back10"><sup>10</sup></a>ushered    in new changes by establishing the district as a local government unit with    a fairly autonomous administration. Among the different organs of the district    were the District Councils, which were comprised of elected members and were    responsible for district administration. Notably, though, the central government    still retained overriding powers over District Council decisions. Chiefs remained    salaried local government officials who were responsible to the central government    through the District Commissioner.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">During the colonial    times other administrative units were kingdoms which more or less operated as    federal states within the system. By the time of independence in 1962 Uganda    had 11 districts and four kingdoms. The independent Constitution of 1962 established    a decentralised system with elements of both federalism and decentralisation    in the governance system. While the kingdom of Buganda was granted federal status,    others such as Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and the territory of Busoga were accorded    semi-federal status. The rest of the country, comprised of the districts of    Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei and West Nile,    was administered through Councils.<a name="top11"></a><a href="#back11"><sup>11</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The independence    Constitution was abrogated in 1966. The successor Constitution of 1967 centralised    powers. The overthrow of the post-independence Obote government by Idi Amin    through a military <i>coup</i> led to the establishment of a military regime    between 1971-1979 during which districts were dissolved and regional/provincial    administrations led by Governors who were high-ranking military officers were    established. The second Obote government (1980-1985) did not make any significant    efforts to change the system.<a name="top12"></a><a href="#back12"><sup>12</sup></a>Thus    Uganda gradually but steadily witnessed increased centralisation of powers through    the various political regimes from independence until 1986, when the nascent    NRM government initiated fundamental changes in local government which culminated    in the enactment of the Local Government Statute of 1993 and the subsequent    Local Government Act of 1997. Under the same regime, the 1995 Constitution,    which adopted and further articulated the local government system of government,    was promulgated. The current system of local government is by far more robust    and elaborate than any other that was ever attempted in the country's history.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i><b>2.2 Rationale</b></i></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The reasons for    the adoption of the current system of decentralisation under Museveni were largely    internal. Unlike the previous efforts, many of which took the form of the deconcentration<a name="top13"></a><a href="#back13"><sup>13</sup></a>of    powers from the centre to lower levels of government through representatives    of the central government, the current system of local government grants by    far the widest and most robust devolution of powers.<a name="top14"></a><a href="#back14"><sup>14</sup></a>The    adoption of such an ambitious system of local government is partly, and indeed    largely, explained by Uganda's post-independence turbulent political history    and the peculiar challenges that affected the NRM government in its early days.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Prior to the rise    of the NRM government in 1986, Uganda's history had been characterised by recurrent    political turbulence. Beginning with the overthrow of the first Obote regime    by Idi Amin Dada through a military <i>coup</i>in 1971 and the subsequent military    overthrow of Idi Amini's regime in 1979, through the successive short-lived    governments that were established and overthrown in a matter of months between    the end of Amin's government in 1979 and the second Obote government in 1981,    Uganda largely experienced military leadership. Expectations of the restoration    of democratic governance after the election of the second Obote government into    power in 1980 were thwarted by the 1985 <i>coup</i>championed by Tito Okello    Lutwa. The Tito Okello government lasted only a few months before it too was    overthrown by the NRM rebel forces under the leadership of Museveni in 1986.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Throughout this    post-independence period of political turmoil, Uganda experienced various socio-economic    challenges ranging from endemic gross violations of human rights through economic    plunder and decadence to outright lack of democratic governance. Upon its rise    to power through an armed rebellion partly prompted by the then socio-economically    decadent situation, the NRM government quite understandably made democratisation    one of its major goals. This was vividly captured in one of Museveni's inaugural    speeches when he asserted:<a name="top15"></a><a href="#back15"><sup>15</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The first point      in our programme is the restoration of democracy. The people of Africa - the      people of Uganda - are entitled to a democratic government. It is not a favour      from any government. It is the right of the people of Africa to have democratic      government; the sovereign power in the land must be the population, not the      government. In our liberated zones, the first thing we started was the election      of Village Resistance Committees. My mother, for instance cannot go to parliament      but she can surely become a member of a Committee so that she too, can make      her views heard. We have, therefore set up village, muluka <i>(parish),</i>gombolola      <i>(sub-county)</i>and district committees ... but right now I want to emphasize      that our first point in our political programme is democracy for the people      of Uganda.