Scielo RSS <![CDATA[PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=1727-378120150004&lang=pt vol. 18 num. 4 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>Editorial</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400001&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt <![CDATA[<b>The life and times of a learned jackal for justice</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400002&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt <![CDATA[<b>Lessons for the SADC from the Indian case of <i>Novartis AG v Union of India</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400003&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt In the pharmaceutical context, many Southern African Development Community (SADC) members grant patents on drugs without substantially reviewing applications first, thus routinely granting patents for new versions of old medicines, thus extending patent life beyond the normal 20-year period. In contrast, Brazil and India, homes to major generic drug manufacturers in the BRICS grouping, examine each application before a patent is granted. It has been argued by health activists and academics that excessive patenting results in too many patents for minor innovations in medical technology and this in turn leads to higher prices of medicines, thus frustrating SADC citizens' right to access affordable essential medicines. This paper highlights how the legislative inclusion of World Trade Organisation (WTO) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) flexibilities around the requirements for patentability can be effectively used to curb incremental patenting and limit the proliferation of evergreen patents. This is achieved through a critical analysis the 2013 Supreme Court of India case of Novartis AG v Union of India before extracting useful lessons for the SADC. The highlighted lessons will in all likelihood inform the current intellectual law reform projects in most SADC members, including South Africa. <![CDATA[<b>The independence of South African judges: A constitutional and legislative perspective</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400004&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Judicial independence is fundamental to democracy. It is in that context that this paper considers whether the existing constitutional and legislative mechanisms provide sufficient judicial independence to South African judges. In so doing, the paper focuses on impartiality, judicial appointments and security of tenure. It also discusses the sensitive matter of complaints and disciplinary proceedings against judges and their removal from office. The issue of the remuneration of judges is also explored. In discussing the challenges facing judicial independence some incidents that have appeared to compromise such independence are highlighted. These include the controversial appointments of Advocate Mpshe as an acting judge in the North West Province in 2010 and Judge Heath as the Head of the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) in 2011. The never-ending controversy surrounding the Cape Judge President John Hlophe and his alleged attempts to improperly influence two Constitutional Court judges in a case involving President Jacob Zuma is also highlighted. Another issue that has brought judicial independence into sharp focus is the June 2015 visit to South Africa of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir, who was on a warrant of arrest from the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and war crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan. A decision by the North Gauteng High Court on his presence in South Africa and the attacks on the judiciary made by various government officials as a result are discussed. Several conclusions are drawn but in the main, it is generally concluded that the constitutional and legislative framework adopted by South Africa sufficiently insulates judges from improper influence. However, there have been several notable challenges that particularly relate to judicial appointments and how the JSC has handled certain matters. Irresponsible and uninformed political statements by politicians and unwarranted political attacks on the judiciary by government are also a source of great concern. These challenges could and should be construed as threats to judicial independence, and need to be comprehensively and properly addressed. <![CDATA[<b>Rethinking violence, reconciliation and reconstruction in Burundi </b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400005&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Armed violence and genocide are among the on-going problems that are still facing contemporary Africa and the world. In the aftermath of the outrages, devastation and appalling carnage of the Second World War, member states of the United Nations (UN) undertook radical steps, inter alia, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights". Subsequently, the International Bill of Human Rights was proclaimed in order to lay down international human rights norms and standards of conduct and to prevent the recurrence of mass killings. Although Burundi is a State Party to the UN and African Union and is a signatory to a number of international and regional human rights treaties, the post-colonial history of Burundi is an epic tale of indescribable human suffering and misery as a result of systematic mass killings. At least every family or household in Burundi has been negatively affected by the mass killings of the 1960s, 1972, 1988 and 1990s, which have created a significant number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).This article traces the root causes of Burundi's systemic armed violence and argues that despite several UN Security Council Resolutions and