Teaching phenomenology to qualitative researchers, cognitive scientists, and phenomenologists

 

 

Shaun Gallagher; Denis Francesconi

 

 

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ABSTRACT

The authors examine several issues in teaching phenomenology (1) to advanced researchers who are doing qualitative research using phenomenological interview methods in disciplines such as psychology, nursing, or education, and (2) to advanced researchers in the cognitive neurosciences. In these contexts, the term "teaching" needs to be taken in a general and non-didactic way. In the case of the first group, it involves guiding doctoral students in their conception and design of a qualitative methodology that is properly phenomenological. In the case of the second, it is more concerned with explaining the relevance of phenomenology to an audience of experimental scientists via conference presentations or published papers. In both cases, however, the challenge is to make clear to the relevant audience what phenomenology is and how it can relate to what they are doing.

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About the Authors

 

 

Shaun Gallagher occupies the Lillian and Morrie Moss Chair of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis in Tennessee, USA. He holds secondary appointments as Research Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Hertfordshire, and is an affiliate faculty member in the Institute for Simulation and Training at the University of Central Florida. He is also Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark).

Professor Gallagher has held visiting positions at various prestigious research institutions and universities in the UK and Europe, including the Universities of Cambridge and Copenhagen, the Ecole Normale Supérieur in Lyon, and the Centre de Recherche en Epistémelogie Appliquée (CREA) in Paris. He is Editor-in-Chief of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, and has published extensively in this broad field (see http://www.ummoss.org). E-mail Address: s.gallagher@memphis.edu

 

 

Denis Francesconi obtained his PhD in the Department of Cognitive and Education Sciences (Faculty of Cognitive Sciences) at the University of Trento (Italy) in 2010, and was a Visiting Scholar at the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, from June 2009 to August 2010, as well as Visiting Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Central Florida from January 2009 to April 2009.

Dr Francesconi's scientific interests include connections between education and cognitive neuroscience, learning and cognition, the body-mind problem, and experiential education. E-mail Address: denis.francesconi@unitn.it