ARTICLES

 

South Africa's Counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado: Examining the Role of Mozambican Migrants to Establish a People-Centric Approach

 

 

Joseph Makanda

Institute for Advanced Study, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Makandaphd2015@gmail.com

 

 

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ABSTRACT

Most scholarship on terrorism in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) has focused on the nature and causes of the insurgency, who the insurgents are, where the insurgents come from, their underlying needs, and how the current military operations may be successful from a state-centric perspective. As a result, the role of non-state actors, such as migrants, has been left out. This is a qualitative study that relies on secondary data sources to offer a critical survey of the work done in the context of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Using the counterinsurgency theory, the paper argues for the inclusion of the voice of Mozambican migrants in South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado as one of the ways of developing a population-centric non-military approach. This is founded on direct and indirect ways of securing the population's support, thereby isolating the insurgents in Mozambique. An awareness of the views of these migrants can shed light on what perpetuates the insurgency in Mozambique. The paper suggests new empirical studies that include the seemingly forgotten role of migrants, in a non-military and people-centered approach in seeking to undermine global terror networks.

Keywords: Al Shabaab, insurgents, Cabo Delgado, counterinsurgency, migrants, Mozambicans, South Africa

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INTRODUCTION

This paper explores South Africa's involvement in the fight against insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. This insurgency has created an ongoing conflict in the province, shaped by religion and fought between Islamist militants and Mozambican security forces with the former aiming to establish an Islamic state in the region. Although Mozambique is a Christian-majority country, Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) point out that the two northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado have an Islamic majority population - the former has 61 percent Muslims and the latter has 54 percent Muslims.¹ Northern Mozambique's administrative centers are also predominantly Muslim. The main militant group is Ansar al Sunna (supporters of the tradition), which is also known by its original name 'Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo' (ASWJ) translated as "adepts of the prophetic tradition." Locals refer to these Muslims as Al-Shabaab even though they are a separate organization from the Somali Al Shabaab (Bukarti and Munasinghe, 2020). According to Sithole (2022), the Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed ties with the Al-Shabaab in Mozambique. The militant group was originally a religious movement when it was formed in 2008 by followers of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Kenyan Muslim cleric who advocated for the formation of an Islamic State in Kenya in a peaceful manner. There are claims that Sheikh Rogo assisted in the bombing of the Embassies of the United States of America (USA) in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and was later sanctioned by the USA and the United Nations (UN) for providing support to Al-Shabaab (Neethling, 2021). Saalfeld (2021) adds that following the death of Sheikh Rogo in 2012, many of his followers settled in Tanzania before moving to Mozambique's northern district of Cabo Delgado around 2015. In Cabo Delgado, members of the group encouraged mosques in Mocimboa da Praia to adopt Sheikh Rogo's interpretation of Islam (Hanlon, 2022). To date, most members of the Al-Shabaab group in Cabo Delgado are Mozambicans, although there are some foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia.

This paper assesses and offers a critique of the militaristic approaches that have framed the Southern African Development Community (SADC)²counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado. This paper is set against the backdrop of insurgent activities in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region and the subsequent involvement of the SADC mission, which South Africa commands. South Africa contributes over half of Southern African Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces (Bussotti and Coimbra, 2023). At the same time, it is important to clarify that South Africa hosts a high number of Mozambican migrants. The SADC heads of state and government in an extraordinary Troika Summit of Botswana of 27 November 2020 observed that terrorist activities in Cabo Delgado have increased exponentially and sought to deploy a Standby Force (Svicevic, 2022). South Africa contributed 1,495 out of 3,000 military troops to this SAMIM to counter the insurgents. This paper argues that while counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado has usually been framed as militaristic and enemy-centric, on 7 September 2022, Mozambique's President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi said that the Islamist militant movement in northern Mozambique is spreading to new territory despite efforts by local and international military forces to contain it.³

These experiences have revived interest in alternative non-military approaches. There is compelling evidence, mainly from European countries, suggesting that there is a possible link between migrants and terrorism (Brouwer, 2002; Schmid, 2016; McAlexander, 2020). According to Brouwer (2002), Schmid (2016), and McAlexander (2020), the European experience is that in many countries, migrants have committed terrorist acts against their host countries. By focusing on migrants as security threats in Europe, these scholars reveal how the role of migrants in perpetuating terrorist acts in their home countries has rarely been studied. Hence, this is one of the gaps in the literature that this paper aims at filling. This paper is among the first attempts to draw on the counterinsurgency theory to develop a conceptual discourse foregrounding a need for empirical studies that explain the seemingly forgotten role of Mozambican migrants, to gain a fuller understanding of the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado.

