Scielo RSS <![CDATA[PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad]]> vol. 19 num. 1 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> <![CDATA[<b>Editorial</b>]]> <![CDATA[<b>Remedial principles and meaningful engagement in education rights disputes</b>]]> This article evaluates the meaningful engagement doctrine in the education rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in the light of a set of normative principles developed by Susan Sturm for evaluating participatory public law remedies. It commences by identifying four principles for evaluating participatory remedies appropriate to South African constitutional law and jurisprudence. Thereafter the relevant jurisprudence is analysed and evaluated in the light of these principles. The article concludes by making proposals for the development of meaningful engagement as a participatory remedy in educational rights disputes. These proposals seek to ensure a better alignment between the meaningful engagement remedy and the four remedial principles identified. <![CDATA[<b>Constitutional values, therapeutic jurisprudence and legal education in South Africa: Shaping our legal order</b>]]> Law schools have a responsibility to remind law students that by studying law they have the power to transform thoughts, policies and lives, and that practising law is not just about financial rewards, but that its greatest reward is contributing to the betterment of society and ultimately to social change. The values and philosophies that law lecturers instil in law students can contribute to the legal order of the future; a legal order that supports a transformative South Africa. A need exists to bring legal education closer to the values enshrined in our Constitution. In addition to an extensive knowledge of legal principles, critical thinking and research skills, law students should critically engage with our constitutional values. The question remains: How do we transform legal education in South Africa? How do we change the way we teach law students? The introduction of concepts such as therapeutic jurisprudence enhanced by our constitutional values will ensure that we deliver graduates that display a commitment to our constitutional vales and an ability to engage critically with these values. It is important to establish a professional legal identity amongst students from their first year as this will assist in the development of a well-rounded graduate that can contribute to the legal order of the future. Letter writing and drafting skills, the value of plain language, moot court activities, alternative dispute resolution and clinical legal education provide opportunities to integrate valuable therapeutic jurisprudence principles into the curriculum and can allow students to critically engage with our constitutional values. By embodying these values they can improve the legal system, shape our legal order and promote progress toward an equal and free democratic society as envisaged by the Constitution. <![CDATA[<b>Concern regarding the "Debt" created by Rule 14.10.9 of the Government Employees' Pension Fund rules</b>]]> This paper highlights the prejudicial effect of the rule within the rules of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), which allows this fund to create a "divorce debt" for its member when the court has ordered that part of such a member's pension interest be paid over to his or her spouse. I argue that this debt is in fact a loan which is provided to the member, which he or she would be expected to pay when he or she exits the fund, with interest. This is despite the fact that the rules of the GEPF do not permit the granting of loans to its members. I argue that the creation of such a loan has the effect of diminishing the GEPF's member's benefits, and thus threaten his or her social security, and can lead to the member becoming unable to provide for himself or herself when he or she reaches retirement age. <![CDATA[<b>Investigating the reasons behind the increase in medical negligence claims</b>]]> Medical negligence claims have increased significantly over the last number of years. The trend is still ongoing and concerns have been raised about the impact of this increase on the medical industry. Medical practitioners are increasingly practising defensive medicine in an attempt to limit the risk of medical negligence claims being instituted against them. Medical negligence claims are instituted for a number of reasons, such as lack of communication between doctor and patient. Birth-related claims are instituted most frequently. This contribution investigates the possible reasons behind the increase in both the value and the number of medical negligence claims. The focus falls especially on the increase in the number of claims. The contribution considers a decline in the level of professionalism amongst medical practitioners as one reason behind the increase, followed by the possibility that lawyers may be responsible for the increase in claims. In addition, it is pointed out that patients are simply becoming more aware of their rights. The contribution further focuses on patient-centred legislation and pronouncements by courts that bolster patient autonomy and place patients in an ever stronger position to enforce their rights. Relevant provisions of the Constitution, the National Health Act, the Consumer Protection Act and the Children's Act are singled out for discussion, followed by a brief discussion of case law in line with themes identified in the aforementioned legislation. The contribution submits that the increase in medical negligence claims should not come as a surprise, considering the high regard that our courts had for patient autonomy even before the enactment of the 1996 Constitution. The Constitution and the above legislation now contain specific rights that patients, including child patients, can enforce. The best interests of the child principle embodied in both the Constitution and the Children's Act is very prominent in the medical context and impacts on the medical practitioner's responsibilities towards a child patient. The Constitutional Court relied on this principle in its recent judgment to the effect that claims for wrongful life (brought by a child with a disability), may possibly have a place in our law. If the claim for wrongful life is eventually confirmed, we will no doubt see a further increase in medical negligence claims. Patient-centred legislation and pronouncements by our courts that constantly reiterate the importance of patient rights arguably create very fertile ground for medical negligence claims. These are, as the contribution concludes, merely contributing factors to the phenomenon under investigation. <![CDATA[<b>Recent developments in sexual offences against children - A constitutional perspective</b>]]> This contribution deals with recent developments in sexual offences against children with reference to sections in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. This Act is addressed against the backdrop of the Constitutional Court judgments in Teddybear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and J v National Director of Public Prosecutions. These two judgments had a profound impact on the shaping of the newly formulated sexual offences in line with constitutional principles, ultimately culminating in the enactment and commencement of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 5 of 2015. The approach by the Constitutional Court in both of these judgments is discussed and assessed. An analysis is provided of the Amendment Act with specific reference to its impact on sexual offences against children. <![CDATA[<b>Understanding the limitations to the right to strike in essential and public services in the SADC region</b>]]> The nature of the limitations to the right to strike in essential and public services in the nine sub-regional countries of Southern Africa - South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe - is examined in this contribution. While all of these countries share common influences and face common challenges, there appears to be a vast disparity in the approaches taken to the right to strike in public and essential services in the region. A brief overview of the