Abstract

VILLET, Charles. A phenomenology of racism: Hegelian (mis)recognition and the structure of colonial consciousness. Tydskr. geesteswet. [online]. 2021, vol.61, n.3, pp.870-890. ISSN 2224-7912.  http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2224-7912/2021/v61n3a14.

This article critically discusses Hegel's account of the failure of mutual recognition (which Charles Taylor calls misrecognition) with specific focus on the master-slave dialectic. In this account, Hegel gives his analysis of a certain development in consciousness that leads to alienated self-consciousness in both the self and the other (subject and object). It is my view that the process which grounds this type of self-consciousness affords a phenomenological description and explanation of the cognitive roots of racism and violence as they are manifested in a so-called modern colonial mentality (in both the colonial and postcolonial context of European colonialism in Africa and elsewhere). In other words, Hegel's account gives us an exposition of how racism forms in self-consciousness. Considering racism, I chart a possible way to mutual recognition in order to see how misrecognition can be grappled with (in self-consciousness). This is done by way of a model of Hegel's theory of consciousness, which is outlined in order to unpack the different types of intersubjective recognition. The focus of this model is the interaction between the phenomenological and conceptual aspects of Hegelian recognition in the encounter between the self (as subject) and the other. It is hoped that this model will promote understanding of the ways in which self-recognition, misrecognition and mutual recognition are connected to different forms of consciousness. Misrecognition and mutual recognition have a significant effect on intersubjective human relations as well as on the socio-political and economic reality of a society. Fanon highlighted this by focusing on the role of race as it concerns the dialectic and recognition. Hegel charts the development of alienated self-consciousness in his account of the master-slave dialectic, and an understanding of this process is of crucial importance to the outline of mutual recognition provided in my study. This development may be summarised as follows: Self-consciousness distinguishes and identifies objects in the world and this level of consciousness can be termed bare existence. Consciousness is deepened as self-awareness when the self is distinguished as distinct from the world; this represents the split that takes place between the self as subject and the world (or the other) as object. Misrecognition as one-sided recognition is basically a continuation of object-centred recognition in human relations, and this kind of recognition distinguishes an other person simply as an object (who is thus reified). Misrecognition leads to a colonial consciousness with a colonial mentality in the self that grounds the alienated self-consciousness of the other through relations of racism and violence. Misrecognition gives form to a relation in which the self dominates the other to such an extent that they are alienated from each other. At the same time, the others feel alienated from their own selves and from the world around them because their sense of freedom is controlled by someone else. The ideal interaction with others that pays attention to issues of racism and violence would be some form of mutual recognition that distinguishes the other as a rehumanised subject (that is, a free person who can form his/her own identity). In this relation one also finds the ideal conditions for the self and the other to develop self-knowledge. This moment of Aufhebung (sublation) in the dialectic is a necessary step in overcoming the misrecognition inherent in the master-slave relationship, but it is also a postcolonial Aufhebung, which is different from the one that Hegel envisioned. This study calls attention to a critical lacuna regarding the account of the master-slave relationship (which is also highlighted in the work of Frantz Fanon and could be viewed as a Fanonian moment in the dialectic). The reaction of the master to the slave (and vice versa) brings about a consciousness that holds ideas, or concepts, as primary. Therefore, the slave will be connected to an idea that the master has in his consciousness. This means that the slave's idea about himself is not of his own making. The nature of the self-consciousness that emerges in the slave (but also in the master) involves a relation of alienation and the development of alienated self-consciousness. This kind of self-consciousness has to do with two key problems: Firstly, the negation, absence or denial of humanity in self-consciousness in so far as it concerns relations with others, for instance in the case of race, and secondly, the ideas generated because of this negation/absence/denial, which are attached to the racial other and lead specifically to misrecognition. Such ideas are sometimes combined in single terms or words (e.g. derogatory racist terms as labels). In the end, my study demonstrates how reification through concepts (as misrecognition) in Hegel's master-slave dialectic leads to the phenomenon of race and racism.

Keywords : alienated self-consciousness; Aufhebung (sublation); colonial mentality; colonialism; Frantz Fanon; Georg Hegel; intersubjectivity; master-slave dialectic; misrecognition; mutual recognition; phoney recognition; postcolonialism; racism; reification; self-consciousness; self and other; struggle for recognition.

        · abstract in Afrikaans     · text in Afrikaans     · Afrikaans ( pdf )