ARTICLES

A truth commission for Uganda? Opportunities and challenges

Prudence Acirokop

Project Manager, Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance Project, Norwegian Refugee Council, Somalia; Doctoral candidate, Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa

SUMMARY

The article addresses challenges and opportunities that a truth-telling process presents to Uganda after the two-decade-long conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army and the national army. The article specifically analyses the appropriate features of legislation regarding a truth-telling process that it argues account for its success. It makes reference to the National Reconciliation Bill, 2009, drafted by civil society groups in Uganda, which is the only comprehensive document relating to a possible truth-telling process in Uganda. The article argues that a truth-telling process will give Uganda an opportunity to confront its past, official denials and imposed silences, and will provide victims with public validation of their suffering and make unquestionable the state's obligation to provide integral reparations. The article, however, questions the extent to which individuals with state authority and state institutions will allow a truth-telling process to exercise its powers and publicly question their conduct with a looming threat of prosecutions. The article further questions whether the National Resistance Movement government will accept that its rule has been tarnished by decades of conflict and that state institutions are in need of reform, or whether it will set its sights on justifying policies, hiding complicity and rejecting blame. The article concludes that a political will and commitment are essential to ensure adequate investment in technical, material and financial resources and that non-interference of the government in the work of the Truth Commission will ensure success. It further finds that with such political will and commitment, and robust consultation with stakeholders, including victim groups, and the creation of alliances locally, nationally, regionally and internationally, a truth-telling process will lead to justice, truth, reparations, reintegration and reconciliation in Uganda.

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* LLB (Makerere), LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) (Pretoria); pacirokop@gmail.com
1 T Allen & K Vlassenroot 'Introduction' in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and reality (2010) 17.         [ Links ]
2 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement, signed in Juba, South Sudan on 29 June 2007 and the Annexure to the Agreement signed 19 February 2008 (Annexure).
3 'Uganda rebels delay signing peace deal' Reuters 10 April 2008 http://www.france24.com/en (accessed 20 January 2009).
4 'Uganda rebels suspend talks, appoint new team' Sudan Tribune 10 April 2008 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=26715 (accessed 20 February 2011).
5 'Uganda LRA fails to sign final peace deal in Riikwanbwa' Sudan Tribune 13 April 2008 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php7article26734 (accessed 17 August 2012).
6 High Court: The establishment of the International Crimes Division of the High Court http://wwww.judicature.go.ug/index.php?option=come_content&task=view&aid =117&Itemid=154 (accessed 17 August 2012).
7 Agreement clauses 2.1, 2.3 & 3.1.
8 The Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okoth Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05) arrest warrants issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005 after Trial Chamber II was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the persons named had ordered or induced the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the territories of Uganda. Raska Lukwiya was killed in battle in 2006 and Vincent Otti is said to have been executed on the orders of Kony in 2008; the other indictees are at large.
9 The International Crimes Division was created in 2008 as War Crimes Division and in 2011 re-designated, International Crimes Division; Legal Notice 10 of 2011, The High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions 2011, cl 3. The ICD is a permanent division of the High Court of Uganda.
10 Thomas Kwoyelo Alias Latoni v Uganda (HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/10). Thomas Kwoyelo was captured in the Garamba forests in the DRC in 2008 and his trial commenced on 11 July 2011 after several delays. A few months later, in a constitutional petition, Kwoyelo challenged his prosecution as amounting to unequal treatment before the law (Amnesty Act), claiming that he had been denied amnesty while similarly-situated individuals were granted it. The Constitutional Court agreed with Kwoyelo and ordered his immediate release - see Thomas Kwoyelo Alias Latoni v Uganda Constitutional Petition 036/11 (arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/10) Ruling of the Court, para 625 ordering the ICD to cease the trial of Kwoyelo. The state is set to appeal this decision.
11 Interview with Joan Kagezi, Senior Principal State Attorney in charge of international crimes prosecutions at the ICD on 18 January 2011.