peace agreements aimed at national reconciliation and reconstruction, mass killings and other heinous crimes remain unaddressed. The article recommends that a comprehensive transitional justice model is required in post-conflict Burundi in order to bring about national reconciliation, healing and reconstruction. <![CDATA[<b>A contextual analysis of the hate speech provisions of the <i>Equality Act</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400006&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt The article presents a detailed contextual analysis of the categorical prohibition of hate speech in terms of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. It is argued that this provision is not primarily intended to describe and effectively regulate the extreme expression that falls within the narrow ambit of "hate speech" as defined in section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. Rather, it is concerned with the promotion of equality in the broad societal context. It acknowledges the hurt and harm that discriminatory expression may entail and it condemns the reinforcement of systemic discrimination by means of expression. Therefore, the principal interpretive frame of reference for the analysis of section 10(1) of the Equality Act is the explicit constitutional obligation in terms of sections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution to enact legislation to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination, and not section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. The fact that section 10(1) categorically prohibits hate speech, instead of premising its prohibition on the unfairness analysis generally applicable to discrimination in other contexts, however, implies that only expression with no reasonable prospect of meeting the constitutional fairness standard ought to be covered by section 10. Put differently, the prohibited expression may in no way promote rather than jeopardise the achievement of equality. The interpretation takes into account that section 10(1) applies only to engagement in expression that, in terms of an objective reasonableness assessment, is clearly primarily aimed at hurting or harming others, or at inciting others to hurt or harm, or at promoting hatred based on group identity. Furthermore, bona fide expression in accordance with the essential characteristics of the freedoms of expression mentioned in section 16(1) of the Constitution is explicitly excluded from its ambit. An analysis of the expression covered by section 10(1) leads to a conclusion that it prohibits only low-value discriminatory expression that obstructs the constitutional quest for the healing of our injured society. It manages to achieve this without jeopardising the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, construed in the light of the foundational values of the Constitution. <![CDATA[<b>Public participation and water use rights</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400007&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt The conservation and protection of water resources is paramount in the safeguarding of environmental rights and the attainment of sustainable development in South Africa. Although the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (the NWA) seeks to provide a framework for ensuring the sustainable use of water resources, its application has been hindered by capacity and enforcement constraints, a legacy of water pollution (primarily as a result of mining and industrial activities), and poor resource management. To aggravate this situation, the difficulties in effectively implementing the NWA are exacerbated by inadequate public participation in water use licensing processes. Public participation in environmental decision-making has increasingly received recognition for its role in ensuring administrative justice and the protection of environmental rights. While environmental legislation (in many cases) sets out procedures for ensuring that public views are taken into account in environmental decision-making processes, the judiciary has also recognised the pivotal role of public engagement in ensuring administrative justice where environmental rights are at stake. Sound public participation practices play an important role in identifying issues requiring consideration in the context of environmental assessment processes, as well as in ensuring that communities are empowered to monitor, identify and report on potential contraventions of environmental legislation. Water is a vital natural resource which is under significant pressure in South Africa. In the circumstances, effective public participation is crucial to ensuring the protection and equitable use of water resources. It follows that provision for comprehensive public engagement in water use licensing processes is integral to ensuring the sustainable management of water resources. While provision is made in the NWA for public engagement in the context of water use licensing processes, such participation is limited, and in some cases discretionary. This, in turn, has the effect of curtailing the right to an administrative appeal in respect of a decision by the competent authority to grant water use rights. This paper will explore the role of public participation in environmental decision-making with a view to identifying the shortcomings of the NWA in this regard, as well as the effectiveness of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA) in supplementing the NWA's shortcomings. It will also consider the implications which recent changes to South Africa's environmental legal framework will have for public participation in water use licensing, particularly in the context of mining-related activities. <![CDATA[<b>Legislation as a critical tool in addressing