&nbsp;</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">But it should be    noted that the creation of local councils (committees) was not originally informed    by the desire to create democratic institutions. As Steiner observes, "the local    councils were originally established for political reasons and not with the    aim of improving service delivery or reducing poverty."<a name="top16"></a><a href="#back16"><sup>16</sup></a>In    fact, according to Mugabi, the explanation lay in considerations of political    expediency. The long protracted war that brought the NRM government to power    greatly weakened state organs in the entire country. In areas where war was    directly waged government systems were literally non-existent, as the rebel    forces had in some cases taken control of parts of such areas. This created    an administrative vacuum especially in local governance, which the rebel forces    addressed by appointing members of the local communities in the areas they controlled    to fill the gaps in local administration. Resistance Councils comprised of members    were accordingly created with both administrative and security mandates in their    areas of jurisdiction. Thus:<a name="top17"></a><a href="#back17"><sup>17</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">During the "bush    war" of the early 1980s, the organs of the state were destroyed, thus creating    a vacuum in local governance. The NRM had no spare manpower to utilize as local    administrators. Accordingly, local communities were requested to elect from    amongst themselves, councils to perform the duties of the defunct agents and    organs of the old state. However, the primary role of these councils was to    resist infiltration - through a network of information gathering on the operations    of the enemy and liaising with the NRM intelligence organs - hence the name    "resistance councils".</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Once in power,    the NRM government embarked on steps aimed at improving and legally entrenching    the resistance council system of administration for the reasons already stated    - democratic governance, filling the gaps in administration created by the destruction    of state organs during the war, and the promotion of security. Indeed, shortly    after taking over power the Museveni government established a commission of    inquiry into local government under the leadership of Mahmood Mamdani. A white    paper was prepared and presented to government and henceforth the government    vigorously embarked on decentralisation based on the resistance council system.    By 1987 the government had enacted the Resistance Council's and Committees Statute    (the RC Statute), which repealed part 1 of the Local Administration Act of 1967    and the Urban Authorities Act of 1964. The RC Statute marked the very beginning    of the formal decentralisation process under the Movement government by transferring    such powers as planning, decision making and the administration of justice to    the community-based Resistance Council system.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Thus, the adoption    of the system of democratisation through the devolution of powers can fairly    largely be attributed to local factors. Nonetheless, the role of external factors    cannot be underestimated. Undoubtedly, Uganda is part of the Third World that    has been subjected to some pressure from the donor community to embrace decentralisation    as a pathway to democratic governance. Quite compelling assumptions have always    been made about the great potential of decentralisation in deepening democracy    and these have rendered it a near-universal prescription for addressing the    governance challenges faced in the developing world.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i><b>2.3 Objectives    of decentralisation</b></i></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">If well implemented,    decentralisation promises efficient and accountable governance through the increased    involvement of the people in the way they are governed. That is, decentralisation    promotes people's participation in important government functions such as decision    making, the identification of problems, priority setting, planning and monitoring    the implementation of any programmes, which in effect promotes and ensures the    better allocation and utilisation of resources. It is also generally believed    that when people are involved in their own governance through decentralisation,    accountability on the part of office bearers is enhanced, hence leading to more    efficient utilisation of public resources, which in turn promotes development.    Decentralisation also promises greater respect for human rights through the    involvement of people in the design, planning and implementation of government    programmes/policies. Over all, decentralisation enhances the process of governance.