12 Interview with Ismene Zarifis, technical advisor, transitional justice with JLOS conducted on 24 February 2012 in Kampala, Uganda. The process is aimed at a comprehensive national transitional justice policy that will include national peace, traditional justice and truth-telling policies.
13 Agreement cl 2.4.
14 'Transitional justice in Northern, Eastern Uganda and some parts of West Nile region' (March 2008) JLOS.
15 n 14 above, 22.
16 n 14 above, 23.
17 '"The dust has not yet settled"', Victims' view on a right to remedy and reparations: A report from the Greater North of Uganda' Uganda Human Rights Commission and United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights (2011) 60.
18 S Cohen States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering (2001) 255-266.
19 P Smith 'Memory without history: Who owns Guatemala's past?' (2001) 24 Washington Quarterly 59-61 64.
20 Smith (n 19 above) 64.
21 C Rose 'Looking beyond amnesty and traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms in Northern Uganda: A proposal for truth telling and reparations' (2008) 28 Third World Law journal 371.
22 The ICD will not award reparations to victims of atrocities and the ICC reparations regime will only come into play if indictees are arrested and tried. Further, only a limited number of victims stand to benefit from the process. In addition, the ICD and ICC for the moment are concentrating on crimes committed by the LRA only, so victims of crimes committed by the UPDf may not receive reparations - a truth and reconciliation commission could deal with these limitations.
23 Interview with Ismene Zarifis, Transitional Justice Advisor of JLOS, conducted on 24 February 2012. The main complaint by civil society groups is that their involvement in the process is very limited and so is the consultation with the local population. This was further discussed during a meeting to ensure greater civil society involvement in the process organised by the African Institute for Strategic Research, Governance and Development hosting representatives from 27 different organisations that took place in Kampala, Uganda, on 26 August 2011.
24 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) 61.
25 'Dialogue: The crossroads of amnesty and justice' keynote address by Frederick Ruhindu, State Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and Deputy Attorney-General and closing speech by Hilary Onek, Minister of Internal Affairs (11 November 2011). Various stakeholders, including representatives from JLOS, UN bodies, development partners, key civil society actors and victims groups in Uganda attended this dialogue; the government expressed its commitment to accountability and reconciliation; UN and other civil society groups also expressed their support and commitment to this endeavour. However, there is a persistent complaint from civil society groups in Uganda that their involvement in the transitional justice processes is limited. This, eg, was the main agenda in a meeting organised by the African Institute for Strategic Research, Governance and Development (n 23 above).
26 The Working Bill was prepared by the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and the Refugee Law Project of Makerere University. It is very much a working document that is continuously being improved. The drafters are aware of the political environment in Uganda that is hostile to a truth-telling process and are making all attempts to ensure that the government of Uganda endorses the Bill and presents it as a government Bill for discussion in parliament. Although great progress was made before the 2011 elections, discussions with the government are still ongoing (telephone discussion with Leandro Komakech of the Refugee Law Project conducted on 23 February 2012). Provisions of the Working Bill are cited in this article with permission of the drafters.
27 Informal discussion with Ismene Zarifis, conducted on 24 February 2012.
28 Working Bill part 11(B).
29 An earlier draft of the Bill provided for a mixed national and international composition, but this provision was amended in the later draft because members of the public favoured a purely national composition. Guatemala and Sierra Leone both had mixed tribunals which was attributed to their success. Advantages put forward for mixed commissions include the fact that foreign members usually have experience from other countries that the commission can draw from and help enrich the process and that where the credibility of nationals is questioned, the presence of foreign members can to some extent give the public confidence in the process. Prof Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, a former commissioner in Ghana and Liberia, suggests that if persons with the requisite credentials exist in Uganda, appointing nationals with the support of internationals at the technical level may be the best way to go (interview conducted via e-mail on 28 March 2011). See also Judge Thomas Buergenthal, lecture given on 17 October 2006 at Western Reserve University School of Law, 'Truth commissions: Between impunity and prosecution' transcript of the Frederick K Cox International Law Centre, Lecture in Global Legal Reform.