The paper draws primarily on a desktop review of literature on the nexus between migrants in South Africa and terrorism. To be clear, this article is not about the evolution of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Instead, the objective here is to raise two new questions in the migration literature: What is the nexus between Mozambican migrants in South Africa and the operations, dynamics, and governance of the ISIS in Cabo Delgado? What can Mozambican migrants contribute to South Africa's counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado? While studies of this nature need empirical data, the arguments of this paper are grounded in a desktop-based review of discourses on the role of migrants in counterinsurgency. As such, this article uses a non-empirical qualitative research approach, relying heavily on literary sources as a primary reservoir for its data.

The paper begins by providing a conceptual discourse related to the counter-insurgency theory. The first section presents an overview of the counterinsurgency (CI) theory to assess how the difficulties encountered by the current kinetic military approaches in Cabo Delgado are reviving interest in alternative non-military approaches. The second section closely scrutinizes the combustible situation of increasing numbers of migrants in South Africa and their potential involvement in both global terror activities and terror threats against South Africa. The section pays particular attention to claims in South Africa's mainstream media that some migrants had been sanctioned by the US government for their alleged links to Islamic State (ISIS) operations in Mozambique and for using South Africa as a haven for seeking financial resources and recruiting those who can facilitate or execute global terror activities. The last section suggests an introspection, interrogation, and analysis of South Africa's involvement in the current militaristic approach in Cabo Delgado by suggesting a more encompassing non-military framework that encapsulates the roles of marginalized non-state actors, such as Mozambican migrants.

 

COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY

The US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2010:12) describes counterinsurgency as a "blend of comprehensive military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat any form of insurgency." Components of counterinsurgency campaigns include political, societal, military, economic, legal, informational, and intelligence aspects (Cassidy, 2008). The counterinsurgency theory, therefore, signals a movement away from exclusive reliance on killing the "enemies" towards targeting the people for political support. Contemporary counterinsurgency theory emphasizes the role of civilian efforts of re-integration and reconstruction in insurgency-stricken areas. Therefore, in this paper counterinsurgency is understood as a blend of all comprehensive civilian and military efforts to contain insurgency and address its root causes simultaneously. It involves a careful balance between constructive dimensions (building compelling and legitimate government) and destructive measures (destroying the insurgent movements).

Galula (1964) and Kilcullen (2007) along with the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) contend that there are conventionally two principal philosophies of counterinsurgency: (a) the "population-centric" philosophy, which puts an emphasis on the populace as the sea in which the insurgents swim. This dimension of counterinsurgency holds that if the population and its surroundings are adequately controlled, the insurgents will be denied the necessary sustenance and support to survive. It can be summarized as, "first protect the population, and all else will follow" (Nagl, 2005); and (b) the "enemy-centric" dimension perceives counterinsurgency as similar to conventional warfare and stresses the military conquest and total defeat of the insurgents. Moore (2007:20) argues that the focus of the "enemy-centric" approach is on the physical defeat of the insurgents. The enemy-centric approach has several variations, including "hard vs. soft," "direct vs. indirect," "violent vs. non-violent," and "marginalization vs. decapitation" strategies. This approach can be précised as "first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow."

This paper uses the population-centric approach because it has proven to be most effective at succeeding in the long term, and it endeavors to resolve conflict by incorporating all dimensions. According to Nagl (2005), the population-centric dimension of counterinsurgency emphasizes the "direct and indirect" non-military ways of securing the population's support, thereby isolating the insurgents. The paper is cognizant that although military action against the militants will undoubtedly be on the cards, this approach recognizes that the center of gravity is the population. Although the counterinsurgency theory emphasizes minimum force, population-centric concepts, political and democratic processes, and winning the hearts and minds of the population, the practical application of these principles is hardly observed on the ground.

