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SAIEE Africa Research Journal

versión On-line ISSN 1991-1696
versión impresa ISSN 0038-2221

Resumen

FRIESLAAR, I.  y  IRWIN, B.. Developing an electromagnetic noise generator to protect a Raspberry Pi from side channel analysis. SAIEE ARJ [online]. 2018, vol.109, n.2, pp.85-101. ISSN 1991-1696.

This research investigates the Electromagnetic (EM) side channel leakage of a Raspberry Pi 2 B+. An evaluation is performed on the EM leakage as the device executes the AES-128 cryptographic algorithm contained in the libcryptoH-+ library in a threaded environment. Four multi-threaded implementations are evaluated. These implementations are Portable Operating System Interface Threads, CH-+11 threads, Threading Building Blocks, and OpenMP threads. It is demonstrated that the various thread techniques have distinct variations in frequency and shape as EM emanations are leaked from the Raspberry Pi. It is demonstrated that the AES-128 cryptographic implementation within the libcryptoH-H library on a Raspberry Pi is vulnerable to Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The cryptographic process was seen visibly within the EM spectrum and the data for this process was extracted where digital filtering techniques was applied to the signal. The resultant data was utilised in the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) attack and the results revealed 16 sub-keys that are required to recover the full AES-128 secret key. Based on this discovery, this research introduced a multi-threading approach with the utilisation of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) to serve as a software based countermeasure to mitigate SCA attacks. The proposed countermeasure known as the FRIES noise generator executed as a Daemon and generated EM noise that was able to hide the cryptographic implementations and prevent the DEMA attack and other statistical analysis.

Palabras clave : AES-128; Electromagnetic; Noise Generator; Raspberry Pi; Side Channel Analysis; SHA; Software Countermeasure.

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