30 Working Bill part IV(B).
31 Working Bill part IV(A)(1).
32 The Working Bill does not clarify how the public nomination shall be done; this needs to be clearly spelled out to ensure that persons nominated meet the necessary criteria and are also representative of the people.
33 Working Bill part IV(B).
34 Working Bill part IV(C).
35 Working Bill parts IV(H) & IV(I).
36 Working Bill part II(C)(1).
37 Agreement cl 2.
38 Agreement cl 4.1.
39 Commission of Inquiry into Disappearance of People in Uganda since 25 January 1971, Legal Notice 2 of 1974 Cap 56 Laws of Uganda (Legal Notice 2, 1974); posted by USIP Library, available at Truth Commissions Digital Collection, Truth Commission in Uganda http://www.usip.org/publicatios/truth-commission-uganda-74 (accessed 2 November 2010).
40 PB Hayner 'Fifteen truth commissions - 1974 to 1994: A comparative study' (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 612; R Carver 'Called to account: How African governments investigate human rights violations' (1990) 89 African Affairs 399 states that the Commission was successful in view of the practical difficulties it faced and highly unfavourable political climate under which it operated.
41 Legal Notice Creating the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, Commission of Inquiry Act, Legal Notice 5 (16 May 1986) Cap 56 Laws of Uganda (Legal Notice 5, 1986).
42 JR Quinn 'Constraints: The undoing of the Ugandan Truth Commission' (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 413.
43 Working Bill part 11(D).
44 As above.
45 Working Bill part 11 (D).
46 Working Bill part II(E).
47 The operation period was not spelled out in the legal notice creating the Commission, which was a weakness, but other reasons advanced for this duration is a lack of adequate financial and material investment by the Ugandan government. Therefore, the work of the Commission came to a standstill every few months; see JR Quinn 'The politics of acknowledgement: An analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission' (2003) 19 York Centre for International and Security Studies 22.         [ Links ]
48 Quinn (n 42 above) 409.
49 Working Bill part III(A).
50 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) 61.
51 Quinn (n 47 above) 20-21, stating that during the operation of the 1986 Commission, thousands of people filled in questionnaires with regard to their recollection of events that had occurred in the past, many of which were then investigated in the field. At least 608 witnesses appeared before the Commission and the commissioners travelled to virtually every region of the country holding hearings and collecting testimonies. These testimonies are bound into 18 enormous volumes that are available at the Uganda Human Rights Commission's offices. The final report, 720 pages long, contains testimony, analyses and recommendations, along with a list of names of those subjected to torture and abuse. What are the chances that these people will want to go through such a comprehensive process again, since nothing much came out of the 1986 inquiry? In addition, the information collected is still available for reference for a new commission in Uganda.
52 Interview with Frank Onapito Ekomoliot, conducted on 14 January 2011 in Kampala, Uganda. This sentiment has been echoed by a number of Ugandans who do not clearly understand the difference a new truth commission will make in regard to 'truth' of what happened in the past - some have even suggested that going far back may derail the matter at hand - the abuses and violations perpetrated in the LRA conflicts with wounds still visible and suffering ongoing.
53 Quinn (n 42 above) 412; JR Quinn 'Dealing with a legacy of mass atrocity: Truth commissions in Uganda and Chile' (2001) 23 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 391.
54 UHCR & UNOHCR (n 17 above) 65.
55 Quinn (n 47 above) 22.
56 The necessity of a historical analysis is recognised in cl 3.2 of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. In addition, the Refugee Law Project has embarked on a country-wide national reconciliation and transitional justice audit to document all major conflicts and their legacies in Uganda, alluding to the need for a national reconciliation process in the country. For more on the audit, see http://www.beyondjuba.org/NRTJA/index.php (accessed 17 August 2012).
57 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation cl 3.2 recognises the need for historical analysis and clarification. Uganda's history since independence has largely been dominated by coups and other insurgencies, all characterised by gross human rights violations and abuse; the LRA conflict is the longest running one. Several other insurgencies cropped up since 1986 when President Museveni took over power and, according to him, in the 2011 presidential campaigns, the NRM quelled 32 insurgencies, many of which Ugandans do not seem to know about.
