Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=0041-475120210003&lang=es vol. 61 num. 3 lang. es <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>A metaphoricity of the senses in William of Auxerre's (ca.1140-1231) Summa Aurea (ca.1220)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300001&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Hierdie artikel bied 'n ideëhistoriese herwaardering van die sonderlinge vroegskolastiese bydrae van Willem van Auxerre (gelatiniseerd Guilhelmus Altissiodorensis of Autissiodorensis, in Frans Guillaume d'Auxerre; ca.1140-1231) as die skrywer van 'n volledige (vier volumes) skolastiese summa in die teologie, getitel Summa Aurea. Dié werk is voltooi in en gesirkuleer rondom 1220. Die artikel poog om Auxerre binne die navorsingsdomeine van eietydse skolastieknavorsing te posisioneer, ook aan die hand van die mees onlangse nisnavorsing (in die besonder dié van BT Coolman en Magdalena Bieniak) en die naspeuring van die ideëhistoriese ontwikkeling van sintuigmetaforiek (met verwysing na die epistemologiese aansprake van die "geestelike sintuie") uit die patristiek en Vroeë Middeleeue tot in die Hoog- en Laat Middeleeue. Daarby word gepoog om geestelike waarneming as die samehangende en samebindende basisbegrip in die Summa Aurea te belig en as sodanig te kommentarieer. Die artikel ondersoek voorts die moontlike tematiese ooreenkomste tussen Auxerre se leer van die "geestelike sintuie" en Middeleeuse Minnemystik (met besondere verwysing na Hadewijch van Antwerpen [fl.1240] se ervaringsgedrewe epistemologie), waarna die konseptuele raamwerk en die diskursiewe aard van 'n sintuigmetaforiek deeglik ontleed word. Auxerre se wesenlike oogmerk was om aan te dui dat geestelike kennis van God, verwerf deur middel van die "geestelike sintuie", soortgelyk is aan kennis van die materiële werklikheid, verwerf deur middel van die liggaamlike sintuie, waar die "geestelike aansien" of (volgens Augustinus) "verligte visie" van God (visio Dei) en die "hoor" (simphonia), "ruik" (odor, met die uitdruklike semantiese lading van 'herinnering' of 'geheue'), "proe" (dulcedo) en "aanraak" (tactus) van God meewerk tot die verruiming van bestaande teologiese kennis. Ten slotte word Auxerre se hermeneutiek bestempel as 'n hoogs oorspronklike dialektiek van die mundane (in via) en die ewige (in patria).<hr/>This article presents an idea-historical reappraisal of the unique early scholastic contribution of William of Auxerre (Latinised as Guilhelmus Altissiodorensis or Autissiodorensis; ca.1140-1231), the author of a complete (four-volume) scholastic summa in theology, the Summa Aurea, completed in and circulated from circa 1220. The article, by reworking several niche outputs from the most recent specialist research (notably that of BT Coolman and Magdalena Bieniak), attempts to position Auxerre within the frame of contemporary scholastic scholarship by specifying the idea-historical development of a metaphoricity of the senses (with regard to the epistemological claims of the "spiritual senses") from patristics and the early Middle Ages to the central and later Middle Ages, and presenting "spiritual apprehension" as the basic integrating concept in the Summa Aurea. Then a possible relationship between Auxerre's teaching of the "spiritual senses" and Medieval Minnemystik (with specific reference to the sensual mysticism of Hadewijch of Antwerp [fl. 1240]) is explored, after which the conceptual framework and discursive nature of a metaphoricity of the senses are examined in detail. Auxerre's fundamental objective was to show that spiritual knowledge of God acquired through the "spiritual senses" is similar to material knowledge acquired through the bodily senses, that is, the "spiritual sight" or (according to Augustine) the "enlightened vision" of God (visio Dei) and "hearing" (simphonia), "smelling" (odor, referring to memory in particular), "tasting" (dulcedo) and "touching" (tactus) contribute to an expansion of existing theological knowledge. Finally, Auxerre's hermeneutics is presented as an original dialectic of the mundane (in via) and the eternal (in patria). This reinterpretation of the significance of the Summa Aurea is descriptive-analytical in its presentation of the history of ideas concerned, literary-analytical in its examination of the relevant sections in the Summa Aurea and synthetic in its coherent integration of the primary and secondary texts concerned. The objective of the article is fivefold, namely 1) to position Auxerre within contemporary scholasticism scholarship; 2) to specify the idea-historical development of the metaphoricity of the senses during the Middle Ages; 3) to detail "spiritual apprehension" as a key metaphorical concept in the Summa Aurea; 4) to indicate the possible relationship between a metaphoricity of the senses and Medieval sensual mysticism (or Minnemystik, with specific reference to Hadewijch of Antwerp's experience-driven epistemology); and 5) to elaborate on the internal conceptual structure and discursive nature of the Summa Aurea as a unique contribution arising from the highly idiosyncratic theological and philosophical contexts of early scholasticism. <![CDATA[<b>The Old Testament as a book of relationships: A reflection on the value of the Old Testament</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300002&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Die publikasie van twee verskillende uitgawes van die Bybel in Afrikaans is 'n resente aanduiding van die kontroversiële posisie van die Ou Testament in die Bybel. Onderliggend aan die aandrang op 'n afsonderlike uitgawe van die Bybel in Afrikaans is die oortuiging dat die waarde van die Ou Testament eintlik lê in die heenwysings, voorspellings, sinspelings en profesieë wat dit bevat ten opsigte van Jesus Christus. Vervolgens die probleemstelling wat in hierdie bydrae ondersoek gaan word: Wat is die waarde van die Ou Testament as deel van die kanon van die Christelike kerk? Die binêre teenoorstelling van begrippe (wet: evangelie; belofte: vervulling; kontinuïteit: diskontinuïteit) om die verhouding tussen Ou en Nuwe Testament te beskryf, deug nie meer om die verhouding effektief te beskryf nie. 'n Alternatiewe moontlikheid vir die waardering van die Ou Testament word voorgestel wat kortliks daarop neerkom dat die Ou Testament gelees moet word as 'n verhoudingsboek wat primêr handel oor God en mens wat in 'n verhouding met mekaar, ander en die skepping staan.<hr/>On 29 November 2020, a new translation of the Bible in Afrikaans was launched. What makes this translation special in a certain way is the fact that two editions of this Bible were released - something that had never been done in the past. In the one edition, institutions and/or characters that are regarded by some theologians as direct prophecies or predictions of Jesus Christ as the Messiah are printed without using higher case letters. In the other edition, higher case letters are used to indicate that certain institutions and/or characters are indeed direct references to Jesus Christ in the New Testament. This extraordinary step by the Bible Society of South Africa to publish two editions of the Bible once again raised the thorny issue of the controversial place the Old Testament occupies in the canon of scriptures of the church. The main problem addressed is the value the Old Testament has for the church. To put the issue in a nutshell: Why does the church need an Old Testament if there is a New Testament? A brief overview of the reception of the Old Testament as part of the canon of scriptures in the church is given. At first, the Old Testament was simply accepted as the Bible in the early church, since the early Christians (being Jews) accepted the Jewish scriptures as authoritative. This can be seen by the many references to what is known today as the Old Testament in the New Testament by all authors of the New Testament writings. In a second movement, there were attempts to eliminate the Old Testament from the Christian church's canon of scriptures. Attention is briefly paid to Marcion, Von Harnack and Bultmann in this regard. In a third movement, the Old Testament was retained as part of the Bible of the church. However, the uneasiness regarding the Old Testament within the church remained, resulting in different hermeneutic formulae to capture the proper relationship between the Old and New Testament. It is argued that the current binary opposition of terms such as law: gospel; promise: fulfilment; continuity: discontinuity to describe the relationship between the Old and New Testament can no longer be upheld. How well intended all of these attempts may have been, it resulted in downgrading the Old Testament as a kind of second-class canon to the "superior" New Testament. An alternative view is suggested where the Old Testament has to be read through the lens of a relational God who enters into a relationship with human beings and, vice versa, human beings who enter into a relationship with God and other human beings. The value the Old Testament has for the church and the believing community is endlessly more than to view it as a collection of predictions concerning the coming Messiah. The result of this proposed fresh approach will allow a new understanding of the Old Testament to be heard on its own terms to the enrichment of the church and believers. <![CDATA[<b>MT Steyn: A modern Christian Afrikaner leader?