demographics and labour markets in the countries under discussion is sketched, the salient features of the ILO's approach to strike in essential and public services is highlighted, and a broad overview of the contrasting and disparate approaches to essential and public services in the region is provided. The focus is, however, on the legislative approach taken to essential service employees in South Africa. It is concluded that - with the exception of South Africa and Namibia - the limitations to the right to strike of public sector employees exceed those endorsed by international conventions, and the broad definition of essential services generally relied upon effectively results in an outright ban of public sector strikes in the sub-region. <![CDATA[<b>Protection of the African lion: A critical analysis of the current international legal regime</b>]]> This article looks at the current international regime that pertains to the African lion, a species that needs adequate protection across its range (a range that does not adhere to state boundaries). This analysis comes at a time when threats such as habitat and prey loss, retaliatory killing, trophy hunting and trade, are all impacting the remaining populations of African lions. The species is in danger of rapid population decline and possible extinction in the near future. Two decades ago there was an abundance of African lions, roughly 100 000, on the continent. But at present there are less than 32 000, while some believe there to be as little as 15 000 left. This decline is mainly due to the threats noted above. African lions are currently listed as "vulnerable" on the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List of Threatened Species. This listing is being contested by commentators who believe that the species now requires an "endangered" status. African lion populations, and the threats to the species, extend across state boundaries. Therefore, international law is of particular importance in providing conservation and protection measures to the species. Creating conservation obligations at a global level allows for more uniform action, implementation and enforcement of legislation at regional and local levels. Therefore this article looks at each threat to African lion populations in detail and then assesses the international legal regime pertaining to each of these threats, and whether that regime is adequate. The Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance are but some of the international instruments that are analysed. This article outlines the arguments that the international legal framework is not acceptable for the protection of the species, and addresses both the positive and negative aspects of this regime. It is found that the international legal regime for the African lion is in fact not effective in achieving the protection and survival of the species. Some changes are recommended, and the best way forward through an international legal lens is outlined. The security and viability of the African lion is uncertain, and legal protection of the species needs to be clear to start ensuring their survival in the future. With the increase in threats to the species and African lions already regionally endangered in some parts of Africa, it is obvious that some legal changes need to be made to ensure greater protection of the African lion at an international level. <![CDATA[<b>The reinstatement and compensation conundrum in South African labour law</b>]]> The SBV Services (Pty) Ltd case brought a novel concept into the labour dispute resolution arena: arbitrators must inform employees who succeed in proving that they were dismissed for an unfair reason of the implications of a reinstatement or compensation order in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 before making an award. This case discussion highlights how the court, under the pennant of the interests of justice, made injudicious errors in the interpretation and application of accepted legal principles, and the potential negative effects that enforcement of this principle could have. <![CDATA[<b>Unaccompanied and separated foreign children in the care system in the Western Cape - a socio-legal study</b>]]> This article reports on the findings of a study of foreign children accommodated in the care system in the Western Cape, based on fieldwork conducted in child and youth care centres. The objectives of the study were firstly to map and quantify the number and demographics of foreign children placed in all CYCCs across the Western Cape. Secondly, the study aimed to analyse the reasons for children's migration and the circumstances around their placement in residential care institutions in order to establish whether family reunification was possible or desirable. Thirdly, the study explores the sufficiency of efforts made to trace and reunify the children with their families, whether in South Africa or across borders, as the institutional placement of children should not only be a last resort but it should preferably be temporary whilst family-based solutions are sought. Lastly, the documentation status of the children in the study was examined. Recommendations emanating from the research conclude the study. <![CDATA[<b>The commission as a party before the court - Reflections on the complementarity arrangement</b>]]> The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has worked as the continent's watchdog, under the ACHPR, for almost 30 years. Much has changed since the time of its inception. More institutions, set to ensure the implementation of the ACHPR, have been added. As the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights became operational, a two-tiered human rights system was created. This article explores the inter-relationship between the ACHPR, the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Procedural Rules of these two institutions within the specific context of the African Commission's mandate to refer communications to the African Court. The aim is to offer a purposeful interpretation of the Procedural Rules governing referrals, guided by the understanding of the principle of complementarity in the preparatory works. The author argues that an appropriate interpretation of complementarity, within the context of referrals, becomes vital in alleviating one of the long-term plagues of the African, protective, human rights system, namely the lack of resources and human capital. It is suggested that the African Commission and the African Court can only be effective if they take proper cognisance of the principle of complementarity, in referring and receiving communications. <![CDATA[<b>An evaluation of the self-regulation of promotional competitions in South Africa</b>]]> Promotional competitions are competitions in which prizes are awarded by lot or chance in order to promote goods or services. In order to protect participants and consumers against abuse, these competitions are usually regulated by gambling or consumer protection legislation. However, the relevant legislation is often complemented by self-regulation, which is the focus of this contribution. Self-regulation entails the regulation or governing of an industry by the role players in that industry. This article commences by explaining the relevant terminology and exploring self-regulation in general, including the various forms of self-regulation and the binding force thereof. The nature of self-regulation is discussed together with the advantages and challenges associated with this form of regulation. This is followed by some examples of self-regulation on a global level in order to provide a comparative perspective on the topic. The provisions of the International Chamber of Commerce's Consolidated Code of Advertising and Marketing Communications Practice are summarised and the European Advertising Standards Alliance's role in self-regulation is considered. Attention is also given to the relevant industry codes in the United Kingdom in view of the comprehensive way in which promotional competitions are covered by self-regulation in that country. The main part of the article centres on the self-regulatory position in South Africa. A brief overview of the role and function of the Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa (ASASA) is provided. The provisions of the ASASA's Code of Advertising Practice are then examined and some ASASA rulings are discussed in order to illustrate the relevant principles. Thereafter, the focus shifts to the Code of Conduct of the Wireless Application Service Providers' Association, which contains detailed provisions relating to promotional competitions. Some relevant rulings are also considered. In conclusion, comments are made regarding the current state of the self-regulation of promotional competitions in South Africa. <![CDATA[<b>Strengthening locus standi in human rights litigation in Zimbabwe: An analysis of the provisions in the new Zimbabwean Constitution</b>]]> Zimbabweans have been both victims of and witnesses to serious human rights violations over the years. Though there is wide agreement and speculation that the state and its agencies are the perpetrators of these atrocities, they have largely remained unprosecuted and unpunished. Such impunity is inter alia the result of ineffective law enforcement mechanisms and institutions as well as the lack of capacity and legal knowledge of victims to approach the courts and seek redress. These factors negatively affected the protection of human rights and access to justice in Zimbabwe. Although the Lancaster House Constitution contained a Declaration of Rights, its enforcement mechanisms, particularly those relating to locus standi (legal standing), posed a great challenge to human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. This is so because the Lancaster House Constitution adopted the traditional common law approach to standing. Under this approach it was required that an individual must have a "personal, direct or substantial interest" in a matter in order to have standing. The Lancaster House Constitution failed to recognise the importance of broader rules of standing, which would accommodate public interest litigation, specifically for protecting human rights. Contrary to this, the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) broadens the rules of standing in order to enhance access to the courts. This paper analyses the new approach to standing under the new constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe. To this end, the discussion commences with an elucidation of the concept of locus standi and its link to access to justice. This is followed by an analysis of locus standi under the Lancaster House Constitution. Since the new approach in Zimbabwe is greatly informed by the South African approach to locus standi, a brief analysis of standing in South Africa is made. The paper concludes with a discussion of the approach to locus standi under the new constitution with a view to demonstrating how the new approach is likely to impact on the right of access to justice and human rights protection. <![CDATA[<b>Doctrinal sanction and the protection of the rights of religious associations: <i>Ecclesia De Lange v The Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa </i>(726/13) [2014] ZASCA 151</b>]]> Scholarship on the protection of religious rights and freedoms in the context of religious associations in South Africa has gained in momentum since the decision by the Equality Court in Johan Daniel Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park some years ago. Emanating from this were diverse scholarly insights on what the parameters of religious associations should be, with specific focus on sexual conduct, religious doctrine and membership of religious associations. The South African judiciary has not been confronted with a similar challenge since the decision. However, with the advent of the judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ecclesia De Lange v The Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa in 2014, questions as to the parameters of the rights of religious associations in the context of sexual conduct and religious doctrine again present themselves. This article consequently analyses the mentioned judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal to further an understanding of the parameters of associational rights of religious institutions against the background of a truly plural and democratic society, as supported by the Constitution of South Africa. <![CDATA[<b>Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the <i>Protection of Personal Information Act</i></b>]]> A person whose privacy has been infringed upon through the unlawful, culpable processing of his or her personal information can sue the infringer's employer based on vicarious liability or institute action based on the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (POPI). Section 99(1) of POPI provides a person (a "data subject") whose privacy has been infringed upon with the right to institute a civil action against the responsible party. POPI defines the responsible party as the person who determines the purpose of and means for the processing of the personal information of data subjects. Although POPI does not equate a responsible party to an employer, the term "responsible party" is undoubtedly a synonym for "employer" in this context. By holding an employer accountable for its employees' unlawful processing of a data subject's personal information, POPI creates a form of statutory vicarious liability. Since the defences available to an employer at common law and developed by case law differ from the statutory defences available to an employer in terms of POPI, it is necessary to compare the impact this new statute has on employers. From a risk perspective, employers must be aware of the serious implications of POPI. The question that arises is whether the Act perhaps takes matters too far. This article takes a critical look at the statutory defences available to an employer in vindication of a vicarious liability action brought by a data subject in terms of section 99(1) of POPI. It compares the defences found in section 99(2) of POPI and the common-law defences available to an employer fending off a delictual claim founded on the doctrine of vicarious liability. To support the argument that the statutory vicarious liability created by POPI is too harsh, the defences contained in section 99(2) of POPI are further analogised with those available to an employer in terms of section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) and other comparable foreign data protection statutes. <![CDATA[<b>Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in <i>Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City</i></b>]]> In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City the Constitutional Court awarded compensation for land that vested in the City of Cape Town in terms of a regulatory framework. The regulatory framework, sections 25 and 28 of the Cape Land Use Planning Ordinance of 1985 (LUPO), provides that land needed for public streets and places and indicated as such on a subdivision plan should vest in the local authority concerned, but without compensation if that land is based on the normal need of providing the particular development with such public streets and places. The appellant argued that since land in excess of the normal need also vested in the City, it had a right to be compensated for the excess land that vested in the City. The Court, overturning two Supreme Court of Appeal decisions, awarded compensation. The Court hinted that the compensation was for the expropriation of the appellant's land that was excess to the normal need. In the absence of a formal expropriation procedure, this case note investigates whether the compensation could have been awarded for statutory expropriation or constructive expropriation. Therefore, the question that is posed is whether the alleged expropriation for which the Court awarded compensation can be classified as either statutory expropriation or constructive expropriation. It is pointed out that the Court accepted that section 28 of the LUPO constitutes a development contribution for the land based on the normal need. In terms of the notion of development contributions, a developer has to donate land to the local authority concerned if that land is required to provide the particular development with public streets and places. A development