Resumo

KOFOED-OTTESEN, Mathias. On the possible phenomenological autonomy of virtual realities. Indo-Pac. j. phenomenol. (Online) [online]. 2020, vol.20, n.1, pp.1-7. ISSN 1445-7377.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20797222.2020.1857945.

In the following article, I examine Martin Heidegger's philosophy of dwelling with a view to its importance for the concept of 'place'. It is my interest to show how a phenomenological concept of place can elucidate the phenomenology of virtual reality. I begin by contextualising the investigation through a presentation of Jeff Malpas' concept of the non-autonomy of the virtual, and argue for a clearer understanding of the notion of causal non-autonomy. Furthermore, I argue that the autonomy or lack thereof of virtual reality should not lead to the conclusion that virtual reality cannot be experienced and examined as a self-standing entity; that in order to properly understand virtual reality, we cannot limit ourselves to the reductionistic view presented by Malpas, but must account also for the phenomenology of experiencing virtuality - and under such a phenomenological consideration, the distinctions made between non-virtual and virtual reality are made more diffuse. I then argue that we can plausibly accept that places may exist in virtual reality, despite current technological and practical limitations. In addition, I go on to consider some possible metaphysical differences between virtual and non-virtual places.

Palavras-chave : Heidegger; immersion; phenomenology; telepresence; topology; virtual reality.

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