Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe

Woord vooraf

Philosophy as an interpretation of our times. Marinas Schoeman as thinker

In hierdie bydrae word Marinus Schoeman se denkweg van 42 jaar as filosoof aan die Universiteit van Pretoria geïnterpreteer. Schoeman is 'n tipe Sokrates-figuur en verfrissende voorbeeld in 'n land waar filosowe al te gou in magsposisies belangstel, in plaas daarvan om die grootse roeping van die denke na te volg. Nadat enkele persoonlike opmerkings oor Schoeman gemaak word (deel 1), bestaan hierdie bydrae uit vier dele. In die tweede deel word Schoeman se loopbaan teen die agtergrond van die verskynsel van Afrikaanse filosofie geplaas. Daar word verwys na Schoeman se mentors aan die Universiteit van Pretoria en hoe hulle hom in ten minste sewe sistematiese navorsingsvelde, kenmerkend van Afrikaanse filosofie, ingelei het. Hierna verskuif die fokus na Schoeman self en 'n nabye lees van sy eerste filosofiese werk oor die denke (Kritiese Teorie) van Herbert Marcuse (deel 3). Dit word opgevolg met 'n kritiese waardering van sy vroeëre lees van die Kritiese Teorie en 'n uiters bondige interpretasie van sy latere filosofiese loopbaan wat uiteindelik in die deugde-etiek van Nietzsche en Arendt kulmineer (deel 4). Laastens word daar met enkele opmerkings oor die roeping van die filosoof in Suid-Afrika volstaan en hoe ons daaroor in gesprek met Marinus Schoeman se denkweg kan bly.

Marinus Schoeman has completed a career spanning 42 years as a philosopher at the University of Pretoria. This contribution focuses on Schoeman's remarkable career as a kind of Socrates figure in a country where thinking is not always first on the agenda of philosophers. The contribution starts (part 1) with some personal remarks by the author who considers Schoeman as one ofhis mentors in philosophy. In this process the following aspects are covered: Schoeman as a passionate teacher; dedicated, but strict supervisor; his broader initiatives in Afrikaans and the South African public sphere; his links with Dutch speaking philosophers; and specific character traits - which includes the virtue of generosity. The remainder of the contribution consists offour parts. In part 2 Schoeman's career as a philosopher is placed in the context of a hundred years of Afrikaans philosophy in South Africa. When Schoeman arrived at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria in 1969, the department was already 60 years old. The significant figures in the department's history in those 60 years were: W.A Macfadyen, T.J. Hugo, C.H. Rautenbach, C.K. Oberholzer, and P.S. Dreyer. The latter two were Schoeman's mentors and they introduced him to the Continental philosophical tradition in which phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, and the history of philosophy were important building blocks. It is also indicated in this part how Schoeman was influenced by at least seven systematic areas within Afrikaans philosophy: the issue of modernity and modern life; the tension between science and religion; the tension between the particular and the universal (including the political implications thereof); the relationship between thinking and language; historical trauma; philosophical criticism; and the issue of the self. In part 3 Schoeman's first major study on the Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse is given close attention. In this study Schoeman basically reconstructs Marcuse's position against the backdrop of Hegel 's, Marx's, and Freud's contributions to our understanding of contemporary society. In Marcuse's version of Critical Theory, Marx's theory of class repression and Freud's instinctual theory is given a new twist, with less emphasis on the biological-determinist sketch of humankind's oppression. In his fascinating work, Eros and Civilization (1955), Marcuse is even hinting in the direction of a society with less repression despite the danger of the achievement principle in contemporary capitalism. Schoeman, though, has problems with Marcuse's sketch of such a repression-less society, especially with regard to new forms of repression needed to create greater freedom. Eventually, at the end of this early study, he sides, quite enigmatically, with the thinking of Heidegger and his mentor, Dreyer as alternative to Marcuse. In part 4 a critical evaluation of Schoeman's early reading ofMarcuse is provided. The author commends Schoeman for his reading and critique of Marcuse, but still asks, why Schoeman never furthered his interest in Marcuse as a member ofthe first generation of Critical Theory. The author is of the opinion that if Schoeman had expanded his criticism of Marcuse in the direction ofthe second generation of Critical Theory (Habermas and Honneth), he could have deepened and expanded his critique of Marcuse. Schoeman'sfurther career is then sketched as a turning away from Critical Theory in the direction of a kind ofpost-Heideggerian reading of our contemporary times. In this regard, Schoeman became interested in the 1980s in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, and the neo-Aristotelianism of the Ritter School. In the 1990s a reading of Robert Bellah and Foucault was added, which eventually culminated in Schoeman's later study on the virtue ethics of Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt. In the final part (5) Schoeman's career as a thinker is appreciatedfor the following reasons: his respect for those mentors and sources that have informed his thinking; his deep sense of the importance of history and its implications for the way we argue in the present; a critique of any kind of abstract, utopian and de-humanising politics; and his concept offriendship as basis for a philosophical life.

Critical remarks on our time and some of its most harmful illusions

Eerstens ondersoek hierdie artikel 'n belangrike verskynsel van ons tyd, naamlik die heroplewing van rewolusionêre bevrydingsbewegings. Basies berus al die rewolusionêre bevrydingsbewegings op minstens twee veronderstellings wat myns insiens albei drogrede-nasies is. Die eerste is die veronderstelling dat ons as mense vry gebore word, en die tweede is die veronderstelling van die nulsom. Beide veronderstellings word krities bespreek. Daar word aangetoon hoe hulle aanleiding gee tot illusies wat n ernstige bedreiging inhou vir die demokrasie en vir beskaafde standaarde in die burgerlike samelewing. Die aandag word veral gerig op die verskynsel van radikaal-Islamitiese terreur en die ideologie van "Derdewêreldisme" oftewel postkoloniale bevryding. Die tweede deel van die artikel handel oor die laat-moderne verskynsel van wat mens kan bestempel as 'n "kultuur van verwerping en onverskilligheid" (beter nog: 'n antikultuur) wat sigself veral in die hoogs ontwikkelde samelewings laat geld. Hierdie antikultuur van onbeskofte en provokerende gedrag kom voort uit n radikale houding van ondankbaarheid, disrespek en 'n totale gebrek aan skroom. Die artikel sluit af met aanduidings van hoe hierdie antikultuur bestry kan word, en wat die voorwaardes vir n beskaafde samelewing sou behels. Filosofie as aktualiteitsanalise - dit beteken dat die filosoof 'n poging aanwend om die tydsgees aan te voel, onder woorde te bring en van vraagtekens te voorsien. "Tydsgees" is 'n vae begrip. Dit is moeilik om dit vas te vang, want as evidensies, d.w.s. as geleefde praktyke, oortuigings, denkgewoontes en denktaboes geld dit meestal as vanselfsprekend, as versweë veronderstellings wat slegs selde tot openbaring kom. Dit het al 'n gemeenplaas geword om te sê dat ons hedendaagse, moderne samelewings gekenmerk word deur die verskynsel van globalisering en sterk beïnvloed word deur die neoliberale lewensopvatting. Dié lewensopvatting berus op die vanselfsprekende aannames van n tegnokratiese en progressiewe elite, wat op elke verstoring van sy wereldbeeld reageer deur die verstorende faktore voor te hou as agterhaalde oorblyfsels uit n oorwonne verlede. Dit lewer n soort sprekerswins op, want dit maak van argumentvoering en debat 'n botsing tussen verteenwoordigers van die toekoms en oorblyfsels van 'n agterhaalde verlede. Wie wil na alles bestempel word as 'n reaksionêr, as 'n struikelblok vir vooruitgang? Ek wil in hierdie bydrae egter nie op die neoliberale gedagtegoed fokus nie. Ek wil eerder die aandag vestig op 'n ander belangrike verskynsel van ons tyd, naamlik die heroplewing van rewolusionêre bevrydingsbewegings. Daarbenewens wil ek, in die tweede plek, stilstaan by die laat-moderne verskynsel van wat mens kan bestempel as 'n "kultuur van verwerping en onverskilligheid" (beter nog: 'n antikultuur) wat sigself veral in die hoogs ontwikkelde samelewings laat geld.