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">However, the extent    to which any decentralised system will deliver these noble objectives depends    on more than the mere adoption of the system. While the formal legal framework/structure    of any given decentralised system is important in the determination of its success,    other extraneous factors such as the level of people's awareness, the availability    of the necessary resources and the commitment of the central government are    usually critical in determining the degree of success. Uganda's experience with    decentralisation is particularly intriguing given the manifest contradictions    between the rather admirable formal legal framework, on the one hand, and the    continued deplorable plunder of public resources, impunity, poor service delivery    and the continued high rate of violation of human rights, on the other. Before    a critical discussion of the challenges faced in the decentralisation process    in Uganda is undertaken, the country's highly acclaimed decentralised structure    deserves to be briefly discussed.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>3 The structure    and functions of local government in Uganda</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Local government    in Uganda is based on the district as the basic unit. Various local governments    and administrative units resort within the district. The district council, which    is comprised of elected members, is the highest political authority having legislative    and executive powers within the district, and other councils in lower-level    local government are also the highest political authorities in their jurisdictions.<a name="top18"></a><a href="#back18"><sup>18</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The structure of    local government in Uganda takes different forms depending on whether the administrative    area in question is rural or urban. Other than Kampala City, which has a special    local government administrative structure<a name="top19"></a><a href="#back19"><sup>19</sup></a>,    the local government system is comprised of a five-tier structure where, in    rural areas, the village council (LC1) forms the lowest level, followed by the    parish council (LC2), then the sub-county council (LC3), the county council    (LC4), and at the top (the district) the district council (LC5).<a name="top20"></a><a href="#back20"><sup>20</sup></a>On    the other hand, in urban districts the structure begins with the village council    (LC1), then the ward or parish council (LC2), the municipal or town division    (LC3), the municipality (LC4) and the district council (LC5/mayor).<a name="top21"></a><a href="#back21"><sup>21</sup></a>&nbsp;</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The district council    is the basic local government unit while the municipal council, city division    council, the municipal division council, and the town council are lower-level    local governments. Both the district council and the lower-level local government    units have corporate status with perpetual succession and a common seal, and    they have independent legal personality in the sense that they can sue and be    sued in their corporate name. On the other hand, the county council, the parish/ward    council and the village council are merely administrative unit councils without    corporate status and thus enjoy less autonomy in the local government system    than the local government units. The functions of these administrative units    are limited to dispute resolution, monitoring of the delivery of services, and    assisting in the maintenance of law, order and security.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In their areas    of jurisdiction, local government councils are mandated to perform a variety    of state functions ranging from making development plans based on locally determined    priorities, raising revenue, budgeting (on condition that all of their budgets    are balanced), and appointing statutory commissions, boards and committees for    personnel (District Service Commission), land (District Land Boards), procurement    (District and Urban Tender Boards) and accountability (Local Government Public    Account Committees), to establish or abolish offices in the public service of    the district, as well as to hire and manage personnel in addition to managing    their own payroll and pension. Local governments are also vested with powers    to provide such services as education (except tertiary education), health services    (except referral hospitals), the construction of roads (except those under the    central government), and ambulance services.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">While the central    government retains jurisdiction with respect to such areas as security - defence,    law and order, mines, minerals, water resources, banks, citizenship, national    parks, foreign relations, national elections and national plans - it also oversees    the performance of local governments through the office of the Resident District    Commissioner (RDC). Under section 71 of the Local Government Act, the RDC is    mandated to represent the President and the Government in the district, coordinate    the administration of government services in the district, advise the district    chairperson on matters of national interest, monitor and inspect the activities    of local government, sensitise the populace on government policies, draw the    attention of the Auditor General to the need for special investigations where    necessary, and advise the district chairperson to instruct the district internal    auditor to carry out a special audit and submit the report to council. The RDC    is also mandated to draw the attention of the Inspector General of government    to a need to investigate any cases of mismanagement or the abuse of office,    just as he could draw the attention of any relevant line ministry to the divergence    from or noncompliance with the Government policy by any council in his jurisdiction.