Although terrorism in Cabo Delgado has been occurring since 2017, interventions so far have not been informed much by political and democratic processes of winning hearts and minds as espoused by population-centric approaches in the counterinsurgency theory. Most interventions in Mozambique have been enemy-centric, using military force by those who are interested in the country's gas reserves or private military contracts (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). Several countries, including the United States, France, and Portugal have offered military support to the Mozambican government to combat international criminal syndicates. For instance, in May 2021, Portugal and Mozambique signed a military cooperation accord to help confront a growing jihadist threat, by beefing up training, notably of Special Forces (News24, 2021). Both the United States and France tried to intervene by contributing troops to patrol the coast of Cabo Delgado (Hanlon, 2020). According to Hanlon (2020), the US government believed that counter-narcotics efforts were needed to disrupt some of the transnational organized crime at sea. Also, the USA believed that terrorists in Cabo Delgado were thriving because of proceeds from narcotics. The French intervention in Mozambique entailed a military maritime cooperation agreement and training of Mozambican forces so that they are able to fight the Al Shabaab. Similarly, Nhamire (2021) asserts that the European Union (EU) subsequently set up an EU military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). The aim of the mission is to train and support the Mozambican armed forces in protecting the civilian population and restoring safety and security. The Mozambican government also signed agreements with the Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), and the Rwandan army to help ameliorate the problem (Peters, 2020).

Regionally, the SADC attention has focused almost exclusively on isolating and fighting the terrorists by military means. For instance, the SADC heads of state and government, in an extraordinary Troika Summit in Botswana on 27 November 2020, acknowledged that terrorist activities in Cabo Delgado had increased exponentially, and sought to deploy a standby military force (Svicevic, 2022). According to Sithole (2022), the standby force falls under the framework of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact and is in line with the United Nations' s "responsibility to protect principle" to prevent human catastrophe. Cilliers et al. (2021) argue that the decision to deploy troops to Cabo Delgado also aimed at preventing the risk of non-African solutions in the Southern African region where lucrative natural resources are prompting fears of the "Iraqification" (militarization and foreign agenda) of Mozambique. Other arguments that were made in favor of the SADC kinetic military intervention, included the fear of the attacks spilling over into Mozambique's neighboring states, and the need for a coordinated response, including tough cross-border intelligence to manage jihadist infiltration (Sithole, 2022). As a result, on 9 August 2021, the national governments in the SADC region launched kinetic military operations known as the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), with troops from Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, and Tanzania (ISS, 2021). South Africa contributed about half of the troops (about 1,495 out of 3,000 SAMIM troops).

Hanlon (2020), Obaji Jr. (2021), and Sithole (2022) are doubtful that the deployment of military forces to counter insurgents in Cabo Delgado is succeeding. These scholars argue that despite all the military counterinsurgency efforts, the insurgents have carried out their acts of terrorism with strength and confidence. For instance, on 7 September 2022, the Mozambican President, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, announced that Islamist militants had spread to the country's northern Nampula province, killing six people by beheading, and abducted three others. According to President Nyusi, the Islamist militant movement in northern Mozambique is spreading to new territory despite efforts by government and regional forces to contain it. This prompted the assertion that, like in Somalia and Nigeria, the enemy-centric militaristic approach in Mozambique was becoming counterproductive. For this reason, the current SAMIM military operations may not be able to stem the threat of insurgency in Mozambique, like other kinetic military operations that failed elsewhere. Whittall (2021) argues that there are fears that the SAMIM military focus is on the physical conquest and total defeat of the insurgents while overulooking the social, economic, and democratic political processes of winning the hearts and minds of the people in Cabo Delgado and elsewhere in Mozambique. According to Whittall (2021), military counterinsurgency efforts have opted for a militaristic approach that targets the enemy in Cabo Delgado rather than addressing the root causes of the insurgency, such as poverty, marginalization, expropriation, and lack of jobs. The enemy-centric approaches in Cabo Delgado are accused of failing to address the fact that Cabo Delgado province is one of the poorest in the country despite its rich gas reserves. According to Demuynck and Weijenberg (2021), the region harbors major gas reserves worth more than USD 50 billion, which foreign energy companies have been extracting without any of the profits benefiting local populations. Furthermore, the predominantly Muslim population in the region feels neglected by the largely Christian ruling elite in Maputo.