In the first part, this article explores an important phenomenon of our time, i.e. the resurgence of revolutionary liberation movements. Basically, all revolutionary movements since the 18th century rest on at least two assumptions which, on closer inspection, are exposed as fallacies. The first one is the assumption that we humans are born free, and the second is the assumption of the zero sum. Both these assumptions are discussed critically, with the aim of showing how they help to give rise to all sorts of illusions that pose a serious threat to democracy and to standards of civilised behaviour in society. Attention is focused primarily on the phenomenon of radical Islamic terrorism and the ideology of "third worldism" that underpins much of the movements for postcolonial liberation. The second part of this article deals with the late-modern phenomenon of what could be called a "culture (or rather counter-culture) ofrejection and indifference" which is currently prevailing, primarily in the most technically and industrially advanced societies. I argue that this counter-culture of uncivilised (even barbaric) and provocative behaviour emanates from an attitude of profound ingratitude, disrespect and a total lack of scruple. I conclude the article with some suggestions as to how this counter-culture could be effectively opposed and contained. What is needed is a thorough reflection on the preconditions for a genuinely civilised society. Together we must ask anew the age old question about the "good life" - for us as individuals, as a particular community and also for society at large. In wrestling with this question we can draw sustenance and inspiration from the classical sources of our tradition. In this regard, the humanities and particularly philosophy has an extremely important role to play.

Unfulfillable longing between tradition and modernity: Orhan Pamuk's The Museum of Innocence

In hierdie artikel word die Turkse wenner van die Nobelprys vir Letterkunde in 2006, Orhan Pamuk, se roman in Engels vertaal as The Museum of Innocence ontleed betreffende die spanning tussen tradisie en moderniteit. Daar word uitgegaan van die tese dat hierdie spanning te wyte is aan die oorhaastige, wilsmatige, sentralistiese, tipies moderne wyse waarop Turkye se groot moderne staatsman, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, die land tussen 1923 en 1938 gemoderniseer het. Die roman word ontleed aan die hand van twee temas. Die eerste tema is dié van nabootsingsbegeerte waarmee voortgebou word op die werk van Hans Achterhuis en veral René Girard. Hier word aangevoer dat die hoofkarakters in die roman vasgevang is in 'n tussentoestand tussen tradisie en moderniteit, wat hulle probeer ontsnap deur 'n nabootsing van die Westerse moderniteit, met tragiese gevolge. Die tweede tema is dié van verlies en herinneringsvoorwerpe soos dit beslag kry in die hoofkarakter, Kemal, se Museum van Onskuld. Daar word aangetoon dat Pamuk op mimetiese wyse aansluiting vind by die werk van Marcel Proust, maar ook Proust se tema van herinneringsvoorwerpe verder ontgin. Die verskillende fases waarin die Museum van Onskuld beslag kry, word ontleed om uiteindelik tot die gevolgtrekking te kom dat Kemal se onvermoë om anders met die Westerse moderniteit om te gaan, hom dompel in 'n permanente vervanging van die hede en die toekoms met 'n verlore verlede.

This article analyzes The Museum of Innocence, a novel by the Turkish winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2006, Orhan Pamuk. The starting thesis of this article is that the wilful, centralist and thus typically modernist way in which Turkey's greatest modern statesman, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) modernized Turkey at breakneck speed led to a lasting in-between condition of Turkey between tradition and modernity. It is argued that Turkey has yet to find a satisfactory mediation between tradition and modernity, and that Orhan Pamuk is the peerless literary archivist of this in-between condition between tradition and modernity. The effective destruction ofthe traditional moorings of Turkish society under Atatürk came after the already destructive effects on Turkish tradition of the long, slow decline of the Ottoman empire, which was finally brought to an end by Western powers in the First World War between 1914 and 1918. The characters in the novel have been the primary (urban) beneficiaries of Atatürk's modernization efforts, both economically and otherwise. However, it turns out that these benefits are ambiguous. While the principal character, Kemal, and his peers experience the trappings of unprecedented wealth, they also find themselves unmoored from Turkish tradition. They try to compensate for this state of disorientation by mimicking what they take to be the model of Western modernity. As Pamuk brilliantly shows, these mimetic efforts of Kemal and the other characters in the novel lead to very mixed and ultimately tragic results, as the tragic outcome of the love triangle between Kemal, hisfiancee Sibel and his lover, Füsun proves. The unfolding of the tragic events at the heart of The Museum of Innocence is analyzed in finer detail with reference to two themes - mimetic desire between tradition and modernity, and loss and objects of remembrance. The theme of mimetic desire between tradition and modernity is discussed by building on the work of Hans Achterhuis and René Girard. Actherhuis's work Het rijk van de schaarste (1988, The Empire of Scarcity) and his argument against Hobbes's state of nature that social desires are never natural but always culturally mediated is used to show to what extent Kemal and the other characters also find themselves in the vacuum left by a disrupted tradition in the grip of the irresistible attraction of Western modernity and its economy of desire. Girard's Deceit, Desire and the Novel (English translation 1978) is used to show how the characters in this novel find themselves trapped in two dynamics of desire. First, they are dependent on their peers for recognition, similar to that of the characters in Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time. Second, this recognition in turn depends on the extent to which the characters are judged by their non-Western peers in the thrall ofthe West to succeed in mimicking Western modernity. Particular attention is paid to Western films as a mimetic medium for the characters, given that Füsun dreams of becoming a famous film actress, inspired as she is by the American actress who became a European princess, Grace Kelly. The second theme in the novel, that of loss and objects of remembrance, is analyzed with reference to the differences between Proust's and Pamuk's treatment of the object of remembrance. It is argued that where Proust in his famous discussion of the madeleine biscuit treats the object of remembrance as involuntarily bringing forth private memories, Pamuk through the character ofKemal develops a concept of the object ofremembrance bringing about memories not only involuntarily, but also voluntarily; not only private but also communal memories. Against this background the various phases of Kemal's development of the Museum of Innocence are discussed, beginning from the initial unconscious, Proustian phase in Kemal's mother 's Merhamet apartment, up to his eventual conscious establishment of the Museum of Innocence in Füsun's parental home, which becomes his private museum home. Finally it is argued that since Kemal is ultimately unable to opt for a tradition-based mediation of modernity as achieved by the main character in Pamuk's subsequent novel, A Strangeness in My Mind, Kemal ends up a living dead man taking leave of the present and the future for a reified past, leaving him with the option ofstoically bearing his pain withdrawn from the world following the example of Montaigne.

On Nihilism: Nietzsche's "Here and now" or our own?

Als filosofie "actualiteitsanalyse" wil zijn, moet zij niet alleen een kritische blik werpen op de eigen actualiteit, maar ook, en daartoe, op de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van een beschrijving en diagnose van die eigen tijd. Actualiteit is de werkelijkheid van "hier en nu". Maar wellicht kan dat "hier en nu" alleen dan doorzien worden op een manier die niet de vooroordelen van de eigen tijd en omgeving herhaalt, wanneer men afstand neemt van dat hier en nu. In dit artikel wordt die afstand ingenomen door Nietzsches beschrijving en duiding van het nihilisme weer te geven op een manier die de actualiteit daarvan suggereert. Wat hij in zijn 19de eeuw aankondigt als de geschiedenis van de komende twee eeuwen, lijkt inderdaad herkend te kunnen worden in onze tijd. Bovendien wordt de suggestie gedaan dat wat volgens Nietzsche een typisch Europees fenomeen is - hij spreekt van "het Europese nihilisme" - ook buiten Europa herkend kan worden. Waarschijnlijk moeten we afstand nemen, in ruimtelijke en in tijdelijke zin, om scherp naar onszelf te kunnen kijken. Zoals Nietzsche het ergens formuleert: "wie weten wil hoe hoog de torens van een stad zijn, verlaat die stad".

If philosophy claims to be an analysis of the here and now, it should also reflect on the preconditions of a description and diagnosis of the present. One of the challenges presented by such an analysis is the risk of repeating the prejudices of the present in the description thereof. In this article, I attempt to address this challenge by presenting Nietzsche's description and interpretation of nihilism in such a way that the topicality of that description comes to light. Nietzsche distinguishes at least three different stages or forms of nihilism. The first one is also called pessimism, or more precisely: the pessimism of the tragic Greeks. It is an awareness of the absurdity of life and reality without becoming completely befuddled by it. The history of European culture from Socrates up to Nietzsche's 19th century is the period in which a second form of nihilism emerges. Unable to affirm the absurdity of reality, people started to devalue it and to interpret it in the light of a truer reality. This ultimate reality was conceived as meaningful and intelligible, and it showed the reality of our sensual experience to be unreal, only apparent and contingent. This schema is nihilistic because it denies the reality of our sensual world. It was introduced first and foremost by Plato's philosophy and then "democratized" in Christianity. But it dominated all of European culture (science, morality, religion and art) for 2500 years. The third stage or form of nihilism is associated with "the death of God", i.e. the erosion and eventual demise of the core concept upholding the protective structure that was built by the second phase of nihilism. The death of God is what Nietzsche foresees as coming to pass in the two centuries to come. His theory of nihilism is a description of this future. It proves not to be too difficult to present Nietzsche's description of this future in such a way that we recognize our present. There are at least three reasons why Nietzsche calls nihilism a European phenomenon. Firstly, Europe represents a great plurality of cultures and peoples. This situation could lead to greatness if it manages to maintain the tension and conflict among all the different tendencies. It is more probable, however, that the conflict and tension will be wiped out and that the collected plurality will lapse into a weak and ugly mixture or into indifference. Secondly, nihilism is already present in the two main roots of European culture: Greece and Christianity. In Greek mythology we learn that the world only emerged out of chaos by violent acts, and Christian theology interpreted the Jewish creation myth as a creation out of nothing. Chaos and nothingness are more fundamental than order and meaning. The third reason for calling nihilism a European phenomenon has to do with the strength and success of the second phase of nihilism: it has become so established that its very foundations may be questioned, without risking discrediting it as such. That is also the reason why the death of God is hardly understood, and the least of all by those "who don't believe anymore". All three reasons seem not to be limited to European culture, or the scope of European culture seems to be much broader than the borders of the European continent. If Nietzsche's predictions are indeed applicable to our present conditions, and if therefore we can gain some insight into ourselves by looking in the mirror of this 19th century European philosopher, it suggests that temporal and spatial distance is needed for self-critique. Here we are reminded of Nietzsche's saying that "whoever wants to know how high the towers in a town are, [should] leave[.] the town."

