Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=0041-475120190002&lang= vol. 59 num. 2 lang. <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>Mother tongue in the church: The Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa (AFM of SA) and Afrikaans as an illustration of the role of mother tongue in the church</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200001&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Die artikel word geskryf vanuit die perspektief van 'n Afrikaanssprekende Christen en gebruik die Apostoliese Geloof Sending van Suid-Afrika (AGS) as 'n gevallestudie van moedertaal wat apartheidstrukture (waarskynlik onbewustelik) perpetueer. Die AGS ontstaan in 1908 as 'n veelrassige, Engelstalige kerk onder leiding van twee Amerikaanse sendelinge, John G. Lake en Thomas Hezmalhalch, wat vanuit hulle betrokkenheid by die Azusastraatherlewing in Los Angeles (vanaf 1906) die boodskap na Afrika bring van die uitstorting van die Gees. Veral Lake is vasbeslote dat eredienste veelrassig bly en sy bediening word deur verskeie botsings hieroor met wit gelowiges gekenmerk, veral oor sy noue verhouding met Elias Letwaba, 'n prominente swart leier. Nog voor hulle vertrek na Amerika, wanneer Pieter L. le Roux as eerste Suid-Afrikaanse president verkies word, verval die kerk reeds in patrone van gemeentevestiging wat ooreenstem met die bestaande patrone wat die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing gekenmerk het, en segregasie tussen rasse institusionaliseer. Leiding hierin het veral van Afrikaanssprekende wit leiers gekom. In 1996 verenig die voormalige vier afdelings van die AGS in al sy strukture maar steeds bestaan die meeste gemeentes volgens taal en geografiese area in segregasie, alhoewel meerdere vergaderings en konferensies in die kerk veelrassig is en in Engels plaasvind. Slegs enkele Engelstalige gemeentes asook wit Kaapse Afrikaanstalige gemeentes wat enkele van die gemengde-rasbevolking insluit, het veelrassig geword. Ná 'n historiese bespreking vra die artikel na die uitdagings wat taaldiversiteit inhou en die houdbaarheid daarvan om die diversiteit wat die kerk verteenwoordig in die plaaslike gemeente gestalte te laat kry. Verskeie voorstelle word gemaak wat wit Afrikaanssprekende AGS-lidmate se taalsentimente akkommodeer terwyl dit ook 'n bydrae lewer om die mense van Suid-Afrika as 'n reënboognasie te vestig.<hr/>The article is written from the perspective of an Afrikaans-speaking Christian and uses the Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa (AFM of SA) as a case study of language, specifically mother tongue, that (probably unconsciously) perpetuates apartheid structures. The AFM originated in 1908 as a multiracial church led by two American missionaries, John G. Lake and Thomas Hezmalhalch, who from their involvement in the Azusa Street revival (since 1906) in Los Angeles came to Africa to proclaim the message of the outpouring of the Spirit. In particular, Lake was determined that worship remains multiracial and his ministry was characterised by several clashes with white believers, especially surrounding his intimate relationship with Elias Letwaba, a prominent black leader. When Pieter L. le Roux was elected as first South African president of the AFM, the church organised itself in patterns of congregations that matched the existing racial grid that characterised the South African society, by institutionalizing segregation between races by means of its church order. Especially Afrikaans-speaking whites took the lead in organising the church along racial lines. In 1996, the former four divisions of the AFM, black, Indian, white and mixed race-population churches, united in all its structures, but most congregations today still exist according to the formerly segregated appearance of languages and geographical areas, although leadership meetings and conferences within the church are multiracial with English as medium of communication. Some neighbourhoods have become multiracial but even in these the worship services still remain arranged mostly in terms of race, with the exception of English-speaking congregations and formerly white Afrikaans-speaking congregations in the Cape Province that included some of the mixed race population. However, most Afrikaans-speaking and black congregations are exclusively based on racial foundations. After a historical survey of the situation in the AFM, the article discusses the challenges that language diversity in the church implies and the sustainability to represent the diversity of the church in the local congregation. Various suggestions are being made that can accommodate the language sentiments of white Afrikaans-speaking members of the AFM, while also contributing to establishing the people of South Africa as a rainbow nation. <![CDATA[<b>Challenges of the diversity of languages in churches: The unity of the church and language</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200002&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Die eenheid van die kerk is van die grootste belang vir die Christelike godsdiens. Onlangs het die teoloog, Bram van de Beek, die standpunt ingeneem dat die taal wat algemeen om die nagmaalstafel aanvaarbaar is ter wille van eenheid gebruik moet word, dus Engels. Volgens hom moet die eenheid van die kerk uitgedruk word waar almal rondom die nagmaalstafel teenwoordig is en dit kan alleen geskied indien daar van een taal sprake is. Daar kan met Van de Beek saamgestem word dat die eenheid van die kerk inderdaad ononderhandelbaar is. Die volgende vrae moet egter indringend ondersoek word: Waarin is die eenheid van die kerk geleë? Hoe moet die eenheid rondom die nagmaalstafel gestalte kry? Hoe kan en moet taalverskille hanteer word? Hoe moet die erediens ingerig word indien daar verskeie tale in 'n gemeenskap voorkom? Sou die uitsluitlike gebruik van 'n gemeenskaplike taal, in dié geval Engels, nie juis weersin wek en die eenheid skend nie? Is taal in die uitdrukking van die Christelike godsdiens nie juis ook betekenisvol nie? Binne die NG Kerk-familie is daar verskeie gemeentes wat verskeie tale, selfs binne een erediens, bedien deur tolking of herhaling van die preek. Die kosbaarheid van 'n eie taal is skeppingsmatig van groot belang. Eenheid en verskeidenheid moet dus nie teenoor mekaar gestel word nie, maar inisiatiewe om eie tale te bevorder sonder om die kerk te versplinter moet oorweeg word.<hr/>The unity of the church is of utmost importance for Christian religion. There is a wide variety of churches and faith communities. Even within churches of the same belief there are cultural and language differences. The theologian Bram van de Beek recently expressed the opinion that the language that is generally accepted for the communion table, i.e. English, should be used for the sake of unity. According to him, the unity of the church must be expressed around the communion table, where everyone is present and it can only be done if one language is used. We can agree with Van de Beek that the unity of the church is indeed non-negotiable. Therefore, the ideas of exponents who emphasize the unity of the church should be taken seriously and further investigated. In this regard, the special contributions by Philip Theron, Johan Heyns, and Dirkie Smit should be considered. Theron emphasizes the importance of the church as an eschatological gift that is not determined by creation, and thus points out that the unity determines the church. Heyns leaves open the possibility that the church may display diversity because the church must also be understood from creation, but it should show that it should never violate the unity. Variety may occur but must not necessarily occur. Smit, in turn, points to the unity of the church as instruction that cannot be violated by any form of position or culture. Belhar's Confession is of great importance in this regard. In the evaluation of this point of view, John 17 is especially explored. The unity of the Father and the Son also determines the unity of the church. That unity is specifically the unity of faith in Jesus Christ. It is shown as confessional and not as structural. However, the relationship in community with one another is of utmost importance. Communion is also an expression of the relationship in community with one another. The function of language in the church in the light of unity is therefore important. In addition, the following questions must be considered incisively: Wherein lies the unity of the church? How should the unity around the communion table be structured? How can and should language differences be dealt with? How