social change in South Africa: Lessons from <i>Mayelane v Ngwenyama</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400008&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Several changes have occurred in South Africa within the customary law system to ensure gender justice, including the enactment of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The purpose of the Recognition Act is to recognise customary marriages as valid in law with equal status and capacity within the marriage for the parties to the marriage, and to regulate customary marriages. This has brought about changes to this social institution in an arena that is steeped in tradition and deep-rooted cultural practice. In 2013 the Constitutional Court in the Mayelane case developed the Xitsonga customary law to include the requirement of the consent of the first wife prior to her husband's taking another wife. This case yet again highlighted the difficulties that surround the practicalities of balancing the tripartite scheme of statutory, constitutional and living law. It remains a challenge for the Courts to determine the norms of African people. Hence the need for proper and much more vigorous engagement with the living law of the people. <![CDATA[<b>Public-private partnerships in local disaster management: A panacea to all local disaster management ills?</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400009&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt It is anticipated that the occurrence and intensity of disasters will increase globally and in South Africa where typical disasters include droughts, floods, extreme hailstorms, gales, fires and earthquakes, as well as sinkholes arising from mining activity in dolomitic areas. Disasters such as these result in human suffering and damage to the resources and infrastructure on which South Africans rely for their survival and the maintenance of their quality of life. Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 affords to everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health and well-being. It may be argued that a person's sense of environmental security in relation to the potential risks and dangers of disaster falls within the scope of the protection provided by section 24. The responsibility to intervene for the protection of the interests inherent in the constitutional environmental right lies with the government of South Africa. Disaster management specifically is a functional area of competence of national and provincial government, but practice has shown that the actual implementation of and planning for disaster management happens in the local government sphere. Against the backdrop of these introductory discussions and, given the fact that several municipalities in South Africa are under-resourced, this article very specifically aims to critically discuss and describe from a legal perspective the potential and function of public-private partnerships (PPPs) between local government (municipalities) and the private sector (such as industries) in fulfilling the legally entrenched disaster management mandate of municipalities. Through a critical evaluation of some existing PPPs, this article illustrates that the private sector has a key role to play in assisting municipalities to fulfil their legally entrenched disaster management mandate. <![CDATA[<b>The constitutional mandate for social welfare - systemic differences and links between property, land rights and housing rights</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400010&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Our purpose in this article is to argue that, as far as the constitutional promotion and protection of social welfare is concerned, there are significant theoretical and systemic differences between property, land rights and housing rights. Our argument is shaped by the fact that these three sets of rights are recognised and protected separately in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, but we argue that the theoretical differences go beyond variations between constitutions and bills of rights from different traditions and time periods. In our view, there are sound theoretical, and therefore also systemic, reasons why it is necessary to at least keep the differences between property, land rights and housing rights in mind when analysing, interpreting and applying any of these rights in a specific constitutional text. Above all, we argue that the reduction of housing rights to just another category of property rights might well reduce or even erode the special social, historical and constitutional value and meaning of housing rights. We first consider theoretical arguments concerning the relationship between property, land rights and social welfare. In view of the theoretical analysis we proceed to consider the constitutional nature and status of property, land rights and housing rights in the South African context. We argue that both land rights (in the form of land redistribution and improved tenure security) and housing rights (in the form of the right of access to adequate housing) should be seen as discrete constitutional rights that stand on their own constitutional foundations and that they do not need to be protected as property rights. On the other hand, they are not fundamentally circumscribed or opposed by property rights either. Instead, the Constitution requires a new, typically constitutional methodology that gives full recognition and effect to all three sets of rights, each in its proper place. Seen in this perspective, property is neither the guardian nor the enemy of social welfare. Nevertheless, the purpose of the property clause in general cannot be isolated from social welfare concerns that relate to improved access to land and housing rights, nor from the