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The Local Government    Act also provides for the office of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO),    who is appointed by the public service commission and serves as the head of    the public service in the district, the head of the administration of the district    council and also as the accounting officer of the district. The CAO is thus    responsible for the implementation of all lawful decisions by the council; giving    guidance to the local government councils and their departments; and supervising,    monitoring and coordinating the activities of the district and lower council    employees; and he acts as the liaison officer between the district and the Government.    Both the office of the RDC and the CAO are represented at all lower levels of    government.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Financially, local    governments are entitled to levy, charge and collect local taxes and fees as    locally generated revenue. But they also receive grants of different kinds from    the central government to supplement their meager revenue collections not only    for local programmes but also for the purpose of enabling them to implement    government plans at the local level. The different grants given to local government    include conditional<a name="top22"></a><a href="#back22"><sup>22</sup></a>,    unconditional<a name="top23"></a><a href="#back23"><sup>23</sup></a>and equalisation    grants.<a name="top24"></a><a href="#back24"><sup>24</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">All in all, therefore,    Uganda's framework of local government entails three different forms of devolution    of power, namely: 1) political decentralisation (as evidenced by the election    of council members), 2) administrative decentralisation (as evidenced by the    appointment of local administration personnel by council), and 3) fiscal decentralisation    (as evidenced by the powers granted to local councils to raise local revenue    and receive funds from the central government for the implementation of agreed-upon    national programmes).</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>4 The performance    of the decentralised system in Uganda</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">It is now over    two decades since Uganda adopted decentralisation, a system of government considered    as a pathway to improving governance in terms of democratisation and service    delivery. Yet, as earlier noted, Uganda's level of accountability for public    resources and service delivery remains deplorable. This rather ironic situation    naturally raises questions about the performance of decentralisation in the    country. According to Ndegwa's stocktaking analysis of Uganda's performance    in the different aspects of decentralisation, the country appears to be in the    best category on the continent. On political decentralisation, the main indicators    of which include the number of elected sub-national tiers, the existence of    direct elections for local governments, and the turn-out and fairness of such    elections, Uganda scores above 3 on a scale of 4.<a name="top25"></a><a href="#back25"><sup>25</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Quite similarly,    the country also scored quite an impressive 3 on a scale of 4 in terms of its    administrative decentralisation, the indicators of which include the role of    local administrative staff in the formulation of the development agenda and    the delivery of services, the existence of a clear legal framework demarcating    the roles of local and central government, and the institutionalisation of the    principle of subsidiarity, where actual service delivery is delegated to and    performed by localities and civil servants responsible to local authorities.<a name="top26"></a><a href="#back26"><sup>26</sup></a>Uganda    also performed quite well in terms of its fiscal decentralisation, which was    assessed on the basis of the amount of the fiscal transfers made from the central    government to the localities as well as the proportion of public expenditure    controlled by the localities. Uganda emerge the third out of the 30 countries    analysed in the study with a 3.5 on a scale of 5 in this category.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">If these findings    are indeed anything to go by, how then does one account for the rather obvious    state of decay of local administration, the poor service delivery, and wholesale    plunder of public resources that continues to dog the country? It is indeed    ironic, and quite baffling, that a country that seems to have even exceeded    its expectations in the decentralisation process should also be among the worst    performing in terms of accountability and service delivery in its governance    system.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">While it is certainly    difficult to make a claim to having a perfect explanation for the current rather    contradictory situation obtaining in the country, a look into the historical    background to the adoption of decentralisation could possibly offer some insight.    As earlier noted, and quite unlike the experience in other countries where the    adoption of decentralisation has been externally driven<a name="top27"></a><a href="#back27"><sup>27</sup></a>,    Uganda's adoption of a system of devolution of power was partly and largely    necessitated by considerations of political expediency. The days when security    was a major concern for the NRM regime are long gone. Concerns about resources,    be they fiscal or human, may still apply but they no longer pose a threat to    the government. The effect of this has been the reversal of the commitment to    the system of local government by the central government, which now appears    to espouse a desire to run the government more from the centre than through    local governments, many of which are now proving problematic in the new multiparty    political dispensation.