Scielo RSS <![CDATA[PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=1727-378120150003&lang=es vol. 18 num. 3 lang. es <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>Editorial</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300001&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es <![CDATA[<b>The AU model law on Universal Jurisdiction: An African response to Western prosecutions based on the universality principle</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300002&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es The African continent has been consistent in placing its concerns regarding the manner in which international criminal justice is administered on the international platform. For the past decade, the continent has minced no words about its misgivings concerning the use of universal jurisdiction (UJ) by both foreign States and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The African Union (AU) has been very supportive of UJ and its utility in fighting impunity and affording justice to victims of the core crimes of international law, namely, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Often referred to as core crimes, these are regarded as customary law crimes which are an affront to entire humankind. These crimes were also codified by the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, the political and selective use of the principle of universality by foreign States to prosecute perpetrators of these crimes was seen as causing conflicts and undermining peace efforts, reconciliation and regional stability. As a result the African continent voiced its concerns at various public platforms, including under the auspices of the UN and it therefore called for reforms. This prompted the AU to produce its own model law on UJ, which African States could adapt to their own socio-political circumstances and legal context. The debates that ensued around UJ on the African continent offered African States a chance to contribute to the development of international law, especially on the rules concerning UJ. This paper analyses the interaction amongst African states that eventually led to the development of UJ regulations within their individual legal systems, and tries to determine if there is indeed an African signature in those legal rules. <![CDATA[<b>Selected legal challenges relating to the military use of outer space, with specific reference to article IV of the Outer Space Treaty</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300003&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Since the end of the Second World War the potential use of outer space for military purposes persisted to be intrinsically linked to the development of space technology and space flight. The launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, by the USSR in 1957 made Western states realise that a surprise attack from space was a real possibility, resulting in the so-called "space-race" between the USA and the USSR. During the Cold War space activities were intrinsically linked to the political objectives, priorities and national security concerns of the USA and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War the political relevance and benefits of space continued to be recognised by states. In view of the recent emergence of new major space powers such as China, the focus has again shifted to the military use of outer space and the potential that a state with advanced space technology may use it for military purposes in order to dominate other states. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space and determines that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only. Due to the dual-use character of many space assets, the distinction between military and non-military uses of outer space is becoming increasingly blurred. This article discusses a number of legal challenges presented by article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, relating specifically to the term peaceful, the distinction between the terms militarisation and weaponisation and the nature of a space weapon. It is concluded that article IV is in many respects outdated and that it cannot address the current legal issues relating to the military use of outer space. The legal vacuum in this area may have grave consequences not only for maintaining peace and security in outer space, but also on earth. Consequently, an international dialogue on the military uses of outer space should be facilitated under the auspices of the UNCOPUOS to address these uncertainties as a matter of urgency. Although it is agreed with the proponents of a hard law approach that a legally binding instrument should be adopted to regulate the military use of outer space, it is submitted that, as an interim measure, soft law guidelines should be developed to provide a framework for the eventual creation of a consolidated and binding legal instrument on all aspects relating to the use of outer space. <![CDATA[<b>No longer in suspense: Clarifying the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300004&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es The Southern African Development Community Tribunal's (SADC Tribunal) decision in the matter of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe 2008 SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) demonstrated its ability to utilise the principles contained in the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community when it ruled that it had the power and competency to adjudicate over a human rights case. The aforesaid decision was hailed by many scholars as a progressive judgment in the SADC region that would promote the rule of law and ensure that member states respected their treaty obligations in their own territories. Unfortunately, the same judgment resulted in the suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2010 because it had purportedly acted beyond its mandate when it adjudicated over a case concerning a human rights dispute. This article investigates whether the SADC Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with cases involving allegations of human rights violations. In addressing this question, this article will discuss the powers (implied and tacit) of international organisations as understood within international law. In addition, the study will ascertain how the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have dealt with cases that involved disputes concerning a tribunal or an international organisation that was said to have acted beyond its mandate. The study will