should worship be set up if there are several languages used in a community? Would the sole use of a common language, in this case English, not just worsen and violate the unity? Is language in the expression of the Christian religion also not really significant? Within the family of the Dutch Reformed Church there are several congregations that offer sermons in various languages, even within one worship service, by interpreting or repeating the sermon. The value of a native language is creatively of great importance. Language is therefore not a coincidence. It is argued in this article that language is dynamic and that the development of an own language can also lead to new relationships in religion. Respect for each other leads to recognition of the other and, consequently, to deep Christian confidence. There are examples of congregations that accommodate several languages, such as Afrikaans, English, Sesotho, and even Chinese, in different worship services under one roof and where opportunities are created where everyone meets around the communion table and the sermon and formula used before the communion are interpreted or repeated. However, language should never be exclusive and used to prevent people from becoming part of the community of faith, or prevent them from attending a worship service, or participating in communion. Unity and diversity must therefore not be set against each other, but there must be an initiative to promote own languages without annulling the church. <![CDATA[<b>Theological contributions for teacherhood</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200003&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Een schoolcurriculum gaat niet alleen over de inhoud en het leren van de leerlingen, maar ook over het handelen van de docent. In het essay wordt gekeken welke bijdrage theologische leraarsmodellen kunnen leveren aan het onderwijs. Om dit te onderzoeken, wordt eerst bestudeerd of en hoe theologische leraarsmodellen te plaatsen zijn binnen recente wetenschappelijke onderwijskundige literatuur. De volgende theologische leraarsmodellen zijn nader onderzocht vanuit vijf perspectieven op docentschap (kennisoverdracht, meester-gezel, ontwikkelgericht, zorg en sociale verandering): het Jesajaboek als leraar, Socrates als leermeester, Ben Sira als leerhuis en leerstoel, Jezus die vragen stelt, het leren rond de Tora en familieverhoudingen, Augustinus' visie op de goede overdracht van kennis en vaardigheden, kardinaal Willebrands' leren door dialoog en de game Bioshock als leraar van deugden. Vervolgens wordt meer reliëf gegeven aan de theologische leraarsmodellen door de effectiviteit van de discussie nader te beschouwen, als ook typische theologische docentbegeleidingsvaardigheden.<hr/>A secondary school curriculum is not only about the content and the learning of the students, but also about the teacher behavior. I assess which contributions theological teacher models can make to education. To investigate this, I first study whether and how theological teacher models can be placed within recent scientific educational literature. Subsequently, I elaborate on the theological teacher models by considering the effectiveness of a discussion, as well as typical theological teacher guidance skills. The book Teacher models from Isaiah to Bioshock by Bart Koet and Archibald van Wieringen discusses, amongst others, the following theological teacher models: the book of Isaiah as a teacher, Socrates as a teacher, Ben Sira as a prime example of an interpreter of biblical wisdom, Jesus asking questions, the Torah against the background of family relationships, Augustine's vision on the transfer of knowledge and skills, The Dutch Cardinal Willebrands's learning through dialogue,1 and the game Bioshock as a teacher of virtues. I studied whether and how these theological teacher models can be placed within Pratt's five perspectives on teaching (transmission perspective, apprenticeship perspective, developmental perspective, nurturing perspective, and social reform). The five perspectives are used as ideal types, which are heuristic instruments that show how my observations exemplify a certain fixed pattern of thinking, understanding and action. The analysis below makes use of these five perspectives, where I do not intervene in the debate as to whether they exclude each other or overlap and what would be the most effective, best or any correct form of teacher or teaching. TRANSMISSION PERSPECTIVE: Ben Sira and the book of Isaiah With the Jewish teacher Ben Sira and in the book of Isaiah there is mainly a transmission of knowledge. Ben Sira with his writings can be seen as a memorable presenter of content in educating young people in the spirit of Jewish wisdom traditions. The Isaiah book shows two processes of learning: the first process gradually develops the material to be learned for the student, where the other confronts the student from the beginning with no introduction or summary, but with an open end. Especially the first, a more deductive learning process, can be understood from the perspective of knowledge transmission. APPRENTICESHIP PERSPECTIVE: Augustine As a teacher and preacher Augustine not only wanted to transmit knowledge, but he also wanted to contribute to a more existential (re)formation of his audience: for beginners he explains briefly and clearly matters of faith, to the advanced he speaks about the details, the ambiguities and open questions associated with the doctrine of faith. Therefore, with Augustine we find mainly the apprenticeship perspective. NURTURING PERSPECTIVE: the Talmud and the Dutch cardinal Willebrands In the Talmud there is much attention for teaching. The book deepens the teacher's appreciation against the background of family relationships. This is where the perspective of nurturing comes in. Cardinal Willebrands's approach was characterised by language awareness. He searched for "the language of the other". Willebrands wanted to listen to the others, to learn from the other and to enter into conversation without leaving behind his own identity. Social reform perspective: the Bioshock game In games like Bioshock the game is the teacher. This teacher stimulates the player to reflect on his/her moral choices and educates the player to practice virtuous behavior. This teacher model is mainly one of social reform. DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE: Jesus and Socrates For Jesus, asking questions is a central activity. When students are asked questions about more complex forms of thinking, it is mainly the developmental perspective. Teacher is one of the most important titles of Jesus. Socrates is also known as a teacher who asks questions. In this questioning elenchus (refutation) and maieutiek (formation) are distinguished: the first is the destructive, critical part of thinking, aimed at undermining an incorrect opinion or thought; the second is constructive, aimed at forming a correct true opinion or a correct true judgment. Furthermore, I studied how to elaborate these theological teacher models by considering the effectiveness of a discussion, as well as typical theological teacher guidance skills. A more effective discussion In earlier research, doing philosophy at a higher level was found, first, in the presence of shared guidance of the discussion by the teacher and the students, and second, rather in a philosophical dialogue in the form of a discussion than in the form of classroom talk. Showing understanding, giving space and listening Earlier research also showed that the specific contribution of a more effective religious education and/or world view teacher is to show understanding, give space and listen. I conclude that this is close to Pratt's perspective of nurturing. This perspective of nurturing, trust, challenging and achievable goals, encouragement and clear expectations is for the time being the most extensive theological teacher model. Possibly this is in the heart of the matter of religious education and/or world view teachers. Witness and witnessing As Pollefeyt stated, a religious education and/or world view teacher is a witness, specialist and moderator. The teacher is a committed witness to his or her own world view, which has been obtained by himself or herself. However, the teacher is also a committed witness to the students' world view, where the students' world view will be obtained by the students themselves. I conclude that reflections about theological teacher models are worthwhile to present in education. It is important that teachers, partly thanks to these models, can show appropriate domain-specific