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The introduction    of multiparty politics in Uganda in the early 2000s engendered a new threat    to the NRM government. Unlike the prior "enemy," who could be effectively checked    through the Resistance council system, the multiparty system created a different    type of "enemy" that could no longer be effectively combated/checked through    a system of local council networks. With time, the new "enemy" in the form of    the opposition has spread out and taken root in most of the districts, a fact    that has shaken the trust once enjoyed between districts (when their councils    were predominantly NRMS supporters) and the NRM government at the centre. In    fact the discomfort between the NRM government and the local government system    started to manifest itself in the early 1990s when opposition groups started    to agitate for the restoration of multiparty politics. As Oloka-Onyango aptly    notes:<a name="top28"></a><a href="#back28"><sup>28</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The claim that      RCs were a system of "popular" selection based on the "individual merit" of      the candidates who stood for office was severely undermined by the fact that      the state (which was controlled by the NRM) intervened heavily in support      of some candidates, while it actively decampaigned, intimidated and blackmailed      others. The peak of hypocrisy was reached when President Museveni declared      "We have won!" following the 1993 elections for the Constituent Assembly which      were originally supposed to be run on an "no party" basis. Who was the "we"      in such a situation?</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">With the restoration    of multiparty politics and the steadily waning popularity of the NRM government    amidst the rising popularity of the opposition, whose members dominate local    councils in some districts, the NRM now finds itself at war for its own survival    with the very system it created to bolster its political hegemony. With council    members from different political parties comprising the local government councils    at all levels, the NRM government finds itself in an unusual position where    it can no longer effectively ensure control over local politics. In effect,    the councils no longer enjoy the trust they once wielded from government, and    as a result it is hardly surprising that the forces of recentralisation have    intensified over time. As the central government strives to ensure stricter    control over the affairs of local governments, especially through fiscal and    political interference, the concept of decentralisation is steadily losing meaning    and giving way to the reconcentration of power in the central government.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Closely related    to the loss of trust is the politicisation of the decentralisation process,    which is another factor that could explain Uganda's rather paradoxical situation.    The original purpose for the creation of resistance (local) councils having    been rendered obsolete, the NRM government has skillfully but successfully been    able to use the decentralised system for quite another purpose which has only    served to weaken local governance further. Under the Constitution, new districts    could be created on the basis of the necessity for effective administration    and the need to bring services closer to people. Other considerations that ought    to be taken into account in the creation of new districts include the means    of communication, geographical features, the density of the population, economic    viability, and the wishes of the people concerned. Evidently, all of the grounds    required for the creation of new districts lack specificity and can quite easily    be exploited, as indeed has been the case. The NRM government has tended to    use the creation of districts both as a reward for its supporters and as a condition    for support in areas where it has historically not enjoyed popular support.    This politicisation of the decentralisation process has greatly undermined its    performance. From only 38 districts in 1986 when NRM rose to power, Uganda now    boasts over 100 districts. As Oloka-Onyango rightly observes:<a name="top29"></a><a href="#back29"><sup>29</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">... the strategy      of district proliferation has ... been adopted by President Museveni as a      means of dispensing patronage, and ultimately of splintering challenges to      central government hegemony and control.