Scielo RSS <![CDATA[PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad]]> vol. 22 num. 1 lang. <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> <![CDATA[<b>Re-categorising public procurement in South Africa: construction works as a special case</b>]]> Public procurement is generally known to be the acquisition of goods and services by the government from the private sector. Construction works are considered to constitute services and as such are not specifically referred to in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Re-categorising public procurement may hold many advantages for the regulation of construction procurement law as a unique form of public procurement in South Africa. The definition of construction works is thus important when establishing what is procured in construction procurement. This definition in turn may indicate that the procurement of construction works is indeed a unique form of procurement and should accordingly be re-categorised in South African public procurement law. <![CDATA[<b>Proselytising the regulation of religious bodies in South Africa: suppressing religious freedom?</b>]]> In democratic pluralistic and secular societies, freedom of religion is a fundamental right to be enjoyed by all individuals and religious organisations. A unique feature of this human right is the extent to which it is premised on a personal belief. The latter can be "bizarre, illogical or irrational", but nevertheless deserving of protection in the interests of freedom of religion. However, when the expression of a religious belief or practice transgresses the civil or criminal law it must be dealt with in the relevant legislative framework to hold the transgressor liable. Measures taken by the state to regulate religious bodies in terms of a general supervisory council or umbrella body are an unreasonable and unjustifiable interference with freedom of religion, and hence unconstitutional. I am of the view that the right to freedom of religion depends for its constitutional validity - and viability - on there being no interference (or regulation) by the state except in instances as provided for in terms of relevant legislation. <![CDATA[<b>Alternatives to bankruptcy in South Africa that provides for a discharge of debts: lessons from Kenya</b>]]> The problems faced by debtors in South Africa is not that there are no alternatives to insolvency proceedings, but that the available alternatives do not provide for a discharge of debt as with a sequestration order, which is ultimately what the debtor seeks to achieve. Debtors in South Africa can make use of debt review in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 or administration orders in terms of the Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944 to circumvent the sequestration process. However, both debt review and administration orders do not provide for a discharge of debt and provide for debt-restructuring only, in order to eventually satisfy the creditor's claims. Attention is given to the sequestration process and the alternatives to sequestration as they relate specifically to the discharge or lack of a discharge of a debtor's debts. The South African law is compared to Kenyan Law. This article seeks to analyse the alternatives to the bankruptcy provisions of the newly enacted Kenyan Insolvency Act 18 of 2015 in order to influence the possible reform of insolvency law in South Africa. Like the South African Insolvency Act, the old Kenyan Bankruptcy Act (Cap 53 of the Laws of Kenya) also did not have alternatives to bankruptcy. The old Kenyan Bankruptcy Act, however, contained a provision on schemes of arrangement and compositions. The Kenyan Insolvency Act now caters for alternatives to bankruptcy and provides a wide range of alternatives to bankruptcy, some of which allow debtors in different financial positions to obtain a discharge. <![CDATA[<b>The appointment of a proxy "at any time" in terms of Section 58 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: <i>Richard Du Plessis Barry </i></b><i><b>ν</b><b> Clearwater Estates NPC </b></i><b>[2017] ZASCA 11</b>]]> Section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 gives a shareholder the right to appoint a proxy "at any time" for the purpose of participating in, speaking and voting on behalf of that shareholder at a shareholders' meeting, or providing or withholding written consent on behalf of the shareholder in terms of section 60. One important issue that arises in regard to the appointment of a proxy relates to the proper interpretation of section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, namely whether this section, as read with section 58(3)(c), constitutes an unalterable provision giving a shareholder an unlimited right to appoint a proxy "at any time" before the proxy exercises the shareholder's rights at the shareholders meeting, or whether the time period within which the instrument of a proxy's appointment must be delivered to the company may be restricted by the MOI. This issue was considered by the sCa in the Richard Du Plessis Barry case in view of the appellant's contention that the provisions of the MOI that limited the time period within which the instrument appointing a proxy must be delivered to the company, or other person on behalf of the company, were valid. In this note, I examine the Richard Du Plessis Barry case with a focus on the proper interpretation of the right of a shareholder to appoint a proxy "at any time" as conferred by section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. I provide some critical comments on the main issues that this judgement raises, including the interpretation of section 58(1) in the context of "alterable" and "unalterable" provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a purposive interpretation of section 58(1), the interaction between section 58(1) and section 58(3)(c), the significance of the difference in the wording of section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and section 189 of the previous Companies Act 61 of 1973, as well as the practical implications of the court's decision in this matter. This is followed by a brief comparative analysis with selected international jurisdictions and some concluding remarks. <![CDATA[<b>Sexual Harassment: Why do victims so often resign?</b> <i></i><i><b>Ε</b></i><i> <b>ν</b><b> Ikwezi Municipality </b></i><b>2016 37 ILJ 1799 <i>(ECG)</i></b><b></b>]]> This article endeavours to find answers to the question of why the victims of sexual harassment often resign after the harassment, while the perpetrator continues working, and suggests how some of the human cost to victims of sexual harassment can be prevented. E v Ikwezi Municipality provides a classic example of how the failure of the employer to protect the victim exacerbated her suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), eventually leaving her with no option but to resign. Had the employer conducted a risk analysis, it could have prevented the sexual harassment by alerting employees to the content of the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace. Further, had the employer been aware that it was responsible for the victim's psychological safety also after the disciplinary hearing, it could have taken measures to ensure her safety. The unsatisfactory sanction (the harasser was not dismissed) could lastly have been referred to the Labour Court for review. Unfortunately, the wrong legal advice and an incompetent chairperson led to the municipality's failing adequately to protect the victim. This caused (and aggravated) the symptoms of PTSD, which forced the victim to resign.