teacher behavior at the right time, and with the right goal in mind. The value of the above elaboration does not have to be limited to secondary education, but is also valuable for lecturers at university level. <![CDATA[<b>"My pen is in my hand": An investigation of lexical activation in English-Afrikaans general bilinguals, professional translators and professional interpreters</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200004&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= De Bruin (2018) stel 'n unieke metodologie voor om te bepaal of tweetalige persone 'n taalselektiewe of taalnieselektiewe aktiveringsproses van die mentale leksikon ondergaan. Dié metodologie, wat die fokus van hierdie artikel is, verskil in twee belangrike opsigte van vorige metodologieë wat taalaktivering in tweetaliges ondersoek.2 In die eerste plek verryk dit die navorsingskonteks van lekseemvlak (woordvlak) na 'n hoër tekstuele vlak in 'n poging om aan die geïdentifiseerde behoefte in die psigolinguistiek vir 'n meer natuurlike navorsingskonteks te voldoen. Tweedens is dit na die navorsers se wete die eerste studie van sy soort wat tussen verskillende tipes tweetaliges onderskei, te wete algemene tweetaliges, beroepsvertalers en beroepstolke. Om die drie tipes tweetaliges doeltreffend af te baken, word streng kwalifiseringsvereistes aan respondente van die onderskeie groepe gestel. In die studie word volledige, intertalige homograaf- en kognaatsinne gebruik, vergeleke met vorige navorsing wat intertalige homograwe en kognate in andersins eentalige sinne gebruik.3 Die bevindinge van die studie dui op taalnieselektiewe aktivering van die mentale leksikon, en dat beroepsvertalers en beroepstolke moontlik 'n hoër mate van taalnieselektiewe aktivering as algemene tweetaliges ondergaan.<hr/>Ample psycholinguistic research has been done into the activation of the mental lexicon of the bilingual person and especially whether this activation is language selective (when only the language in use is activated, whilst the other language is completely deactivated) or language nonselective (when the language not in use is not completely deactivated, but merely inactive).1 Researchers who have studied this phenomenon employed three kinds of words to test their hypotheses, namely interlingual homographs (words with the same form, but different meanings), interlingual cognates (words with the same form and meaning) and interlingual neighbours (words with very similar yet not the exact form, but different meanings). These methodologies typically embed these words in otherwise unilingual sentences (sentences that are grammatically and syntactically possible in only one language). The need has been expressed, however, to use a more natural context. This article describes the methodology that De Bruin (2018) designed to determine whether language-selective or language-nonselective activation occurs in general (non-professional) bilinguals, professional translators and professional interpreters. To achieve this, the methodology employs two of these word types, namely interlingual homographs and interlingual cognates, but extends these to sentence level, i.e. interlingual homographic sentences and interlingual cognate sentences in Afrikaans and English. In the former, the sentences have the same form and order in both languages, but they differ in meaning; in the latter, the sentences display the same word order, form and meaning in both languages. In this way, De Bruin (2018) attempts to enrich the research context from a word to a sentence level, i.e. from lexeme to sentence level, thereby satisfying the need for a more natural context. This methodology is further designed to incorporate different types of bilinguals (general bilinguals, professional translators and professional interpreters) to investigate whether professional translators and professional interpreters present with a higher level of language-nonselective activation than general bilinguals. An experimental task consisting of five sentence groups with four sentences each in a specific order forms part of the research design. Respondents are required to read these sentences aloud, which are displayed in a particular sequence one after the other on a computer screen. The first sentence group starts with a unilingual sentence to ensure that the respondent is primed in a specific language. This sentence is followed by a perfect cognate sentence (which, it is assumed, the respondent would also read in the same language). The third sentence, which serves as the target sentence, is in the opposite language than the first sentence, but in such a way that it closely resembles the primed language but violates the grammar rules of the primed language. The reaction of the respondent points to either language-selective or language-nonselective activation. If, for example, respondents do not recognise the newly-introduced, "correct" language by correcting their error (either by rereading or completing the sentence in the "correct" language), this can be taken to point to language-selective activation because the "correct" language had not been activated. However, if the "correct" language is recognised and used, this can be regarded as language-nonselective activation. Whenever the researcher experiences difficulty in clearly establishing either types of activation, the result is recorded as undetermined. An important component of the research methodology is the identification and inclusion of respondents. To clearly define and delineate the three respondent groups - general bilinguals, professional translators and professional interpreters - strict inclusion criteria and minimum requirements are applied that respondents must meet. These are based on ethical considerations, as well as criteria relating to language proficiency, language skills and language use. The professional translators and professional interpreters are furthermore subject to strict requirements to ensure their professionalism, which are based on experience, income, language proficiency and language use, as well as membership of and accreditation with professional language organisations. The results obtained by applying this novel methodology complement existing evidence to support theories of language-nonselective activation of the mental lexicon of the bilingual person (Dijkstra, Timmermans & Schriefers 2000; Nakayama & Archibald 2005; Kerkhofs et al. 2006; and Szubko-Sitarek 2015) and can be explained in terms of current theories and models of lexical activation in bilinguals, most notably the BIA (1998) and the BIA+ (2002) models of Dijkstra and Van Heuven. Moreover, it provides evidence that professional translators and professional interpreters may demonstrate a higher level of language-nonselective activation compared to general bilinguals. However, as a result of the relatively small sample sizes the results of the study are not generalisable to larger populations. <![CDATA[<b>Storytelling as a teaching strategy to strengthen identity development in disadvantaged individuals</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200005&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= In Suid-Afrika gaan heelwat mense gebuk onder 'n negatiewe identiteit as gevolg van armoede en die maatskaplike uitvloeisels daarvan (Bakker & Műller 2010:49-50; De Vries 2017). Die probleemvraag wat in hierdie studie ondersoek is, was: Hoe kan storievertelling as strategie ter versterking van identiteitsontwikkeling aangewend word? 'n Kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetodologie is gevolg deur gebruik te maak van Deelnemende Aksieleer en -navorsing (PALAR: Participatory Action Learning and Action Research) as navorsingstrategie. Die lewensverhale van die deelnemers is ingesamel volgens hierdie metodologie aan die hand van onderhoudvoering, Photovoice-aktiwiteite, joernaalinskrywings asook die navorser se waarnemings wat deur middel van veldnotas opgeteken is. Die ingesamelde data is geanaliseer deur gebruik te maak van die sagtewareprogram ATLAS.tiTM.