</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300003&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Die waardering vir president MT Steyn onder sy mense het weerklink in beskrywings waarmee hulle hom gekarakteriseer het, soos "Afrikaner van die Afrikaners" en "siel van die Vryheidstryd". Steyn (1896-1902) was die laaste president van die Republiek van die Oranje-Vrystaat, maar die eerste een wat in dié onafhanklike Boererepubliek gebore is. Omstanders kon sy belydenis van God Drie-enig as die Driemaal Heilige God uit sy eie mond hoor. Hy het sy taak, waaronder die Vrystaat se deelname aan die Anglo-Boereoorlog, in die geloof aangepak. Sy reaksie op probleme was gegrond op Christelike lewenswaarhede. Hoewel hy soms in onpersoonlike, onsydige terme na God verwys het, sou dit hom nie verhinder om die Bybel as gids vir die lewe te aanvaar nie. Vanuit sy agtergrond as 'n Vrystaatse boerseun sou Steyn 'n spontane band met die Afrikaner en veral die Vrystaatse Afrikaner ontwikkel. Deur studie en opleiding as 'n Afrikaner uit Afrika in Nederland en Brittanje, asook deur sy vriendskap met bekende Engelse van Bloemfontein en sy werk as 'n Vrystaatse regter, sou Steyn ontwikkel in 'n moderne, belese en berese staatsman. Hierdie Vrystaatse president het gedurende sy ampstydperk (1896-1902) getoon dat hy deeglik op hoogte was van Suid-Afrikaanse en Westerse denkrigtings en dat hy sy eie posisie as Vrystater in hierdie opsig na binne en buite kon verantwoord. Steyn se optrede as president op nasionale sowel as internasionale vlak is deurgaans gerig deur die beginsel van reg en geregtigheid. Hy was uitgesproke Afrikaans, maar met lewensruimte vir ander groepe. Daarby was hy 'n voorstander van die strukturele gelykwaardigheid van state, ongeag hulle mag of vermoë. Steyn se sentrale lewenskompas is op die Vrouemonument aangebring: "Uw wil geschiede …".<hr/>MT Steyn was the last president of the Republic of the Orange Free State (1896-1902), since his term as president coincided with the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) in which the small republic, together with its sister state, the South African Republic (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, ZAR), had to defend themselves against imminent invasion by Great Britain. His inspirational leadership during this war gave rise to nicknames such as "Afrikaner van die Afrikaners" (the outstanding Afrikaner) and "Siel van die Vryheidstryd" (the spiritual driving force behind the fight for freedom), simultaneously showing his close ties with the Afrikaner people. This article takes a closer look at MT Steyn as an able leader of Christian Afrikaners in his time. It focuses on Steyn as an outspoken reformed Christian, his credo or expression of faith in God and his application of biblical truths to everyday life. His spontaneous identification with and leadership of the Afrikaner people are discussed with reference to his term as president, but also taking into consideration his conduct as an ex-president and community leader. Steyn was born near the town of Winburg in the Free State on 2 October 1857, the first president to be born in the republic as such and educated within an Afrikaner farming community - according to him he was a "simple" son of a farmer ("'n gewone boerseun"), familiar with both "a horse and a gun". Given this kind of background Steyn's spiritual and emotional bond with the Afrikaner people was never doubted. It was simply accepted. He was the political and spiritual leader - the real first citizen - of the Republic of the Orange Free State at the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war in 1899. His reading of this momentous event was that the very existence of the Afrikaner people was at stake. In his opinion, imperialists such as the British High Commissioner in Southern Africa, Lord Alfred Milner, precipitated the Anglo-Boer War with the intent of discouraging the Afrikaner people in trying to resist the proposed expansion of the British Empire, which would cost them their freedom as citizens of an independent Boer republic. Steyn spoke of the Triune God as our God who is three times holy. Apart from certain unpersonal names associated with the influence of the Enlightenment from 1750 onwards, he used scriptural or biblical names for the Lord. He accepted the beneficial effect of the providence of God in human life. His notion that nothing happened outside the will of the Lord, was shared by his fellow Afrikaners' unquestionable belief in the providence of God. Although the Boers could not explain it properly, they nevertheless believed in God's guiding while engaging in fierce battles with the English. Even the unimaginable suffering endured by women and children in concentration camps, where more than 34 000 Afrikaner women and children reportedly died of unnatural causes, eventually resulted in the words, "Let thy will be done.." being included in the inscription on the Women's Memorial in 1913. It is important to note, here, that the by then ex-president Steyn was instrumental in having this particular inscription approved, thereby showing his ability to influence the opinion of his fellow Afrikaner people. It should be clear that Steyn knew his people well enough to persuade them to follow his lead. Towards the end of the Anglo Boer War a well-known British enemy, Lord Kitchener, while in charge of the British troops in Southern Africa, remarked that Steyn had the ability to turn his people around in not accepting a peace treaty and, instead, to continue with the war. Undoubtedly, it was no easy decision for Steyn to surrender to the British, thereby accepting the reality that the Republic of the Orange Free State would cease to exist. At the end of the peace talks, his absence from signing the peace treaty due to serious illness, as far as he was concerned, could be ascribed to the providence of God. During the war Steyn often took the initiative of leading by example, thereby inspiring citizens of both the republics engaged in the war. According to his perspective the Afrikaners or Boers could physically lose the war, but still overcome the British emotionally and spiritually. However, should the Boers cowardly surrender to the British, they would lose both their self-esteem and self-respect. A similar view was shared by Emily Hobhouse, the British Florence Nightingale who had endeavoured to alleviate the suffering of the Boer women and children in the concentration camps during the Anglo Boer War. In an address, read on her behalf at the opening of the Women's Memorial in Bloemfontein in 1913, she urged women and children to forgive the British aggressors, because, in her opinion, the Boers had gained the upper moral ground and could therefore afford forgiveness. This sentiment was echoed by Steyn in his reference to the triumphant martyrdom of the Afrikaner people, in particular the women and children. According to him they had lost the war but won the peace, and to his satisfaction they had also retained their self-esteem, Christian faith and proven values of life. In Steyn's view, then, the struggle against British oppression could be justified as an attempt to uphold justice between the states of the world. As a Christian he opted for the structural equality of states, irrespective of their military power, material wealth or superior numbers. He chose to help the sister republic of the Free State, the ZAR, against the British, because as a Christian state, the Free State had to keep its promise, which was included in a treaty with the ZAR in 1889 and 1897. In the representative assembly of the Free State or the meeting of his "Volksraad" before the war, on 22 September 1899, he declared in public that although the Free State was a small and weak state, it was strong enough to keep its word. Steyn saw in a republic with democratic customs the preferred way whereby a Christian Afrikaner state could be established. He chose a republic as the right of his people and one in which he as a Christian was willing to accommodate other cultures and languages. Already before his term as president, the Republic of the Free State was complimented as a model state. As a republican and a man with insight in the ways of the Afrikaner people, Steyn embraced the Free State as his homeland. <![CDATA[<b>"...But no wings buttress now": Selected poems in Antjie Krog's mede-wete read through the lens of autobiographical post-secular late work</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300004&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es In Antjie Krog se bundel mede-wete verskyn 'n aantal gedigte waarin die ek-spreker se soeke na 'n nuwe soort spiritualiteit verwoord word en waarin die implisiete versugting na die eenheid van alle dinge voorkom. Die doel van hierdie artikel is om 'n teoretiese konsep aan die hand te doen waarvolgens die spirituele aspekte in hierdie bundel bespreek kan word. Teorieë oor outobiografie as spirituele praktyk, veral in die digter se laatwerk, sowel as postsekularisme en ekopsigologie sal vir hierdie doel ingespan word. Daar sal hoofsaaklik eksemplaries te werk gegaan word deurdat enkele kerngedigte in die bundel ontleed word, te wete "moniaal", " 'n eland staan by 'n kuil", "ongelowig is nie die regte woord nie" en "kerssonnet". Daar word aangetoon op welke wyse Krog kategorieë of gehele wat in moderne tye hulle relevansie verloor het, poëties nuut verwoord deur te fokus op die verbeelding van 'n groter geheel waarin plante, diere en mense interverbonde is en interafhanklik van mekaar bestaan. Sodoende word die grense van die paradigma van egosentrisme waarin moderne mense verval het, opgehef en bestaande religieuse grense word deurbreek deurdat holisme op kreatiewe wyse as nuwe werklikheid daargestel word.