contribution, as part of the administrative process of approving developments, is regulatory in nature and its validity is judged in terms of the requirements for a valid deprivation of property. It is argued that since the Court interpreted section 28 of the LUPO to provide for development contributions, the alleged expropriation cannot be classified as statutory expropriation. Statutory expropriation occurs when legislation expropriates property directly through mere promulgation. In this case, the excess land vested in the City only after an administrative action was taken to approve a subdivision plan. It is also argued that statutory expropriation cannot be recognised in South African law, due to the constitutional requirements for a valid expropriation in section 25(2) of the Constitution. <![CDATA[<b>Planning and <i>Arun's </i>(not so straight and narrow) roads</b>]]> Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd wished to subdivide portions of the farm Langeberg 311, Durbanville. The 1988 structure plan for the area had indicated that certain roads would traverse the property. These and other roads all formed part of a new subdivision known as Sonstraal Heights. As is customary, the ownership of the roads in the subdivision vested in the municipality in terms of section 28 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (C) (LUPO) on the date of approval of the subdivision. Central to this provision is that no compensation is payable to the developer if the provision of the public roads is based on the normal need therefor arising from the subdivision. Since the developer was of the opinion that the roads it had provided exceeded the normal need, the issue that had to be resolved was whether compensation must be paid for roads beyond what would normally be required for a subdivision. The main issue that the courts, from the Western Cape High Court to the Constitutional Court in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 2 SA 584 (CC), had to deal with was whether the vesting of roads beyond the normal need therefor arising from the subdivision amounted to an expropriation of land for which compensation is payable in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution. This case note looks at the different stages of the case, and in the process highlights the historical and legislative background and the subdivision process. It shows that the vesting of the ownership of roads in the municipality is similar to the payment of a development contribution, both of which can be categorised as deprivations of property in terms of the constitutional property clause. On 1 July 2015 LUPO was effectively superseded by the new Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) and the Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 3 of 2014 (LUPA). Since SPLUMA does not and LUPA does contain a reference to the "normal needs" provision, the implications of Arun for the new legislative dispensation are addressed. <![CDATA[<b>Step-parent adoption gone wrong: <i>GT v CT </i>[2015[ 3 ALL SA 631 (GJ)</b>]]> <![CDATA[<b>The impact of minority status in the application of affirmative action: <i>NAIDOO v MINISTER of SAFETY and SECURITY </i>2013 5 BLLR 490 (LC)</b>]]> Affirmative action measures within the workplace seek to ensure equal employment opportunities and create a workforce that is representative of South African society. Accordingly, employers need to ensure that the substantive goal of equality is achieved when implementing affirmative action. One of the challenges faced by employers is the choice of beneficiary from designated groups which is diverse and unequal within itself. This paper seeks to address this challenge by looking at the definition given to beneficiaries of affirmative action and the concept of multi layered disadvantage within the Employment Equity Act. The paper will focus on the decision in Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and National Commissioner of the South African Police Service which is an example of the disadvantages experienced by members of the designated groups who are also part of a minority group within the designated groups. Particular focus will be placed on the disadvantages experienced by a black female who is also part of a minority. This paper highlights the multi-layered nature of disadvantage experienced by such members of the designated groups and the need to ensure that new forms of disadvantage are not created in the implementation of affirmative action policies by using a situation sensitive approach. It argues that affirmative action as a means to an end needs to evolve with the understanding that it functions within an ever changing social and economic environment. If such changes are ignored the true beneficiaries of affirmative action will not be given recognition and the desired end of creating a workforce representative of South African society together with the goal of substantive equality cannot be realised. <![CDATA[<b>Legal ethics, rules of conduct and the moral compass - Considerations from a law student's perspective</b>]]> When young law graduates enter the legal profession they will undoubtedly be exposed to difficult situations that will demand of them to make difficult decisions, often having to balance conflicting systems of belief and ideas on what ethical behaviour entails. Legal ethics training in law faculties the world over often neglects teaching aspects of morality to focus on reviews of rules of professional legal conduct. This article argues that if legal education is to adequately prepare law graduates for legal practice, it must offer more than reviews of these codes of conduct. To properly assist law students in avoiding pitfalls which may lead to disciplinary action, they must be taught to appropriately use their moral compasses. This narrative aims to show that the metaphorical moral compass, with the cardinal virtues as possible main points, may serve as the crucial and underlying guide in the avoidance of the pitfalls which may result in a person being struck from the roll, but more than that, that it may aid in the pursuit of personal dreams or goals. The article contributes to the literature on legal ethics by foregrounding the virtues that pertain to sound conduct in a lawyer, as opposed to the rules and codes, in the hope that this may help legal practitioners to decide on what is right and what is wrong. <![CDATA[<b>Sentencing option for juristic persons</b>]]> This contribution addresses the issue of adverse publicity orders as a possible supplementary sentencing option for corporate offenders. In South Africa fines are the primary sentencing option available to courts when imposing sentences on juristic persons. Fines, however, do not adequately serve the purposes of corporate sentencing. Publicity orders require the publication of an offender's conviction, sentence and the details of the offence to individuals or a group of persons (such as shareholders). An adverse publication damages the corporate offender's reputation - a valuable asset to a corporate entity. It therefore serves the purpose of corporate deterrence. In this contribution criticism is levelled against the fine as primary sentencing option for juristic persons; the notion of corporate reputation is considered from a social and legal perspective; a functional comparative study of adverse publication orders is presented and recommendations are made regarding the content of effective publication orders. <![CDATA[<b>Judicial understanding of the reliability of eyewitness evidence: A tale of two cases</b>]]> One of the most significant consequences of the use of postconviction DNA testing in the criminal justice system has been the growing recognition that eyewitness identification testimony is simply not as reliable as it was previously considered to be. In approximately 75% of DNA exonerations in the United States, mistaken eyewitness identifications were the principal cause of wrongful convictions. Notwithstanding scientific advances regarding human memory and other factors that could influence identifications by eyewitnesses, courts have not shown eagerness in utilising such scientific knowledge in reaching legal decisions. Two cases have been chosen for