At this point, it can be argued that the difficulties encountered by kinetic enemy-centric military approaches as expressed by the above views of President Nyusi are reviving interest in alternative approaches to counterinsurgency in the region. Alternative counterinsurgency is the main aim of this paper. It is important to note that SADC has introduced a multi-dimensional approach, although the military approach is still the most privileged. Additionally, by contributing almost half of the military personnel in the SAMIM, South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Cabo Delgado is raising new fundamental questions. One such question is what else South Africa can do to counter insurgents in Cabo Delgado.

According to Makonye (2020), Mabera and Naidu (2020), and Sithole (2022), South Africa might be contributing the highest number of military personnel within the SAMIM operations because it is the regional power and has most interest in Cabo Delgado, including contracts to South African companies in constructions on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal. The LNG terminal and park are proposed to be constructed in the Afungi peninsula area in Cabo Delgado, constituting the onshore element of the larger Mozambique Gas Development Project. The above scholars also mention that there are several South African banks that have invested in Mozambique LNG. At the same time, South Africa is host to many Mozambican migrants. While there is compelling evidence, anchored substantially on case studies from European countries, suggesting that there is a strong link between migrants and terrorism, how then can South Africa go beyond the limitations of conventional enemy-centric military interventions and prevent violent jihad groups from finding havens within South Africa's borders where they can reorganize and thrive? Hence, this paper asserts that some Mozambican migrants in South Africa are to some extent aware of the nature and operations of insurgents in Cabo Delgado and can contribute toward a greater understanding of the factors perpetuating the insurgency and what South Africa can do to counter it. In this regard, this study draws on the counterinsurgency framework to explore how South Africa may potentially use the views of Mozambican migrants as a resource for developing a people-centric nonmilitary approach to undermine terror networks in the SADC region.

 

SOUTH AFRICA AS A MIGRATION DESTINATION FOR MOZAMBICANS

Historically, the first half of the nineteenth century saw forced migrations of people from modern-day South Africa to other parts of Southern Africa during the war period known as the Mfecane. Migration in the second half of the nineteenth century was spurred by the discovery of diamonds and other minerals in South Africa (Muanamoha et al., 2010; Pasura, 2014; Isike, 2017). Even though migration has continued unabated, the different phases had different dimensions. Some migrants were forced to flee to South Africa due to war. Others migrated to South Africa because of the promise of a better life there (Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015). However, migration has become a fraught issue that threatens to tear the fabric that holds South Africans and migrants together (Pineteh, 2017; Moyo, 2020). Economic and political instability in Zimbabwe and war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are contributing to burgeoning numbers in South Africa, with a significant number of such immigrants arriving without proper documentation or involving themselves in criminal activities (Crush and Peberdy, 2018; Mlambo, 2019). There is a possibility that terrorism in Mozambique is also increasing the number of Mozambican migrants to South Africa via Tanzania. This has brought into sharp relief the potential threat that both legal and illegal immigration could cause in South Africa. According to Sichone (2020) and Chiyangwa and Rugunanan (2022), negative attitudes toward immigration have partly been bred by economic difficulties, unemployment, and exaggerated numbers of immigrants. As a consequence, xenophobic violence has become common in South Africa.

Moyo et al. (2021) observe that estimating the total number of migrants currently residing in South Africa is a difficult task due to lack of accounting for undocumented migrants by South Africa's Department of Home Affairs (DHA). The large number of migrants is attributed to the fact that South Africa is the most industrialized and stable economy in the region and a particularly attractive destination for those in search of education and better opportunities in the SADC region. For example, Statistics South Africa (2021)⁴ estimates that there were about 3.95 million migrants in South Africa in mid-2021. The UN DESA (2021) and DHA (2021) reports estimated a total of about 4.1 million migrants.