Three senses of Umwerthung: Developing an interpretation of Nietzsche's revaluation proposal

In hierdie artikel ontwikkel ek 'n vertolking van Nietzsche se veelbesproke voorstel aangaande 'n herwaardering van alle waardes (Umwerthung aller Werthe). Ek stel 'n manier voor waarop Nietzsche se herwaardering-voorstel vertolk kan word na afloop van 'n kritiese bespreking van Thomas Brobjer (1996) se invloedryke werk. Daarna ondersoek ek die bydrae van Edgar E. Sleinis (1994), Nadeem J. D. Hussain (2009) en Manuel Dries (2010) binne die konteks van 'n verdere ontwikkeling van my eie interpretasie.

A promising suggestion regarding how to understand the question of the significance of philosophy in terms of its ability to provide a critical diagnosis and transformation of our understanding of our contemporary present could be claimed to be found in Friedrich Nietzsche's proposal of a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller WertheJ. Yet, despite recently receiving increasing attention in the secondary literature, the meaning and importance of this seductive expression in his thinking remains disputed. In this paper, my focus is upon developing an interpretation ofhis Umwerthung - proposal by means of a critical consideration of Thomas Brobjer's influential suggestions regarding interpreting the proposal. Brobjer distinguishes four possible interpretations, naming them the utopian, critical, reversal, and dichotomy interpretations. Even though he admits that none of these interpretations capture the complete meaning of the different passages in which the revaluation appears, he nonetheless favours the fourth because it is, in his view, the only one that gives a clear indication as to what new values will look like once the revaluation is complete. In my reading, Brobjer's favoured dichotomy interpretation is subject to a number of criticisms. Specifically, as I show, Nietzsche explicitly rejects the metaphysical belief in "opposite values" on a number of occasions, which makes it seem unlikely that he would advocate Brobjer's dichotomy or reversal interpretations as being the work of his human beings of the future. Even though the dichotomy interpretation has the advantage of providing specific content to the new values as Brobjer admittedly claims, it does not, in my reading, form an interpretation that acknowledges the nuances of Nietzsche's characterization of the revaluation throughout his oeuvre. Rather, it seems to acknowledge only one element of Nietzsche's portrayal of the revaluation. I use the problems I identify in Brobjer's schema to form the beginnings of my own interpretation that I present in the paper - that Nietzsche's Umwerthung proposal can be read as being expressed in three interlinked senses. The third sense in which I claim that the Umwerthung is intended - the creation of new values - generates significant interpretative difficulties, and so in this context, I examine the contributions of E.E. Sleinis (1994), Nadeem J.D. Hussain (2009) and Manuel Dries (2010). Sleinis'(1994) Nietzsche's Revaluation of Values: A Study in Strategies revolves around the claim that the strategies requiredfor a revaluation of all values are present in Nietzsche's thinking, and, importantly, that these strategies do not themselves depend upon or presuppose values. As I show, in his discussion of Nietzsche's strategies regarding cognitive valuation, Sleinis explains that in Nietzsche's view, the absolute theory of truth is incoherent and so collapses not because of an appeal to values, but rather because of its own unintelligibility. For Sleinis, this shows that it is indeed possible to take up a position "outside" of valuation in order to allow certain values to be radically re-valued. Contrary to Sleinis, I characterise Nietzsche'sposition as aproto-contextualist due to his assertion that valuation is not something we do after we have perceived things or sensations, but rather is an integral part ofperception itself, and so our valuations always take place within a context of other valuations. As such, it is my contention that Sleinis'strategy to show that it is possible to take up a position "outside " of valuation in order to allow certain values to be radically re-valued is misguided. The second theorist whose contribution I consider in the context of the proposal of the creation of new values as the third facet of Nietzsche's revaluation proposal is that of Nadeem J.Z. Hussain. Hussain provides a fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche's understanding of values and valuation, and emphasizes the close connection drawn in Nietzsche's works between art, the avoidance of practical nihilism, and the creation of new values. Even though art holds a significant place in Nietzsche's thought and so it seems reasonable to suggest that it plays an important role in the creation of values, I argue in the paper that suggesting that aesthetic choice determines which values the human beings of the future would create is problematic for at least two reasons. Thefinal contribution that I consider in the paper in the context ofattempting to understand what Nietzsche could mean by the creation of values is that of Manuel Dries. Dries argues that Nietzsche's revaluation project refers to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. As Dries explains, traditional values function within a "...standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and 'bindingness'based on exogenous authority with absolute extension" (Dries 2010: 30). Since Nietzsche rejects such traditional approaches as nihilistic, because they attempt to exclude contradiction and opposition among competing values, Dries proposes that Nietzsche would propound a nonstandard, dialetheic model of valuation that entails that a value would have to be both true and false, as well as neither true nor false. I conclude that Dries' proposal of how to understand the creation of new values as a creation of new ways understanding what a value is and how it functions is the most promising suggestion of those discussed. My paper is admittedly limited in its engagement with only a selection of the literature that has been generated on the Umwerthung-proposal, but it remains my contention that such an engagement can allow for a step closer in working out the relevance of the proposal, most especially in the light of the question ofphilosophy's significance as a means to provide a critical analysis of the present.

Welcome to the desert of decolonialphilistism. Aesthetic reflection amidst radical cultural struggle in South Africa

Dit artikel stelt zich tot doel om de voornaamste theoretische implicaties te doordenken van wat het benoemt als de filistijnse tendens van het radicale dekoloniale cultureel activisme van universiteitstudenten in Zuid-Afrika sinds 2015. Dit verwijst naar het gebruik van extreme, confronterende en gewelddadige strategieën van culturele contestatie zoals het vandaliseren, vernietigen en verwijderen van culturele of artistieke artefacten uit het koloniale of apartheidverleden. Het artikel biedt vooreerst een kritisch overzicht van gangbare theoretische rechtvaardigingen van dergelijke culturele politiek, alsook de belangrijkste tegenwerpingen. Ik voer aan dat deze te kort schieten in het ernstig opvatten en/of fundamenteel doordenken van wat op het spel staat in filistijnse daden jegens artistieke en culturele objecten. Ik beargumenteer dat een meer nuchtere en dialectische conceptualisering vereist is van de filistijnse achterdocht en agressie jegens kunst en cultuur. Als één van de belangrijkste aanzetten tot dergelijke benadering wend ik mij tot Fredric Jamesons notie van de filistijn, die hij articuleerde in zijn interpretatie van het esthetische denken van Theodor Adorno. Alhoewel ik mij distantieer van het neomarxistisch perspectief van Jamesons theorisering, zie ik hierin de mogelijkheid om filistijnisme te begrijpen als reactie tegen wat ik, in verwijzing naar het werk van Jacques Rancière, "esthetische verdelingen" noem, oftewel, opgelegde onderscheidingen en hiërarchieën met betrekking tot de esthetische capaciteiten van verschillende groepen in de samenleving. De filistijnse haat tegenover kunst en cultuur kan dan begrepen worden als een legitieme onvrede met hun medeplichtigheid in het instellen en onderhouden van dergelijke verdelingen. Aldus onderneemt dit artikel om een meer affirmatieve lezing te bieden van de radicale culturele politiek van de huidige studentenactivisten in Zuid-Afrika.