</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">By using the creation    of districts as a reward for political support, the government has been steadily    increasing its expenditure portfolio without necessarily balancing it with increased    GDP, which has naturally affected the local governments' ability to improve    on service delivery due to their limited funding. The local government system    envisages a financial partnership with the central government in the sense that    while the central government remains duty bound to fund national programmes    through the local government, the local government too was expected to raise    local revenue for the purpose of funding its budget. With limited funding and    no reliable source of local revenue, the local governments have been reduced    to mere agents of the centre. It is important to note that the government has    been notorious in undermining the fiscal autonomy of local governments. For    instance, originally the major source of revenue for local governments was graduated    tax, which, for clearly political reasons, was abolished just before the 2006    elections. This created increased dependence of local governments on the central    government, with the obvious effect of undermining the local governments' capacity    to plan and perform effectively. As Steiner observes:<a name="top30"></a><a href="#back30"><sup>30</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">... the principal      problem with regard to local finance is that collection of local taxes and      fees is extremely low... Reasons for this are manifold and include the politicisation      of local taxes ...</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">She adds:<a name="top31"></a><a href="#back31"><sup>31</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">... the problem      of low tax collection is far from being resolved. Instead of improving local      governments' capacity to collect taxes and fees, the central government recently      abolished graduated personal tax ...</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The lack of awareness    of the masses and the incompetence of the local administrative staff and local    politicians are yet other factors that have continued to undermine the performance    of the local government system in Uganda. The claim that decentralisation promotes    people's participation in the way they are governed is premised on the assumption    that people understand their roles in the decentralised programme. One of the    challenges evident in Uganda's decentralised programme is, however, that the    government appears to operate under the illusion that people know their roles    in the decentralised system, an assumption which is absurdly wrong, especially    in a country where the illiteracy level is still quite high. Under the said    illusion, districts have been created all over the country without conducting    civic education to empower the masses for the purpose of meaningfully getting    involved in local administration. The effect of this rather sporadic, radical    approach to decentralisation, which entails a total shift in the manner in which    governance is conducted,<a name="top32"></a><a href="#back32"><sup>32</sup></a>has    led to a clear lack of consistency and compliance with the requirements under    the decentralisation legal framework. As Steiner observes, "people have not    fully understood what decentralisation is about and what their rights and duties    are."<a name="top33"></a><a href="#back33"><sup>33</sup></a>The lack of awareness    among the masses has rendered the notion of decentralisation more of a myth    than a reality since the envisaged people's participation in their governance    remains too sketchy and almost meaningless. This is moreover compounded by the    general lack of competent staff in local government: "both politicians and civil    servants are often inadequately trained..."<a name="top34"></a><a href="#back34"><sup>34</sup></a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Perhaps the most    revealing effect of the lack of awareness of the masses and the incompetence    of local government staff is found in the planning process. Under the local    government legal framework,<a name="top35"></a><a href="#back35"><sup>35</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">... the planning      cycle provides for a consecutive elaboration of plans starting at the lowest      level so that the plan of each level can be integrated into the plan of the      next higher level.</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">But this is rarely    complied with. In a study conducted in Tororo district, it was found in the    three sub-counties that were visited that none had submitted "their plan to    the district even though the new fiscal year had already started."<a name="top36"></a><a href="#back36"><sup>36</sup></a>The    ignorance and incompetence of the people and the local government staff are    some of the reasons for the failure of compliance with the principles and procedures    of decentralised governance:<a name="top37"></a><a href="#back37"><sup>37</sup></a></font></p>     <blockquote>        ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Ignorance of      procedures among the officials in charge can represent the source of the problem...      Many officials simply do not understand the rules of the game, and nobody      at the local level is informed about what is going on, who has which plans,      and whether plans have been written at all.</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Government inefficiency    has combined with the old problem of corruption to exacerbate matters. I have    been told by many people who work in local government that government usually    delays sending grants to local governments. By the time the money is received,    the time for some of the planned activities would have passed. In such situations,    the local governments have to choose between fabricating records to justify    the expenditure of the money or sending the unutilised funds back to central    government. While the latter would seem the right option to take, the reality    is different: sending money back to the central government is usually construed    as a failure on the part of the affected local government and could easily adversely    affect future funding. The effect of this government inefficiency has not only    been the undermining of service delivery by local governments but also the promotion    of corruption.