constitutional imperative to provide stronger land and housing rights. Important connections exist between these divergent constitutional imperatives that should be acknowledged to ensure the efficient realisation of social welfare concerns. <![CDATA[<b>The <i>Consumer Protection Act </i>68 of 2008 and procedural fairness in consumer contracts</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400011&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt In general, the concept "contractual fairness" can be narrowed down, described and analysed with reference to the two interdependent types of fairness - substantive and procedural fairness. Measures aimed at procedural fairness in contracts address conduct during the bargaining process and generally aim at ensuring transparency. One could say that a contract is procedurally fair where its terms are transparent and do not mislead as to aspects of the goods, service, price and terms. Despite the noble aims of legislative measures aimed at procedural fairness there are certain limits to the efficacy of procedural measures and transparency. The special procedural measures which must be considered in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 in order to decide if a contract is fair are analysed in this article, as are other measures contained in the Act, which may also increase procedural fairness, and are discussed so as to allow suppliers to predict whether their contracts will be procedurally fair or not in terms of the Act. The special procedural measures can be categorised under measures requiring disclosure and/or mandatory terms, and measures addressing bargaining position and choice. It is concluded that owing to the nature of all these factors and measures related to procedural fairness, it is clear that openness and transparency are required by the CPA. <![CDATA[<b>Judicial "translation" and contextualisation of values: Rethinking the development of customary law in <i>Mayelane</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400012&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt The relevance of Mayelane v Ngwenyama (2013 4 SA 415 (CC)) has not been exhausted. Particularly the constitutional mandate undertaken by the Constitutional Court to "develop" customary law deserves closer scrutiny. In Mayelane the Constitutional Court, in seeking to vindicate the dignity and equality of women in polygynous marriages, examines the validity of a second marriage in terms of "living" customary law. The Court applies customary law as a "primary" source of law, while it simultaneously promotes the values enshrined in the Constitution, however - bearing in mind that the constitutional values of dignity and equality have their roots in international rights law - the Court is in reality dealing with normative plurality spanning subnational (customary), national as well as international regimes. Furthermore, each of these systems is embedded in its own socio-cultural context, and therefore the liberal individualism of international law could be "foreign" in a customary context, which values communalism. Hence, it is asked whether courts can accommodate pluralism by simply transposing norms and values such as dignity and equality from one system to another, particularly in cases where the court sets out to "develop" customary law. It is argued that norms and values have to be interpreted and applied with reference to their particular context and audience. Thus, there is a need for courts to contextualise and attune, or "translate" norms, whenever they are applied to another system. <![CDATA[<b>Avoiding <i>Mazibuko</i>: Water security and constitutional rights in Southern African case law</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400013&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt The 2009 judgment by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg is seen by many as a watershed in the interpretation of the fundamental constitutional right of access to water. The Constitutional Court ruled that the right of access to sufficient water does not require that the state provide every person upon demand and without more with sufficient water. Nor does the obligation confer on any person a right to claim "sufficient water" from the state immediately. Reactions to the judgment have been consistently negative, with criticisms largely focusing on the Court's apparent lack of appreciation for the situation of the very poor. It is not easy, however, to overturn a decision of the Constitutional Court and South Africa will need to work within the constraints of the precedent for many years to come. It is suggested in this article that two subsequent, recent judgments (one of the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa, City of Cape Town v Strümpher, 2012, and one of the High Court in Zimbabwe, Mushoriwa v City of Harare, 2014) show how it might be possible for courts to avoid the Mazibuko precedent and yet give special attention to water-related rights. Both cases concerned spoliation applications in common law, but both were decided as though access to water supply and water-related rights allow a court to give weight to factors other than the traditional grounds for a spoliation order. It can be argued that in both cases the unlawfulness necessary for a spoliation order arose from a combination of dispossession and breach of rights in respect of a very particular and special kind of property. In the arid and potentially water-stressed Southern African region, and in the context of extreme and apparently increasing poverty, there will undoubtedly be more court cases to come involving access to water. Conclusions are drawn as to how the two judgments considered might offer a way to ameliorate the harsh effects of the Mazibuko judgment. <![CDATA[<b>The