58 Working Bill part III.
59 As above.
60 Quinn (n 47 above) 7, referring to C Tomuschatt 'Clarification Commission in Guatemala' (2000) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 239-240.
61 Quinn (n 47 above) 5 states that one critical reason for the failure of the 1986 Commission was its very broad and vague mandate.
62 Working Bill part III(B)(1)(a).
63 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) XVI-XXVII states that it is the desire of the victims that vulnerable groups, especially women and children, participate and that they are adequately protected.
64 An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia, enacted by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly on 12 May 2005.
65 Liberia TRC Act art IV(4), VI(24) & VII(26)(n) & (o).
66 Liberia TRC Act art IV(4)(e).
67 Liberia TRC Act art IV(26)(n).
68 Liberia TRC Act art IV(26)(o).
69 T Sowa 'Children and the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission' in S Pamar et al (eds) Children and transitional justice: Truth telling, accountability and reconciliation (2010) 198.         [ Links ]
70 Working Bill parts IV(H) & V(B).
71 Working Bill part V(B)(b).
72 Working Bill part V(A)(1).
73 Effected under Statutory Instrument 34 of 2012, signed and gazetted on 1 June 2012. This was by virtue of sec 16(3) of the Amnesty Amendment Act of 2006 that provides that the Minister may by statutory instrument declare the lapse of the operation of Part II of the Act.
74 Such persons are protected under the Constitution of Uganda that in art 28(5)(f) provides that no person shall be tried for a criminal offence if that person shows that he or she has been pardoned in respect of that offence.
75 Effected under Statutory Instrument 35 of 2012, signed and gazetted on 1 June 2012. This was done by virtue of sec 16(2) of the Amnesty Amendment Act of 2006.
76 Interview with Judge Onega, Chairperson of the Amnesty Commission, conducted on 11 July 2012 in Kampala, Uganda.
77 Interview with Joan Kagezi, conducted on 15 June 2012 in Kampala, Uganda.
78 L Hovil & Z Lomo 'Whose justice? Perceptions of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2002: The potential for conflict resolution and long-term reconciliation' (2005) 15 Refugee Law Project Working Paper 15.         [ Links ]
79 This has been extensively documented. See, eg, Human Rights Watch 'Stolen children: Abduction and recruitment in Northern Uganda' http://hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303 (accessed 14 February 2009); Human Rights Watch Abducted and abused: Renewed conflict in Northern Uganda (2003) 15 (12A) 14-28.
80 Joint Leadership and Steering Committee 'Presentation by Hon Justice Gidudu, Chair Transitional Working Group' (18 May 2012) http://www.jlos.go.ug/page.php? (accessed 10 July 2012).
81 WA Schabas 'Truth commissions and courts working in parallel: The Sierra Leone experience' (2004) 98 American Society of International Law 198.         [ Links ]
82 Art 1 (1) Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
83 Art 2 Truth and Reconciliation Act of Sierra Leone.
84 WA Schabas 'A synergistic relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone' in WA Schabas & S Darcy (eds) Truth commissions and courts: The tension between criminal justice and the search for truths (2004) 191.         [ Links ]
85 WA Schabas 'The relationship between truth commissions and international courts: The case of Sierra Leone' (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 1035.         [ Links ]
86 As above.
87 Schabas (n 81 above) 190.
88 The Constitutional Court of Uganda ordered the ICD to cease the first trial of its first case and the ICC indictees are at large.
89 Working Bill part V(D)(8).
90 A Tejan-Cole 'The complementary and conflicting relationship between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission' (2002) 5 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 326.
91 Schabas (n 84 above) 192.
92 T Kelsall 'Truth, lies, ritual: Preliminary reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone' (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 361 381.
93 M Wierda et al 'Exploring the relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone' (2002) The International Centre for Transitional justice 3; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, rule 54bis.
94 Working Bill part 111 (A)(1) extends the jurisdiction of the truth process to all nationals and all atrocities committed within the geographical limits of Uganda.