discussion in this article. In S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court was the first in State and Federal jurisdictions in the US that adopted a science-based approach to the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. The other case under discussion is S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA), a South African Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, where the identification of the perpetrator was based on an eyewitness account and the evidence of an expert on CCTV images. In part one of this article the research findings with regard to estimator variables that were acknowledged in S v Henderson are discussed. Part two specifically scrutinizes S v Mdlongwa to determine the extent to which psychological eyewitness research findings are recognised in South Africa as having an influence on the reliability of eyewitness evidence. In Henderson the court recognised that the legal standards governing the admissibility and use of identification evidence lagged far behind the findings of numerous studies in the social sciences. The new wave introduced by S v Henderson has not gone unnoticed in other State courts in the USA. In Massachusetts, for example, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court convened a study group on Eyewitness Evidence and the resulting report inter alia recommended judicial notice of modern psychological principles, revised jury eyewitness identification instructions and continuous education of both judges and lawyers. Recognition and education pertaining to these factors can and should be incorporated in South Africa. <![CDATA[<b>The core meaning of human dignity</b>]]> The concept of human dignity is relatively new in international and domestic constitutional law. Dignity is protected as a value or a right, or both, in international law and many domestic jurisdictions. It is difficult to define human dignity in a legal context, as the concept is not defined in the first international document which recognizes inherent human dignity and the protection thereof, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946) and many international (and national) documents enacted thereafter. Despite dissensus regarding the widespread use of the concept, dignity has come to display three elements in constitutional adjudication post World War Two: the ontological element which entails that human beings have equal inherent human dignity that cannot be waived or diminished; the second element being the claim that inherent human dignity has to be recognised and respected; and the limited-state claim as the third element which entails that states have a positive obligation to progressively realise human dignity through the mechanism of socioeconomic rights. It is widely accepted that these elements root in Kantian moral ethics which holds that man's autonomy is based upon universal dignity, as a result of which man should never be used as a means to an end, but only as a means in himself. Kant expressed this idea through formulation of a categorical imperative, namely that everyone's inherent human dignity has to be respected and protected universally. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), article 1(1) of the German Basic Law and section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 embody the elements of Kant's categorical imperative. As a result, the three elements are applied as a definitional term of human dignity in German and South African constitutional adjudication. Based on these elements, it can be argued that the current idea of universal inherent dignity, at least in German and South African law, comports with Kant's ideal that man should never be used as a means to an end. <![CDATA[<b>The admission and enrolment of foreign legal practitioners in South Africa under the <i>Legal Practice Act: </i>international trade law and constitutional perspectives</b>]]> Globalisation requires ever closer co-operation between legal professionals hailing from different national jurisdictions. This interactive global environment has fostered growing international training and mobility among legal practitioners and the internationalisation of legal education. Increasing numbers of law students get trained in other countries as part of their undergraduate degrees or even come to foreign shores to obtain law degrees. Many students hailing from other African countries study towards LLB degrees at South African universities. Major commercial law firms ensure that they can offer in-house expertise on major foreign legal systems and co-operate with partner firms in other parts of the globe. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), to which South Africa is a party, is a multilateral agreement focusing on the liberalisation of trade in services amongst member countries. Services under the GATS system include legal services. The commitments made by South Africa under this agreement require that South Africa allows foreign legal practitioners to establish a commercial presence or be transferred to South Africa. The Bill of Rights entrenched in Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution guarantees fundamental rights including the right to equality and freedom of trade, occupation and profession. With the coming into force of the new Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014, which provides a legislative framework for regulating the affairs of legal practitioners, including their admission and enrolment, it is necessary to assess the extent to which the Act complies with the GATS rules and the South African Constitution. This paper examines the new Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014, and examines whether the Act addresses the conflicts that have always existed between the regulation of the legal profession and the admission of legal practitioners in South Africa with South Africa's commitments under the GATS system. Using the doctrinal legal method, it analyses and evaluates the rules governing the admission of foreign attorneys in South Africa from two perspectives. First, it considers them in the light of the international law obligations of the country and second it evaluates whether or not they comply with the South African Constitution, and more specifically with the Bill of Rights entrenched in the South African Constitution. While the new legislation may assist in ensuring the compliance of South Africa with the relevant GATS rules, it will depend on the regulations which still have to be promulgated to what extent the new legal framework will achieve the full compliance of South Africa with all relevant GATS rules. The paper concludes with recommendations for the reform of the Legal Practice Act. It argues that while the requirement to be a South African permanent resident in order to qualify for admission as an attorney may be justifiable in terms of GATS and in terms of South African constitutional law, it is not in South Africa's best interest to retain it. Consequently, the paper calls for the repeal of the permanent residence requirement for admission as an attorney in the county. <![CDATA[<b>The Rights and Freedoms of Moroccan Women: Has the 2004 reforms benefited Moroccan Women?