incorporation of double taxation agreements into South African domestic law</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400014&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt There are different opinions as to the process whereby double taxation agreements (DTAs) are incorporated into South African law. This contribution aims to discuss some of the existing opinions and to offer a further perspective on the matter. At the heart of the debate lies the interpretation of two provisions, namely section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and section 108 of the Income Tax Act and the interaction between the two. This contribution argues that South Africa's DTAs are not self-executing (a term referred to in section 231(4) of the Constitution)and should therefore be enacted into law by national legislation. It is furthermore argued that section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act enables a DTA to be incorporated into South African domestic law, by means of publication in the Government Gazette. An analysis of the case law supports this argument. Whether or not DTAs are regarded as self-executing, the status of a DTA in relation to the Income Tax Act still has to be determined. In other words, once the DTA forms part of South African domestic law, does it rank higher, lower or on a par with the Income Tax Act?It is submitted that the status of DTAs in South Africa is determined by the Constitution. It is furthermore submitted that South Africa's DTAs do not attain a status on the same level as the Constitution and that the Constitution allows for the possibility that South Africa's DTAs may be overridden by subsequent legislation (for example, by amendments to the Income Tax Act). Whether or not an override will take place in a specific case should, it is submitted, be determined by the application of the principles of statutory interpretation which apply in the case of conflict. Although this latter submission finds support in the minority judgement in Glenister, both the AM Moollaand Tradehold decisions express contrary views. The hope is expressed that the South African courts will provide clarity on this matter in due course. <![CDATA[<b>Deliberating the rule of law and constitutional supremacy from the perspective of the factual dimension of law</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400015&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting (opinio iuris),in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution. <![CDATA[<b>International Law and Child Soldiers by Gus Waschefort</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000400016&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Positive law is two-dimensional: it has a justice (or ideal) dimension (and requisite) and a factual (or real) dimension (and requisite). Both are essential. Hence positive law lapses when either of the two is absent. In terms of the factual requisite, law remains in place as actual norms of law (unlike mere norm-formulations), provided that a minimum degree of effectiveness is maintained; that is to say, only as long as the subjects of the law consistently and voluntarily act in accordance with such norm/s, and provided further that deviant conduct is remedied by effective coercive measures. "Norm/s" that lose the factual dimension lapse into mere norm-formulations and no longer qualify as positive law. Thus viewed, a realistic grasp of the content of law is co-dependent on actual conduct, regardless of what the norm-formulations purport positive law to entail, because the norm-formulations may have lost track of the actual state of the law. Grasping the actual content of law, including constitutional law, therefore requires not only analysing the norm-formulations of the formally recognised sources of the law, but more specifically social and political observation which may reveal the following: (1) actual behaviour that closely corresponds with a legal norm-formulation, in which case the formulations reliably happen to reflect (and by implication to describe) the actual state of law; or (2) conduct that regularly deviates from the norm-formulations (usus) by the deviators who deem themselves legally bound to act as they are acting (opinio iuris),in which case new (substituting) law has in fact come into being, without such substituting law being reflected in a new (amended) norm-formulation; or (3) large-scale but inconsistent and irregular deviant conduct where the deviators do not consider themselves legally bound to act in the various deviant ways, combined with haphazard enforcement, thus allowing deviators to get away with their transgressions. Unlike the first scenario, the purported norm (law) as reflected in the norm-formulations is in part unsettled but unlike as in the second scenario, no new norm (law) has come into being. A legal lacuna opens up - that is, an area not regulated by existing legal norms. Viewed from the perspective of the factual dimension, law, including constitutional law, is much more susceptible to the volatility of unpredictable changes and instability than what the doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy purport it to be. The doctrine holds law (and the constitution) to be formulation driven, and therefore formal-static in nature, in that the law remains essentially static until the norm-formulations (the text) are amended in terms of the prescribed amendment procedures prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the prevalent doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy fail to account for the factual dimension which causes it (the doctrine) to obscure the inner workings of the factual dimension of law, and therefore acts as a hindrance to understanding the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.