<hr/>In Antjie Krog's collection of poetry, mede-wete (English translation, Synapse, by Karen Press)¹there are a number of poems in which the author's search for a new kind of spirituality is articulated and in which the implicit longing for unity of all living things is suggested. Even before Socrates, philosophers speculated that wholes do indeed exist, but that their independently functioning parts are nothing but theoretical speculation. In modern physics, this concept is embodied in quantum field theory, which implies that everything that exists can be compared to waves at sea that cannot exist independently of the ocean. For the seeker of spiritual truth, the holistic path is a mystical path on which life reveals itself in its deeper meaning and "where our thoughts, feelings and actions are integrated by a clear intelligence and knowledge, and where a feeling of intimacy and participation with something greater than our normal selves occurs" (Ashraf 2012). In this manner the individual pursues so-called "higher knowledge". The purpose of this article is to suggest a theoretical paradigm on the basis of which the spiritual aspects in mede-wete can be discussed. I mainly rely on theories of autobiography as a spiritual practice, especially as an aspect of authors' "late work", post-secularism and ecopsychology when analysing a number of core poems, namely "moniaal", ("postulant"), "'n eland staan by 'n kuil" ("an eland stands at a pool"), "ongelowig is nie die regte woord nie" ("faithless is not the right word"), and "kerssonnet" ("christmas sonnet"). It can be argued that, in these poems, it becomes evident that rigid categories have lost their relevance in modern times. New categories have been imagined by the poet and phrased in poetic similes suggesting a larger whole in which plants, animals and people exist in interrelated and interdependent ways. In this way the boundaries of egocentrism by which modern people have been trapped are lifted, and existing religious boundaries are re-imagined through the creation of holism as a new reality - a reality that is greater than the sum of its individual elements; a liquid, ever-changing reality, adapted to the situation as it presents itself. The first section of the article focuses on spiritual autobiography and the individual's search for transcendent meaning as an aspect of identity construction. Spirituality involves, among other things, the feeling of interconnectedness with something greater than ourselves, which often includes a search for the meaning of the individual's life. As such, it is a universal human experience that can deeply affect human beings emotionally. Spiritual autobiography is often practised by writers who, towards the end of their lives, focus on the past in the light of universal human experiences in order to make sense of their own lives. Especially in autobiographies written in the later phase of an author's life, family and family relationships often play an important role - not only the role of the poet's ancestors and origins is investigated and reflected upon, but often children and even grandchildren form part of a reflection on the future and the legacy of the individual to posterity. It is precisely these poems that are examined in this article. Although mede-wete is clearly not intended as a spiritual autobiography, there is ample reason to consider several poems in this collection through the lens of theories on this particular genre, as there are such a large number of poems that correspond to the poet's (Antjie Krog's) biographical details. What is interesting is that three of the poems analysed directly follow on a poem about the poet's grandchildren or other toddlers. Therefore, I argue that there is a rhetorical connection between these "child poems" and the poems on spiritual reflection that directly follow them. It seems that "child poems" often give rise to reflection on transcendent experiences and to the need to explain these experiences. Several poems in mede-wete can be interpreted as confessions of faith. In the second section, I discuss the poem "kerssonnet" ("Christmas sonnet") from which it would appear that biblical metanarratives no longer provide modern people adhering to a secular value system with the hermeneutics of trust necessary for a firm belief in biblical truths. In its stead, the speaker, for example in a poem such as "ongelowig is nie die regte woord nie" ("faithless is not the right word"), suggests an alternative paradigm that does not imply a return to traditional religions, but rather a greater awareness of the continuing relevance of religion in secular societies. Such "post-secular" discourse is characterised by individual preferences for particular aspects of spirituality, implying that spirituality is still important, although it does not depend on the hegemony of mainstream discourse. In a post-secular world, new metaphors must be found to talk about God. In "ongelowig is nie die regte woord nie" ("faithless is not the right word") the following metaphor is significant: "we all drink like babies at a breast we feel / the nipple between our gums and say: it's / God (...)". By means of this metaphor, then, postmodern feminist discourse enters the poem - a discourse that refers to Julia Kristeva's theory of the mother as abject. Abjection here is the personification of the radical Other, the non-Self - or God. The poem "'n eland staan by 'n kuil" ("an eland stands at a pool"), discussed in the third section, depicts a mystical experience, an ecstatic moment in which the speaker comes into direct contact with the Holy One and feels herself, in a mystical way, being united with the universe. It is interesting to note that the eland is considered by San people to be a sacred animal, but that it is also the animal associated with rites of passage and initiation. My argument being that one can also read this poem as the creed of a newly initiated, someone who begins to walk a new spiritual path. The poem expresses the insight, which also underlies the whole volume of poetry, that all things created are interconnected. <![CDATA[<b>Political transformationism in South Africa: Implications for the state, the economy and society</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300005&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Vorme van sosiogeniëring, byvoorbeeld kolonisasie, apartheid en vorme van radikale sosialisme (Ujamaa - sosialisme in Tanzanië, en radikale grondhervorming in Zimbabwe), was meestal 'n mislukking met katastrofiese gevolge vir die onderskeie state, hul ekonomieë en selfs die betrokke samelewingsordes. Dikwels is die omgekeerde bereik van juis dít wat in die vooruitsig gestel is. Die mislukking van apartheid (soms voorgehou as afsonderlike ontwikkeling) is nog vars in die geheue as voorbeeld van bogenoemde. Uitgaande van die idee (of ideologie) van die Nasionaal Demokratiese Rewolusie, het die oorhoofse beleidsraamwerk van politieke transformasie in Suid Afrika beslag gekry - die teenvoeter vir die historiese apartheid- en koloniale praktyke. Die doel van hierdie ideologie is om, met behulp van radikale (transformatiewe verandering), 'n samelewing wat verenigend, nierassig, nieseksisties en ontwikkelingsgerig is te bewerkstellig. Die sentrale fokus is verteenwoordigendheid op alle vlakke van die samelewing met inbegrip van die staat, die ekonomie en die burgerlike samelewing. Hierdie navorsing stel as hipotese dat politieke transformasie, die ideologie wat in Suid-Afrika toegepas word, tot mislukking gedoem is en dat hierdie mislukking nie net reeds waarneembaar is nie, maar verreikende toekomstige implikasies inhou vir die staat, die ekonomie en die groter samelewing. Die doel van hierdie artikel is dus 'n grondige ondersoek na en kritiese ontleding van transformatisme as die heersende politieke ideologie in Suid-Afrika. Hierdie beoordeling geskied teen die agtergrond van die regstaatidee as norm, asook verbandhoudende demokratiese kriteria waarin politieke, ekonomiese en sosiale vryheid as normatiewe grondslag en vertrekpunt geneem word.<hr/>Forms of political and social engineering, for example colonisation, apartheid and forms of radical socialism (Ujamaa - socialism in Tanzania, and radical land reform in Zimbabwe), proved to be mostly failures with catastrophic implications for the various states, their economies and even the societies involved. Often the opposite of what exactly had been envisaged, was achieved. In this regard, the failure of apartheid (sometimes described as separate development) is still freshly remembered as a pertinent example of the abovementioned instances of political and social engineering. Proceeding from the idea (or ideology) of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), the overarching policy framework of political transformation has since been established in South Africa - the response to the former apartheid and colonial practices preceding the country's change to a democratically elected government in 1994. The objective of the ideology informing NDR policies is the establishment of a society that strives to become reconciling, non-sexist and aimed at development in a radical transformative way. The central focus is representativity at all levels of society, including the state, the economy and civil society. This research states as hypothesis that political transformation (transformationism) the ideology currently prevalent in South Africa, is doomed to failure and that this failure is not only already observable, but holds far reaching implications for the state, the economy and greater society in future. My aim is to undertake a thorough investigation and critical analysis of political transformation as the overarching political ideology in South Africa. Such evaluation is undertaken in terms of the rule of law adage ("Rechtsstaat" notion) as norm, as well as connected democratic criteria according to which political, economic and social freedom are taken as normative basis and point of departure. <![CDATA[<b>The soul of protest: Reconsidering the causes, significance and subcomponents of public protest</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300006&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es In 'n wêreld deurdrenk met geweld - beide subjektief en objektief beskou - tref mens protes as 'n teken van gemeenskaplike ontevredenheid aan. Die beweegrede onderliggend aan protesaksie word egter gereeld misken vir wat dit in werklikheid is, naamlik solidariteit met diegene wat onreg ly. Daar was die afgelope twee dekades plaaslik en internasionaal 'n skerp toename in openbare protes, met 'n gepaardgaande toename in teorieë wat oor die oorsake hiervan bespiegel. Ondanks 'n verskeidenheid voorstellings is dit nietemin steeds onduidelik "waaroor ons praat wanneer ons van protes praat", in die mate waarin die grondbeginsels van protes slegs binne beperkte epistemologiese gemeenskappe (en nie in die algemeen nie) oorweeg word. Hierdie artikel besin oor die aard van protes as 'n politieke handeling wat op 'n kontinuum wat wissel van opposisiepolitiek tot burgeroorlog lê. Hierdie kontinuum verskaf 'n gegradeerde beskouing wat uitdrukkings van ontevredenheid orden volgens die erns van die uitkoms. Voorts bied die artikel 'n abstrakte voorstelling van die onderskeie afdelings van protesvorming as sodanig, waaronder griewe, gebare en taktiese maatreëls. Van nader beskou, blyk hieruit dat protes getipeer kan word as 'n openbare uitdrukking van 'n niehegemoniese, etiese verbintenis tot geregtigheid, 'n optrede wat moed en koördinasie verg, en waarvan die uitkoms altyd onvoorspelbaar is; dit wil sê, 'n daad van liefde. Ten slotte word die episode van openbare geweld en plunder in Julie 2021 in Suid-Afrika aan die hand van die voorgestelde raamwerk ondersoek en bespreek.