This article engages with the theoretical challenges posed by what I call - in a non-derogatory sense - the philistine tendency of current decolonization struggles in South Africa, spearheaded by students at tertiary institutions of learning since 2015. This refers to the employment of extreme, confrontational and violent cultural strategies of contestation, such as vandalism, destruction and removal of cultural artefacts from the colonialist or apartheid era. Most controversially in this regard, was undoubtedly the burning of paintings at the University of Cape Town in early 2016. Taking the latter as primary case, I aim to develop an approach that has been missing so far in public and theoretical discourse on such philistine cultural acts, one that is affirmative and redemptive without thereby wanting to absolve such actions completely. As a preliminary to such an interpretation, the first half of the article offers an overview and critique of the most significant responses to current decolonial cultural activism, starting with the few defences by participants and commentators. I demonstrate how the latter mostly use approaches such as vulgar materialism, the politics of representation and institutional critiques of art in their justification ofphilistine acts by student protesters. I also point to the latter's limitations in fully accounting for the student activists 'passionate and indiscriminate disregard and hatred for art. Next, the article examines more reserved reactions to decolonial cultural activism by progressive critics that, although mostly sympathetic to its aims, seriously question the appropriateness and adequacy of the cultural strategies employed to achieve the latter. I argue that such responses mostly take issue with utilitarian, ends-justifying-the-means type defences of the destruction of cultural artefacts, with concerns raised about what appears to be an unstoppable descent into cultural barbarism. On a more specific, aesthetic level, commentators have pointed to the inefficacy and even inconsistency of the tactics employed to contest cultural artefacts. Here, I particularly take issue with ensuing attempts to plead for more mediated, sublimated and, allegedly, more "constructive" and "meaningful" tactics. I argue that the latter involve a too hasty rejection of key features of current decolonial cultural politics that have made it so effective in shaking up the status-quo and unleashing radical political passions. I further point to the danger among progressive cultural theorists of exerting mechanisms of othering, exclusion and externalization in response to violent acts against art, as well as the adoption of a prescriptive, patronizing, or reprimanding mode of interaction with current decolonial movements. In contrast, this article aims to conceptualize the latter's radical cultural activism in a way that stays true to those key features which I have labelled polemically as "philistine" and that have been regarded generally as unacceptable and unproductive. As such, it undertakes a reappropriation of predominant, stigmatizing and derogatory depictions of such activism in the view that something fundamental concerning the relation between aesthetics and politics is revealed by it. Key to this purpose is the articulation of a more positive, critical, complex and dialectical notion of philistinism, to which the second half of the article is devoted. I take my cue here from essential work done by Fredric Jameson in the early 1990s in his important interpretation of the aesthetic theory of Theodor Adorno. Of special significance here is the way in which he stresses the importance in Adorno's work of the opposite or negative of art which, for instance, includes art's others or enemies. What is valuable here is that the latter are not understood in the pejorative sense, but are dialectically and critically related to the spheres of art and culture. They are said to function as reminders of the operations of social and cultural division that are constitutive of these spheres. It specifically concerns divisions between intellectual labour (including aesthetic contemplation) and manual labour, or between art and praxis. Here, however, I depart from Jameson's neomarxist reading of this process of division and propose to interpret it in a less economistic and reductionistic fashion as involving relatively autonomous mechanisms of "sensible division", a notion I borrow from the work of Jacques Rancière. Against the background of such processes of division, philistine acts are thought to manifest a certain truth - albeit a partial one - regarding the structural guilt and complicity in the division of the sensible, as well as the intolerability of art's inconsequential claims to preserve a promise of happiness in such societal conditions. Finally, I use Jameson's redemptive interpretation of philistinism as a springboard to argue that in his or her extreme hatred of art, the philistine can be seen to be driven by a utopian longing for a suspension of not only illegitimate sensible divisions, but also a sublation of the divorce between art and (revolutionary) political praxis. The article thus employs Jameson's reading of philistine acts and attitudes as theoretical lever to facilitate a more positive way of analysing, understanding and valuing current decolonial cultural activism in South Africa. This is not to justify violation or destruction of art in absolute terms but to contest and offer a corrective to offhand rejections of such radical cultural acts, as well as of the avoidance of serious theoretical engagement.

The university as a battlefield. On democracy, protest and violence

Dit artikel onderzoekt de hedendaagse studentenprotesten in Zuid-Afrika in het licht van vragen rond de betekenis van democratie, de wet en burgerschap. Een onderliggende vraag is of we eigenlijk wel een maatstaf hebben voor het beoordelen van de legitimiteit van instituties, de wet, protest en geweld. Daarbij laat ik me inspireren door het werk van Hannah Arendt, Claude Lefort en Bonnie Honig. Deze denkers komen overeen in hun historisch geïnformeerde en fenomenologische of "diagnostische" benadering van democratische verschijnselen en burgerschap, die bij elk van hen leidt tot een agonistische opvatting van democratie. Desalniettemin heeft hun denken wel degelijk normatieve consequenties. Eerst bespreek ik de betekenis, waarde en grenzen van (democratische) instituties met behulp van Arendts begrip van wereld. Aan de hand van Honigs werk laat ik vervolgens zien dat politiek en recht, vrijheid en structuur een paradox vormen binnen de democratie. De zwarte burgerrechtenbeweging in het Zuiden van de VS in de jaren '50 en '60 illustreert de politieke betekenis die de wet kan hebben. Tenslotte onderzoek ik de legitimiteit van gewelddadige protesten in democratieën aan de hand van het conceptuele onderscheid tussen macht en geweld en een vergelijking tussen de burgerrechtenbeweging en gewelddadige facties in de studentenbeweging in de jaren '60 in de VS. Ik concludeer dat instituties als de universiteit waardevol zijn omdat ze het menselijke samenleven enigszins stabiliseren, maar anderzijds de blijvende aanvulling van democratisch collectief handelen (inclusief protest) van burgers nodig hebben. Strijd en het conflict zijn permanent in de democratie. Dat betekent dat democratie bestaat uit (niet perse aangename) meningenstrijd en onrust. Die strij d heeft wel betrekking op gedeelde democratische objecten of "publieke dingen" (res publicae) die op die manier bemiddelen tussen mensen (burgers, studenten, de staat, universiteitsbesturen) die het fundamenteel niet met elkaar eens zijn. Ook betoogde ik dat res publicae letterlijker dan gebruikelijk genomen moet worden. Gedeelde artefacten vormen niet alleen gespreksonderwerp, maar ook een podium voor democratische strijd. Het sluiten van campussen moet dan ook met de grootst mogelijke terughoudendheid gebeuren. Als kern van de democratie kan het conflict principieel nooit gesloten worden, noch door de (grond)wet, noch door geweld. Een poging tot het eerste is de legalistische reflex van de staat om zich louter te beroepen op rechten die door de grondwet gegarandeerd worden. De aanspraak op het (nog) niet bestaande recht op gratis hoger onderwijs sluit daarentegen aan bij de belofte van democratisch burgerschap. Ten tweede vormt geweld (of dat nu staatsgeweld, het geweld van andere instituties of dat van protestbewegingen is) als poging tot sluiting van de strijd (en dus niet op grond van een moreel principe) de grens van legitiem protest en het optreden daartegen. Geweldsinzet door de staat, universiteiten en studenten zijn geen indicatie van macht maar juist van haar tegendeel.

This article investigates the current student protests in South Africa in light of the meaning of democracy, the law and citizenship. It also addresses the fundamental question about the existence - if at all - of an independent norm or yardstick for judging the legitimacy of institutions, the law, protest and violence. I draw on the work of Hannah Arendt, Claude Lefort and Bonnie Honig. These thinkers share a historically informed and phenomenological or "diagnostic" approach to democratic phenomena, which leads them to embrace an agonistic conception of democracy and the place of institutions, including the law and the constitution. While recognizing the groundlessness of democratic action and the law, their reflections nevertheless have important normative ramifications for collective democratic action and political freedom. First, I discuss the meaning, value and limits of institutions, using Arendt's notion of "world". With the help of Honig's work, I subsequently demonstrate that the paradoxical relation between politics and law, freedom and structure are inherent to democracies. The black Civil Rights movement of the 1950's and 60's in the Southern states of the US illuminates the political meaning the law may have. Finally, I investigate the legitimacy ofviolent protest in democracies, by exploring the conceptual distinction between power and violence and by comparing the civil rights movement to violent factions in the 1960's student protest movement in the US and Europe. I conclude that institutions like the university are valuable because they stabilize human coexistence somewhat, yet they are in permanent need of supplementation by citizens' democratic collective action (including protest). Struggle, contestation and conflict are inherently part of what democracy is. That is, democracy means unrest, and the struggle of opinions may be unpleasant at times. Struggles do however concern shared democratic objects or "public things" (res publicae) which, as a consequence, mediate between people (citizens, students, state officials, university administrators) who fundamentally disagree. I also argue that res publicae should be taken more literal than it usually is. Shared artifacts do not only constitute topics of debate, but also serve as stages or arenas for democratic struggles. Decisions to close down campuses should therefore only be taken with great caution. As inherent to democracy, conflict can on principle never be resolved or closed, neither through the law or the constitution, nor by violent means. An attempt to achieve the first is the state s legalist reflex to strictly stick to rights that are guaranteed by the constitution. In contrast, the claim to the not (yet) existing right to free higher education fits in with the promise of democratic citizenship. Second, violence sets the limit of legitimate protest and action against it, not just for pragmatic reasons, or because a moral principle prohibiting violence is imposed on democratic action. Instead, violence is anti-democratic because it pursues the closure of conflict. The fact that violence easily gets out of hand is not merely incidental, but inherent to the illusion that democratic action is a kind of "making". Violence, whether it is deployed by the state, universities or protesting students, is never an indication of power, but rather of its opposite.