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>5 Conclusion</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The ironic outcome    of Uganda's policy of decentralisation speaks to the challenges faced generally    in the developing world. Decentralisation as a concept is not just about form,    in the sense of developing a good legal and institutional framework, as has    taken place in Uganda; it is also about content and process. The contradictions    that characterise the Ugandan system of decentralisation are explained by factors    that require effective mechanisms to address them. The challenges that continue    to inhibit the performance of Uganda's decentralised system of governance are    peculiar to Uganda's political history and facing up to them will certainly    require a change of heart among the government leadership at the very least,    or a change of regime. A true commitment to democratic values, where the leadership    believes in the genuine empowerment of the masses, is critical to the effective    performance of Uganda's decentralised system.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Bibliography</b></font></p>     <!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Francis P and James    R "Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions    of Uganda's Decentralisation Program"2003<i>World Development</i>325-337</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=372606&pid=S1727-3781201200020000500001&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Mitchinson R "Devolution    in Uganda: An Experiment in Local Service Delivery" 2003<i>Public Administration    andDevelopment</i>241-248</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=372607&pid=S1727-3781201200020000500002&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Ndegwa SN <i>Decentralization    in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey</i>(World Bank Washington DC 2002)</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=372608&pid=S1727-3781201200020000500003&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Oloka-Onyango J    <i>Decentralisation Without Human Rights? Local Governance and Access to Justice    in Post-Movement Uganda</i>(Huripec Kampala 2007)</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=372609&pid=S1727-3781201200020000500004&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Steiner S <i>Decentralisation    in Uganda: Exploring the Constraints for Poverty Reduction</i>(GIGA Hamburg2006)</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=372610&pid=S1727-3781201200020000500005&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">TumushabeGW <i>et    al Monitoring and Assessing the Performance of Local Government Councils in    Uganda: Background, Methodology and Score Card</i>(ACODE Kampala 2010)</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=372611&pid=S1727-3781201200020000500006&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i><b>Register    of legislation</b></i></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i>African Native    Authority Ordinance</i>of 1919</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i>Kampala Capital    City Authority Act</i>of 2010</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i>Local Government    Act</i>of 1997</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i>Uganda Constitution</i>of    1995</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><i><b>Register    of internet sources</b></i></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Mugabi 2004unpan1.un.org</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Mugabi E2004Uganda's    Decentralisation Policy, Legal Framework, Local Government Structure and Service    Delivery unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN029080.pdf (date    of use 12Jan 2011)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>List of abbreviations</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/pelj/v15n2/05t01.jpg"></p>     <p>&nbsp; </p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="back1"></a><a href="#top1">1</a>    Steiner <i>Decentralisation in Uganda</i> 1.    <br>   <a name="back2"></a><a href="#top2">2</a> Francis and James 2003 <i>World Development</i>    325 (also cited in Steiner <i>Decentralisation in Uganda</i> 1).    <br>   <a name="back3"></a><a href="#top3">3</a> Mitchinson 2003 <i>Public Administration    and Development</i> 241 (also cited in Steiner <i>Decentralisation in Uganda</i>    1).    <br>   <a name="back4"></a><a href="#top4">4</a> Tumushabe <i>et al Monitoring and    Assessing the Performance</i> vi.    <br>   <a name="back5"></a><a href="#top5">5</a> Oloka-Onyango <i>Decentralisation    Without Human Rights?</i> 6.    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>   <a name="back6"></a><a href="#top6">6</a> Ndegwa <i>Decentralization in Africa</i>.    <br>   <a name="back7"></a><a href="#top7">7</a> According to the 2011 corruption perception    report produced by a global graft watchdog, Transparency International, Uganda    is ranked number 143 of the 183 countries considered. For a more detailed analysis    of the poor service delivery system in Uganda's decentralisation system, see    Tumushabe <i>et al Monitoring and Assessing the Performance</i> vi and Oloka-Onyango    <i>Decentralisation Without Human Rights?</i> 6.<i>    <br>   </i> <a name="back8"></a><a href="#top8">8</a> Museveni (the president of Uganda    from 1986 to date) fought a guerilla war that brought him to power under a system    of government known as the National Resistance Movement (NRM), commonly referred    to as the Movement Government, which formed the first government under his leadership    until 2001, when the country adopted a multiparty system of government. The    name Movement was then adopted as the name of his political party, which continues    to dominate Uganda's politics.    <br>   <a name="back9"></a><a href="#top9">9</a> Entebbe, Government Priner 1919.    <br>   <a name="back10"></a><a href="#top10">10</a> The African Local Government Ordinance    and District Council Proclamations and Regulations, 1949; Entebbe, Government    Printer, 1949.    <br>   <a name="back11"></a><a href="#top11">11</a> Tumushabe <i>et al Monitoring and    Assessing the Performance</i> vi and Oloka-Onyango <i>Decentralisation Without    Human Rights?</i> 6.    <br>   <a name="back12"></a><a href="#top12">12</a> Oloka-Onyango <i>Decentralisation    Without Human Rights?</i> 4-9.    <br>   <a name="back13"></a><a href="#top13">13</a> Deconcentration "involves the transfer    of some powers and responsibilities to lower administrative units operated by    officials appointed by the central authority, who implement defined functions    under tight control." See Oloka-Onyango <i>Decentralisation Without Human Rights?</i>    6-7.    <br>   <a name="back14"></a><a href="#top14">14</a> The structure of the current system    of local government is discussed later in the paper.    <br>   <a name="back15"></a><a href="#top15">15</a> Mugabi 2004 unpan1.un.org 1-2.    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>   <a name="back16"></a><a href="#top16">16</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 9.    <br>   <a name="back17"></a><a href="#top17">17</a> Mugabi 2004 unpan1.un.org 1-2.    <br>   <a name="back18"></a><a href="#top18">18</a> Section 3 <i>Local Government Act</i>    of 1997 (LGA).    <br>   <a name="back19"></a><a href="#top19">19</a> Kampala, as the capital city, is    governed under a special legislation, <i>Kampala Capital City Authority</i>    Act of 2010 (KCCA). Though the City Council is the highest authority under KCCA,    the executive functions are discharged by the Chief Executive Officer, who is    appointed by the central government, while the Lord Mayor is the chief political    officer and is elected, just like his counterparts in other districts, the LC5.    <br>   <a name="back20"></a><a href="#top20">20</a> Section 3(2) LGA.    <br>   <a name="back21"></a><a href="#top21">21</a> Section 3(4) LGA.    <br>   <a name="back22"></a><a href="#top22">22</a> Article 193(3) <i>Uganda Constitution</i>    of 1995 defines conditional grants as consisting of monies given to local governments    to finance programmes agreed upon between the government and the local governments,    which monies are expended only for the purposes for which the grant was made    and in accordance with the conditions agreed upon.    <br>   <a name="back23"></a><a href="#top23">23</a> Article 193(2) <i>Uganda Constitution</i>    of 1995 defines the unconditional grant as the minimum grant that shall be paid    to local government to run decentralised services.    <br>   <a name="back24"></a><a href="#top24">24</a> Article 193(4) <i>Uganda Constitution</i>    of 1995 defines the equalisation grant as the money to be paid to local government    for giving subsidies or making special provisions for the least developed districts,    and provides that it shall be based on the degree to which the local government    unit is lagging behind the national average standard for a particular service.    <br>   <a name="back25"></a><a href="#top25">25</a> Ndegwa <i>Decentralization in Africa</i>    3.    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>   <a name="back26"></a><a href="#top26">26</a> Ndegwa <i>Decentralization in Africa</i>    4.    <br>   <a name="back27"></a><a href="#top27">27</a> Steiner acknowledges this fact    when she notes: "... Uganda is different from many other countries where decentralisation    was motivated by a fiscal crisis of the central government or by external conditionality."    (Steiner <i>Decentralisation in Uganda</i> 9).    <br>   <a name="back28"></a><a href="#top28">28</a> Oloka-Onyango <i>Decentralisation    Without Human Rights?</i> 10-11.    <br>   <a name="back29"></a><a href="#top29">29</a> Oloka-Onyango (n 28 above) 6.    <br>   <a name="back30"></a><a href="#top30">30</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 12.    <br>   <a name="back31"></a><a href="#top31">31</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 12.    <br>   <a name="back32"></a><a href="#top32">32</a> Decentralisation entails a drastic    shift in the nature of governance in the sense that it marks a shift from the    government's deciding what is best for the people to the people's telling government    what is best for them. See Steiner <i>Decentralisation in Uganda</i> 16.    <br>   <a name="back33"></a><a href="#top33">33</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 16.    <br>   <a name="back34"></a><a href="#top34">34</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 13.    <br>   <a name="back35"></a><a href="#top35">35</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 15.    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>   <a name="back36"></a><a href="#top36">36</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 15.    <br>   <a name="back37"></a><a href="#top37">37</a> Steiner <i>Decentralisation in    Uganda</i> 15. Other reasons for the poor compliance with local government procedures    include mistrust of the capacity of lower-level local government levels and    hence disrespect for their identified priorities; delays in the submission of    their plans, and logistical constraints.</font></p>      ]]></body>
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