</b>]]> Morocco has maintained its identity and adherence to the Islamic faith since before colonialism and after. As a result of such identity the Moroccan monarchy over the years developed the Code of Personal Status (referred to as the mudawana) which affected only the Muslim population. This type of family law was drawn mostly from Islamic doctrines with little or no participation of women. The mudawana has been criticised by many as being one-side and feminist groups have made numerous calls for a reformed mudawana that addressed the plight of women and to improve their status within the wider community. In 2004, the monarchy decided to reform the mudawana as a result of women's groups pressuring the monarchy to do so. The 2004 reforms has the possibility of enhancing the rights of Moroccan women, for example, a wife is no longer legally obliged to obey her husband, contrary to a widely-held custom which regards obedience as an absolute duty of a Muslim wife, the minimum age for marriage for both parties eighteen years of age, including free and full consent. Polygyny has also been addressed. Although the 2004 version kept the concept of polygyny, there are severe restrictions to curtail this practice, for example, judicial authorisation is required as well as informing the current wife of the prospect. There are certain obstacles that seem to be hampering the full implementation of 2004 reforms which are discussed in this contribution. <![CDATA[<b>Reforming the South African social security adjudication system: innovative experiences from South African non-social security jurisdictions</b>]]> There is currently no uniform social security dispute resolution system in South Africa due to the piecemeal fashion in which schemes were established or protection against individual risks regulated. The result is that each statute provides for its own dispute resolution institution(s) and processes. There are also various gaps and challenges in the current social security dispute resolution systems, some of these relating to the uncoordinated and fragmented nature of the system; inaccessibility of some social security institutions; inappropriateness of some current appeal institutions; the lack of a systematic approach in establishing appeal institutions; a limited scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication institutions; inconsistencies in review and/or appeal provisions in various laws; an unavailability of alternative dispute resolution procedures; and an absence of institutional independence of adjudication institutions or forums. The system is therefore in need of reform. In developing an appropriate system, much can be learned from innovative experiences in comparative South African non-social security jurisdictions on the establishment of effective and efficient dispute resolution frameworks. Dispute resolution systems in the labour relations, business competition regulation and consumer protection jurisdictions have been established to realise the constitutional rights of their users (especially the rights of access to justice, to a fair trial and to just administrative action). They thus provide a benchmark for the development of the South African social security dispute resolution system. <![CDATA[<b>At the intersection between expropriation law and administrative law: two critical views on the Constitutional Court's <i>Arun </i>judgment</b>]]> In Arun the Constitutional Court held that section 28 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO) vests all land indicated as public roads on a development plan in the local authority upon approval of such a plan. This includes land that is in excess of the normal need of the development. The appellant must hence be compensated for the "expropriation" of such excess land if the provision is to comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution. This ruling is problematic for both expropriation law and administrative law. In terms of section 25(2) four objections may be raised against the Arun decision. Firstly, it disregards the function of the public interest requirement for expropriation, as understood in view of the law-of-general-application requirement (which, in turn, is informed by the legality principle). The state cannot expropriate property for purposes that are ultra vires (or ulterior to) the authorising legislation. Yet the Arun court seems to allow just this by permitting the local authority to acquire land unrelated to the normal need of the development against payment of compensation instead of setting the attempted expropriation aside. The judgment, secondly, ignores the role of compensation under section 25(2). Merely paying compensation to an affected party cannot turn an invalid expropriation into a valid one, since compensation is merely the result of a valid expropriation and not a justification for it. Thirdly, it makes the distinction between deprivation and expropriation pivot on the effect of the property limitation, which is unable to properly distinguish between these two forms of limitation in all instances. Finally, Moseneke DCJ's ruling seems to afford an election to litigants who are affected by materially defective expropriations to choose whether to accept the expropriation and claim compensation or to have it reviewed and set aside under PAJA. This election, if it indeed exists, subverts the principles of expropriation law and may have negative repercussions for both expropriation law and administrative law, especially in view of the single-system-of-law principle. From an administrative law perspective the authors identify four considerations that could assist courts in determining whether administrative law should be considered, if not applied, in a given case. The first is the internal coherency of the law in view of the subsidiarity principles. The subsidiarity principles provide guidelines for courts to decide cases where two fundamental rights might be applicable. A principled approach is necessary in this context to ensure that the law operates as a single system and displays the positive characteristics of such a system. The fact that Moseneke DCJ preferred to award compensation to Arun instead of reviewing the expropriation under PAJA runs contrary to these principles and seems to result in an outcome which endorses - instead of prevents - administrative injustice. Secondly, the Constitutional Court's refusal to follow PAJA by reason of its being onerous on the appellant contradicts earlier case law where the Court held that time-periods under the Act cannot be circumvented by reason of their being burdensome. The rationale behind these time-periods is integral to securing administrative justice, since time-periods are not merely formalistic technicalities. Thirdly, the authors argue that a green-light approach to internal remedies could have resulted in the broadening of the interpretative context and recognition of the legitimate role of the public administration in the state. Finally, deference as understood by Dyzenhaus also exemplifies why administrative law should not be ignored in cases which concern the exercise of public power. According to Dyzenhaus, deference requires courts to actively participate in the justification of administrative decisions by asking whether the administration's "reasoning did in fact and also could in principle justify the conclusion reached". <![CDATA[<b>The legal statusof evidence obtained through human rights violations in Uganda</b>]]> The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 is silent on the issue of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. This silence dates to the earlier Constitutions of 1962, 1966 and 1967. It is only the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act of 2012 that renders evidence obtained through torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment inadmissible. This means that evidence obtained through human rights violations other than torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is not covered by any other legislation in Uganda. The position is different in other jurisdictions such as South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, which have constitutional provisions on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The decisions that have been handed down by the Ugandan courts reflect various jurisprudential inconsistencies in dealing with this kind of evidence. This study delves into this lacuna and suggests proposals for reform. <![CDATA[<b>Included or excluded: an analysis of the application of the free, prior and informed consent principle in land grabbing cases in Cameroon</b>]]> Even though the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is soft law, the need to respect, protect and fulfil the rights to be informed and to be involved in development projects is strongly backed in international legal instruments including inter alia the ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries (1998) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People (2007). These instruments do not only appear to be the most comprehensive and advanced international legal instruments that deal with indigenous peoples' rights in terms of the FPIC, but also signal an addition to the growing body of international