<hr/>The protest event. In a world steeped in ambient violence, public protest is a vital signal of shared discontent. The essential compulsion at the heart of protest, however, is conventionally not recognised for what it is i continue: solidarity with those suffering injustices. A sharp rise in public protests has been perceived since the early 2000s. Thousands of column inches dedicated to reporting on protests are rivalled in volume only by the reams of academic theories produced around causes. Despite this overabundance of discourses, it often remains unclear what protest, at heart, constitutes. That is, what are we talking about when we talk about protest, and why does this question matter? While stewards of the state often portray protests (and protesters) as "the problem", we have long understood protests as weapons of the weak, at once signalling desperation and civil discontent. In this paper I reflect on the nature of protest as a direct political action that is situated on a continuum that ranges from opposition politics to civil war. By visualising this continuum, I recapitulate how political actions can be represented within three schemas of recognition (by official political parties and agents); reintegration (into official politics); or revolution (i.e., the obliteration of certain political institutions with the aim of establishing an alternative utopia). While there is overlap between the three, we see that actions that are not revolutionary are not necessarily opposed to maintaining the present social order, while those not interested in recognition may be considered as political projects. Based upon these principles, I develop the argument that protest is, in a certain sense, a "continuation of politics by other means", evoking Von Clausewitz in this regard. : protest is, however, not merely politics by other means, but nobler. While protest, a form of direct political action, is an indication of events, policies, or conditions that are experienced as repression, neglect, or injustice, it is simultaneously both a contextually rational response, and a reactive counterweight, a necessary checking of social communication channels, or part of an emancipatory project, enacted to change a prevailing violation and establish what is anticipated to be a more humane or just social order. In this mode, courage and coordination are exerted to better the beneficiaries' quality of life, not to lower the quality of life of another. Thus understood, protest is not merely altruism, but an outflow of care and compassion towards another. Put differently, protest is vitally animated by, and thus an act of, love Next, I justify approaching protest as an ethical commitment by considering the constituent parts of protest formation in the abstract. These parts, which also represent a nonlinear sequence of sorts, include grievances, gestures, and tactics, and may give rise to protest "arcs" (or episodes). I develop an argument to show how individual concerns, invoked amid background violence, snowball into shared grievances, which may be catalysed by a trigger event into the idea of a response, which in turn may precipitate a set of tactics. Referring to Jacques Lacan's "three orders" typology, the idea of the response (or gesture) and the planned action, map onto the Imaginary and Symbolic orders, respectively. The resultant event, contingent and unpredictable (especially with regard to the emergent tumult), is best understood in terms of the Real. Once more, but now approached "from the bottom-up" (as opposed to my former top-down classification-driven argument), my treatment of these constituent parts reveals protest to be, first and foremost, a manifestation of a nonhegemonic ethical commitment to justice, requiring courage and coordination, and whose outcome is always contingent; underscoring the essential quality of love. <![CDATA[<b>The necessity of competent teachers in each South African school classroom</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300007&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Goeie onderwys kan beskou word as die belangrikste funksie van die staat. Kinders kan nie sukses in die lewe behaal sonder onderwys nie en die basiese instellings van 'n staat kan ineenstort sonder goeie onderwys (vgl. Thro 2005; Nkomo 2021). 'n Verslag van die Wêreld Ekonomiese Forum (2013) het bevind dat Suid-Afrika se onderwysstelsel die derde swakste van al die geëvalueerde lande gevaar het. Die jongste ewekniestudies oor aspekte van die onderwys bevestig almal dat Suid-Afrika groot uitdagings in die gesig staar, hoewel daar tog geringe vordering te bespeur is (Department of Basic Education 2017). Die beskikbaarheid van bevoegde leerkragte word as as een van die grootste uitdagings van die Suid-Afrikaanse onderwyssstelsel gesien. Die pedagogiese en vakinhoudelike kennis van die meeste onderwysers is swak en is die hoofrede vir swak leerderprestasie. Verskeie redes kan vir hierdie onbevoegdheid aangevoer word. Meta-analiste soos Hanushek en Hattie het bevind dat iemand wat oplossings vir onderwysprobleme soek in die eerste plek na die gehalte van onderwysers moet kyk. In hierdie artikel ondersoek ek die implikasies van hulle sienings en in besonder hulle bevindings dat mens "prosaiëse" ekonomiese waardes aan onderwysers se bydraes kan heg. Nuwe uitdagings wat aan onderwysers gestel word deur die Covid-19-virus nou, en ook wanneer die onderwysstelsel na die pandemie herstel ("reset"), sal in berekening gebring moet word. Die koronavirus en die afloop daarvan sal waarskynlik saam met die huidige probleme met die gehalte van onderwys die aanstelling van bevoegde onderwysers ononderhandelbaar maak.<hr/>The South African government's relatively high spending on education is not reflected in die quality of educators and education. The inadequate quality of education can to a large degree be attributed to the poor quality of South African educators. In this article I will briefly sketch the poor performance of the education system as measured by agencies like the World Economic Forum and evaluated in international studies with reference to matters such as literacy and mathematics teaching. This is an attempt to make sense of some existing and emerging reasons why the presence of competent educators in classrooms may be non-negotiable to provide improved and adequate education. The reasons apply to the present and the future when education will be in a space completely different from the present due to the COVID-19 pandemic. I will explore questions about what a competent teacher is, why so many South African teachers are incompetent, whether we can define the value of teachers in terms of more than vague and sentimental praises for educators' work, the challenges COVID-19 poses which are lkely to render incompetent teachers uanable to respond effectively and the challenges and opportunities that the post-pandemic epoch will entail. In trying to define what a competent teacher is, I first consulted the Department of Education's Norms and Standards for Educators document of 2000 which defines seven roles that educators have to play. I believe that this document does not adequately define what a competent educator is in our current situation as it was primarily developed to support the Outcomes-Based Education teacher education initiative around 2000. Furthermore, present compliance theory approaches to education management limit the autonomy a teacher needs to fulfil these seven roles. Spaull (2013) believes a competent educator should display a minmum level of professionalism including a real desire to teach. I agree with his four characteristics of teacher professionalism. Even taken together with the seven roles they still do not capture all the qualities a competent educator should possess and I added some perspectives from education law and pedagogical theory to augment their definitions. I referred to capabilities of competent teachers such as creating the future for the learners in their care, protecting learners' sexual and overall safety and creating a relationship of trust with learners and the entire education community to lead children to maturity in enabling them to shoulder their responsibility for the welfare of society. Competent educators should also be capable of responding quickly and effectively to new and unexpected challenges. The main aim of this article is not to identify the reasons why so many teachers are incompetent. I did, however, refer to some aspects that policy makers and leaders and managers should address to improve the quality of teachers. These include concerns about the quality of teachers' initial and further training programmes, the legacy of apartheid which provided most teachers with inadequate teacher training, the poor state of teacher induction, appointment