Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Phronimon]]> vol. 22 num. 1 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> <![CDATA[<b>Rebel Discourse(s) on Gender as Demonstrated by Contemporary and Historical Chinese Marriage Practices</b>]]> I attempt to evaluate rebel discourse(s), as opposed to mainstream, dominant discourse, on gender as demonstrated by marriage practices in Chinese societies, both contemporary and historical, vis-à-vis general Western, marriage practices. This is done discursive-analytically by way of cross-cultural analysis as methodology. Contributions on the theory of discourse are considered and applied. In this contribution, several rebel discourses on marriage during both post-Maoist Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and former dynastic periods, are found to be emancipatory (with women refusing to partake in patriarchal constructs such as marriage) and progressive (with women having several sexual partners simultaneously). The hope is expressed that the profound insights unearthed from these rebel discourse(s) might be beneficial for Western feminisms. To this end, I utilise Zwart's notion of cultural "mixing" and Derrick's idea of the "sliding signifier" before making recommendations for improved public policy formulation. If the 21st century is indeed the Chinese century, such investigations are crucial. <![CDATA[<b>African Philosophy? Questioning the Unquestioned</b>]]> African philosophy, at least the modern modality of its practice, is said to have been initiated by the overwhelming question concerning its existence: Is there an African philosophy? No doubt such radical questioning concerning "knowledges" from Africa is determined by an overarching, indeed imperial, definition of what is understood to be "philosophy"; in other words, this question sought to determine whether those knowledges from Africa fit the category of what is known to be "philosophy" in the Western world. In this paper, I deal with the historical question pertaining to the existence of an African philosophy and the present reiterations of this question. I begin in the first section with an interrogation of such questioning concerning doubt about African philosophy's existence: 1) to subvert the question and thereby undermine the basis of its questioning; 2) to examine the underlying structures of coloniality in Western philosophy and its colonising effects-showing how such a question is rooted in doubt, ignorance and power as functionaries of the European epistemological paradigm facilitating epistemological dominance; and 3) to use such questioning as a basis from which to develop an account of what African philosophy is. <![CDATA[<b>The "Pandemic" and the <i>Différend</i></b>]]> Jean-Francois Lyotard's concept of "the différend" enables one to gain a purchase on the plethora of clashing, divergent discourses or opinions characterising the current historical era, that of the coronavirus "pandemic" (Covid-19), in so far as this concept enables one to discern those areas of discourse where no possibility of agreement could possibly be reached. It contrasts Lyotard's notion of the différend with Habermas's of "consensus," and advances the argument that Lyotard's perspective not merely seems to be applicable to the global situation, today, but that it appears to be vindicated by the incommensurability of opinions, views and beliefs characterising the informational and communicational exchange in contemporary media on various aspects of the "pandemic." The latter include the question of the origin of the "novel coronavirus" (natural, zoonotic transfer to humans, or techno-scientifically produced in a laboratory); the issue of so-called PCR-tests (reliable or not); whether to "lockdown" or not (Sweden versus the rest of the world); and perhaps the most vexing question of them all, namely, whether to receive a Covid-19 vaccine or not (one of several available ones), or to depend on alternative available treatments such as Ivermectin, when necessary. It is demonstrated that the available reports, opinions and pronouncements on these issues diverge irreconcilably, and therefore constitute an exemplary instance of the différend. Finally, the question is raised, what it would take to resolve the différend, or alternatively, make it disappear. <![CDATA[<b>Does Covid-19 Rupture Theodicy? Theo-philosophical Musings</b>]]> When Covid-19 first broke out in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, no one suspected it would go beyond an epidemic. Within less than three months it had become a worldwide pandemic. In the first 15 months since it broke out in Wuhan, the disease grew exponentially, manifesting itself in different variants: Alpha (UK); Beta (South Africa); Gamma (Japan and Brazil); and Delta (India). In August 2021, confirmed cases were 204 million people worldwide, with about 4 million people deceased. Although the mortality rate has halted in China and slightly abated in continental Europe, Canada, Asia and South America, due to medical and social intervention strategies, it is steadily climbing in the USA and Africa. The first vaccine was ready only 12 months after the pandemic broke out, making it one of the quickest manufactured vaccines. For those who operate within a theistic framework, an avalanche of existential questions surfaced: Is this the end of the world? If so, does God, the omnipotent, omniscient and loving Divine being, not care about what seems to be the decimation of human beings on Planet Earth? If the Divine being cares, has it lost its power perhaps? Or, if it is still powerful, has it lost its affectivity? This article gives a theo-philosophical exploration of these questions to make "sense" of what seems like God's silence amid the loud noise of the Corona virus. The article asks whether God could be blamed in what may seem like silence, and argues on the meaning of God's "silence." It then constructs a theodicy that dispenses God of any wrongdoing in the current pandemic.