"Mother, can't you see I'm burning?" A few remarks on what we are today

Die huidige nasionale krisis in tersiêre onderrig in Suid-Afrika, gesien teen die agtergrond van 'n korrupte nasionale regering wat geen leiding neem om die krisis te bestuur nie, noop filosowe om 'n indringende analise te onderneem van ons tyd. In 'n poging om sin te versin begin die artikel met 'n soort denkeksperiment waarin ons land, Suid-Afrika haar op die spreekwoordelike praatbank bevind in gesprek met die outeur-terapeut. In die loop van die terapie-sessie kom Freud se bekende droomscenario aan bod oor die oorlede kind wie se doodskleed aan die brand slaan en die droom wat sy/haar ouer op basis van die tragiese gebeure het. In hierdie essay word die droom met sy brand-motief gekoppel aan die heersende toestand in Suid-Afrika wat deur koerantopskrifte beskryf word as 'n land wat brand van woede. In 'n poging om sin te versin word die Freudiaanse droom sorgvuldig vanuit Lacaniaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Vervolgens poog die essay om na te speur waarom die huidige woede van die jeug op hierdie spesifieke historiese tydstip so vurig is. Die speurtog bring die outeur op Mbembe se spoor en spesifiek sy oortuiging dat die fundamentele vraag rakende die herstel van sosiale bande wat vernietig is deur mensehandel en die eindelose oorloë nie vooropgestel word in die postkoloniale diskoers rondom die identiteit van die Afrika-subjek nie. In plaas daarvan figureer die Afrikaan primêr as passiewe slagoffer oorgelewer aan magte buite sy/haar beheer, onbewustelik geteken deur die onderdrukte trauma van die broedermoord wat mede ten grondslag van die slawehandel lê. As die vrygebore generasie in die teken staan van 'n oorspronklike trauma wat alle daaropvolgende traumas hulle trefkrag gee en wat irrasionele emosie-gedrewe reaksies tot gevolg het, hoe kan ons hoop op 'n uitkoms wat nie vooraf bepaal is deur dieselfde regressiewe spiraal van ons en hulle, van geweldpleger en slagoffer nie? Op 'n hoopvolle wyse wend die outeur haar tot Lacan om die vraag te beslis. Lacan dring aan op 'n minimale dog weerbarstige keusevryheid wat die historiese voorafbepaaldheid kan deurbreek. Daar word bevind dat die sogenaamde keusevryheid allesbehalwe 'n eenvoudige antwoord op die dilemma bied.

The current national crisis in Higher Education in South Africa, set against the backdrop of a corrupt national government incapable of providing any leadership in this regard, compels philosophers to undertake an incisive analysis of our present, a task that has always been a crucial and inherent part of philosophical discourse. The formidable nature of such diagnostics of the present forces one to try to make sense of the senseless violence, the irrational politics, and the disintegration of society that typify our time. In an attempt to devise sense, the article starts out with a thought experiment of sorts, in which our country, South Africa finds herself on the proverbial psychoanalyst's coach in discussion with the author-therapist. In the course of the therapy session, Freud's well-known dream scenario comes up about the dead child whose shroud caughtfire and the dream that the parent had following the tragic incident. In this essay, the dream with its burn-motif is linked to the prevailing conditions in South Africa, which newspaper headings describe as a country burning with rage. In an attempt to make sense of the present, the Freudian dream isfirst and foremost closely analysed from a Lacanian perspective. In contrast to Freud's contention that all dreams are wish fulfilments, Lacan argues that it is not the dream that offers an escape from the reality of the child's passing. In actual fact, the child's terrible accusation in the dream that the parent had failed him/her while still alive was experienced as far worse than the actual death of the child. It is the same accusation seen in the eyes of our children having fallen by the wayside, going hungry, burning to death in their shacks, left behind and to their own devices. The essay continues by investigating why the fury of the youth is so fervent at this particular historical juncture. This line of investigation puts the author on Mbembe's track, specifically his contention that the fundamental question regarding the restoration of social bonds that had been destroyed by human trafficking (slave trade) and endless wars has been neglected by the postcolonial discourse on the identity of the African subject. Instead the African subject has primarily been conceived as passive victim of forces beyond his/her control. This has divided African societies against themselves and it opened the way for Africans to participate in the victimization of their own people. Throughout the blame had been laid before the door of the external Other while failing to acknowledge the repressed trauma of the original fratricide, which played an important part in the slave trade. It is argued that the repressed trauma is the reason why the present trauma of the born-free generation has led to so much fervent protest and violence. What is being repressed is the fact that the African subject has not only been violated by European imperialism, but also by his/her own people in the form of African slave traders and more recently a self-elected government in blind pursuit of self-enrichment rather than the empowerment of its citizens. If the born-free generation is indeed subject to an original trauma to which all subsequent traumas owe their impact or amplified potency, and which results in irrational, emotionally driven reactions, how can we possibly hope for an outcome that is not predetermined by the same regressive spiral of us and them, of violator and victim? The author turns to Lacan in the hope of finding an answer to this question. Lacan is adamant that a minimum yet recalcitrant measure of choice remains at our disposal, which is capable of breaking the chain of historical predestination. In the end it is found that this supposed freedom of choice is anything but a straightforward or simple solution to the dilemma.

Why Kant never mentioned paedophillia. A Foucaultian hypothesis

Bestond de pedofilie reeds voor het begin van de 19 e eeuw? Zo ja, hoe kunnen we dan begrijpen dat Immanuel Kant, die in principe over alle onderwerpen schreef (inclusief de "mentale stoornissen" en de seksualiteit in haar veelvuldige verschijningsvormen) de pedofilie nergens vermeldt? Verschillende hypotheses worden vermeld en besproken: moest de pedofilie nog worden "ontdekt" of kwam ze in Kants tijd minder vaak voor dan vandaag het geval is? Vanuit het werk van Foucault en Hacking formuleren we een meer gewaagde hypothese: de pedofilie bestond nog niet als een "possibility of personhood" (Hacking). Ik bespreek deze hypothese uitgaande van Kants verwerping van de incest. Ik laat zien dat Kant nog niet over het conceptuele kader ("dispositief') beschikt om de pedofilie te denken. Het "dispositief van de seksualiteit" (Foucault) dat dit mogelijk maakt ontstaat slechts in de loop van de 19e eeuw. Ik illustreer de nieuwe logica die dit dispositief introduceert aan de hand van een confrontatie tussen Kants bespreking en verwerping van de incest en Sandor Ferenczi's tekst over "Confusion of Tongues Between Adults and the Child".

In his brilliant novel Payback, Mike Nicol tells about an Anglican priest who at the end of the 18th century was burnt to death because of hispaedophilic crimes. Nicol's story seems to imply that paedophilia already existed at the end of the eighteenth century and that at that time people also reacted to it in the same way as many people do today. How can we explain then that Immanuel Kant who lived in the same period and who basically wrote about everything (including mental disorders and sexual life in all its diversity) never mentions paedophilia (or, more generally, the sexual perversions) as a "mental disorder"? I discuss different hypotheses: was paedophilia not discovered yet or did it occur less frequently then it does today? The German psychiatrist and sexuologist Krafft-Ebing who introduced the term ("paedophilia erotica") in German psychiatric literature at the end of the 19th century claims, for instance, that he only encountered four cases in his entire career. I formulate another hypothesis on the basis of the work of Foucault and Hacking: paedophilia as a "possibility of personhood" (Hacking), or better still, the paedophile as a type of person, only came into being at the end of the 19th century. This "possibility" is intrinsically linked to the introduction of a "deployment of sexuality" over and against a "deployment of alliance". Kant's remarks on incest make it possible to explain why there is no room in the "deployment of alliance" for paedophilia or the paedophile. This is why Kant never considers generalizing his argumentation against incest to sexual relations between children and adults as such. What counts for him are not so much children, but children in as far as they are relatives. It is only at the very moment that sexuality starts being conceived in terms of feelings, fantasies and capacities that can be different in adults and children that paedophilia enters the (intellectual and social) arena and that propositions on it become intelligible. This was not yet the case in Kant's day. I illustrate the distinction between these two "deployments" further through the analysis of the opposition between Kant's approach and the approach of the Hungarian psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi. I refer in this context to Ferenczi's seminal text, "Confusion of Tongues Between Adults and the Child", which was first published in 1932. I further illustrate this opposition by explaining that the very idea of a "psychic trauma" did not exist as such before the second half of the 19th century. In the conclusion, I state that this debate should not be reduced to mere epistemology and that Foucault's "deployments" or Hacking's "possibilities of personhood" are something more and something different than just divergent "modes of thinking". Quite on the contrary, they are intrinsically rooted in the material conditions of our existence and in the power relations that constitute it.