95 Wierda et al (n 93 above) 3-4.
96 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman Case (SCSL.2003.08.PT), Decision on Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Sam Hinga Norman JP (29 October 2003) para 3.
97 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman Case (SCSL.2003.08.PT) Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Sierra Leone and Sam Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision of His Lordship Mr Bankole Thompson delivered on 30 October 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request to Hold a Public Hearing with Sam Hinga Norman JP (28 November 2003) para 47.
98 Wierda et al (n 93 above) 19.
99 As above.
100 Working Bill part I(B)(18).
101 The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (16 December 2005).
102 Working Bill part III (B)(13).
103 See http://savenorthernuganda.org/about_us.html (assessed 1 March 2012); several victims are dissatisfied with this compensation that has been limited to cattle lost during the war. The victims state that while they lost hundreds of herds, they have been compensated for the loss of one or two cattle.
104 'Government compensation to Acholi war claimants not enough' Daily Monitor 23 November 2011.
105 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) 29-53 provides detailed accounts of the crimes that victim groups in Uganda feel that they must receive a remedy for.
106 There is no evidence to suggest that the LRA leadership has property and money stashed somewhere to enable it to pay reparations.
107 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) 15.
108 The set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Intended to Strengthen Action to Combat impunity UN Sub-Commission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (29 June 1996) (Joinet Principles) principle 31.
109 I Cano & PS Ferreira 'The reparations in Brazil' in P de Greiff (ed) A handbook on reparations (2006) 102; E Lira 'The reparations policy for human rights violations in Chile' in P de Greiff (ed) A handbook on reparations (2006) 55; MJ Guembe 'Economic reparations for grave human rights violations: The Argentinean experience' in De Greiff (above) 21.
110 See eg South Africa Policy Framework for Urgent Interim Reparation Measures 1995.
111 Uganda Victims' Foundation c/o Africa Youth Initiative Network 'Statement on the Need for Reparations and Guiding Principles for Victims of Crimes Perpetrated in Uganda' (6 May 2011) 5.
112 CJ Colvin 'Overview of the reparations programme in South Africa' in De Grieff (n 109 above) 176.
113 B Goldblatt 'Gender and reparations in South Africa' International Centre for Transitional Justice and International Development Research Centre http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/SAfrica/SouthAfricaExecsSum.pdf (accessed 15 November 2010).
114 MR Amstutz The healing of nations: The promise and limits of political forgiveness (2005) 196-197. The RRC principle recommendation was that the government should grant all victims monetary reparations and recommended equal financial compensation to all qualified victims regardless of need or level of suffering of US 000 over the next six years. In April 2003, the government promised instead to pay US 900 to each of the victims' families. Considering that this amount was intended to serve not just as compensation, but also to contribute to a better quality of life for survivors, it is a very conservative sum which is yet to be paid.
115 LS Graybill Truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or model? (2002) 6-8.
116 Goldblatt (n 113 above).
117 LJ Laplante & K Theidon 'Transitional justice in times of conflict: Colombia's Ley de Justicia Y Paz' (2007) University of Michigan Law School 95, referring to arts 10, 11, 54, 55.1 & 56 of Justice and Peace Law of Columbia, 975 of 22 July 2005.
118 Laplante & Theidon (n 117 above), referring to art 8 of Justice and Peace Law of Columbia, 975 of 22 July 2005.
119 The International Centre for Transitional Justice and the International Development Research Centre 'Repairing the past: Reparations and transitions to democracy, perspectives from policy, practice and academia' Symposium Summary (Ottawa Canada) 11-12 March 2004 http://www.ier.ma/IMG/pdf/REPARATIONsymposium_report_.pdf (accessed 15 November 2010).
120 n 119 above; stating that in Peru, President Toledo proposed a Peace and Development Plan worth US $ 820 million to support reconstruction in the areas most affected by the conflict. This fund is not specifically linked to the actual abuse suffered, therefore its reparatory effect may be extremely limited.
