Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=1445-737720100002&lang=pt vol. 10 num. 2 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>Editorial</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200001&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt <![CDATA[<b>Disciplinarity in phenomenological perspective</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200002&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt <![CDATA[<b>Ethics and the primacy of the Other: A Levinasian foundation for phenomenological research</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200003&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt This paper compares Heidegger's "dasein-centric" existential hermeneutic to Levinas's primacy of the Other and the importance the latter places on the ethical relationship. Invoking the concepts of totality and infinity, the paper discusses the ways in which one encounters the Other and how signification arises from the ethical relationship. This is followed by a discussion of how Levinas's ethics might influence existential phenomenological research methodology, pointing to the ethical demands described by Levinas as seeming to have priority over the praxis of research insofar as the Other calls us beyond the methodological framework. Finally, the paper considers the extent to which the ethical demands of Levinas's phenomenology are met by the special place of the research participant and the attitude of empathic presence prescribed within the Heideggerian framework. <![CDATA[<b>Heidegger and Levinas: Metaphysics, ontology and the horizon of the Other</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200004&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Already in his earlier works Levinas proposes a distinct phenomenological project which takes into consideration the radicality of the other and otherness by questioning intentionality and the validity of intersubjectivity within intentional consciousness. His move "towards Heidegger and against Husserl" was due primarily to Heidegger's Dasein analysis, understanding of Being and being-with. However, in his major work, Totality and Infinity, Levinas proposes a new perspective on reading intersubjective relations with the Other which strongly contrasts with the Heideggerian concept of intersubjectivity. This paper addresses the question of the Other, intersubjectivity and ethics in the writings of Levinas and Heidegger respectively. It considers Levinas's critique of intersubjectivity as provoked and developed by Heidegger's analytic of Dasein, and concentrates on Levinas's specific understanding of intentionality in his account of metaphysics, metaphysical desire and the other. It also takes up the question of temporality as a necessary condition for intersubjective relation and explores its implication for the self and the Other in Levinas's and Heidegger's respective philosophies. <![CDATA[<b>Phenomenology of joint attention</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200005&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt It is one thing for two or more persons to perceive the same object, and it is quite another for two or more persons to perceive the same object together. The latter phenomenon is called joint attention and has recently garnered considerable interest from psychologists. However, contemporary psychological research has not succeeded in clarifying how persons can share perception of an object. Joint attention thus stands in need of phenomenological clarification. Surprisingly, this has yet to be offered. Phenomenologists have provided thoroughgoing analyses of perceptual experience, but have overlooked the perceptual experiences of co-perceivers; and, while a number of well-known phenomenologists have offered accounts of how one encounters other persons, they have neglected the phenomenon of perceptually attending to an object with other persons. This paper addresses a shortcoming of both contemporary psychological research and the phenomenological tradition by providing a phenomenological analysis of joint attention. <![CDATA[<b>Re-thinking what we think about Derrida</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200006&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Although many still see Derrida as a thinker opposed to a unified systematic meaning, there has recently been growing recognition that Derrida, in his later years, suggested that his work is not averse to formalisation. In support of this view, this paper points out that, in 1990, Derrida himself told us that his first work of 1954 reveals a "law" which impels his career, and that some responses had arisen even there. Some benefits of adopting such a common pole are set out, and an interrelated "system" developed to relate the law of 1954 to the later responses, in order to help find a common, systematic base for Derrida's oeuvre. The need to accommodate approaches which are wary of a systematic approach is nevertheless acknowledged, and possible ways of reconciling the diverse readings of Derrida's intent and collaboratively furthering the formalisation of Derrida's oeuvre for posterity are outlined in closing. <![CDATA[<b>Cycling as reading a cityscape: A phenomenological approach to interface-shaped perception</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200007&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt This essay attempts to assess whether the perceptual issues posed by the contemporary interface culture, and the constant attitude shift demanded by the new media between the "natural" and the "as if" modes, might be considered a significant challenge for phenomenological aesthetics as understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception. To demonstrate how the use of a particular interface profoundly shapes the form and structure of an activity as well as enabling perception of a particular kind, the author does not focus directly on the state-of-the-art smart interfaces, but describes the experience of cycling in a large city, with the interface in the form of the bicycle upgraded with an imagined ride simulator. While the former enables a very particular entrance into the world of perception, shaped by its moderate speed and detachment from the ground, the latter enables techno-shaped perception in the "as if" screenic mode. The experience described raises questions concerning the kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and motor features contributing to the cyclist's mobile perception, as well as pointing to issues related to the reading of the city's network as a particular spatial configuration generated by the cyclist's real-time activity. This is the space-time-event-ridescape maintained and modified by the corporeal act of cycling. The spatiality of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space that contains the cyclist, but builds on notions of being-in-the-ridescape (as a kind of cityscape), in terms not only of full corporeal and mental engagement, but also of bodily literacy. The reading of the cityscape enabled by the combination of two interfaces, the bicycle and the ride simulator, is discussed in relation to de Certeau's account of pedestrian (walking) experience in a big city, his distinction between strategies and tactics, and the notion that each cyclist contributes a novel story to ridetext, which is viewed not as an aesthetic object but as the production of puzzles for the rider to solve. The paper concludes by questioning the capacity of phenomenology to accommodate the contemporary phenomenon of a "mixed" or "augmented reality" either in concept or in relation to the demands of the phenomenological reduction and the ends of the epoché. <![CDATA[<b>Naturalistic and supernaturalistic disclosures: The possibility of relational miracles</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200008&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt This paper explores naturalism and supernaturalism as modes of disclosure that reveal and conceal different aspects of relationality. Naturalism is presented as a worldview or set of philosophical assumptions that posits an objective world that is separable from persons and discoverable or describable via scientific methods. Because psychotherapy tacitly endorses many naturalistic assumptions, psychotherapy relationships may be limited to an instrumentalist ethic premised upon use-value and manipulability. Given these naturalistic limitations, relationships may require a supernatural component - a component which reaches beyond the naturalistic and into the miraculous. The alternative grounding for this supernatural disclosure is found in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and that of Emmanuel Levinas, the former emphasizing the possibilities inherent in contemplative rather than calculative disclosures, and the latter emphasizing ethical obligation and absolute otherness. A therapeutic case is discussed as an exemplar of both kinds of relational disclosure - that is, naturalistic and supernaturalistic - and the therapeutic and relational consequences of each type of disclosure are explored. <![CDATA[<b>When research and psychotherapy meet</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1445-73772010000200009&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt This paper explores naturalism and supernaturalism as modes of disclosure that reveal and conceal different aspects of relationality. Naturalism is presented as a worldview or set of philosophical assumptions that posits an objective world that is separable from persons and discoverable or describable via scientific methods. Because psychotherapy tacitly endorses many naturalistic assumptions, psychotherapy relationships may be limited to an instrumentalist ethic premised upon use-value and manipulability. Given these naturalistic limitations, relationships may require a supernatural component - a component which reaches beyond the naturalistic and into the miraculous. The alternative grounding for this supernatural disclosure is found in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and that of Emmanuel Levinas, the former emphasizing the possibilities inherent in contemplative rather than calculative disclosures, and the latter emphasizing ethical obligation and absolute otherness. A therapeutic case is discussed as an exemplar of both kinds of relational disclosure - that is, naturalistic and supernaturalistic - and the therapeutic and relational consequences of each type of disclosure are explored.