Resumo

EKSTEEN, Riaan. Historical perspective: Reasons for and consequences of the involvement by great powers in the Suez Canal (Egypt), in particular before 1956 (Part I). Tydskr. geesteswet. [online]. 2023, vol.63, n.2, pp.420-451. ISSN 2224-7912.  http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2224-7912/2023/v63n2a14.

This first of three articles discusses the geopolitical importance of Egypt, the geostrategic location of the Isthmus of Suez and the channel itself. It also focuses on the construction of the canal and the imperatives to both control and retain possession of it. In the late 1700s and throughout the 19th century, up until mid-1956, European powers were interested in Egypt for various reasons, including the canal. Intermittent intrigues and conflict occurred from time to time. Much was at stake, given the fact that this Isthmus and where the canal would later be constructed, has a particular strategic significance in connecting Europe and the East and also the Indian Ocean. It became increasingly more important for Britain to control this link. France's involvement in Egypt began in 1798 with Napoleon Bonaparte and later with Ferdinand de Lesseps who was granted permission to build the Suez Canal. It was opened in 1869 and it revolutionised the shipment of goods between Britain and its colonies. Initially, Britain was opposed to the construction of the canal, but later acquired a share in it. Given the execution of his foreign policy, Germany's Otto von Bismarck showed little interest in Egypt. In 1882, British troops were deployed in Egypt to suppress a nationalist uprising. The troops stayed on until after World War I. The Entente Cordiale ended 40 years of bitter rivalry between Britain and France. It granted Britain a free hand in Egypt and France the same in Morocco. In 1922, Egypt became independent, but British forces still stayed on to protect the Suez Canal. After the Second World War, Britain increased its military presence in the vicinity of the Suez Canal considerably, but Egyptians were dissatisfied about that arrangement. Britain transferred few of the advantages derived from the use of the canal to Egypt. A series of failures by Britain in the application of its foreign policy fuelled the ever growing and multifaceted conflict between Britain and Egypt. On 23 July 1952, King Farouk was dethroned in a military coup d'état in which the young Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser played the leading role. After that Egypt was not the same anymore. Nasser established himself as an exceptional leader, not only in Egypt, but also internationally, and as one of the outcomes of his leadership, the canal was nationalised on 26 July 1956. The consequences stretched far and wide. The second article addresses such consequences in general, while the third focuses, in particular, on the effect(s) closure of the canal has had for South Africa. Attention is paid to the sea route around the Cape, as well as the closure of the canal in 1967, bearing in mind Britain's transference of its naval base, Simonstown to South Africa in the late 1950s.

Palavras-chave : Bismarck; Britain; British Empire; Cape sea route; Churchill; coup d'etat; Eden; Egypt; France; India; Middle-East; Napoleon Bonaparte; Nasser; nationalisation; Suez canal.

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