121 R Bubio-Marín 'Introduction: A gender and reparations taxonomy' in R Rubio-Marín (ed) The gender of reparations: Unsettling sexual hierarchies while redressing human rights violations (2009) 2-3.
122 Several international instruments recognise and reflect in their provisions how violence and other abuses affect girls and women adversely and differently from males, eg CRC and the two Optional Protocols on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children that Uganda is a party to. In addition, several policy outcomes of intergovernmental processes have reached consensus on this issue, eg, the Beijing Platform for Action (1995); the Outcome of the Twenty-Third Session of the General Assembly (2000); The International Conference on Population and Development (1994); the World Summit for Children (1990); the Millennium Declaration (2000) that led to the Millennium Development Goals (2005); as well as the various Security Council Resolutions such as Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security; Resolutions 1261, 1314, 1379, 1539 & 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict.
123 Preamble Nairobi Declaration on Women's and Girls' Rights to Remedy and Reparations 22 May 2007 (Nairobi Declaration).
124 Cl 3(g) Nairobi Declaration.
125 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) 28.
126 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 'Rule of law tools for post-conflict states: Reparations programmes' (2008) 30-31.
127 The proposed Bill is titled the National Reconciliation Bill 2009.
128 Working Bill part III(B).
129 Working Bill part 111 (B)(14).
130 According to the Durable Solutions Officer of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); NRC and other NGOs stepped in to construct houses for some of the vulnerable children who knew their original homes, but those who did not have land were left out of this programme.
131 Interview with NRC officials that specifically handled camp management in Northern Uganda.
132 Land has become a major source of conflict in Northern Uganda; several people have lost claims to clan land that has been taken by the more powerful families and the government; its officials, including officials with security organs, are cited as the major land grabbers in the region.
133 Interview with local government officials and staff of civil society organisations, including Save the Children in Uganda, the Norwegian Refugee Council and CARITAS, conducted in Gulu from 19 to 25 October 2011.
134 Interview with officials working with the NRC; Save the Children in Uganda and local government officials in the Gulu district.
135 This information was consistent among all interviewees. However, there seems to be no data showing the actual number of child-headed households in Northern Uganda.
136 Discussion with the probation and welfare officer in the Pader district conducted on 22 October 2011.
137 John Bosco Oryema, a 15 year-old boy living in the former camp in Acholi Bur with his four siblings, gave this information.
138 A great number of street children in Gulu are former abductees and they cite stigma, ridicule and alienation from families as the reason why they left their villages.
139 Interview with an official at the World Vision Reception Centre in Gulu, conducted on 21 October 2011. The officer added that there were no reported cases of former abductees or rebels that had been killed.
140 Information from the probation and social welfare officer in the Gulu district.
141 T Allen Trial justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army (2006) 171.
142 Allen (n 141 above) 171-172.
143 Several studies have assessed the causes of the LRA conflict and conclude that it is rooted in the history of ethnic politics in Uganda dating back to the colonial era. See eg A Branch 'Exploring the roots of LRA violence: Political crisis and ethnic politics in Acholiland' in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and reality (2010); C Dolan Social torture: The case of Northern Uganda (2009); S Finnstrom Living with bad surroundings: War, history and everyday moments in Northern Uganda (2008); A Branch 'Neither peace nor justice: Political violence and the peasantry in Northern Uganda 1986-1998' (2005) 8 African Studies Quarterly 1; C Mbazira 'Prosecuting international crimes committed by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda' in C Murungu & J Biegon (eds) Prosecuting international crimes in Africa (2011) 197.
144 International Crisis Group (ICG) 'Uganda: No resolution to growing tension' Africa Report 187 (5 April 2012) 7, referring to YK Museveni 'Ours is a fundamental change' in YK Museveni (ed) What is Africa's problem? Speeches and writings on Africa (1992) 21; YK Museveni Selected articles on the Uganda resistance war (1985) 46. The initiatives the government introduced to solve the longstanding divisions and broaden NRM support included the national 'no party' structure, broad-based government and a process to adopt a constitution through extensive popular consultations.