The migration of Mozambicans to South Africa date from the colonial period, based in contract between the Portuguese and the then government of South Africa for workers to South African mining. However, the civil war that took place from the 1970s to the 1990s spurred the highest wave of migration of Mozambicans to South Africa.⁵ According to Mubai (2015), and Mabera and Naidu (2020), this was a 16-year conflict that occurred between 30 May 1977 and 4 October 1992 in Mozambique. The war occurred two years after Mozambique officially gained its independence from Portugal. The main belligerents were the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which controlled the central government under President Samora Machel, and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) led by André Matsangaissa (Mubai 2015; Mabera and Naidu 2020). An estimated one million people died during the conflict in a country, which in 1990 had a population of 14 million. Additionally, 250,000 to 350,000 Mozambicans crossed the border from Mozambique into South Africa fleeing the civil war ravaging their country (Moagi et al., 2018; Chiyangwa and Rugunanan, 2022). According to the IOM (2020) report, it is estimated that over 11 million Mozambicans are now living abroad, with South Africa being one of the top destinations. Currently, there are more than 800,000 Mozambican migrants in South Africa, most of them in the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. According to Lazzarini (2017), mining and farming jobs are the norm for Mozambicans in South Africa, especially for those working in the formal sector, with about 24,000 Mozambicans working in the mining sector. Data for the farming sector is incomplete, but in Mpumalanga province alone, the 2020 census estimates over 200,000 Mozambicans were working on farms. The report estimates that there were over 150,000 Mozambicans working in the informal sector in KwaZulu-Natal, concentrated mostly in the northern parts of that province. In Limpopo, there were over 100,000 Mozambicans (Machele, 2022).

According to Isike (2022), the mass migration of Mozambicans to South Africa is attributed to lack of economic opportunities in Mozambique and to demands for cheap labor in South Africa. However, the terrorism in Cabo Delgado has exacerbated a new form of forced migration of Mozambicans to South Africa. According to Neethling (2021), on 5 October 2017, when the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique was battered by bloody jihadist attacks, the insurgents killed over 3,100 and more than 800,000 were displaced. Again, when the group resurfaced in March 2021, Langa (2021) asserts that the insurgents attacked Palma, killing over 2,500 people and displacing over 700,000 people. According to Mangena and Pherudi (2019), the overwhelming majority of people displaced by war in Cabo Delgado are internally displaced. Few of them migrated to neighboring countries such as Malawi and Tanzania. There are reports indicating that some Mozambicans who migrated to Malawi and Tanzania due to terrorism in Cabo Delgado are finding their way to South Africa. What can be said here is that currently, it is the economic situation in Mozambique that has turned Mozambicans into displaced "subalterns" in South Africa, to borrow a famously deployed term of Spivak (2003). Although outside the immediate scope of this paper, the struggle for survival and livelihoods by the Mozambican migrants in South Africa, bears testimony to this agency.

A survey of the cited literature shows that South Africa is the leading destination for most economic migrants from other Sub-Saharan African countries. However, there are emerging claims in current South African media that some of the migrants have been sanctioned by the USA for their alleged links with terror networks. Although none of these migrants sanctioned by the USA are Mozambican nationals, media reports indicate that they were using South Africa to seek resources, finances, and recruits for global ISIS's struggle, including that of Cabo Delgado. For instance, in March 2021, News24⁶ and the Mail and Guardian⁷ reported that the USA had sanctioned two South African men, an Ethiopian national, and a Tanzanian, for helping the ISIS terror group to secure funding. According to News24 (2021), Farhad Hoomer, Siraaj Miller, and Abdella Hussein Abadigga were wanted for playing an increasingly central role in facilitating and promoting terrorist activities. Farhad was sanctioned for having established an ISIS cell in Durban. Siraaj was sanctioned for being the leader of a group of ISIS supporters in Cape Town. Abdella Hussein, originally from Ethiopia, was sanctioned for being responsible for recruiting young men in South Africa to send them to an ISIS weapons-training camp. Also, Peter Charles Mbaga, a Tanzanian based in South Africa, was identified by the USA for being responsible for recruiting, transferring funds, and procuring weapons and equipment from South Africa to aid ISIS activities (News24). Furthermore, on 17 September 2022, the Sunday Times⁸ reported that South Africa could soon be grey-listed. At the time of writing this paper, South Africa has indeed been grey-listed. While there are many reasons for this grey-listing, the Sunday Times of 17 September 2022 alleges that there are some foreign-owned spaza shops funding brutal terrorist groups, such as ISIS and Al Shabaab. Moreover, these spaza shops are allegedly also responsible for increasing the illicit cigarettes market, whose proceeds end up funding acts of global terrorism.