Is applied linguistics part of linguistics?

Die redelik onlangse ontstaan van die toegepaste taalkunde as dissipline verklaar waarom die definisies daarvan soveel stryd ontlok. Daar is 'n veelheid van wyses waarop die veld gekonseptualiseer word. Tans is multi- of inter- en selfs transdissiplinariteit weereens gewilde terme in sulke definisies. Merkwaardig genoeg verbind sommige huidige beskouings die veld eksklusief aan die taalkunde, net soos by die aanvang van die dissipline sowat 60 jaar gelede. Hierdie artikel bespreek 'n reeks onlangse herbesinnings oor die definisies vir die dissipline. Die argument word gevoer dat daar nie konseptuele kontinuïteit tussen die linguistiek en die toegepaste taalkunde bestaan nie. Die filosofiese idee word benut dat dissiplines optimaal gedefinieer kan word - nie met verwysing na konkrete entiteite (soos "taal") nie, maar eerder deur te verwys na die teoreties onderskeibare modaliteite of aspekte. Daardie aspekte funksioneer as konseptuele invalshoeke vir dissiplinêre begripsvorming. Die tersaaklike modaliteite hier is respektiewelik die linguale aspek, wat begripsvorming in die linguistiek omskryf, en die tegniese dimensie van ons ervaring, wat sentraal staan in toegepaste taalkundige begripsvorming. Daar is historiese redes waarom sommige taalkundiges ongemaklik was binne die linguistiek, en verkies het om eerder as "toegepaste" taalkundiges te werk. Sulke ongemak is egter nie voldoende rede om helderheid oor die aard van hul teoreties analitiese arbeid te vermy nie. Dissiplinêre definisies bly belangrik: modernistiese en postmodernistiese idees onderliggend aan die linguistiek en die toegepaste taalkunde hou gevolge vir sulke werk in. Dissiplinêre bewustheid, veral van paradigmaverskille, beskerm akademici teen naïewe opinies of die klakkelose navolg van intellektuele modes.

In historical perspective applied linguistics is a fairly recent discipline, which may explain some of the contestation that still surrounds its definition. There is in fact a multiplicity ofways in which it is conceptualised: each of at least seven different traditions of working in the field defines applied linguistics differently. Today, multi-, inter- and even trans-disciplinarity are once again fashionable terms in applied linguistics. It is surprising, then, tofind views ofapplied linguistics that tie it closely and sometimes exclusively to linguistics, as at its inception 60 or more years ago. A discipline cannot claim to have both a singular and a multi-source base. In fact, viewing applied linguistics as part of linguistics or positing linguistics as its "mother discipline" has clearly modernist roots, as was acknowledged as far back as 1985, when it became evident that the exclusive link between linguistics and applied linguistics was untenable. In a recent (2015) volume of the journal Applied Linguistics (36[4]) seven specialists and their editor bring together a number of conceptualisations of the field under the theme of "Definitions for applied linguistics". In assessing these contributions, as well as other recent attempts to conceptualise the field, the paper employs a systematic argument that refutes the notion that there is a conceptual continuity between linguistics and applied linguistics. The argument utilises the philosophical idea that disciplines are best defined with reference not to concrete entities, such as "language ", but rather by referring to theoretically distinguishable modalities or aspects of experience that function as conceptual entry points or angles. These modalities may be identified respectively as the lingual or semiotic aspect, which circumscribes linguistic conceptualisation, and the technical dimension of experience, that is at the centre of applied linguistic concept formation. What reasons can then be found for the contradictory and sometimes self-contradictory current definitions of applied linguistics? One is that at its inception the name chosen for the field suggested, in keeping with its then modernist approach, that there were linguistic subdisciplines and insights that might readily be "applied" in the design of language teaching. This perspective did not endure, however, but the modernist pretence that "science" would show the way to the ultimate solution to language teaching design did. The current definition offered by the international applied linguistics organisation (AILA), for example, does nothing to dispel this pretence. There is a second historical reason for the continuing linkage of linguistics and applied linguistics. This is that some linguists, especially those working on sociolinguistic themes and interests, at one stage felt uncomfortable within the confines of linguistics, and so opted to work rather as "applied linguists". The historically dominant linguistic paradigm of the end of the 20th century, transformational-generative grammar (TGG), defined linguistics in such a way that their work was unwelcome in that discipline. However, while it may explain the organisational or institutional choice of another disciplinary locality, such discomfort does not warrant the suspension of conceptual clarity as to the character or the theoretical focus of both disciplines. A third reason for the lack of conceptual clarity about the disciplinary focus of applied linguistics lies in the vagueness that accompanies current callsfor multi- or inter-disciplinarity. In fact, one of the dissenting opinions among those being reviewed contains an observation that those who urge applied linguists to embrace an inter-disciplinary base are merely attempting to persuade them to use philosophically inspired postmodernist paradigms that are already operative in otherfields, such as anthropology and sociology. Embracing the same methodology or paradigm acrossfields is a trans-disciplinary rather than a multi-disciplinary endeavour. The fact is that inter- or multi-disciplinarity, when left undefined, gives no clear conceptual understanding or guide to how one should or might legitimately or even appropriately proceed as applied linguist. The question might be asked why one would in the first instance want to have a clear idea of the disciplinary boundaries of a field. Might working in an undefined manner not perhaps be more exciting, creative or productive? The renewed current attempts to define applied linguistics imply, however, that its practitioners do seek clarity, and do in fact value it. Moreover, if one s conceptualisation of a field is not clear, then naïve, unsophisticated or intuitive interpretations of what its work comprises may continue to flourish to the detriment of the quality ofwhat it can deliver. The paper will conclude with a consideration of why disciplinary definitions matter, and of how modernist and postmodernist conceptualisations of linguistics and of applied linguistics have effects on the work being done under their respective umbrellas. Paradigm choice and disciplinary awareness are central in avoiding becoming a victim of intellectual fashion, or of naïve interpretations of the nature of one's work.

Nature writing as ecosystem: An analysis of Boomkastele: 'n Sprokie vir 'n stadsmens (Schalk Schoombie). Part 2

David Barnhill stel 'n nuwe benadering tot natuurgesentreerde skryfwerk voor. Op grond van bepaalde nadele in die sisteme van klassifikasie waarop meestal gesteun word in die beskrywing van natuurgerigte skryfwerk, stel Barnhill voor dat 'n natuurgesentreerde woordwerk beskou word as 'n ekosisteem. Die kategorieë waarin natuurgerigte skryfwerk geplaas word wanneer die taksonomie-benadering gevolg word, word beskou as veelvoudige elemente wat in individuele werke saam- of op mekaar inwerk, soos die organismes in 'n ekosisteem. Dié benadering het ten doel om die interne kompleksiteit en diversiteit van die werk te onleed en sodoende tot 'n genuanseerde beskrywing daarvan te kom. In die vorige afdeling van hierdie studie, wat in die Desemberuitgawe van hierdie tydskrif gepubliseer is, is 'n deeglike teoretiese begronding vir Barhnill se benadering gebied. In hierdie afdeling word die teoretiese gereedskap wat Barnhill se benadering bied, getoets. Schalk Schoombie se debuutroman, Boomkastele: 'n sprokie van 'n stadsmens (2015) word bestudeer vanuit die hipotetiese uitgangspunt dat die teks 'n ekosisteem is ten opsigte van die kenmerkende elemente van natuurgesentreerde skryfwerk daarin. Verskillende elemente wat aan natuurgesentreerde skryfwerk sy unieke aard gee, word in Boomkastele geïdentifiseer en die besonderhede omtrent hierdie elemente word verken. Aandag word geskenk aan die interaktiewe samehang tussen hulle, aan hoe elk van die elemente ontwikkel en met sekere anderes geïntegreer word. Hieruit word sigbaar hoe die beeld van 'n ekosisteem uit die roman te voorskyn tree. Uit die toepassing van Barnhill se benadering vloei 'n verskerpte bewustheid van die aard van natuurgerigte skryfwerk asook waardering vir Boomkastele as 'n ryk geskakeerde roman.