145 ICG (n 144 above) 8-9.
146 ICG (n 144 above) 1.
147 As above.
148 The fears that abundant natural resources are a curse are unscientifically drawn from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Sudan, among others, that have all experienced at one time or another different levels of armed conflict due to poor institutional and governance quality that allows national elites to become corrupt and give maximum advantage to foreign mining companies to reap huge profits.
149 J Kathman & M Shannon 'Oil extraction and potential for domestic instability in Uganda' (2011) 12 African Studies Quarterly 27.
150 W Okumu 'Uganda may face an oil curse' Africa Files 1 June 2010.
151 See, eg, 'Top ministers took bribes from Tullow Oil - Parliament told' The Independent 11 October 2011; 'Oil bubble burst' Monitor 11 October 2011; 'MPs demand halt in government oil deals citing bribery' Monitor 11 October 2011; Kutesa & Onek 'Willing to step aside, Mbabazi stays put' Monitor 12 October 2011; 'Here is what is at stake with Uganda's oil' Monitor 12 October 2011; 'Accused ministers deny corruption' Monitor 12 October 2011; 'MPs order ministers to resign over alleged oil bribes' Monitor 12 October 2011; 'MPs collect signatures to censure ministers named in saga' New Vision 12 October 2011; 'Oil saga - Museveni speaks out' New Vision 12 October 2011.
152 Kathman & Shannon (n 149 above) 24.
153 Kathman & Shannon (n 149 above) 29-30. In addition, the Lake Albert region is a politically-sensitive area that lies between Uganda and the DRC that has had a violent history and border disputes. In addition, the region has also been vulnerable to rebel activities, eg the ADF in the 1990s and the LRA after the failure of Operation Iron Fist in 2002.
154 See eg N Valji 'Race and reconciliation in a post-TRC South Africa' paper presented at a conference entitled Ten Years of Democracy in Southern Africa (May 2004) organised by the Southern African Research Centre and Queen's University.
155 UHRC & UNOHCHR (n 17 above) 66.
156 J Spiegel & J Prendergast 'A new peace strategy for Northern Uganda and the LRA (Strategy Paper)' Enough Project 18 May 2008 http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/new-peace-strategy-northern-uganda-and-lra (accessed 17 January 2012).
157 M Mamdani When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda (2011) 36, indicating that the genocide in Rwanda found roots in the invasion of Rwanda by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda with support of the Ugandan government and that, by providing this support, Uganda exported its first political crisis since coming into power in 1986 to Rwanda; 'Evaluating peace and security in the DRC and US policy in the Great Lakes region' Africa Faith and justice Network http://afjn.org/focus-campaigns/promote-peace-d-r-congo/30-commentary/788evaluating-peace-and-stability-in-the-rdc-and-us-policy-in-the-great-lakes-region.html (accessed 22 November 2011), indicating that from 1996, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola supported the rebel group, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, until the overthrow of the then President, Mubotu Sese Seko. In addition, the Congo War (1998 to 2003) drew in eight African nations, including Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan and 25 armed groups becoming the deadliest conflict since World War II, killing an estimated 3,8 million people; millions were displaced and millions sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.
158 'Museveni wants to hunt LRA in Congo' New Vision 19 June 2006.
159 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) ICJ (19 December 2005) ICj Reports (2005) 168. The DRC alleged that Uganda committed the crime of aggression against it and violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Uganda disputed the claim and counter-claimed that the DRC had committed acts of aggression towards it when it attacked its diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa as well as other Ugandan nationals. The ICJ observed that instability in the DRC has had negative security implications for Uganda and some other neighbouring states and that by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces operating in the territory of DRC, Uganda had violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention. The ICJ also decided that there was credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the UPDF were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of Congo's natural resources and that the military authorities did not take any measures to put an end to these acts.
160 The regional governments recognised the interrelatedness of conflict in the region and started a process aimed at devising means to deal with violations and the abuse of human rights and humanitarian law in the region through the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. For more, see https://icglr.org/index.php (accessed 31 August 2012).