While it may be argued that most Mozambicans who have migrated to South Africa are seeking economic survival, there is a possibility that in one way or another, they know the dynamics of insurgents in that region. A possible rebuttal to my assertion, might be that there are no Mozambicans fleeing Cabo Delgado to South Africa because of the distance. Another rebuttal could be that the majority of Mozambicans who migrate to South Africa come from the southern region of the country, which is not experiencing any terrorism. I am cognizant that while people from southern Mozambique are historically linked to South Africa (Smith, 1973; Madalane, 2014) and even speak similar languages (tsiTsonga and tsiShangane), in northern Cabo Delgado where the insurgents are attacking, people are closer to Tanzania and speak the shared Swahili language (Bonate, 2018; Alden and Chichava, 2020). However, it cannot be ruled out that there are Mozambicans in South Africa with relatives or social ties with those in Cabo Delgado or those who have migrated from the northern part of Mozambique via Tanzania.

It is not within the realm of this paper to gainsay the apparent tenet of counterinsurgency that all Mozambicans (among others) who have come to South Africa are linked to terrorism or potentially contribute to counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado. However, it can be said that the above unverified media claims bridge that link. Moreover, due to the subaltern position of migrants, it is possible that scholars have barely studied the link between migrants in South Africa and operations of ISIS and other terror groups. Similarly, scholars are yet to offer a more empirical and constructive analysis of the nexus between Mozambican migrants and the operation, dynamics, and governance of ISIS in Cabo Delgado. Perhaps the lack of literature stems from scholars' failure to see the links of empirical evidence. Using the population-centric component of counterinsurgency, this paper maintains that studying the views of these refugees and migrants can provide an enhanced understanding of the factors perpetuating the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, and shed light on what else South Africa can do.

 

INCLUSION OF MOZAMBICAN VIEWS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CABO DELGADO

South Africa is the dominant regional power and has significant interests in Cabo Delgado, including contracts of South African companies in constructions on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal. Additionally, several South African banks have invested in Mozambique LNG (Makonye, 2020; Mabera and Naidu, 2020; Sithole, 2022). It is therefore plausible to argue that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado is the result of the country's pursuit of economic interests. Contextualized within the realists' perspective, the success that can be made by SAMIM intervention in Cabo Delgado asserts, preserves, and improves the prestige and powers of South Africa as the regional power with the most interests in Cabo Delgado. At the same time, any failure of SAMIM military operations in Cabo Delgado weakens and ruins South Africa's status as regional power and its related economic interests in Mozambique (Schmidt, 2005; Gbaya, 2015). The underlying rationale here is the supposition that by contributing more troops to SAMIM military operations in Cabo Delgado, South Africa promotes its own interests and economic prosperity. It can also not be ruled out that it is within the South African government's desire to avoid an incessant influx of insurgent groups in Mozambique and the SADC region that might threaten South Africa's economic interests. What can be said here is that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado takes the form of economic expansion. According to Salimo et al. (2020), Makonye (2020), Mabera and Naidu (2020), and Sithole (2022), South Africa has greater interests in Mozambique's LNG terminal construction in Cabo Delgado's gas industry through its SASOL deals, than any other country in the region.

South Africa's interests in Mozambique are so vivid that on 18 July 2022, while addressing the media at Luthuli House - the African National Congress (ANC) headquarters in Johannesburg - the governing party's head of international relations, Lindiwe Zulu, referred to the document dubbed "In Pursuit of Progressive Internationalism." Zulu asked the party branches to discuss solutions to terrorism and cross-border terror networks on the African continent.⁹ According to Zulu, the spike in terror attacks in Mozambique is likely to cause political and economic instability in South Africa if not stopped. Zulu asserted that South Africa's bid for political leadership in the region, and its attempts at economic integration and expansion have consistently implied that it should help resolve African conflicts and play a more active role in peace missions. Hence, this paper underscores the idea that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado may rest on an assumption that kinetic military operations constitute a means of protecting its interests in Mozambique's gas industry, as espoused by Makonye (2020), Mabera and Naidu (2020), and Sithole (2022). However, the recent assertion by President Nyusi of Mozambique on 7 September 2022 reveals that kinetic military operations might be failing and that the Islamist militant movement in northern Mozambique is spreading to new territory despite efforts by the current local and international military operations to contain it.