human rights law that serves to ensure the realisation and protection of the substantive environmental and other human rights of indigenous people, particularly in the context of land grabbing activities that have the potential to negatively impact on their rights. Such rights include, for example, the rights to be informed and to participate in decision-making processes with respect to development projects, including land grabbing activities. This implies an obligation on states party to such international agreements to ensure that indigenous people are informed about and are actively involved in both the negotiation and the implementation of land grabbing deals. However, because the latter often takes place against the background of non-transparent transactions which are inimical to the rights and interests of indigenous people, one may wonder why the principle of FPIC is not applicable during land grabbing transactions. Focusing on Cameroon, this article examines instances of land grabbing in the country in order to support this hypothesis. This is done by focusing specifically on the application of the principle of FPIC. The arguments in the article are inspired by international law in which the application of the principle in the context of land grabbing serves not only to protect the rights and interests of indigenous people but is also conducive to fostering and reinforcing the land governance regime of host countries involved in such deals. To this end, the article concludes that because the principle embodies aspects of procedural rights such as the rights to information and participation, which are often conspicuously lacking during land grabbing contracts, its application in and during land grabbing might be useful to set the basis for the recognition, promotion, and enforcement of local communities' rights in Cameroon. <![CDATA[<b>Realising the child's best interests: lessons from the <i>Child Justice Act </i>to improve the <i>South African Schools Act</i></b>]]> Although the contexts of school discipline and child justice differ considerably there are a number of contact points and points that overlap. Since the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 came into operation in 1996, the Constitutional Court has made several pronouncements on the best-interests-of-the-child concept which are not reflected in the provisions regarding school discipline. The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 came into operation in 2010. This Act provides valuable guidance on how to deal with transgressing children. It is therefore proposed that the Schools Act should draw on the provisions of the Child Justice Act to refine the Schools Act with regard to serious matters of school discipline and to ensure its proper alignment with the constitutional imperatives regarding the best-interests-of-the-child right. <![CDATA[<b>A spring without water: the conundrum of anti-dumping duties in South African law</b>]]> The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (Anti-Dumping Agreement) permits the imposition of anti-dumping duties for as long and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury, subject to the proviso that they must be terminated after five years unless a sunset review has been initiated. A sunset review has the purpose of either permitting or terminating the continuation of an anti-dumping duty. This is significant because if the sunset review is not initiated prior to the expiry of the five-year period, the anti-dumping duties will be terminated. Therefore, this places an emphasis on the determination of the precise date of commencement of the anti-dumping duties. This is because an incorrect determination of the date of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty has obvious financial implications for the interested parties. The Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa has delivered two salient judgments in this regard: firstly, in Progress Office Machines CC v SARS 2008 2 SA 13 (SCA) (POM), and then more recently, in Association of Meat Importers v ITAC 2013 4 All SA 253 (SCA) (AMIE). This paper contends that these two judgments are in conflict and are riddled with inconsistencies. Secondly, the paper contends that the SCA has in the recent AMIE case virtually rewritten its earlier judgment of Progress Office Machines. Lastly, the paper shows that the approach of South African courts to whether the Anti-Dumping Agreement is binding on South African law is fraught with uncertainty and ambivalence. The case analysis also reflects on the impact of the newly minted but yet to be implemented Customs Duty Act with a view to assessing the impact of the new legislation on the issues currently plaguing the anti-dumping regime of South Africa. <![CDATA[<b>Equal pay for work of equal value in terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998: Lessons from the International Labour Organisation and the United Kingdom</b>]]> Equal pay is an area of employment law that is complex and not easily understood. This complexity is recognised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which notes that equal pay for work of equal value has proved to be difficult to understand, both with regard to what it entails and in its application. Amendments have been made to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) to include a specific provision to regulate equal pay claims in the form of section 6(4)-(5) of the EEA. The amendments were made in terms of the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013, which came into effect on 1 August 2014 by presidential proclamation. Prior to section 6(4), the EEA did not contain a specific provision regulating equal pay claims. Claims could be brought in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA, which prohibits unfair discrimination on a number of grounds. The recent amendments to the EEA in the form of section 6(4)-(5) (including the Employment Equity Regulations and the Code of Good Practice on Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value) in respect of equal pay claims is a response to the ILO's criticism of South Africa's failure to include specific equal pay provisions in the EEA. Section 6(4) of the EEA provides for three causes of action in respect of equal pay. They are as follows: (a) equal pay for the same work; (b) equal pay for substantially the same work; and (c) equal pay for work of equal value. The first two causes of action are not difficult to understand as opposed to the third cause of action, which is complex. The ILO has recognised the complexity of the third cause of action, "equal pay for work of equal value". In Mangena v Fila South Africa 2009 12 BLLR 1224 (LC), the Labour Court remarked in the context of an equal pay for work of equal value claim that it does not have expertise in job grading and in the allocation of value to particular occupations. This article will deal with the third cause of action only, "equal pay for work of equal value". The purpose of this article is to critically analyse the law relating to equal pay for work of equal value in terms of the EEA (including the Employment Equity Regulations) and evaluate it against the equal pay laws of the ILO and the United Kingdom, which deal with equal pay for work of equal value. Lastly, this article seeks to ascertain whether the EEA (including the Employment Equity Regulations) provides an adequate legal framework for determining an equal pay for work of equal value claim. <![CDATA[<b>Concern regarding the "Debt" created by Rule 14.10.9 of the Government Employees' Pension Fund Rules</b>]]> This paper highlights the prejudicial effect of the rule within the rules of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), which allows this fund to create a "divorce debt" for its member when the court has ordered that part of such a member's pension interest be paid over to his or her spouse. I argue that this debt is in fact a loan which is provided to the member, which he or she would be expected to pay when he or she exits the fund, with interest. This is despite the fact that the rules of the GEPF do not permit the granting of loans to its members. I argue that the creation of such a loan has the effect of diminishing the