also make reference to the East African Court of Justice and the Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice as they have also dealt with implied powers when they were confronted with cases concerning human rights abuses. Certain decisions of the SADC Summit of Heads of States or Government (Summit) and the Council of Ministers whose roles include the control of functions and/or overseeing the functioning of the SADC will also be referred to in this study. <![CDATA[<b>Affiliation to a new customary law in Post-Apartheid South Africa</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300005&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es This article examines the possibility that in the post-apartheid South African legal system South African citizens can voluntarily change their customary law and affiliate to a new one in the true spirit of citizenship. The article argues that such a change would affirm the dignity of all South Africans and would significantly enhance the vision of a truly non-racial society envisaged by the Constitution and contribute to social justice. <![CDATA[<b>"I am not a number! I am a free man!" The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and other myths about the pursuit of "equality", "equity" and "dignity" in post-apartheid South Africa) (PART 1)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300006&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) - SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes - probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionally-compliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivity in "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). This article forms Part 1 of this piece and the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. In Part 2 of this piece (which follows in this edition), the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnard case, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon. <![CDATA[<b>"I am not a number! I am a free man!" The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and other myths about the pursuit of "equality", "equity" and "dignity" in Post-Apartheid South Africa) (PART 2)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300007&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) - SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes - probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionally-compliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivity in "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). In Part 1 of this piece (which precedes this article in this edition), the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. This article forms Part 2 of this piece and the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnardcase, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon. <![CDATA[<b>Questioning the use of the mandament van spolie in Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security 2014 5 SA 112 (CC)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300008&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es This cursory note reflects on the outcome of the Constitutional Court judgment of Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security. The decision presented the Court with the opportunity to consider what happens to existing common law remedies in light of legislation that has been enacted to regulate a specific area of the law. The Constitutional Court held that the Traffic Act did not place an absolute prohibition on the possession of tampered vehicles and therefore the Court granted the spoliation remedy. The Court's conclusion that the mandament van spolie is in principle available in these instances, creates the impression that the common law remedy would be appropriate even though the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) contains a remedy to claim the property back. This note argues that such a conclusion is problematic. If the CPA has a remedy to restore possession, that option should first be exhausted. In this regard, it is necessary to regulate the choice of remedy if the common law and the legislation provide a remedy to vindicate the violations of rights. Furthermore, in instances where legislation has been enacted to regulate a specific area of the law (or to give effect to a constitutional provision) the mandament van spolie should in principle not be available. Finally, this note concludes that in instances where the Traffic Act prohibits possession of certain vehicles, it should not be possible to use the mandament van spoiie to by-pass the legislation. <![CDATA[<b>A critical appraisal of <i>Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of South Africa </i>2011 5 SA 87 (WCC)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812015000300009&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es The 2011 the Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of The Republic of South Africa case flagged a lot of issues faced by persons with disabilities relating to access to education in South Africa. The case tackled certain perceptions about the ineducability of persons with profound and severe disability and the remaining charity-oriented perception by the South African Department of Basic Education. While the court made several important points in advancing universal access to education, the author argues that certain holes in the judgment hinders the existence of judicial finding truly infused with concerns of substantive equality. An example of this short-coming is the court's consideration of reasonableness when the right to basic education is an immediately realisable right. The author also argues that the South African developments in education policy for persons with disability, while positive, is insufficient to truly give effect to substantive equality - the claim to equality being made in the new constitutional dispensation. There is still an attitude that is too permissive of separating students based on abilism. The social model of thinking about requires a complete transformation of the education system that would not require a classification of learners by abilities but have a different constitution so as to accommodate all students and not unduly enable one group over another. The author considers the approaches from Canada and India to explore its responses to education for students with varying levels of ability. Canada's similar conception of equality and India's influence on South African constitutionalism and shared experience with massive equality gaps make these jurisdictions instructive.