Using the population-centric counterinsurgency theory, this paper suggests that the inclusion of the voice of the actual Mozambicans may be one of the alternatives of developing a counter-terror approach that emphasizes direct and indirect ways to secure Cabo Delgado's populations, thereby helping South Africa to isolate the insurgents in that region. The paper acknowledges the difficulty of finding migrants from Cabo Delgado in South Africa due to the region's distance from South Africa. A further constraint is that very few Mozambicans might have reliable knowledge about terrorism in the northern part of the region. These constraints notwithstanding, studies done by Sinatti and Horst (2015), Galipo (2018), and Arrey and de la Rosa (2021) reveal that migrants can contribute towards both instability, or building sustainable peace in their country of origin through political or economic means. A common thread among the above studies is that through financial remittances to their home countries, migrants, with a particular focus on those in Europe, can be viewed as positively or negatively affecting the peace processes. Galipo (2018) for instance, says that financial remittances can be used to fund the actions of militant, rebel, or insurgent groups in migrants' countries of origin. Positively, Sinatti and Horst (2015) opine that migrants may use their financial means to fund development projects in their countries of origin, thereby promoting stability. Furthermore, Sinatti and Horst (2015), Galipo (2018), and Arrey and de la Rosa (2021) comment that sometimes migrants use lobbying and public demonstration to bring awareness of their home countries on the international stage or in their host countries. "The lobbying usually takes place in the country of settlement, but it may be that diaspora manage to network with international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs" (Galipo, 2018:10). According to Rempel (2013), since 1990, the Palestinian refugees appealed for a voice in negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel to secure a lasting solution of the Gaza conflict. An equally important case is that of South African exiles during the fight against apartheid. Ellis and Sechaba (1992), Freund and Padayachee (1998), Gilbert (2007), and Thörn (2009) point out that many South Africans in exile played an important role in pressuring their host countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America to support their struggle against the apartheid regime. For instance, after going into exile in 1961, Oliver Tambo, the then president of the ANC, established several anti-apartheid missions across Europe and Africa. It was in some of the established missions that many South Africans had their military training, and developed strategies on how to dismantle the apartheid government. Freund and Padayachee (1998) point out that many South Africans solicited funding for arming and training uMkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) in the USA and the UK. The main aim of uMkhonto we Sizwe was to fight and dismantle the apartheid regime militarily.

In relation to terrorism, a study done by Menkhaus (2010) shows how Somalian migrants, especially in England and the USA, are both assets and liabilities in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. As assets, some Somalian diaspora members have become civil society activists who fund and advocate for good governance, progressive principles, and ensuring that the states intervening in the Somalian conflict put the interests of the locals at center stage. As liabilities, Menkhaus (2008) argues that there are groups of Somalians in the diaspora who use their resources to finance the escalation of the ongoing terror activities in that country. According to Anderson and McKnight (2015), some of the Al-Shabaab funding emanates from contributions from Somalis in the diaspora. Hence, this paper foregrounds ways of doing new types of empirically based research on the role of Mozambican migrants in South Africa in exacerbating terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Although there might be very few Mozambicans with knowledge of terrorism in Cabo Delgado, listening to their narratives might play a role in any attempt of finding a lasting solution to the insurgency situation in Mozambique.

While the above segment has shown that there is compelling evidence, based on case studies from European countries suggesting that there is an increasing link between migrants and terrorism, some studies argue that the link has been decreasing since the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Paasche and Gunter, 2016; Speckhard et al., 2017). However, with emerging claims in South Africa's media that some migrants are being sanctioned by the USA for their alleged links with terror groups, this paper is cognizant that the enactment of the foregoing claims reveal that there might be a corresponding link between Mozambican migrants and the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado and other parts of Africa. In this case, the people-centric, non-military component of counterinsurgency theory calls for the inclusion and incorporation of the views of Mozambican migrants within the current South African counterinsurgent strategies in Mozambique. This paper acknowledges that the issue of insurgency in Cabo Delgado is a complex one and that it has developed from a range of many factors, including structural and ideational. The paper is also cognizant of studies that have compared the situation in Cabo Delgado to the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, the Tuareg rebellion that has seen the Islamists take over Northern Mali (Azumah, 2015; Adela, 2021), and the rise of Al Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia (Githigaro and Kabia, 2022; Papale, 2022). The foregoing scholars attribute the causes of insurgency in Cabo Delgado to socioeconomic dynamics and the influence of radical Islamic preachers. This paper concurs with the views of the foregoing scholars and contends that structural and ideational factors might be defining the context of insurgency in Cabo Delgado. For instance, Okunade et al. (2021) and Mutasa and Muchemwa (2022) argue that social and economic factors behind the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado are exclusion, marginalization, youth unemployment, rising inequalities, widespread corruption, and poverty of the local communities, who see no real gains from the gas megaproject.