GEPF's member's benefits, and thus threaten his or her social security, and can lead to the member becoming unable to provide for himself or herself when he or she reaches retirement age. <![CDATA[<b>Section 27 of the <i>Insolvency Act </i>24 of 1936 as a Violation of the equality clause of the <i>Constitution of South Africa: </i>a critical analysis</b>]]> This paper examines section 27 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 within the context of the right to equality in section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). Section 27 of the Insolvency Act protects benefits arising from an antenuptial contract and given by a man to his wife or to a child born of their marriage, from being set aside as dispositions without value during sequestration proceedings. It excludes men, same-sex partners, children born outside of wedlock and children born to same-sex partners from keeping benefits given to them in an antenuptial contract. It affords such a privilege only to a wife or a child born in the marriage. The right to equality in the Constitution seeks to provide equal benefits before the law to persons in the same or similar positions by prohibiting unfair discrimination. This paper points out that the limitations in section 27 make it vulnerable to constitutional review under section 9(3) of the Constitution on the grounds of marital status, sexual orientation and birth. Certain proposals have been made to develop section 27 to be consistent with the Constitution by amending the definition of spouse in section 21(13) of the Insolvency Act. Such proposals will be considered to illustrate the progress made in reforming the section and to establish whether the reform measures proposed will protect all those affected by the discrimination arising from section 27. The paper concludes that if the proposals are implemented in a future Insolvency Act, they will eliminate the discriminatory effect section 27 has on husbands and wives, civil unions, and children adopted by civil union partners. However, as regards the right to birth, the proposals extend the benefit only to children born of a customary marriage or union, children who are adopted by partners in a civil union, or children who are born to parents who live together as partners in a partnership. Children born outside of marriage or to parents who do not live together in a relationship as partners are still excluded. It is submitted, therefore, that the proposal still distinguishes between the rights afforded to children and still violates the right to birth in section 9(3) of the Constitution. <![CDATA[<b>The Deadlock Principle as a Ground for the Just and Equitable Winding Up of a Solvent Company: <i>Thunder Cats Investments 92 (Pty) Ltd </i></b><i><b>ν</b><b> Nkonjane Economic Prospecting investment (Pty) Ltd </b></i><b>2014 5 SA 1 (SCA)</b>]]> The question addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Thunder Cats Investment 92 (Pty) Ltd v Nkonjane Economic Prospecting & Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 SA 1 (SCA) (hereafter the "Thunder Cats") provides much-needed guidance on the deadlock principle as well as the breadth and scope of the "just and equitable ground for winding up in terms of s 81(1)(d)(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The facts, the issues and the contextual authority of Thunder Cats also bring to fore the lacuna in the just and equitable winding up provisions of the current Companies Act which lacuna has so far received no judicial or academic consideration. This Note contends the fact that the just and equitable winding up provisions do not countenance any deviation from the statutory prescriptions once the factual grounds for just and equitable winding up have been established is not in consonance with the spirit, purport and objects of Companies Act, and, in particular those of Chapter Six of the Act which have introduced the innovative business rescue scheme into South African corporate law landscape. The facts, the issues and the contextual authority of Thunder Cats will be reviewed at length in the ensuing discussion. <![CDATA[<b>A Targeted Outsider's Right to Challenge Local Winding-Up Proceedings <i>PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd </i>2014 UKPC 35 (10 November 2014), 2014 1 WLR 4482 (PC)</b>]]> The problem in PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd 2014 UKPC 35 (10 November 2014), 2014 1 WLR 4482 (PC) was that the Cayman liquidators, frustrated by the unhelpfulness of the company's previous auditors in supplying documents and information to help the liquidators get to the bottom of the company's problems, then obtained a winding-up order in Bermuda, the auditors' home jurisdiction, to have them examined. The auditors appealed successfully to the Privy Council in London to have the winding-up stayed. The facts and the reasoning of this senior court are described, and then critically discussed in this case comment. The auditors were erroneously added to the statutory list of persons who may apply to the court for the stay of the winding-up proceedings. Still, the decision may be supported for the finding that, on the particular facts of the case, the auditors had standing to challenge the winding-up application because the Bermudian court of first instance had no jurisdiction under the relevant statutes and the auditors were the direct targets of the application to wind up the company and examine them. The outcome of the decision carries important implications for the development of company law in England and Bermuda, and for the corresponding company law in South Africa, where the decision is of persuasive authority. <![CDATA[<b>Derivative Misconduct and Forms thereof: <i>Western Refinery Ltd </i></b><i><b>ν</b><b> Hlebela </b></i><b>2015 36 <i>ILJ </i>2280 (LAC)</b>]]> Western Platinum Refinery Ltd v Hlebela 2015 36 ILJ 2280 (LAC) ("'Hlebela") required the Labour Appeal Court to grapple with difficult questions presented by a generic dilemma which confronts an employer who is faced with clear evidence of recurrent theft of precious minerals but is unable to identify the actual culprits, nor are the employees disposed or willing to cooperate with the employer in tracking down the perpetrator(s). Suddenly, the police informed the employer that an employee who had accumulated wealth was a person of interest in their investigations. However, they could give no information about the employee's being engaged, to their knowledge, in particular illegal activities. Hlebela answered the nagging question: what is the appropriate way to discipline an employee who has actual knowledge of the wrongdoing of others or who has actual knowledge of information which the employee subjectively knows is relevant to unlawful conduct against the employer's interests? The categorical answer is that the employer should charge the employee with material breach of the duty of good faith, particularising the knowledge allegedly possessed and alleging a culpable non-disclosure. <![CDATA[<b>Taking a Second Bite at the Appeal Cherry: <i>Molaudzi v S</i></b>]]> The principle of res judicata is well-established in our law: essentially it means that parties to a dispute have only one metaphorical "bite at the cherry". The "bite" can entail appealing through the hierarchy of courts, but once the parties have exhausted their appeals, they cannot re-litigate the same dispute. However, in the recent case of Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) the appellant attempted to appeal to the Constitutional Court twice: the first time the application for leave to appeal was dismissed; the second time the application was granted and the appeal upheld. The appellant got a second "bite at the cherry". In Molaudzi v S the Constitutional Court developed the common law by creating an interest-of-justice exception to the principle of res judicata and - for the first time in the Constitutional Court's history - overturned one of its own judgements. In this case note I present the background of the case of Molaudzi v S, analyse the judgement, and differentiate it from another Constitutional Court case that dealt with res judicata, namely Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 2 SACR 407 (CC).