processes that go wrong for various reasons and, lastly, the unsatisfactory conditions of service of educators in regard to which Mbiza (2021) makes a statement that rings true and addresses two problem areas simultaneously: "Yes, let's pay teachers more, but let's also raise the entry-level requirements for the profession". Next I considered the value of competent teachers and was surprised that many eminent scholars like Hanushek (2011) and Hattie (2002) as well as Martinez (2015) and Kristof (2012) agreed that one cannot really measure the value of educators or clothe it in slogans aimed to make teachers feel good. They all agreed that the solution to problems in education does not lie in policy initiatives and strategies like limiting the number of learners per teachers, the provision of artificial intelligence and cyber hardware to schools and statistical analyses of schools' performances. Instead, they all found that the best way to address educational challenges was to ensure that in every classroom there was a teacher of at least average competence (not even a good or excellent teacher) and that poor teachers should be removed from classrooms - the obvious question here is how that can be done while respecting the labour and other rights of teachers. However, what was most surprising is that they discovered that they were able to develop "more prosaic economic values related to effective teaching, by drawing on research literature that provides surprisingly precise estimates of the impact of student achievement levels on their lifetime earnings" (Hanushek 2011). They were even able to calculate and articulate the impact of better than poor educators on a country's economy. I then turned to the implications of COVID-19 for educators and used the NIDS-CRAM fifth wave review of the pandemic for indications of areas that will require the involvement of competent teachers. These areas include the tripling of learner drop-outs, the increase in learners' suffering from "silent" and other forms of hunger and the problem of stunting caused by hunger and malnutrition. I commented on the loss of teaching time of between 70% and 100% of primary school learners. However, educational managers and leaders and teachers now have an opportunity and duty to use special skills to find more ways of involving the community in addressing these problems. An attempt to imagine the situation after the pandemic led me to study the work of Schwab and Malleret (2020). They adduced that the post-pandemic world would be totally different from the pre-pandemic one. They did not provide any concrete guidelines but argued convincingly that the complexity, interdependence and velocity of hitherto unknown societal changes and the acceleration of some present phenomena will present competent educators with more challenges than ever before. However, there will also be opportunities to "reset" or reimagine a new education dispensation. The need for competent educators will become even more acute than it is now and will be non-negotiable. <![CDATA[<b>The value of personal storytelling in Afrikaans Home Language in the National Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300008&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Storievertelling word wêreldwyd aangewend om individue op 'n informele wyse te onderrig. Persoonlike vertellings of lewensverhale is 'n onderafdeling van storievertelling as groter fenomeen en hierdie persoonlike lewensverhale kan suksesvol as onderrigstrategie ingespan word. In hierdie verband het McAdams (2001:101) bevind dat lewensverhale veral belangrik is as uitdrukking van die individu se identiteit en hom of haar sodoende help om sin te maak van persoonlike ervarings. Storievertelling is dus 'n uitdrukking van identiteit, want om die storie van 'n mens se lewe te vertel, help jou om sin te maak van jou ervarings en kweek 'n gevoel van self, oftewel "wie ek is". Dit is gevolglik baie belangrik dat leerders van 'n vroeë ouderdom af blootgestel word aan en opleiding ontvang in lewensverhaalvertellings. Hierdie blootstelling lei daartoe dat leerders geleidelik daaraan gewoond gemaak word om as 't ware die storie van hul lewe aan ander te vertel. Op hierdie manier verseker blootstelling aan die deel van persoonllike lewensverhale dat individuele leerlinge nie geïntimideer sal voel deur dergelike aktiwiteite wanneer hulle die ouderdom bereik waar die stories van hul persoonlike belewenisse met vertroue vertel kan word nie. Daar is daarom veral gekyk na die Kurrikulum en Assesseringsbeleidsverklaring (KABV) om vas te stel of daar in die KABV voldoende ruimte geskep is om leerders vanaf 'n vroeë ouderdom bloot te stel aan lewensverhale. Daar is ook ondersoek ingestel of hierdie blootstelling en opleiding in die vertel van lewensverhale toeneem totdat leerders in vroeë adolessensie spontaan en met selfvertroue hulle persoonlike stories aan ander kan vertel.<hr/>Storytelling, in general, is used worldwide as a strategy in informal education. Telling one's personal life story, a subdivision of the encompassing phenomenon, is a valuable educational tool. In this regard storytelling on an individual level possesses important characteristics that can be used to enhance teaching strategies. McAdams (2001:101) found that life stories are especially important in expressing an individual's identity, thereby enabling them to make sense of their experiences. It is therefore very important that learners receive exposure to and training in telling life stories from an early age. This exposure guides learners in gradually becoming familiar with different storytelling activities, thereby enabling them to participate confidently in sharing their life stories upon reaching the age when such activity may be practised successfully. Given the fact that telling life stories is a subdivision of storytelling as a larger global phenomenon, it was important to have a closer look at the functions of storytelling in general. Storytelling as a general educational tool supports the value of learning the art of telling one's life story, especially when considering the influence of storytelling with regard to the neuro-development and associated processes and changes in learners. According to Gazzaniga (2011:75), storytelling reflects a basic ability of the memory to organise, helping a person to present memory thoughts coherently. Particular attention was therefore paid to the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) to determine whether the CAPS underlines Gazzaniga's findings on storytelling and memory functions. It is generally accepted that most people learn best by means of their own meaningful experiences that enable them to connect new knowledge to that which they already believe or understand (Killen 2019:3). The guidelines in the CAPS support the notion that storytelling represents the way in which people use spoken language (discourse) and written language (text) in coherent and meaningful ways (Department of Basic Education 2011:14). It is necessary to determine whether enough time has been allocated in the CAPS to expose learners to storytelling from an early age. Since McAdams found that life stories can only be told successfully in early adolescence, it was necessary to determine whether this exposure to and training in storytelling skills accumulate until learners in early adolescence have reached the point where they are able to participate spontaneously and with confidence in telling their life stories. In this study, the CAPS documents were analysed by means of document analysis to see what kind of storytelling is encouraged, how much time is allocated to storytelling from Grade R to Grade 12 and which skills are acquired, according to the CAPS, for learners to be able to successfully participate in personal storytelling (listening and speaking). Findings in this article show that although learners are exposed to storytelling at a young age, the time allocated in the CAPS for storytelling is not enough to establish a storytelling culture. Also, the time spent on storytelling in class decreases as learners grow older, instead of increases, as would be expected. It is recommended that a partnership be established between the school and the community to address this issue. Teachers do not have enough time in the classroom for personal storytelling to take place, and therefore such a partnership will make a positive contribution in this regard. Moreover, the class situation is not always a safe environment in which to engage in personal storytelling - a problem that can, however, also be addressed by means of a partnership. When storytelling is learnt in the community, it should not be a strange concept for the individual when he or she encounters it in class. In this way, storytelling should facilitate the teacher's task in the classroom. It is important that trustworthiness be established in a partnership in order for it to become the medium through which the participants may safely expose their identity, thereby also assisting others in engaging in a similar activity. In this way such a partnership will be mutually beneficial to all the role players. <![CDATA[<b>Capacity development among skilled and highly skilled unemployed persons in Pretoria, Gauteng, in order to improve their employability and self-employability</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300009&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Party nieregeringsorganisasies (NRO's) help werklose mense om in diens geneem te word of om vir hul eie sak te werk. Sulke NRO's bied gewoonlik opleiding en ondersteuning aan werklose mense met die doel om hulle vermoë te ontwikkel op terreine waar hulle dit dalk nodig het. Die doel van hierdie verkennende navorsing was om te bepaal hoe geskoolde en hooggeskoolde werklose persone wat by 'n NRO in Pretoria, Gauteng, betrokke is, hulle eie vermoë sien om hulle indiensneembaarheid en selfwerksaamheid te verbeter. Die kapasiteitsbenadering van Sen en van Kolbe is in hierdie studie as teoretiese raamwerke gebruik, soos ook interpretativisme, fenomenologie en 'n kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetode. Twee semigestruktureerde fokusgroeponderhoude is gebruik om inligting van die deelnemers te bekom. Die bevindinge kan in drie hooftemas saamgevat word, naamlik die kognitiewe, of denke (selfbeeld, nuwe denke en vaardighede); die affektiewe, of emosies (motivering, negatiewe emosies ten opsigte van verhoudings); en strategieë om kapasiteit te bou (erkenning van vorige leer en werkskaduwing). Die konatiewe (strewe, gedrag) as deel van Kolbe se teorie is nie in die narratiewe gevind nie. Op grond van die navorsingsbevindinge en die literatuur is 'n raamwerk saamgestel om die "hoe" (watter strategieë) en die "wat" (watter kapasiteit) van kapasiteitsontwikkeling van geskoolde en hooggeskoolde werklose persone uit te lig.