From the foregoing reasons, this paper posits that the current enemy-centered military counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado is mere Band-Aid - a quick and impetuous solution to an intractable and convoluted problem. Instead, the paper suggests that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado should move away from exclusive reliance on killing the "enemies" towards targeting the people for political support. Fundamentally, the paper calls for the need for empirical studies that include the seemingly forgotten role of Mozambican migrants as an alternative people-centric non-military approach that is more subtle and patient in seeking to undermine terror networks in the SADC region. Implicit here is that some Mozambican migrants have some knowledge of the dynamics of terrorism in that region and they may aid South Africa's policymakers in crafting an all-encompassing people-centric and non-military South African counterinsurgency strategy. This paper does not rule out the possibility of empirical studies that pay attention to those left behind in Cabo Delgado or those who were forced to migrate to Tanzania because they are the ones who are in direct contact with the insurgents. However, the paper argues that by taking inventory of some Mozambican migrants' insights, perceptions, and attitudes on insurgency in Cabo Delgado, South Africa might revoke and presuppose the rethinking of the current militaristic counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado and other parts of the world that are failing to bear fruits. Specifically, this paper asserts that the stultifying effects and the non-inclusion of Mozambican migrants in South Africa's counterinsurgent interventions in Cabo Delgado do not sufficiently challenge the culture of structural injustices and violence that characterize the genesis of terrorism in that region. For that reason, this paper suggests that South Africa should take cognizance of the roles played by non-state actors, including Mozambican migrants, in producing specific outcomes that define the trajectory of terrorism and counterterrorism in Cabo Delgado and the SADC region.

From an empirical point ofview, there are several organizations that researchers can work with to generate qualitative research from Mozambican migrants themselves. For instance, Southern African Migration Management (SAMM),¹⁰Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA),¹¹ Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS),¹² and the Muslim Refugee Association of South Africa (MRASA)¹³ are some of the organizations that are potentially valuable as research sites for future scholars. SAMM, SIHMA, JRS, and MRASA assist all categories of migrants in South Africa. While these organizations are broad in their scope and attempt to assist all migrants, there are other organizations that more specifically provide basic information and assistance to Mozambicans. Many Mozambican organizations in South Africa are run by Mozambican activists and can potentially offer valuable connections to research participants for grounded qualitative studies seeking to consciously include the perceptions and insights of Mozambican migrants in South Africa.

 

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this paper was to explore how the inclusion of the voices of Mozambicans in South Africa are potential resources for developing a population-centric approach that emphasizes direct and indirect ways to pacify Cabo Delgado by isolating the insurgents. It further argued that due to the likely difficulty of finding Mozambican migrants from Cabo Delgado in South Africa and also the lack of many Mozambican migrants with the required knowledge about terrorism in the northern part of the region, scholars are yet to offer a more constructive analysis on their contribution to the ongoing war against terrorism in Cabo Delgado. In this regard, this paper sought to potentially pave the way for more (hopefully new) empirical research trends into Mozambicans's role in the fight against insurgency in Cabo Delgado. To this end, the paper suggests that particular qualitative and ethnographic studies, by drawing on the experiences, insights, and arguments of the Mozambican migrants, can substantively contribute to the alternative approaches to the current militaristic counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado. This kind of focus, from a qualitative perspective with Mozambican migrants' voices included, allows for the question of whether or not the ongoing participation of South Africa in the militaristic counterinsurgency in Mozambique rests on the imperative of securing its own benefits rather than the benefits of the Mozambicans.

This paper strongly recommends that such a focus should seek to ascertain whether or not the involvement of Mozambican migrants can offer a grassroots-based contribution to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique. Like in the studies done elsewhere suggesting that there is a link between migrants and terrorism, this paper sees the possibility of some Mozambican migrants in South Africa doing the same in Cabo Delgado. Thus, an argument to include the subaltern voices of Mozambican migrants as an alternative approach to the current militaristic counterinsurgency approaches in Cabo Delgado, cannot but deepen the discourse on how counterinsurgency initiatives are perceived and bolstered.

 

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Received 02 January 2023
Accepted 03 February 2023
Published 30 April 2023

 

 

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