In the first part of the present study, published in the December edition of this journal, I explored the theoretical underpinning of a new concept of viewing nature writing, introduced by David Barnhill. Barnhill attempts to improve on taxonomies of nature writing that do not acknowledge the inner complexity and diversity of individual works. He calls his scheme an ecosystem, reminding us that such a system involves the interactions between a community and its non-living environment as well as interactions between the elements in it. According to Barnhill (2010:279) each piece of nature writing is an ecosystem in which various elements of nature writing are developed and integrated in a unique way. The abstract categories into which works are placed in a taxonomy become multiple elements within individual works, working in concert with or influencing each other, such as the organisms in an ecosystem. The internal qualities of such works are analysed and described in order to discover the interplay between different elements and how the character of an ecosystem emerges from this. Barnhill (2010:279-282) distinguishes several elements of nature writing: accounts or descriptions of nature, personal experience in nature, social experience of nature, philosophy of nature, spirituality in nature experiences, ecological consciousness, concern with language in representing nature, and ecosocial politics - the latter a term reflecting the interconnectedness of environmental and social issues. Boomkastele: 'n sprokie vir 'n stadsmens (2015) is Schalk Schoombie's first novel and Barnhill's theoretical approach to nature writing is directly relevant to studying this novel. A prominent narrative line is constructed around Hannes Moerdyk, the researcher in the novel, and his affectionate ties with the trees in his backyard in suburban Johannesburg. These trees, which grow on the boundary between his and his neighbour's premises, are unexpectedly cut down to make way for the new flats that the neighbour is planning to build and lease. This enrages the researcher, who estimates the trees to be more than half a century old and blames the neighbour for his short-sightedness and hisfinancial greed. This incident leads to a private war; the researcher sets his heart on avenging the death of the trees and this obsession eventually comes to dominate his mind This analysis of Boomkastele puts Barnhill's theoretical instrument to the test. The hypothetical point of departure is that the novel resembles an ecosystem comprising the characteristic elements of nature writing found in it. This method of approximation focuses on analysing the internal complexity and diversity of Schoombie's novel and arriving at a more complete understanding and a more nuanced description of this work. This investigation firstly aims at determining which elements of nature writing are presented in Boomkastele. Close attention is paid to the content and detail of these elements, the relative emphasis of each, the interrelationships among them and the way in which each element is developed and integrated in the whole of the ecosystem to be found in the novel. Eco-social criticism, a dominant element in Boomkastele, functions in support of various other elements. Criticism against the destruction of trees is linked with the researcher'spersonal experience of nature: trees are his friends and he obsessively focuses on avenging their death. The eco-social criticism in this novel also emphasises the description of trees as treasures of nature. The significance of trees, which are described as having limbs and lives, is being ironised by the criticism on their fate, namely losing those lives and limbs because of man's short-sightedness. The researcher decides to plant new trees and to build a wooden cabin in one of them as a way to celebrate the splendour oftrees and to bring back something of a glorious partnership between humans and trees. The construction process of this cabin is planned carefully so as not to harm the tree at all; it will sit like a nest between the branches and will naturally mingle with the tree itself. The eco-social ideals that are included in this tree-friendly way of building a cabin, function in support of another element, namely ecological consciousness. This is expressed in the novel by means of details about the researcher's growing identification with and deep-felt respect for the trees. The element of eco-social critique is also integrated strongly with the focus on language to represent unique experiences in nature, especially when the wounding of the trees is depicted. Barnhill's approach to nature writing creates a sharpened awareness of the qualities that characterise this genre. Applying his method of describing and evaluating texts to Boomkastele has led to the discovery of the interactive connection between diverse elements in the novel, which lends it the nature of an ecosystem and affirms its multifaceted character.

The contemporary Afrikaans poetry system: In search of the most representative model of the role player relationship which it contains

Die sisteemteoretiese benadering tot die literatuurstudie is reeds deeglik gevestig, ook in Afrikaans. Sisteme kan as netwerke gemodelleer word en sedert die vyftigerjare van die vorige eeu is 'n groot aantal netwerkmodelle binne die wiskundige grafiekteorie ontwikkel. Die huidige studie vergelyk die hedendaagse Afrikaanse poësiesisteem en die Afrikaanse literêre sisteem van ander tydperke met twee netwerkmodelle ten einde te bepaal watter netwerkmodel die juisste voorstelling van Afrikaanse literêre netwerke verteenwoordig. Twee van die belangrikste netwerkmodelle in die wiskundige grafiekteorie, naamlik die lukrake netwerkmodel van Erdös en Rényi (1959; 1960 - voortaan die ER-model) en die skaalvrye netwerkmodel van Barabási en Albert (1999 - voortaan die BA-model), word bespreek en met behulp van Pearson se korrelasiekoëffisiënt word die korrelasies tussen die skakelverspreidingspatrone van Afrikaanse literêre netwerke en hierdie twee netwerkmodelle bereken. Daar word aangetoon dat sowel die hedendaagse Afrikaanse poësiesisteem as ander Afrikaanse literêre netwerke akkuraat met die BA-model gemodelleer kan word. Die betekenis van hierdie modellering word bespreek, veral met betrekking tot hoe die groei van die literêre netwerk daar uitsien, dit wil sê, deur Barabási se beginsel van selektiewe skakelvorming op die hedendaagse Afrikaanse poësie van toepassing te maak.

The system theoretical approach to literature is well-established (Even-Zohar, 1979; 1990; 1997), also in Afrikaans literary studies (Viljoen, 1984; 1986; Senekal, 1987). Systems can be modelled as networks, and since the fifties of the last century, a large number of network models have been developed in mathematical graph theory. The current study follows Li et al. 's comparison (2013) of network models in comparing the contemporary Afrikaans poetry system and the Afrikaans literary system from other periods with two network models in order to determine which network model constitutes the most suitable representation of Afrikaans literary networks. Two of the most important network models in mathematical graph theory, namely the random graph model of 'Erdas andRényi (1959; 1960 - henceforth the ER-model) and the scale-free network model of Barabási and Albert (1999 - henceforth the BA-model), are discussed. In an ER-model, link formation occurs at random, meaning that there is an equal probability that a link will form between any two nodes. Because of this random process, the link distribution pattern in an ER-model follows a Poisson distribution, which means that the majority of individual data points can be found close to the average and that the average is therefore a good prediction of the number of edges that an individual node will have. In contrast, link formation is biased towards nodes that already have a high number of links in the BA-model, meaning that ties are more likely to form with nodes that already have a high degree. The result of this preferential attachment process is that the link distribution pattern in a BA-model is right-skewed and inhomogeneous, with a small number of nodes having a high number of ties, while the majority of nodes have a small degree that falls below the average. Using Pearson's correlation coefficient, the correlation between the link distribution patterns of Afrikaans literary networks and these network models is calculated. With a correlation of r = 0,942 between the link distribution pattern of the contemporary Afrikaans poetry network and that of the BA-model, and 0,836 < r < 0,986for other Afrikaans literary networks and this model, it is shown that both the contemporary Afrikaans poetry system and other Afrikaans literary networks can be modelled accurately with the BA-model. In contrast, correlations between the link distribution patterns of Afrikaans literary networks and those of the ER-model are shown to be weak, with r = 0,138 between the contemporary Afrikaans poetry network and that of the ER-model, and -0,119 < r < 0,043for other Afrikaans literary networks and the ER-model. The meaning of this modelling is also discussed, especially how the growth of the literary network is informed by Barabási'sprinciple of preferential attachment. It is argued that authors that have been studied frequently in the past are more likely to be studied in the future, and that reviewers who have been asked to review poetry books in the past are more likely to be asked to review a new publication than reviewers who have not been as active in the poetry network in the past. While this illustrates that the literary system is self-organising insofar as decisions about which authors and books to review, as well as which reviewers to use are made from within the system, it is also argued that Barabási's notion of fitness can further illuminate the functioning of the literary system; it is through a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic factors that poets become popular in academic circles.