<hr/>One of the objectives of some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is to assist unemployed persons to become employed or self-employed. In Pretoria, Gauteng, one such NGO gives training and support to unemployed persons with the purpose of capacitating them in certain areas of need. This exploratory research was aimed at determining how skilled and highly skilled unemployed persons involved in this NGO's programme view their own ability to become employed or self-employed. The capacity approaches of Sen and Kolbe served as theoretical frameworks for this study. Interpretivism as a research philosophy and a phenomenological approach guided the study. Interpretivism, phenomenology and a qualitative research method were therefore used. Two semi-structured focus group interviews were used to obtain rich data from the participants. Forty-two unemployed persons were involved in the NGO programme at the time, and eleven persons volunteered to participate in the study. Seven persons with a post-school qualification participated in one focus group interview, and four persons with a Grade 12 certificate in the other. The purpose of this division was to attain a wide variety of perspectives in the dynamics of each focus group interview. The trustworthiness of the data was essential; this was achieved by considering credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the data into meaningful themes and categories. Saturation of data was taken into consideration. Verbatim extracts were used to substantiate the themes. The themes yielded by the findings were categorised according to Kolbe's capability approach based on the three faculties of the mind (cognitive, affective and conative), as well as the strategies to develop capacity. The findings can be summarised in three main themes, namely the cognitive, or thoughts (self-image, new thinking, skills); the affective, or emotions (motivation, negative emotions relating to relationships, dealing with depression and despondence); and strategies to develop capacity (recognised prior learning and job shadowing). The conative part of Kolbe's approach did not feature in the findings. Recommendations were drafted by combining the findings of the study and the literature review. This combination resulted in the development of a framework to improve employability and self-employability of the skilled and highly skilled unemployed persons. This framework consisted of the "what" (capacities) that should be developed and the "how", that is, strategies to follow in order to develop the capacities of the skilled and highly skilled unemployed persons. Training in making online job applications, writing a curriculum vitae, computer skills, how to brand and market oneself, how to network, job interviewing and entrepreneurship should be offered. Coaching and mentoring should be made available, especially to persons who want to be self-employed. Financial assistance should be considered as start-up funds for a new business venture. To improve employability and self-employability, the cognitive, affective and conative parts of the person should, therefore, be taken into consideration when developing personal capacity. It is recommended that, in future research, this study be extended to other skilled and highly skilled unemployed persons and to unskilled unemployed persons in South Africa. The constraints on employability and the influence of the Covid-19 pandemic on unemployment in South Africa should also be researched. <![CDATA[<b>Love and reflexive thinking: The early Hegel on the vicissitudes of modern man</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300010&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es In hierdie artikel val die fokus op hoe Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel se vroeë denke en vroeë teologiese geskrifte die tema van die historiese lotgevalle van die moderne mens in die moderne wêreld hanteer. Meer spesifiek fokus die artikel op Hegel se begrip van die liefde soos hy dit in sy essay "Die Gees van die Christendom en sy lotgevalle"2 (1797-99) weergee, en op die epistemologiese, eties-politiese, ontologiese en krities-historiese implikasies daarvan. Hierteenoor word begrippe soos refleksiewe denke, eiendom en abstrakte reg in 'n sekere vroeëre dialektiese verhouding by Hegel in spel gebring. Die bydrae bestaan basies uit vier dele. Eerstens word, ter wille van die leser, 'n bondige biografiese skets van Hegel gegee. Tweedens word Hegel se vroeë teologiese geskrifte oor die verhouding van die moderne mens en sy diepste bronne, wat gedurende sy jare in Tübingen en Bern geskryf is, bondig gerekonstrueer. Dit bied derdens die agtergrond waarteen hierdie denkmotiewe by wyse van 'n fokus op sy belangrike essay "Die Gees van die Christendom en sy lotgevalle", uit sy Frankfurtse periode (1798-1799), verdiep word. Hierdie bespreking, waarin Hegel se argument in 'n aantal stappe gerekonstrueer word, vorm die kern van die bydrae. Laastens word aangetoon hoe die denkmotiewe in hierdie belangrike vroeë essay in Hegel se latere werke weerklank vind.<hr/>Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel's shadow falls far and his thinking resonates even in our own time. This resonance has much to do with his interpretation of the fascinating theme of the historical vicissitudes of modern man in a modern world. This article focuses on how his earlier thinking and earlier theological writings deal with this theme. Even more specifically, it focuses on Hegel's understanding of love as he interprets it in his essay "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate"1 (1797-99) and on the essay's epistemological, ethical-political, ontological and critical-historical implications. In contrast, Hegel brings into play a certain earlier dialectical relationship with concepts such as reflexive thinking, property and abstract law. Finally, it is shown how Hegel's understanding of love may perhaps be seen as an earlier formulation of his later notions of the spirit, dialectic, Sittlichkeit and the absolute. Thus, some connecting lines are drawn between his earlier writings and his later philosophical system and project. Understandably, this article involves an interpretation of Hegel - because there are many Hegels. Shortly after his death, the well-known division between so-called left-wing and right-wing Hegelians appeared, and since then his thinking has followed fascinating paths in continental Europe (especially Germany and France), Britain and her former colonies (such as South Africa, Australia and Canada), and the USA. Apart from the fact that almost all twentieth-century philosophical positions are in some way an answer to Hegel, there are also two influential positions in contemporary philosophy that serve as interpretations of Hegel, namely an analytical and a hermeneutical one. According to the analytical interpretation, Hegel can be read as a virtual present-day participant in contemporary conversations. Here his arguments are analysed to show their relevance or not to contemporary issues. This interpretation is very similar to what is called the anti-metaphysical reading of Hegel. According to the hermeneutical interpretation, Hegel is a historical figure, a contributor to conversations in the past, but still of contemporary importance. Here he is studied in his historical context; the development of his thinking is explored and reconstructed with historical integrity and individuality, but still with a view to contemporary issues. This approach (Beiser 2005:2-6), which underlies this article, does not shy away from the metaphysical aspects of Hegel's philosophy. Against the background of these introductory remarks the argumentative line of this article can be explained as follows: First, and for the benefit of the reader, a concise biographical sketch of Hegel is given. This sketch is not only of historical interest, but also provides an appropriate context better to understand the systematic points about Hegel's early reflexive thinking and reconstruction of love , which are at the heart of this article. Hegel's life does not stand apart from his thinking. Second, Hegel's early theological writings on the relationship between modern man and man's deepest spiritual and intellectual sources, produced during his years in Tübingen and Bern, are briefly reconstructed. Third, this reconstruction forms the background to Hegel's deepening philosophical motifs and focuses on his important early essay "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate", dating from his Frankfurt period (1798-1799). This discussion, in which Hegel's argument is reconstructed in several steps, forms the core of the article. These steps include the idea-historical framework within which that essay is reconstructed, followed by a comparative discussion of the concepts of love and reflexive thinking (indicating their epistemological, ethical-political, ontological and critical historical implications). Finally, it is shown how the motifs of thought in this important early essay resonate in Hegel's later works. In this regard a few remarks are made about the reception history of Hegel's essay "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate". <![CDATA[<b>Die verwerwing van absolute wete as louterings-proses in Hegel se <i>Fenomenologie van de Geest</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300011&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Hierdie artikel ondersoek die absolute wete as sleutelbegrip in Hegel se Fenomenologie van de Geest (2013). Die vermyding, onderbeklemtoning en wanbegrip van die absolute wete in veral 20ste-eeuse interpretasies van Hegel se werk sal met behulp van sy eie uiteensetting bevraagteken word. Eerstens is die absolute wete nie 'n klaargemaakte bloudruk wat kritiekloos op die werklikheid toegepas kan word nie, maar 'n moeisame proses wat mens nie van 'n afstand kan betrag nie en waardeur 'n mens self moet werk. Tweedens word aangevoer dat die absolute wete slegs die resultaat kan wees van die strengste moontlike beproewing,1 in die vorm van 'n "sich vollbringende Skeptizismus"; en derdens gaan dít wat deur die beproewing opgehef word, steeds gekoppel bly aan die absolute as deel van die prosesmatige aard daarvan. Die proses dui daarop dat selfverlies in die vorm van die uitwys van tekortkominge en selfverowering as die selfbewuswording van die gees twee kante van dieselfde muntstuk verteenwoordig, naamlik wat Hegel as die "loutering tot gees" beskryf.