<hr/>Inhabitants of a community in the Western Cape, heavily burdened by a negative identity caused by poverty and many of the socio-economic problems associated with poverty, formed the focus of the research. It was necessary for the participants in this study to reflect anew on their own experiences as revealed by their stories about themselves, because they are and become the stories they tell. It was assumed that storytelling would be an enabling tool to assist them in discovering their true identity, since their own stories as told by themselves in a familiar language could bring to the fore more positive aspects of an otherwise depressing existence, thereby strengthening a more positive identity. The research question in the present study can be simply stated as: • What contribution can storytelling as a strategy make to the construction of identity? A qualitative research methodology was followed by using PALAR (Participatory Action Learning and Action Research) as method of enquiry. The life stories of the participants were collected in accordance with this methodology using interviewing, Photovoice activities, journal entries, observations made by the researcher and recordings by means of field notes. The collected data were analysed using the software program ATLAS.tiTM. The results were discussed in accordance with the objectives of the study in an attempt to answer the research questions from the findings as comprehensively as possible. The results, as obtained from the literature review and the empirical investigation, were taken into consideration while implementing storytelling as a teaching strategy. Cohesion exists between the identity of the participant and the context(s) in which the stories are constructed. The narratives are presented by the participants themselves and from the stories they tell, their individual experiences are deduced in the micro-system. The meso-system entails the relation between the micro-systems, and it could be ascertained that incidences experienced by the individual influenced the individual's relationship with other role players. Should storytelling have developed within a specific micro-system, it can serve as a solution when social problems such as poverty exert influence on the individual. In the eco-system in which a link exists between the context in which the individual plays no active role, and the context in which he actively participates, storytelling brought to the fore factors that influence individuals (for instance parents' workplace, family's social networks and the community). Stories describe the macro-system, the culture in which the individual lives, for instance customs, traditions, the economy, health services, education and values. It was found that the individual does not understand who they are if their life forms no story, because stories are not simply something people tell, but also incidences of what people have experienced. Therefore, storytelling can expose the individual's negative identity. From the participants' storytelling it became clear that they are dependent on one another at both material and emotional levels due to the brokenness observed in family constructs and poverty (at all levels - material and emotional, as well as the socio-economic decay brought about by poverty). The group that is seen as an entity (community) dissipates uncertainty in the self by practising immoral and bad habits. Participants' storytelling brought to the fore the internalisation of symptoms (depression and fear) as well as the externalisation of symptoms, amongst others, drug and liquor abuse risks. Absent parental support has an influence on the construction of the individual's identity, as confirmed from the participants' storytelling. From the stories told by the participants it became clear that incidents and actions around the individual can be destructive, but can in time be seen and experienced as positive. Therefore, storytelling as strategy brings to the fore a positive identity. A large number of the participants never recognised positive elements in their lives before communicating these in their stories. Specifically the positive characteristics, abilities and skills of the participants are revealed in their storytelling. Religion plays a prominent role in the lives of quite a number of the participants, and serves as a solution for restoration. It is then also especially religion that gives them insight into all the problematic aspects of their lives. It was also found in the storytelling that the focus should be centred on the individual's religion and not on the individual. The participants' dreams were revealed by the stories told by them. The contribution stories make to identity is that stories told by individuals reveal who they are. When storytelling directs the individual's way of thinking in a positive direction, it enables them to organize their way of living and adopt a positive world view. Storytelling has at its command a number of qualities that make it suitable to be applied as an education strategy. Therefore, stories told by individuals with a view to establish a storytelling culture serve to promote identity development. <![CDATA[<b>"Weeds amongst the wheat": Oswald Pirow and the New Order for South Africa, 1940–1943</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200006&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= In Suid-Afrika gaan heelwat mense gebuk onder 'n negatiewe identiteit as gevolg van armoede en die maatskaplike uitvloeisels daarvan (Bakker & Műller 2010:49-50; De Vries 2017). Die probleemvraag wat in hierdie studie ondersoek is, was: Hoe kan storievertelling as strategie ter versterking van identiteitsontwikkeling aangewend word? 'n Kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetodologie is gevolg deur gebruik te maak van Deelnemende Aksieleer en -navorsing (PALAR: Participatory Action Learning and Action Research) as navorsingstrategie. Die lewensverhale van die deelnemers is ingesamel volgens hierdie metodologie aan die hand van onderhoudvoering, Photovoice-aktiwiteite, joernaalinskrywings asook die navorser se waarnemings wat deur middel van veldnotas opgeteken is. Die ingesamelde data is geanaliseer deur gebruik te maak van die sagtewareprogram ATLAS.tiTM.<hr/>Inhabitants of a community in the Western Cape, heavily burdened by a negative identity caused by poverty and many of the socio-economic problems associated with poverty, formed the focus of the research. It was necessary for the participants in this study to reflect anew on their own experiences as revealed by their stories about themselves, because they are and become the stories they tell. It was assumed that storytelling would be an enabling tool to assist them in discovering their true identity, since their own stories as told by themselves in a familiar language could bring to the fore more positive aspects of an otherwise depressing existence, thereby strengthening a more positive identity. The research question in the present study can be simply stated as: • What contribution can storytelling as a strategy make to the construction of identity? A qualitative research methodology was followed by using PALAR (Participatory Action Learning and Action Research) as method of enquiry. The life stories of the participants were collected in accordance with this methodology using interviewing, Photovoice activities, journal entries, observations made by the researcher and recordings by means of field notes. The collected data were analysed using the software program ATLAS.tiTM. The results were discussed in accordance with the objectives of the study in an attempt to answer the research questions from the findings as comprehensively as possible. The results, as obtained from the literature review and the empirical investigation, were taken into consideration while implementing storytelling as a teaching strategy. Cohesion exists between the identity of the participant and the context(s) in which the stories are constructed. The narratives are presented by the participants themselves and from the stories they tell, their individual experiences are deduced in the micro-system. The meso-system entails the relation between the micro-systems, and it could be ascertained that incidences experienced by the individual influenced the individual's relationship with other role players. Should storytelling have developed within a specific micro-system, it can serve as a solution when social problems such as poverty exert influence on the individual. In the eco-system in which a link exists between the context in which the individual plays no active role, and the context in which he actively participates, storytelling brought to the fore factors that influence individuals (for instance parents' workplace, family's social networks and the community). Stories describe the macro-system, the culture in which the individual lives, for instance customs, traditions, the economy, health services, education and values. It was found that the individual does not understand who they are if their life forms no story, because stories are not simply something people tell, but also incidences of what people have experienced. Therefore, storytelling can expose the individual's negative identity. From the participants' storytelling it became clear that they are dependent on one another at both material and emotional levels due to the brokenness observed in family constructs and poverty (at all levels - material and emotional, as well as the socio-economic decay brought about by poverty). The group that is seen as an entity (community) dissipates uncertainty in the self by practising immoral and bad habits. Participants' storytelling brought to the fore the internalisation of symptoms (depression and fear) as well as the externalisation of symptoms, amongst others, drug and liquor abuse risks. Absent parental support has an influence on the construction of the individual's identity, as confirmed from the participants' storytelling. From the stories told by the participants it became clear that incidents and actions around the individual can be destructive, but can in time be seen and experienced as positive. Therefore, storytelling as strategy brings to the fore a positive identity. A large number of the participants never recognised positive elements in their lives before communicating these in their stories. Specifically the positive characteristics, abilities and skills of the participants are revealed in their storytelling. Religion plays a prominent role in the lives of quite a number of the participants, and serves as a solution for restoration. It is then also especially religion that gives them insight into all the problematic aspects of their lives. It was also found in the storytelling that the focus should be centred on the individual's religion and not on the individual. The participants' dreams were revealed by the stories told by them. The contribution stories make to identity is that stories told by individuals reveal who they are. When storytelling directs the individual's way of thinking in a positive direction, it enables them to organize their way of living and adopt a positive world view. Storytelling has at its command a number of qualities that make it suitable to be applied as an education strategy. Therefore, stories told by individuals with a view to establish a storytelling culture serve to promote identity development. <![CDATA[<b>Brexit's political and economic consequences and historical realities</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200007&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Hierdie oorsigartikel is nie 'n kronologiese weergawe van alles wat rondom Brexit gebeur het nie. Dit gee eerder die hooftemas weer wat op hul beurt onvermydelik lei tot duplikasie van verwysings en gevolgtrekkings in sekere gevalle. Waar Brexit vir die Europese Unie (EU) 'n ernstige buitelandse beleidsonderwerp is, gaan dit vir die Verenigde Koninkryk (VK) amper meer oor 'n oorlewingstryd om binnelandse politieke mag en die voortbestaan van die VK as 'n politieke eenheid. Die impak van binnelandse aangeleenthede op buitelandse beleid word gedemonstreer deur eerste minister May se onversetlike standpunt oor die Europese Geregshof (EG).1 Die VK ervaar die EG as 'n soewereiniteitsbedreiging. Daarom is die wekroep van die Brexit-veldtog vir die VK om "weer volle beheer terug te kry". Om die VK van die EU se menige instellings en beleidsvoorskrifte los te maak en te organiseer, sou altyd 'n moeilke taak wees. Die aanvanklike pogings om volle betekenis aan Brexit te gee en ook 'n toekomstige verhouding met die EU te bewerkstellig - een sonder die EG se betrokkenheid - is kil deur die Europese gespreksgenote ontvang. Aangesien die eerste minister se ononderhandelbare voorwaardes en rooilyne dwaaslik en teenstrydig neergelê is, was dit onvermydelik dat hulle nie sou steekhou nie. Dat die EG in die proses sou verdwyn, was wensdenkery aan die kant van die VK. Daarenteen was die EU nou meer vasberade dat geen voorstel wat die EG se rol minimaliseer, nog minder die Hof se betrokkenheid uitsluit, oorweeg sou word nie. Om die VK se oordrewe fokus op die EG te verstaan, is dit belangrik om die gebeure voor en na die referendum in ag te neem.<hr/>In an attempt to determine the significance of Brexit, I analyse both the internal (national) and international consequences of Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May's ongoing attempts at negotiating the United Kingdom's (UK's) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). At the time of writing this article (May 2019), it has become clear that Brexit is a foreign-policy issue for the rest of Europe. In London, however, it revolves primarily around a battle for domestic power and the survival of the UK as a political unit. Seldom before has the impact of domestic affairs on foreign affairs been so vividly demonstrated as in the case of political divisions in the UK driving foreign-policy positions on Brexit and, in particular, PM May's hard line position with respect to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because of this fixation on and preoccupation with the ECJ the UK views many of its position points through this ECJ-prism. The issue of the Irish border touches the soul of the UK. The continuation of its four united entities is at stake. As are peace arrangements that have lasted now for more than 30 years. Of all the remaining EU countries the Republic of Ireland (RI) will experience the consequences of Brexit the most - in whatever shape or form it materialises. The emergence of the Irish backstop border issue as a deal breaker during the parliamentary debates on Brexit in the latter part of 2018 caused havoc. In the final analysis Brexit is not just about tariffs or trade and their consequences: it is about history, and making sure it is not repeated. This is a real concern. The backstop was an attempt to avoid renewed instability in Northern Ireland (NI) and is an effort to avoid a hard border between the RI and NI. Opponents argue that it could keep the UK trapped in the EU's customs union and keep the UK enmeshed in the EU. The siren call of the Brexit campaign was for the UK to "take back control". It was stubbornly determined to regain its distinctive identity in the world, how it chooses to proceed in the world and to formulate a previously untested approach. To achieve that PM May adopted a hard line approach to Brexit. She drew red lines and endorsed previous ones. Each one of them - and the one on the ECJ in particular - was incompatible with the relationship between the UK and the EU. But, she drew them nevertheless. More so in an effort to appease the anti-EU wing of her party. Brexiteers mobilised around the slogan of regaining control which then became a policy objective. Three years later nobody was in control. The failure to take back control was due to the PM failing to take and keep control. With her laid down contradictory red lines, breaking them was inevitable. Removing the UK from the purview of the ECJ is a delicate and sensitive issue with questions being raised over whether the UK can totally sever all ties with the Court without harming relations with the EU. The reasons why any future relationship with the EU will be nearly impossible without the Court are equally numerous. Whatever position the UK adopted it would not escape ECJ-related consequences. Considered from PM May's hard line standpoint on the Court it was a fact that she could hardly bear to contemplate. The EU has one common purpose. Foremost, it was determined to ensure that its Court continues to be the protector of all that have been created by the Union for the well-being of its Member States and their citizens, whether the negotiations with the UK succeeded or failed. European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. For the EU economic and political integration are intertwined and have been advanced and enhanced by the ECJ. PM May's red line on the ECJ overshadowed the negotiations and caused her headaches both internally and with the EU. Her negotiations with the EU on this issue and other crucial matters required patience, diplomatic ability and skill, together with an in depth understanding of the workings of all the EU institutions. The UK displayed no sign of any of these qualities. The Withdrawal Agreement, which PM May negotiated would be legally binding once it was approved by the UK Parliament and EU Members and ratified by the EU Parliament. It will thereafter govern the terms of the UK's departure from the EU. Its draft provisions include a transition period ending on 31 December 2020. Coupled with this Agreement is the non-binding Political Declaration. It details the UK's longer-term relationship with the EU. It envisages an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership. On Brexit the EU stands united as never before; the UK is regarded simply as a divisive entity. To exarcerbate matters, the UK government consistently underestimated the EU's resolve to stay united. Furthermore, it tried and failed dismally to drive a wedge between Member States and the EU Commission. Its Ministers misled themselves and the public in the UK into believing that the continentals would cave in because of their trade surplus with the UK. Ministers were either not briefed or ignored briefings on critical core features of the EU that conditioned the latter's approach and drove its ambition to stay united and speak with one voice. Seldom before have 27 States acted in such unison. By contrast, divisiveness characterised the UK's performance. UK officials knew right from the start that a leaving state was required to accept the EU position as the basis for the talks. In the Brexit talks, it was 27 to one. But their Ministers and not least of all their PM gave the impression that the UK had equal political weight to the EU in the negotiations. They minimised the difficulties. They implied the talks would be a walkover. When reality dawned, they accused the EU of stubbornness and unwillingness to cooperate. They questioned the good faith of their EU interlocutors. When they were not doing that they cried victory after every encounter with the EU negotiators. It would serve the UK well to approach the new round of negotiations with a new frame of mind so as to give substance to a future relationship with the EU. One that would treat their European counterparts as worthy negotiating partners and not as foil for use in domestic politics. <![CDATA[<b>Redakteursnota</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200008&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Hierdie oorsigartikel is nie 'n kronologiese weergawe van alles wat rondom Brexit gebeur het nie. Dit gee eerder die hooftemas weer wat op hul beurt onvermydelik lei tot duplikasie van verwysings en gevolgtrekkings in sekere gevalle. Waar Brexit vir die Europese Unie (EU) 'n ernstige buitelandse beleidsonderwerp is, gaan dit vir die Verenigde Koninkryk (VK) amper meer oor 'n oorlewingstryd om binnelandse politieke mag en die voortbestaan van die VK as 'n politieke eenheid. Die impak van binnelandse aangeleenthede op buitelandse beleid word gedemonstreer deur eerste minister May se onversetlike standpunt oor die Europese Geregshof (EG).1 Die VK ervaar die EG as 'n soewereiniteitsbedreiging. Daarom is die wekroep van die Brexit-veldtog vir die VK om "weer volle beheer terug te kry". Om die VK van die EU se menige instellings en beleidsvoorskrifte los te maak en te organiseer, sou altyd 'n moeilke taak wees. Die aanvanklike pogings om volle betekenis aan Brexit te gee en ook 'n toekomstige verhouding met die EU te bewerkstellig - een sonder die EG se betrokkenheid - is kil deur die Europese gespreksgenote ontvang. Aangesien die eerste minister se ononderhandelbare voorwaardes en rooilyne dwaaslik en teenstrydig neergelê is, was dit onvermydelik dat hulle nie sou steekhou nie. Dat die EG in die proses sou verdwyn, was wensdenkery aan die kant van die VK. Daarenteen was die EU nou meer vasberade dat geen voorstel wat die EG se rol minimaliseer, nog minder die Hof se betrokkenheid uitsluit, oorweeg sou word nie. Om die VK se oordrewe fokus op die EG te verstaan, is dit belangrik om die gebeure voor en na die referendum in ag te neem.<hr/>In an attempt to determine the significance of Brexit, I analyse both the internal (national) and international consequences of Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May's ongoing attempts at negotiating the United Kingdom's (UK's) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). At the time of writing this article (May 2019), it has become clear that Brexit is a foreign-policy issue for the rest of Europe. In London, however, it revolves primarily around a battle for domestic power and the survival of the UK as a political unit. Seldom before has the impact of domestic affairs on foreign affairs been so vividly demonstrated as in the case of political divisions in the UK driving foreign-policy positions on Brexit and, in particular, PM May's hard line position with respect to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because of this fixation on and preoccupation with the ECJ the UK views many of its position points through this ECJ-prism. The issue of the Irish border touches the soul of the UK. The continuation of its four united entities is at stake. As are peace arrangements that have lasted now for more than 30 years. Of all the remaining EU countries the Republic of Ireland (RI) will experience the consequences of Brexit the most - in whatever shape or form it materialises. The emergence of the Irish backstop border issue as a deal breaker during the parliamentary debates on Brexit in the latter part of 2018 caused havoc. In the final analysis Brexit is not just about tariffs or trade and their consequences: it is about history, and making sure it is not repeated. This is a real concern. The backstop was an attempt to avoid renewed instability in Northern Ireland (NI) and is an effort to avoid a hard border between the RI and NI. Opponents argue that it could keep the UK trapped in the EU's customs union and keep the UK enmeshed in the EU. The siren call of the Brexit campaign was for the UK to "take back control". It was stubbornly determined to regain its distinctive identity in the world, how it chooses to proceed in the world and to formulate a previously untested approach. To achieve that PM May adopted a hard line approach to Brexit. She drew red lines and endorsed previous ones. Each one of them - and the one on the ECJ in particular - was incompatible with the relationship between the UK and the EU. But, she drew them nevertheless. More so in an effort to appease the anti-EU wing of her party. Brexiteers mobilised around the slogan of regaining control which then became a policy objective. Three years later nobody was in control. The failure to take back control was due to the PM failing to take and keep control. With her laid down contradictory red lines, breaking them was inevitable. Removing the UK from the purview of the ECJ is a delicate and sensitive issue with questions being raised over whether the UK can totally sever all ties with the Court without harming relations with the EU. The reasons why any future relationship with the EU will be nearly impossible without the Court are equally numerous. Whatever position the UK adopted it would not escape ECJ-related consequences. Considered from PM May's hard line standpoint on the Court it was a fact that she could hardly bear to contemplate. The EU has one common purpose. Foremost, it was determined to ensure that its Court continues to be the protector of all that have been created by the Union for the well-being of its Member States and their citizens, whether the negotiations with the UK succeeded or failed. European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. For the EU economic and political integration are intertwined and have been advanced and enhanced by the ECJ. PM May's red line on the ECJ overshadowed the negotiations and caused her headaches both internally and with the EU. Her negotiations with the EU on this issue and other crucial matters required patience, diplomatic ability and skill, together with an in depth understanding of the workings of all the EU institutions. The UK displayed no sign of any of these qualities. The Withdrawal Agreement, which PM May negotiated would be legally binding once it was approved by the UK Parliament and EU Members and ratified by the EU Parliament. It will thereafter govern the terms of the UK's departure from the EU. Its draft provisions include a transition period ending on 31 December 2020. Coupled with this Agreement is the non-binding Political Declaration. It details the UK's longer-term relationship with the EU. It envisages an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership. On Brexit the EU stands united as never before; the UK is regarded simply as a divisive entity. To exarcerbate matters, the UK government consistently underestimated the EU's resolve to stay united. Furthermore, it tried and failed dismally to drive a wedge between Member States and the EU Commission. Its Ministers misled themselves and the public in the UK into believing that the continentals would cave in because of their trade surplus with the UK. Ministers were either not briefed or ignored briefings on critical core features of the EU that conditioned the latter's approach and drove its ambition to stay united and speak with one voice. Seldom before have 27 States acted in such unison. By contrast, divisiveness characterised the UK's performance. UK officials knew right from the start that a leaving state was required to accept the EU position as the basis for the talks. In the Brexit talks, it was 27 to one. But their Ministers and not least of all their PM gave the impression that the UK had equal political weight to the EU in the negotiations. They minimised the difficulties. They implied the talks would be a walkover. When reality dawned, they accused the EU of stubbornness and unwillingness to cooperate. They questioned the good faith of their EU interlocutors. When they were not doing that they cried victory after every encounter with the EU negotiators. It would serve the UK well to approach the new round of negotiations with a new frame of mind so as to give substance to a future relationship with the EU. One that would treat their European counterparts as worthy negotiating partners and not as foil for use in domestic politics. <![CDATA[<b>Die ramp van Brexit</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200009&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Hierdie oorsigartikel is nie 'n kronologiese weergawe van alles wat rondom Brexit gebeur het nie. Dit gee eerder die hooftemas weer wat op hul beurt onvermydelik lei tot duplikasie van verwysings en gevolgtrekkings in sekere gevalle. Waar Brexit vir die Europese Unie (EU) 'n ernstige buitelandse beleidsonderwerp is, gaan dit vir die Verenigde Koninkryk (VK) amper meer oor 'n oorlewingstryd om binnelandse politieke mag en die voortbestaan van die VK as 'n politieke eenheid. Die impak van binnelandse aangeleenthede op buitelandse beleid word gedemonstreer deur eerste minister May se onversetlike standpunt oor die Europese Geregshof (EG).1 Die VK ervaar die EG as 'n soewereiniteitsbedreiging. Daarom is die wekroep van die Brexit-veldtog vir die VK om "weer volle beheer terug te kry". Om die VK van die EU se menige instellings en beleidsvoorskrifte los te maak en te organiseer, sou altyd 'n moeilke taak wees. Die aanvanklike pogings om volle betekenis aan Brexit te gee en ook 'n toekomstige verhouding met die EU te bewerkstellig - een sonder die EG se betrokkenheid - is kil deur die Europese gespreksgenote ontvang. Aangesien die eerste minister se ononderhandelbare voorwaardes en rooilyne dwaaslik en teenstrydig neergelê is, was dit onvermydelik dat hulle nie sou steekhou nie. Dat die EG in die proses sou verdwyn, was wensdenkery aan die kant van die VK. Daarenteen was die EU nou meer vasberade dat geen voorstel wat die EG se rol minimaliseer, nog minder die Hof se betrokkenheid uitsluit, oorweeg sou word nie. Om die VK se oordrewe fokus op die EG te verstaan, is dit belangrik om die gebeure voor en na die referendum in ag te neem.<hr/>In an attempt to determine the significance of Brexit, I analyse both the internal (national) and international consequences of Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May's ongoing attempts at negotiating the United Kingdom's (UK's) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). At the time of writing this article (May 2019), it has become clear that Brexit is a foreign-policy issue for the rest of Europe. In London, however, it revolves primarily around a battle for domestic power and the survival of the UK as a political unit. Seldom before has the impact of domestic affairs on foreign affairs been so vividly demonstrated as in the case of political divisions in the UK driving foreign-policy positions on Brexit and, in particular, PM May's hard line position with respect to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because of this fixation on and preoccupation with the ECJ the UK views many of its position points through this ECJ-prism. The issue of the Irish border touches the soul of the UK. The continuation of its four united entities is at stake. As are peace arrangements that have lasted now for more than 30 years. Of all the remaining EU countries the Republic of Ireland (RI) will experience the consequences of Brexit the most - in whatever shape or form it materialises. The emergence of the Irish backstop border issue as a deal breaker during the parliamentary debates on Brexit in the latter part of 2018 caused havoc. In the final analysis Brexit is not just about tariffs or trade and their consequences: it is about history, and making sure it is not repeated. This is a real concern. The backstop was an attempt to avoid renewed instability in Northern Ireland (NI) and is an effort to avoid a hard border between the RI and NI. Opponents argue that it could keep the UK trapped in the EU's customs union and keep the UK enmeshed in the EU. The siren call of the Brexit campaign was for the UK to "take back control". It was stubbornly determined to regain its distinctive identity in the world, how it chooses to proceed in the world and to formulate a previously untested approach. To achieve that PM May adopted a hard line approach to Brexit. She drew red lines and endorsed previous ones. Each one of them - and the one on the ECJ in particular - was incompatible with the relationship between the UK and the EU. But, she drew them nevertheless. More so in an effort to appease the anti-EU wing of her party. Brexiteers mobilised around the slogan of regaining control which then became a policy objective. Three years later nobody was in control. The failure to take back control was due to the PM failing to take and keep control. With her laid down contradictory red lines, breaking them was inevitable. Removing the UK from the purview of the ECJ is a delicate and sensitive issue with questions being raised over whether the UK can totally sever all ties with the Court without harming relations with the EU. The reasons why any future relationship with the EU will be nearly impossible without the Court are equally numerous. Whatever position the UK adopted it would not escape ECJ-related consequences. Considered from PM May's hard line standpoint on the Court it was a fact that she could hardly bear to contemplate. The EU has one common purpose. Foremost, it was determined to ensure that its Court continues to be the protector of all that have been created by the Union for the well-being of its Member States and their citizens, whether the negotiations with the UK succeeded or failed. European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. For the EU economic and political integration are intertwined and have been advanced and enhanced by the ECJ. PM May's red line on the ECJ overshadowed the negotiations and caused her headaches both internally and with the EU. Her negotiations with the EU on this issue and other crucial matters required patience, diplomatic ability and skill, together with an in depth understanding of the workings of all the EU institutions. The UK displayed no sign of any of these qualities. The Withdrawal Agreement, which PM May negotiated would be legally binding once it was approved by the UK Parliament and EU Members and ratified by the EU Parliament. It will thereafter govern the terms of the UK's departure from the EU. Its draft provisions include a transition period ending on 31 December 2020. Coupled with this Agreement is the non-binding Political Declaration. It details the UK's longer-term relationship with the EU. It envisages an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership. On Brexit the EU stands united as never before; the UK is regarded simply as a divisive entity. To exarcerbate matters, the UK government consistently underestimated the EU's resolve to stay united. Furthermore, it tried and failed dismally to drive a wedge between Member States and the EU Commission. Its Ministers misled themselves and the public in the UK into believing that the continentals would cave in because of their trade surplus with the UK. Ministers were either not briefed or ignored briefings on critical core features of the EU that conditioned the latter's approach and drove its ambition to stay united and speak with one voice. Seldom before have 27 States acted in such unison. By contrast, divisiveness characterised the UK's performance. UK officials knew right from the start that a leaving state was required to accept the EU position as the basis for the talks. In the Brexit talks, it was 27 to one. But their Ministers and not least of all their PM gave the impression that the UK had equal political weight to the EU in the negotiations. They minimised the difficulties. They implied the talks would be a walkover. When reality dawned, they accused the EU of stubbornness and unwillingness to cooperate. They questioned the good faith of their EU interlocutors. When they were not doing that they cried victory after every encounter with the EU negotiators. It would serve the UK well to approach the new round of negotiations with a new frame of mind so as to give substance to a future relationship with the EU. One that would treat their European counterparts as worthy negotiating partners and not as foil for use in domestic politics. <![CDATA[<b>Nog klein jakkalsies</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-47512019000200010&lng=&nrm=iso&tlng= Hierdie oorsigartikel is nie 'n kronologiese weergawe van alles wat rondom Brexit gebeur het nie. Dit gee eerder die hooftemas weer wat op hul beurt onvermydelik lei tot duplikasie van verwysings en gevolgtrekkings in sekere gevalle. Waar Brexit vir die Europese Unie (EU) 'n ernstige buitelandse beleidsonderwerp is, gaan dit vir die Verenigde Koninkryk (VK) amper meer oor 'n oorlewingstryd om binnelandse politieke mag en die voortbestaan van die VK as 'n politieke eenheid. Die impak van binnelandse aangeleenthede op buitelandse beleid word gedemonstreer deur eerste minister May se onversetlike standpunt oor die Europese Geregshof (EG).1 Die VK ervaar die EG as 'n soewereiniteitsbedreiging. Daarom is die wekroep van die Brexit-veldtog vir die VK om "weer volle beheer terug te kry". Om die VK van die EU se menige instellings en beleidsvoorskrifte los te maak en te organiseer, sou altyd 'n moeilke taak wees. Die aanvanklike pogings om volle betekenis aan Brexit te gee en ook 'n toekomstige verhouding met die EU te bewerkstellig - een sonder die EG se betrokkenheid - is kil deur die Europese gespreksgenote ontvang. Aangesien die eerste minister se ononderhandelbare voorwaardes en rooilyne dwaaslik en teenstrydig neergelê is, was dit onvermydelik dat hulle nie sou steekhou nie. Dat die EG in die proses sou verdwyn, was wensdenkery aan die kant van die VK. Daarenteen was die EU nou meer vasberade dat geen voorstel wat die EG se rol minimaliseer, nog minder die Hof se betrokkenheid uitsluit, oorweeg sou word nie. Om die VK se oordrewe fokus op die EG te verstaan, is dit belangrik om die gebeure voor en na die referendum in ag te neem.<hr/>In an attempt to determine the significance of Brexit, I analyse both the internal (national) and international consequences of Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May's ongoing attempts at negotiating the United Kingdom's (UK's) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). At the time of writing this article (May 2019), it has become clear that Brexit is a foreign-policy issue for the rest of Europe. In London, however, it revolves primarily around a battle for domestic power and the survival of the UK as a political unit. Seldom before has the impact of domestic affairs on foreign affairs been so vividly demonstrated as in the case of political divisions in the UK driving foreign-policy positions on Brexit and, in particular, PM May's hard line position with respect to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because of this fixation on and preoccupation with the ECJ the UK views many of its position points through this ECJ-prism. The issue of the Irish border touches the soul of the UK. The continuation of its four united entities is at stake. As are peace arrangements that have lasted now for more than 30 years. Of all the remaining EU countries the Republic of Ireland (RI) will experience the consequences of Brexit the most - in whatever shape or form it materialises. The emergence of the Irish backstop border issue as a deal breaker during the parliamentary debates on Brexit in the latter part of 2018 caused havoc. In the final analysis Brexit is not just about tariffs or trade and their consequences: it is about history, and making sure it is not repeated. This is a real concern. The backstop was an attempt to avoid renewed instability in Northern Ireland (NI) and is an effort to avoid a hard border between the RI and NI. Opponents argue that it could keep the UK trapped in the EU's customs union and keep the UK enmeshed in the EU. The siren call of the Brexit campaign was for the UK to "take back control". It was stubbornly determined to regain its distinctive identity in the world, how it chooses to proceed in the world and to formulate a previously untested approach. To achieve that PM May adopted a hard line approach to Brexit. She drew red lines and endorsed previous ones. Each one of them - and the one on the ECJ in particular - was incompatible with the relationship between the UK and the EU. But, she drew them nevertheless. More so in an effort to appease the anti-EU wing of her party. Brexiteers mobilised around the slogan of regaining control which then became a policy objective. Three years later nobody was in control. The failure to take back control was due to the PM failing to take and keep control. With her laid down contradictory red lines, breaking them was inevitable. Removing the UK from the purview of the ECJ is a delicate and sensitive issue with questions being raised over whether the UK can totally sever all ties with the Court without harming relations with the EU. The reasons why any future relationship with the EU will be nearly impossible without the Court are equally numerous. Whatever position the UK adopted it would not escape ECJ-related consequences. Considered from PM May's hard line standpoint on the Court it was a fact that she could hardly bear to contemplate. The EU has one common purpose. Foremost, it was determined to ensure that its Court continues to be the protector of all that have been created by the Union for the well-being of its Member States and their citizens, whether the negotiations with the UK succeeded or failed. European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. For the EU economic and political integration are intertwined and have been advanced and enhanced by the ECJ. PM May's red line on the ECJ overshadowed the negotiations and caused her headaches both internally and with the EU. Her negotiations with the EU on this issue and other crucial matters required patience, diplomatic ability and skill, together with an in depth understanding of the workings of all the EU institutions. The UK displayed no sign of any of these qualities. The Withdrawal Agreement, which PM May negotiated would be legally binding once it was approved by the UK Parliament and EU Members and ratified by the EU Parliament. It will thereafter govern the terms of the UK's departure from the EU. Its draft provisions include a transition period ending on 31 December 2020. Coupled with this Agreement is the non-binding Political Declaration. It details the UK's longer-term relationship with the EU. It envisages an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership. On Brexit the EU stands united as never before; the UK is regarded simply as a divisive entity. To exarcerbate matters, the UK government consistently underestimated the EU's resolve to stay united. Furthermore, it tried and failed dismally to drive a wedge between Member States and the EU Commission. Its Ministers misled themselves and the public in the UK into believing that the continentals would cave in because of their trade surplus with the UK. Ministers were either not briefed or ignored briefings on critical core features of the EU that conditioned the latter's approach and drove its ambition to stay united and speak with one voice. Seldom before have 27 States acted in such unison. By contrast, divisiveness characterised the UK's performance. UK officials knew right from the start that a leaving state was required to accept the EU position as the basis for the talks. In the Brexit talks, it was 27 to one. But their Ministers and not least of all their PM gave the impression that the UK had equal political weight to the EU in the negotiations. They minimised the difficulties. They implied the talks would be a walkover. When reality dawned, they accused the EU of stubbornness and unwillingness to cooperate. They questioned the good faith of their EU interlocutors. When they were not doing that they cried victory after every encounter with the EU negotiators. It would serve the UK well to approach the new round of negotiations with a new frame of mind so as to give substance to a future relationship with the EU. One that would treat their European counterparts as worthy negotiating partners and not as foil for use in domestic politics.