Slavoj Žižek and film (theory)? Part 1: An overview

Enersyds weens die gebruik van filmvoorbeelde in sy filosofiese werk en andersyds weens sy teoretisering van film vanuit 'n Lacaniaanse perspektief, het Slavoj iek 'n beduidende merk op filmteorie gelaat. Hierdie artikel stel ten doel om die kontoere en belangrikste motiewe van 'n iekiaanse filmteorie te beskryf. Omdat iek homself as verteenwoordiger van 'n Lacaniaanse konseptuele tradisie presenteer, word sy eie idees rondom film teen die historiese ontwikkelinge van tradisionele Lacaniaanse filmteorie gestel. Die evolusie in laasgenoemde tradisie hang nou met 'n herkonseptualisering van die filmiese "gaze" as objektivering van die Lacaniaanse objet petit a saam. Met hierdie herkonseptualisering, vergesel van 'n sentraalstelling van aspekte soos die Reële, jouissance, begeerte en fantasie, sinjaleer iekiaanse filmteorie 'n terugkeer na 'n latere Lacan - nie die Lacan van die spieëlfase nie. iek, as boegbeeld van neo-Lacaniaanse filmteorie, ontsnap egter aan die teoretiese ivoor- toring. Omdat films volgens hom soortgelyk aan ideologie funksioneer (as 'n betekenisstruktuur wat die begeerte van die kyker van meet af aan impliseer), kan films as analitiese gereedskap aangewend word om ideologie te teoretiseer. iek se appèl is voorts die dink met film en nie die dink oor film nie, as verantwoordbare wyse om teorie as sodanig in die moderne kapitalistiese wêreld te beoefen.

Both by virtue of his regular use of illustrative examples from films in his philosophical work and his theoretical analysis ofmovies from a Lacanian perspective, Slavoj Zizek has made an important contribution to film theory. This article proposes to give a simplified overview of the main tenets and motifs that could be considered representative of a Zizekian theory of film. Because Zizek presents himself self-consciously as a Lacanian thinker, it is important to contextualise his work on film within this conceptual tradition. Traditional Lacanian film theory focused on Lacan's early work on the Imaginary (mirror stage) and via Althusser proposed film as indicative of subject-positioning in ideological contexts. After criticism levelled by the Post-Theorists (Bordwell, Carroll, etc.), Lacanian film theory had to reinvent itself. This happened through a reconceptualisation of a number of Lacanian theoretical motifs, as well as a change offocus from Lacan's earlier to his later work. Although Zizek is but one amongst a number of theorists that can be mentioned in this regard, his popularity and the fact that his work encompasses all of these rejuvenated theoretical motifs, result in the claim that neo-Lacanian film theory can also be described as being Zizekian. The main motif that represents the break between traditional and neo-Lacanian (or Zizekian) film theory, is the reconceptualisation of the filmic gaze. Whereas previously it was considered to represent the perspective of the camera and give the viewer the illusion of control, Zizekian theory identifies the gaze as the objectivation of the objet petit a i.e. the indication that the viewer is implied in the thing he or she sees. This meant that the gaze had nothing to do with control but rather with its opposite: an indication that the viewer cannot see everything, is implicated in the structure of what is seen and that the symbolic signification of thefilm harbours inherent antagonisms. The first exponent to present this interpretation was Joan Copjec, but Zizek followed suit to relate the gaze as objet petit a to a number of Lacanian concepts. These include a new focus on the dynamics of objet petit a (the object-cause of desire), the role that the Lacanian Real plays in contradistinction to the Symbolic and the Imaginary, the implications ofjouissance, the meaning of drive and desire and the all-important role of fantasy. The gaze, the objet petit a and the Real should be considered as a triad of motifs that partly overlap, partly modulate and partly shed light on one another. The common effect of all three would be the way in which these undercut the illusionary coherence presented by the Symbolic. The latter can be described as the filmic fantasy seen by the viewer and can be identified as representing the attempts to negate or hide the inconsistencies of the Symbolic as these are represented by the gaze. iek is very quick to indicate the similarities between the dynamics of fantasy in film and the dynamics of ideology in reality. If one could understand the tension between the objet petit a (gaze) and fantasy in film as the foundational element of ideology in reality, film analysis takes on a heuristic role beyond the ivory tower ofmere theory. It then becomes an entry point to think about the individual as ideological subject. This is where iek finds a moral obligation in the way he practices theory: theory should not be seen as a way to achieve objective truth, but rather as a historically situated attempt to make a difference in reality. Seen in this way, his appeal for theory in general andfilm theory specifically, is to employ its analytical apparatus to think about and even effect changes in our socio-political domain. His film theory therefore evolves into a thinking withfilm rather than a thinking aboutfilm: film remains crucial to gain insight into the fantastical coordinates of everyday life.

Learners' experiences while blogging in an Afrikaans class

Hierdie studie het op blogging gefokus, as een van die moontlike maniere waarop 'n rekenaar in 'n Afrikaansklas gebruik kan word, met die doel om integrasie tussen die verskillende leerareas te bevorder. Die navorser wou bepaal hoe leerders blogging sou hanteer, met die fokus op die verskillende komponente in die skoolomgewing - die gebruik van tegnologie, die leerders self, die reëls waaraan hulle moes voldoen en die gemeenskap waarin hulle leef, naamlik die onderwyser, en ander leerders en ouers wat op hul werk kommentaar moes lewer. Hierdie komponente is belangrik in die aktiwiteitsteorie. Met Maier en Ellen se 1956-frustrasieteorie as agtergrond, het die navorser aangeneem dat die projek leerders sal motiveer om beter as in die verlede te doen, of dat dit aggressie, regressie, vermyding of fiksasie sou veroorsaak. Die navorser het 'n kwalitatiewe, interpretatiewe gevallestudie onderneem met 40 graad tien Eerste Addisionele Taal Afrikaans-leerders van 'n privaat skool as deelnemers. Die leerders moes dagboekinskrywings in 'n blog doen. Daarna het hulle narratiewe kommentaar oor hulle ervarings geskryf. Dit is verbatim oorgetik en deur middel van Atlas.ti ontleed. Die meeste leerders se ervarings was positief, baie het aggressief geraak, 'n groot persen-tasie het na 'n normale skryftaak geregresseer, terwyl sommige probeer het om die probleem sover as moontlik te ignoreer. Leerders het hul eie frustrasievlakke verhoog as gevolg van vergeetagtigheid, foute en 'n gebrek aan tydsbestuur en kennis.

The focus of this study was on blogging as one of the possible uses of the computer in an Afrikaans First Additional Language class, in order to improve integration between the learning areas in a school environment. It was a new experience for learners, the use of technology in an Afrikaans class being particularly unusual for them. Blogging had its inception in the 1990's and, like many trends that have been given life by rapidly evolving information technology, might have been expected to wane in usefulness and popularity. However, blogging is still going strong and has changed in the sense that it is not merely regarded as a casual platform for the expression of personal interests and opinions, but offers an easily accessible means for deep-thinking, informed and socially aware individuals to contribute significantly to the global body of knowledge about any particular topic. Such contributions are considered sufficiently serious and substantial to be listed under a blogger's work experience. In the classroom, blogging helps learners to build their writing skills and to gain their own voice. They become aware of correct writing styles and learn to express their own opinions lucidly in written format. They begin to write with an audience in mind and produce work that ispublishable, without the normal publication requirements. At the same time, they have access to many different resources and are made more aware of copyright issues, so that instances of plagiarism and copyright infringements by learners are significantly reduced. Blogging affords learners the opportunity to communicate through multimedia, thus enhancing the quality of the presentation of their work and motivating them to deliver their best. Furthermore, a classroom blog is not only an excellent way to keep parents in the loop about classroom activities, but also gives learners the chance to network globally with learners from other countries. The researcher wanted to determine how learners would handle frustration in a new situation, with the focus on the different components operating in a school environment: the frustration caused by the use of the technology, themselves, the rules they had to adhere to, the community they lived in: the teacher, other learners and parents or family. These components come into prominence when you take the activity theory into account. The learners had to reach certain outcomes, in this case good project marks and possible participation in a competition. Based on Maier and Ellen's 1956 frustration theory, the researcher assumed that the project would either motivate learners to obtain better marks, or cause aggression, regression, avoidance (withdrawal) or fixation. She conducted a qualitative, interpretive case study with 40 First Additional Language grade ten Afrikaans learners from a private independent school as participants. They had to do diary entries in a blog. Thereafter they had to write narrative essays about their experiences while completing the assignment. These essays were typed verbatim and analysed through Atlas.ti. Most learners' responses were positive, many were aggressive, a considerable percentage regressed to a normal written task, while some tried to avoid the problem as long as possible. No learners displayedfixation as a response. Many learners showed more than one possible response. Learners increased their frustration levels as a result of a lack of knowledge, forgetfulness, mistakes and a lack of time management. The fact that there were different expectations from different classes causedfrustration, as well as the fact that the parents and other learners had to comment on learners' work. Quite a number of learners experienced frustration as a result of the use of the blog itself. The most important conclusion is that this type of exercise should become a preferred way of teaching and learning, due to its educational value in shaping learners' minds and guiding teachers to see and do things differently in a technology driven society. Blogging promotes analytical and creative thinking and gives all learners in the class a voice.

Nederlandse tippetoppetepeltuitjes: De Afrikaanse literatuur in Nederland in 2016

Taalrubriek_TGW_04: Oor die skryfwyse van Afrikaans II

Huldigingsbundels: Afrikaanse skrywers/digters/dramaturge