<hr/>This article examines the nature and importance of the notion of absolute knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The avoidance, undervaluation and misinterpretation of absolute knowing, especially in 20th-century interpretations of Hegel's work, are challenged on the basis of Hegel's own account of absolute knowing. Three characteristics of absolute knowing stand out: first, absolute knowing is not a ready-made blueprint that can be applied blindly, but is achieved only through a laborious process that has to be completed in person and not at arms length. Second, absolute knowing can only result from the strictest possible proof in the form of complete scepticism or what Hegel termed "sich vollbringende Skeptizismus". Third, that which is criticised by the proof must be sublimated into the absolute as part of the processal nature of absolute knowing. The process reveals that self-negation, indicating shortcomings, and self-attainment, representing self-awareness of the spirit, are two sides of the same coin, namely what Hegel describes as the movement of spirit. Hegel does not avoid the topic of truth and goes so far as to claim that those who do avoid it, in fact make a claim to truth themselves (in so far as they presuppose that the denial of truth is true) and in turn deny others. Some take Hegel's explicit reference to truth, with which his philosophy is preoccupied, to be bold and too arrogant. Consequently, the tendency recently has been to work eclectically with parts of Hegel's philosophy and dialectical approach, but largely to reject his system as a whole. Hegel was sensitive to the claims emanating from a sceptical approach to overarching truth and incorporated the critique expressed by that approach into his account of truth, along with his own critique of scepticism. Hegel's critique of modern scepticism's denial of truth (in this case modern philosophy since Descartes) does not mean he regards it as being without merit. In fact, Hegel not only accepts, but also recommends, that any claim to truth must be subjected to scepticism in the form of science (Wissenschaft). The very essence of science (Wissenschaft) is knowing, and what else is worthy of knowing but truth? Truth, therefore, does not undermine scepticism, but rather leads scepticism to its own limits and therefore its fulfilment. The process of leading scepticism to fulfilment is described in terms of a sublimation. Sublimation (Läuterung) is understood as an arduous process that rectifies, but does not exclude, the parts that it problematises. It is in this sense of sublimation that Hegel's famous statement that "truth is the whole" is to be understood. However, the exacting passage to truth cannot begin with the whole, as the whole has not legitimised itself, which leads Hegel to consider the way towards the whole as just as important as the destination. Natural (immediate) consciousness must therefore be allowed to present its claims to truth, after which scepticism is employed to question the claims. This process of constantly questioning certainty corresponds with the Socratic method and, unsurprisingly, finds expression in a dialectic. The dialectic is more than a mere back-and-forth exchange, but rather an unfolding of truth itself. Without such dynamism a fuller conception of truth would not take shape, and in any case would not be able to legitimise itself. To overcome the presuppositions of every stage, a certain leap over the position is required, a leap away from the position that is to be overcome, but at the same time a leap that recognises that very position. The process therefore involves active participation and expanding awareness, on the one hand, but, on the other, a measure of fate, by which Hegel means that the course of knowing is destined to lead to fulfilment (a "homecoming") in the guise of absolute knowing, a knowing that is in and for itself. <![CDATA[<b>A matter of recognition: Regarding Hegel's understanding of recognition and the postmodern crisis of identity</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300012&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Centraal thema van deze bijdrage vormt Hegels begrip van erkenning (Anerkennung) en de betekenis daarvan voor de huidige politieke en maatschappelijke discussies rond identiteit. Mede aan de hand van Hegels bepaling van ziekte en dood in de natuurfilosofie wordt de rol van de negativiteit in zijn Geest- en vrijheidsbegrip opgehelderd. Uit de dood van de natuurlijke gestalte wordt de vrije Geest geboren. Hoewel de erkenning als een verdubbeling van het zelfbewustzijn (het Ik dat Wij en het Wij dat Ik wordt) een fundamentele bepaling is van de Geest en zijn vrijheid, lijkt men in de recente receptiegeschiedenis de aard van deze negativiteit nog al eens uit het oog te verliezen; iets wat o.a. bij Honneth en Fukuyama gebeurt. Ware erkenning ligt in een dubbelzinnig en wederzijds "doen" van zelfbewustzijnen; zowel jegens zichzelf als jegens de ander. Daartoe zijn de negatie van de natuur en de vorming (Bildung) noodzakelijk. Daadwerkelijke zelfbepaling vindt bij Hegel bij uitstek plaats in de vorm van arbeid, en wel binnen de context van een zedelijke gemeenschap die in het teken staat van vrijheidsverwerkelijking. Aan de hand daarvan laat zich duidelijk maken dat hedendaagse identiteitsproblemen mede kunnen ontstaan door de alomtegenwoordigheid van onze technologische consumptiemaatschappij die traditionele erkenningsstructuren ondermijnt en zowel vervreemding als massavorming in de hand werkt. Daarin kan een compensatoir verlangen opkomen naar een "dadeloze" vorm van erkenning die leidt tot een cultus van slachtofferschap. Een dergelijke identiteitsvorming draagt bovendien het gevaar in zich dat de identiteit vooral vorm krijgt in de strijd jegens de vermeende "daders"; waarmee een postmoderne vorm van tribalisering zijn intrede doet. De gedachtegang wordt afgesloten met een kritische herneming van Hegels erkenningsbegrip vanuit een bredere vraag naar een dieperliggende zin van het primaat van "zelfbewustzijn" in de moderne filosofie. Daarmee opent zich mogelijk ook een ander perspectief op zowel Hegels denken als onze eigen situatie.<hr/>The central question of this article concerns Hegel's concept of recognition (Anerkennung) and its meaning for the current political and social debate regarding issues of identity in our postmodern society. In the dominant interpretations of this pivotal Hegelian concept - for example in Honneth's or Fukuyama's work - the relationship between self-consciousness and absolute "negativity" has not been given due consideration. Departing from Hegel's determination of sickness and death in his philosophy of nature, the specific role and nature of absolute negativity in his concept of spirit and freedom will be clarified. Following the death of the immediate living being - as the manifestation of infinity in a finite entity - the free spirit is born. According to Hegel, man as a self-conscious being is not only part of infinite life, but he is this infinity in and for itself. Recognition as the concept of spirit is the actualisation of self-consciousness through doubling itself: the I that becomes We and the We that becomes I. The infinity of the spirit that is actualised in and through a doubling of self-consciousness contains this death of its natural being - absolute negativity. Now, this recognition can only become "real" due to a reciprocal action of at least two self-conscious people: both acting against themselves and towards each other. As became clear in the battle of life and death, in which both parties put their lives at stake in trying to kill each other, this action against themselves - as the actualisation of absolute negativity - is only made possible by both parties acting against each other, thereby enabling each other to put their lives at risk. As long as both parties fight no recognition is actualised. For actual recognition both the negation of immediate nature and "education" (formation/Bildung) are necessary. Recognition in this sense implies that you "mean" something in the eyes of others on the basis of what you can do, your skills and attitudes. Now, in his philosophy of spirit for Hegel this formation of freedom (as the prerequisite of recognition) is actualised by labour, as the latter is professionally performed in the ethical life of a community (that is directed towards such actualisation of freedom). The so called system of needs, as presented in Hegel's reinterpretation of modern economy, is a vital moment for this actualisation of freedom in "civil society" (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft). From the perspective of Hegel's concept of recognition and freedom, pressing issues concerning "identity" in postmodern society can be viewed and interpreted in a new way. The ubiquity of our technological consumer society tends to undermine socially fixed structures of recognition, erode communities and can therefore, lead to both alienation and mass formation. In an atomised and consumptive environment a compensative desire for recognition might manifest itself and remain inactive and turn into a cult of victimhood. This passive way of identity creation carries with it the risk of forming one's identity in an externally negative way, i.e. in an irresolvable battle against the supposed offenders. Such a counterculture might in fact destroy the elementary conditions for a civil society and give rise to a kind of postmodern "tribalisation". The article ends with a critical review of Hegel's concept of recognition from a wider perspective, looking at a more fundamental motive behind the primacy of self-consciousness in modern philosophy. Could it be a manifestation of a titanic power in modernity? One that Hegel is trying to tame, but simultaneously falls prey to? This idea might also present us with an alternative perspective on both Hegel's philosophy of spirit and our current situation. <![CDATA[<b>A phenomenology of racism: Hegelian (mis)recognition and the structure of colonial consciousness</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300013&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Hierdie artikel neem Hegel se weergawe van die mislukking van wedersydse erkenning (dus wanerkenning) krities onder die loep met spesifieke fokus op die meester-slaaf-dialektiek. Hegel gee daarmee sy analise van 'n soort bewussynsontwikkeling wat lei tot vervreemde selfbewussyn in sowel die self as die ander (subjek en objek). Die proses wat hierdie soort bewussyn begrond, gee myns insiens 'n fenomenologiese beskrywing en verduideliking van die kognitiewe wortels van rassisme en geweld soos wat dit gemanifesteer word in 'n sogenaamde moderne koloniale mentaliteit (beide in die koloniale en die postkoloniale konteks). Dit bied met ander woorde 'n uiteensetting van hoe rassisme vorm aanneem in die selfbewussyn. Die moontlike wegbeweeg van rassisme na wedersydse erkenning word ondersoek met die doel om te sien hoe wanerkenning hanteer kan word (in die selfbewussyn). Dit word gedoen aan die hand van 'n model van Hegel se bewussynsteorie, wat verskillende soorte intersubjektiewe erkenning in breë trekke uiteensit. Die fokus van hierdie model is die wisselwerking tussen die dinglike en begripsaspekte van Hegeliaanse erkenning in die interaksie van die self (as subjek) met die ander. Hopelik kan hierdie model help om begrip te bevorder van hoe selferkenning, wanerkenning en wedersydse erkenning gepaard gaan met verskillende vorme van bewussyn. Teen die agtergrond van 'n koloniale bewussyn het wanerkenning en wedersydse erkenning 'n beduidende uitwerking op menslike verhoudinge. Fanon het dit verder belig met sy fokus op die rol van ras in die dialektiek en erkenning.<hr/>This article critically discusses Hegel's account of the failure of mutual recognition (which Charles Taylor calls misrecognition) with specific focus on the master-slave dialectic. In this account, Hegel gives his analysis of a certain development in consciousness that leads to alienated self-consciousness in both the self and the other (subject and object). It is my view that the process which grounds this type of self-consciousness affords a phenomenological description and explanation of the cognitive roots of racism and violence as they are manifested in a so-called modern colonial mentality (in both the colonial and postcolonial context of European colonialism in Africa and elsewhere). In other words, Hegel's account gives us an exposition of how racism forms in self-consciousness. Considering racism, I chart a possible way to mutual recognition in order to see how misrecognition can be grappled with (in self-consciousness). This is done by way of a model of Hegel's theory of consciousness, which is outlined in order to unpack the different types of intersubjective recognition. The focus of this model is the interaction between the phenomenological and conceptual aspects of Hegelian recognition in the encounter between the self (as subject) and the other. It is hoped that this model will promote understanding of the ways in which self-recognition, misrecognition and mutual recognition are connected to different forms of consciousness. Misrecognition and mutual recognition have a significant effect on intersubjective human relations as well as on the socio-political and economic reality of a society. Fanon highlighted this by focusing on the role of race as it concerns the dialectic and recognition. Hegel charts the development of alienated self-consciousness in his account of the master-slave dialectic, and an understanding of this process is of crucial importance to the outline of mutual recognition provided in my study. This development may be summarised as follows: Self-consciousness distinguishes and identifies objects in the world and this level of consciousness can be termed bare existence. Consciousness is deepened as self-awareness when the self is distinguished as distinct from the world; this represents the split that takes place between the self as subject and the world (or the other) as object. Misrecognition as one-sided recognition is basically a continuation of object-centred recognition in human relations, and this kind of recognition distinguishes an other person simply as an object (who is thus reified). Misrecognition leads to a colonial consciousness with a colonial mentality in the self that grounds the alienated self-consciousness of the other through relations of racism and violence. Misrecognition gives form to a relation in which the self dominates the other to such an extent that they are alienated from each other. At the same time, the others feel alienated from their own selves and from the world around them because their sense of freedom is controlled by someone else. The ideal interaction with others that pays attention to issues of racism and violence would be some form of mutual recognition that distinguishes the other as a rehumanised subject (that is, a free person who can form his/her own identity). In this relation one also finds the ideal conditions for the self and the other to develop self-knowledge. This moment of Aufhebung (sublation) in the dialectic is a necessary step in overcoming the misrecognition inherent in the master-slave relationship, but it is also a postcolonial Aufhebung, which is different from the one that Hegel envisioned. This study calls attention to a critical lacuna regarding the account of the master-slave relationship (which is also highlighted in the work of Frantz Fanon and could be viewed as a Fanonian moment in the dialectic). The reaction of the master to the slave (and vice versa) brings about a consciousness that holds ideas, or concepts, as primary. Therefore, the slave will be connected to an idea that the master has in his consciousness. This means that the slave's idea about himself is not of his own making. The nature of the self-consciousness that emerges in the slave (but also in the master) involves a relation of alienation and the development of alienated self-consciousness. This kind of self-consciousness has to do with two key problems: Firstly, the negation, absence or denial of humanity in self-consciousness in so far as it concerns relations with others, for instance in the case of race, and secondly, the ideas generated because of this negation/absence/denial, which are attached to the racial other and lead specifically to misrecognition. Such ideas are sometimes combined in single terms or words (e.g. derogatory racist terms as labels). In the end, my study demonstrates how reification through concepts (as misrecognition) in Hegel's master-slave dialectic leads to the phenomenon of race and racism. <![CDATA[<b>Critical ecological art and Hegel's cryptic statement that art must die</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300014&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>Die toekoms van Hegel (gebore 1770)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300015&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>Max Weber (1864-1920): denker over godsdienst en kapitalisme</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300016&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>Fijn bederf. Over Jacob Israël de Haan en het Kwaad</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300017&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>Alleen nog wereld? Een bespreking van Erik Megancks <i>Religieus atheïsme. (Post)moderne filosofen over God en godsdienst</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300018&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>Antwoord Aan Joeri Schrijvers - <i>Het duren van de Naam</i></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300019&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>"In die gebreekte spieël van die self": skryf en die psige in Hambidge se jongste bundel</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300020&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>"Jamme sê betieken fokkol": Veronique Jephtas se <i>Soe rond ommie bos </i>(2021)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300021&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. <![CDATA[<b>Woorde wat verwar word </b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512021000300022&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas.<hr/>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity.