Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Historia]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=0018-229X20120002&lang=pt vol. 57 num. 2 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>"</b><b>The sacred tie"</b>: <b>Sir Thomas Smartt, the Unionist Party and the British Empire, 1912-1920</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200001&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt The Irish born Thomas Smartt loved South Africa, and fervently believed that that his adopted country's highest destiny could only be achieved by being in the British Empire. For him the imperial connection with Britain was a "sacred tie", and he saw it as his duty as the leader of the pro-imperial Unionist Party, the official parliamentary opposition between 1912 and 1920, to protect and strengthen it. He was, however, a disastrous leader of the Unionist Party, and did much to harm the "sacred tie". His lack of self-restraint when it came to imperial interests meant that instead of controlling and guiding the attachment of South African English-speakers to Britain, he fuelled a destructive jingoism. In the process he harmed the efforts of Louis Botha and J.C. Smuts to reconcile the two white groups after the trauma of the South African War, and to create a united and loyal South Africa within the Empire.<hr/>Die Iers gebore Thomas Smartt was lief vir Suid-Afrika en het vuriglik geglo dat sy aangenome land net die hoogste voorbestemming kan bereik deur deel van die Britse Ryk te wees. Vir hom was die imperiale verbintenis met Brittanje 'n "onskendbare band", en hy het dit tussen 1912 en 1920 as sy plig gesien om hierdie band, as die leier van die pro-imperial Unioniste Party, die amptelike parlementêre opposisie, te beskerm en te versterk. Hy was egter 'n rampspoedige leier van die Unioniste Party wat die "onskendbare band" ernstige skade berokken het. Sy gebrekkige selfbeheer oor imperiale belange het tot gevolg gehad dat hy nie die Engelssprekendes in Suid-Afrika se gehegtheid aan Brittanje kon beheer en lei nie, en 'n vernietigende jingoïsme aangemoedig het. In die proses het hy die pogings van Louis Botha en J.C. Smuts ondermyn om die twee blanke groepe na die trauma van die Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog te versoen, en 'n verenigde lojale Suid-Afrika binne die Ryk te skep. <![CDATA[<b>The "coolie curse"</b>: <b>The evolution of white colonial attitudes towards the Indian question, 1860-1900</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200002&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Neither by accident nor design, Natal became home to over 50 000 Indian immigrants during the latter half of the nineteenth century. At the request of fewer than 50 sugar planters, colonial Natal embarked on a labour dispensation which was initially envisaged as "an experiment," on a small scale, as Governor John Scott saw it. Appreciated for their contribution as labourers to the success of sugar production, Indians nonetheless, were resented by white colonists as settlers after they had completed their indenture contracts. That resentment was heightened by the influx of traders and non-indentured Indians into Natal after 1875 and found expression in published opinion and in discriminatory legislation. By the 1890s Natal's anti-Indian legislation became an imperial controversy which also proved life-changing for M.K. Gandhi. This article attempts to track the evolution of white settler attitudes to what was termed the "coolie curse."<hr/>Gedurende die tweede helfte van die negentiende eeu het Natal die tuiste van meer as 50 000 Indiese immigrante geword. Op versoek van minder as 50 suikerboere het koloniale Natal begin met 'n arbeidsbedeling wat aldus die mening van Goewerneur John Scott slegs as 'n "kleinskaalse eksperiment" beskou was. Nieteenstaande die waardering vir hulle bydrae as arbeiders tot die sukses van suikerproduksie, was blanke koloniste nogtans verbitterd teenoor Indiers as setlaars nadat hulle inboekstelsel kontrakte verstryk het. Hierdie misnoë was verder aangevuur deur die instroming van handelaars en ongekontrakteerde Indiers in Natal na 1875, en was ook duidelik verwoord in gepubliseerde opinie asook diskriminerende wetgewing. Teen die 1890s het Natal se anti-Indier wetgewing ontaard in 'n imperiale kontroversie wat selfs die toekoms van M.K. Ghandi beinvloed het. Hierdie artikel poog om die evolusie van blanke setlaars se houding ten opsigte van die destydse sogenaamde "coolie curse" te ontleed. <![CDATA[<b>"Goddank dis hoogverraad en nie laagverraad nie!"</b>: <b>Die rol van vroue in die Ossewa-Brandwag se verset teen Suid-Afrika se deelname aan die Tweede Wêreldoorlog</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200003&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Gedurende die Tweede Wereldoorlog het die Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) as massaorganisasie homself verset teen Suid-Afrika se deelname aan die oorlog aan die kant van Brittanje. Duisende Afrikaners het die OB gesien as 'n middel tot die voortsetting van die "volk" se stryd teen Britse oorheersing en het na die beweging verwys as die "Tweede Rebellie". Afrikanervroue het ook in hulle duisende deel uitgemaak van die OB se lidmaatskap en was ten nouste betrokke by alle aktiwiteite van die organisasie - insluitende die verset teen Smuts se oorlogspoging. Ten spyte hiervan is daar geen historiese studie wat fokus op OB-vroue se agentskap in hierdie verband nie. Hierdie artikel verken die verskillende vorme wat vroue se verset aangeneem het as deel van die OB se aktivistiese aard. Daar word bepaal hoe vroue se agentskap beïnvloed is deur die metaforiese moontlikhede van die sogenaamde volksmoeder-konstruksie. Van al die kwaliteite van die volksmoeder het veral die idee van die vrou se "sin vir onafhanklikheid" bepaald in die OB se verset na vore getree. OB-vroue het binne die beperkings van die volksmoeder-diskoers, as reaksie op historiese gebeure, self betekenis gegee aan hulle gekonstrueerde identiteit en by wyse van hulle verset dikwels vooroorlogse gendernorme oorskry of rekonstrueer.<hr/>The Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) was a mass-movement opposed to South Africa's participation in the Second World War on the side of Britain. Thousands of Afrikaners saw the OB as a movement in which they could express their opposition to the war and continue the volk's struggle against British authority. They referred to the OB as the Afrikaner's "Second Rebellion". Afrikaner women also joined the OB in their thousands and participated in all the activities of the movement - including the active resistance to the war effort. In spite of this there is no study that describes the role of women in this regard. This article explores the different forms of resistance women used to articulate their opposition to the war as part of the more activist nature of the OB. The influence of the metaphoric possibilities of the so called volksmoeder construction also comes under the looking glass. Of all the qualities of the volksmoeder especially the idea of women's "sense of independence" is evident in women's resistance. OB-women acted within the confines of the volksmoeder discourse and gave meaning to their constructed identity through their activities of resistance. By doing so they often transgressed and reconstructed pre-war gender norms. <![CDATA[<b>Radio broadcasting for blacks during the Second World War</b>: <b>"It could be dangerous .."</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200004&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt One year after the Union of South Africa declared war on Germany in 1939, the South African government began to use radio broadcasting to a black target group as a medium for propaganda. In the winter of 1940, the Department of Native Affairs (DNA), responsible for transmitting propaganda to blacks, together with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and the Department for Post and Telegraphs, launched the first broadcasting service for blacks in Johannesburg. The broadcast, which was initially only transmitted via telephone lines, differed considerably from the broadcast for whites. Based on extensive archival research, this article describes the conception and implementation of that broadcasting service along with the specific programming the DNA and the SABC introduced for black listeners. Because it includes enquiries on the reception of the service at that time, this article offers new insights into South African media history. The broadcasting service for blacks during the Second World War clearly reflected the white producers' stereotypical conception of blacks. It was designed to assert the hegemonic position of the white minority and legitimise and help to maintain the colonial order. However, the black audience did not prove to be the passive, grateful recipients of carefully selected information that producers expected them to be. Instead, several independent enquiries on audience response to the broadcasting service, for example from the Bantu News Service Committee of the Witwatersrand and the Sub-Committee of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), suggested a rather critical response from the target audience.<hr/>Een jaar nadat die Unie van Suid-Afrika oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar het, het Suid-Afrika se regering begin om radio-uitsending as 'n medium vir propaganda na 'n swart teikengroet aan te wend. In die winter van 1940 het die Departement van Naturelle Sake (DNS), wat in beheer was van propaganda vir die swart bevolking, gepaard met die Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie (SAUK) en die Departement Posen Telegraafdienste die eerste uitsaaidiens vir die Swart bevolking in Johannesburg van stapel gestuur. Die program, wat aanvanklik slegs via telefoonlyne versend is, het aansienlike van die programme vir witmense verskil. Gebaseer op uitvoerige argiefnavorsing, beskryf hierdie artikel die stigting en implementering van daardie uitsaaidiens gepaard met die spesifieke program die DNS en die SAUK wat vir swart luisteraars ingestel is. Insluitend navrae oor die ontvangs van die diens destyds, bied die artikel nuwe insigte in die Suid-Afrikaanse mediageskiedenis. Die uitsaaidiens vir swartmense tydens die Tweede Wereldoorlog weerspieël duidelik die wit aanbieders se stereotipe begrip van swartmense. Gevolglik het die diens die hegemoniese posisie van die wit minderheid onderhou en dus die koloniale orde in die gemeenskap geregverdig en meegehelp om dit te onderhou. Die swart luisteraars was egter nie die soort passiewe dankbare ontvangers van die geselekteerde inligting soos sommige aanbieders verwag het hulle sou wees nie. Inteendeel, etlike navra oor die ontvang van die uitsendingsdiens, byvoorbeeld by die Bantoe Nuusdienskomitee van die Witwatersrand of die Onderkomitee van die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Rasseverhoudings (SAIRV), het op 'n heel kritiese respons van die luisteraars gedui. <![CDATA[<b>Amsterdam as 'n anti-apartheidstad</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200005&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Daar is n noue verbintenis tussen Amsterdam as n anti-apartheidstad en Ed van Thijn, wat van 1983 tot 1994 die burgemeester daarvan was. Amsterdam is in 1986 uitgeroep tot anti-apartheidstad - die eerste stad van dié aard in Nederland. Groot anti-apartheidsdemonstrasies is oor die jare heen in Amsterdam gehou. In 1988, byvoorbeeld, het 50 000 Amsterdammers 'n massabetoging bygewoon. Amsterdamse universiteite het eredoktorsgrade aan ds. C.F. Beyers Naudé en Govan Mbeki as gebaar van solidariteit toegeken. Belangrike konferensies vir Suid-Afrikaanse kunstenaars in ballingskap is in Amsterdam gehou, byvoorbeeld "De kulturele stem van het verzet' (1982) en "Culture in Another South Africa' (1987). Dié konferensies het gestaan in die teken van solidariteit met die ANC. Die ANC het ook in 1989 n eie kantoor in Amsterdam gevestig. Nelson Mandela se vrylating in 1990 is met uitbundige vreugde in Amsterdam gevier. Mandela is beide in 1990 en 1999 soos n held in die stad ontvang. Daar was n noue band tussen Mandela en Amsterdam as n anti-apartheidstad, omdat hy die verpersoonliking van die stryd teen apartheid was.<hr/>There is a close link between Amsterdam as an anti-apartheid city and Ed van Thijn, who was its mayor from 1983 to 1994. Amsterdam was declared an anti-apartheid city in 1986 - the first city of this nature in the Netherlands. Large anti-apartheid demonstrations were held over the years in Amsterdam. In 1988, for example, there was a mass demonstration of 50 000 people of Amsterdam. Reverend C.F. Beyers Naudé and Govan Mbeki received honorary doctorates from Amsterdam universities as a gesture of solidarity. Important conferences for South African artists in exile were held in Amsterdam, for example "The cultural voice of the struggle" (1982) and "Culture in Another South Africa" (1987). These conferences were organised in solidarity with the ANC. The ANC also opened an office in Amsterdam in 1989. Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990 was greeted with much jubilation in Amsterdam. Mandela was received as a hero in the city in both 1990 and 1999. There was a close link between Mandela and Amsterdam as an anti-apartheid city, as Mandela was the personification of the struggle against apartheid. <![CDATA[<b>Shifting sexual morality? Changing views on homosexuality in Afrikaner society during the 1960s</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200006&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt A police raid on a gay party in Johannesburg in 1966 set in motion a series of events which led to a proposal in parliament that there be amendments made to the Immorality Act that would criminalise male and female homosexuality. In an attempt to block these amendments, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund was established to state the case of the middle-class gay community before the select committee that had been formed to conduct an enquiry on the proposed legislative amendments. This is seen as the beginning of the organised gay rights movement in South Africa. For Afrikaner society, the work of the parliamentary select committee was particularly significant because in 1968 it triggered a debate in the letter column of at least one Afrikaans newspaper, Die Burger. It was a historic debate. Previously homosexuality had not been a topic for public discussion in "decent" Afrikaner circles. Now the taboo was lifted for the first time. After the 1968 homosexuality debate there was freer dissemination of information about gay people and the discourse on homosexuality slowly gained momentum. This article contextualises, analyses and evaluates the 1968 debate.<hr/>'n Polisieklopjag op 'n partytjie vir gays in Johannesburg vroeg in 1966 het 'n kettingreaksie veroorsaak, wat gelei het tot 'n voorstel in die parlement dat die Ontugwet gewysig moet word. Die bedoeling was om homoseksualiteit onder beide mans en vroue te kriminaliseer. Om so 'n wetswysiging te probeer stuit, is die Homosexual Law Reform Fund in die lewe geroep om die gay middelklasgemeenskap se saak te stel aan die gekose komitee wat ondersoek moes instel na die voorgestelde wetswysiging. Hierdie kortstondige maar suksesvolle organisasie word beskou as die begin van 'n georganiseerde beweging vir gay-regte in Suid-Afrika. Vir die Afrikanersamelewing is die parlementêre gekose komitee van besondere belang, want dit het in 1968 'n debat in die briewekolomme van Afrikaanse koerante soos Die Burger aan die gang gesit. Voorheen was homoseksualiteit nie 'n onderwerp wat in die openbaar deur "ordentlike" Afrikaners bespreek is nie. Die briewedebat in die koerante het die taboe onherroeplik opgehef. Daarna is inligting oor homoseksualiteit openliker versprei en die diskoers oor homoseksualiteit het geleidelik onder Afrikaners momentum gekry. Hierdie artikel kontekstualiseer, ontleed en evalueer die 1968-debat. <![CDATA[<b>Die wynmakerfamilie van Zonnebloem, Simondium, 1915-1963</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200007&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Die verhaal van Zonnebloem wyn wentel om Marie Furter-Crouse en die drie manlike wynmakers van Zonnebloem-plaas: haar pa, Willem Furter wat haar die kuns van wynmaak geleer het, haar swaer, John de Villiers, en haar eggenoot, Maurice Crouse, sowel as Stellenbosch Boerewynmakery (SBW). Sedert 1920 is Zonnebloemwyn na Londen uitgevoer en teen 1947 was Zonnebloem Cabernet Sauvignon en Zonnebloem Riesling in Suid-Afrika sowel as Europa bekend as gehaltewyne. John de Villiers was die eerste wynmaker wat bekend geword het as die "Wynkoning van Suid-Afrika". SBW het sedert 1930 nou betrokke geraak by die wynmakers van Zonnebloem en in die laat 1940's het dié maatskappy Zonnebloem-wyn vir John de Villiers gebotteleer, geëtiketteer en bemark. Kort na sy dood in 1948 het SBW die naam Zonnebloem as handelsmerk geregistreer sonder om die familie daaroor in te lig. Die veranderinge gedurende die 1950's in die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf, die internasionale boikotte, asook stygende produksiekoste het Crouse gedwing om sy wynmakery te staak. Die plaas Zonnebloem is in 2003 verkoop.<hr/>The story of Zonnebloem wine revolves round Marie Furter-Crouse and the three male winemakers of Zonnebloem farm: her father, Willem Furter who taught her the art of wine-making, her brother-in-law, John de Villiers, and her husband, Maurice Crouse, as well as Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery (SFW). Since 1920 Zonnebloem wine was exported to London and by 1947 the excellent Zonnebloem Riesling and Zonnebloem Cabernet Sauvignon were renowned in South Africa and Europe for their quality. John de Villiers was the first winemaker to become known as the "Wine King of South Africa". From 1930 SFW became deeply involved with the wine-makers of Zonnebloem and by the 1940's the company bottled, labelled and marketed Zonnebloem wine for John de Villiers. Shortly after his death in 1948, SFW registered the name Zonnebloem as its trade mark without informing the family. The changes which took place in the South African wine industry during the 1950's, international boycotts, as well as the ever increasing production costs, forced Crouse to stop making wine. Zonnebloem farm was sold in 2003. <![CDATA[<b>No nukes in Africa</b>: <b>South Africa, the denuclearisation of Africa and the Pelindaba Treaty</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200008&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt African efforts to denuclearise Africa originated in the 1960s in response to French nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert and to apartheid South Africa's nuclear weapons programme. The Organisation of African Unity joined the UN in the mid-1960s to denuclearise the continent. With international opposition to its apartheid policies, the South African government became increasingly isolated; a situation which worsened as confirmation of the country's nuclear capabilities revealed the extent of its nuclear weapons programme. By the end of the 1980s, the apartheid government under President F.W de Klerk decided to terminate the South African nuclear weapons programme as well as its apartheid policies; a decision which accelerated the denuclearisation of Africa. Once South Africa's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation became evident, the continent included it in negotiations on an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). With the treaty's entry into force in July 2009 and South Africa's subsequent election to leadership positions in the treaty's compliance mechanism, South Africa's nuclear diplomacy with Africa entered a new phase which continues to pose challenges to the continent's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.<hr/>Pogings om Afrika van kernwapens te vrywaar het hul oorsprong in die sestiger jare as 'n reaksie teen Frankryk se kern toetse in die Saharawoestyn en apartheid Suid-Afrika se kernwapen program. Die Organisasie vir Afrika-eenheid het in die middel sestigerjare by die Verenigde Nasies aangesluit om kernwapens uit Afrika te verwyder. Internasionale teenkanting teen apartheid het daartoe gelei dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering toenemend gei'soleer is. Hierdie toestand is vererger namate die omvang van die land se kernwapen program bekend geword het. Teen die einde van die tagtiger jare het die apartheids regering onder leiding van President F.W. de Klerk besluit om die Suid-Afrkaanse kernwapen program te staak en om apartheid af te skaf. Hierdie besluite het die kernontwapening van Afrika versnel. Namate Suid-Afrika se toewyding tot kernontwapening duideliker geword het, is die land by onderhandelinge oor 'n verdrag oor 'n kernwapenvryesone in Afrika betrek. Die verdrag het in Julie 2009 in werking getree met Suid-Afrka as verkose leier van die verdrag se nakomings meganisme. Hiermee het die land se kern diplomasie 'n nuwe fase betree. Hierdie fase bide nuwe uitdagings vir kern nie-proliferasie op die kontinent. <![CDATA[<b>Zimbabwe's land struggles and land rights in historical perspective</b>: <b>The case of Gowe-Sanyati irrigation (1950-2000)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200009&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt This article examines the history of land struggles in the Sanyatidryland and the Gowe-ARDA irrigation-community in northwestern Zimbabwe from 1950 to 2000. Land has been one of the most contentious issues in this area in the colonial and post-independence eras. Informed by the broader contestation around land, the article seeks to address the question of indigenous rights to land in Zimbabwe. Writing from an economic history point of view, it analyses the historical roots of contemporary land struggles and land grabbing in Zimbabwe since the forced removal of people from Rhodesdale to Sanyati in 1950. It also evaluates the need for land (as a factor of accumulation) and water rights in addressing key issues that could enable Zimbabwe realise peace and the much-needed restoration of the economy. Demands for land and associated rights are an indicator of the tension reminiscent of the dryland and ARDA-irrigated lands in Sanyati which was informed by Rhodesian-era evictions and resettlements. Clearly, in the pre-2000 period, the lack of adequate land to settle the farmers on a satisfactory basis coupled with the absence of a deliberate policy framework to regularise land-allocation has created a perception of economic disempowerment in both the dryland and irrigated peasant-sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. This informs the spate of farm-invasions witnessed in recent times in Gowe-Sanyati and beyond and underlines the fact that it is imperative that further research be undertaken on Zimbabwe's contemporary agrarian revolution.<hr/>Hierdie voordrag ondersoek die geskiedenis van grondstryd in die Sanyati-droogland en die Gowe-ARDA-besproeiingsgemeenskap in noordwes-Zimbabwe van 1950 tot 2000. Grond was nog altyd een van die mees omstrede kwessies in hierdie omgewing in die koloniale en die post-onafhanklikheidsera. Geinspireer deur die breér stryd rakende grond, beoog die voordrag om die vraag rakende inheemse regte op grond in Zimbabwe onder die loep te neem. Deur primêre bronne aan te wend, insluitend mondelinge onderhoude (wat oorspronklikheid aan my artikel verleen), asook sekondere literatuur en deur vanuit 'n ekonomies historiese uitganspunt te skryf, analiseer die voordrag die historiese wortels van kontemporere grondstryd en grondinpalming in Zimbabwe sedert die gedwonge verwydering van mense uit Rhodesdale na Sanyati in 1950. Dit evalueer ook die behoefte aan land (as 'n akkumulasiefaktor) en waterregte om sleutelkwessies wat Simbabwe in staat sou kon stel om vrede en die hoogs noodsaaklike herstel van die ekonomie te ondervang. Deur die grondvraag as 'n omstrede kwessie van Zimbabwier-geskiedenis na te vors verbreed duidelik ons begrip van die kwessie. Terselfdertyd kan nuwe lewe in die voosgeslane of mankoliekige ekonomie ingeblaas word, gebaseer, onder andere, op grondaangeleenthede en uitdagings met die breer ontwikkelingsagenda en demokratiseringsproses te inkorporeer. Dit vereis dat verskeie belanghebbendes hulle moet losmaak van geykte houdings en weerstand teen 'n benadering wat op regte gebaseer is en een volg wat op grondhervorming toegespits is. Inheemse mense se demokratiese regte op grond en toegang tot water is van die allergrootste belang in n land waar koloniale staatsbeleide stryd en konflik oor grond geskep het. Eise vir grond en gepaardgaande regte is n aanduiding van die spanning wat herinner aan die droogland- en ARDA-besproeide grond in Sanyati wat geskep is deur Rhodesie-era-uitsettings en -hervestigings. Die ontneming van grond van die kleinboerestand in die pre-onafhanklikheidsera het aansienlik bygedra tot sosio-ekonomiese en politieke spanning. Die kennelike mislukking van die post-onafhanklikheidsregering om landhonger onder die mense te ondervang het ook gelei tot n verwagtingskrisis ("crisis of expectations") onder diegene wat gemeen het dat die terminering van die koloniale bewind op groter toegang tot grond sou uitloop. Duidelik, in die pre-2000-periode, het die gebrek aan voldoende grond om die boere op n bevredigende grondslag te vestig, gepaard met die afwesigheid van 'n oorwoe beleidsraamwerk om grondtoekennings te regulariseer het 'n persepsie van ekonomiese ontmagtiging in sowel die droogland- as besproeide kleinboerestand-sektore van die Zimbabwier-ekonomie geskep. Dit lei tot die stortvloed van plaasinvalle wat in onlangse tye in Gowe-Sanyati en verder aan waargeneem is en die noodsaaklikheid van verdere navorsing oor Zimbabwe se hedendaagse grondbesittersrevolusie. <![CDATA[<b>How the story of the South African experience in the Italian campaign was recorded - and distorted</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200010&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Despite the best efforts of professional historians attached to the 6th South African Armoured Division, the demands of morale building overwhelmed those of historical accuracy and the true story of the ordinary South African soldier has been left untold. Unsurprisingly, after 67 years individual memories have become distorted, but the cleansing of the national memory began as events were happening. This article explains how the story of the war in Italy was conveyed to the South African public and how propaganda and censorship contributed to the misconceptions which became inculcated in the national consciousness. Contemporary accounts were subjected to censorship and accentuated the positive and post-war literature does little to change these perceptions. Conflicting accounts of the Battle of Chiusi illustrate how language transformed events from a defeat into a triumph of the indomitability of the human spirit. Taboo topics of sexuality, alcohol use, atrocities and battle fatigue are mostly absent from the literature. Conventional wisdom regarding enlistment and the unwillingness to serve is challenged by arguing that almost all formations within the 6th South African Armoured Division, apart from rifle companies, were over-subscribed. An analysis of casualty statistics revealed that the life of an infantryman was indeed precarious, whereas for the ordinary member of the division, death or injury was typically caused by accident.<hr/>Nieteenstaande die beste pogings van professionele historici wat aan die 6de Suid-Afrikaanse Pantserdivisie verbonde was, het die eise van moreelbou die eise van historiese akkuraatheid oorskadu. Die ware verhaal van die gewone Suid-Afrikaanse soldaat het dus onvertel gebly. Dit is nie verbasend nie dat individuele herinneringe oor 'n tydperk van 67 jaar verdraai is, maar die "reiniging" van die nasionale geheue het reeds tydens die gebeure self begin. Hierdie artikel verduidelik hoe die verhaal van die oorlog in Italie aan die Suid-Afrikaanse publiek voorgestel is en hoe propaganda en sensuur tot die wanopvattings bygedra het wat in die nasionale bewussyn ingeprent is. Tydgenootlike verslae is aan sensuur onderwerp en het die positiewe beklemtoon, terwyl na-oorlogse literatuur weinig gedoen het om opvattinge te verander. Taboe onderwerpe oor seksualiteit, alkoholmisbruik, wreedhede en gevegsvermoeidheid is meestal afwesig in die literatuur. Konvensionele wysheid rakende indiensneming en die onwilligheid om te dien is nie op die 6de Suid-Afrikaanse Pantserdivisie van toepassing nie. Ongevalle statistieke word ondersoek wat bewys dat sterftes en beserings hoofsaaklik voorgekom het in infanterie-eenhede, hoewel ongelukke vir 25 persent van beserings verantwoordelik was. Weersprekende weergawes van die Slag van Chiusi illustreer hoe taal gebeure kon omvorm van 'n nederlaag tot 'n oorwinning van die ontembaarheid van die menslike gees. <![CDATA[<b>Operasies Chuva en Moduler (fase 1)</b>: <b>'n Waardering van die SAW-UNITA-bondgenootskap, Mei tot Oktober 1987</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200011&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt In Julie 1974, nadat die Portugese Caetano-regering in n militêre staatsgreep omvergewerp is, het Portugal aangekondig dat hy bereid is om oor Angolese onafhanklikheid te onderhandel. Op 15 Januarie 1975 het Portugal die Alvor-ooreenkoms gesluit met die drie Angolese bevrydingsorganisasies, die MPLA, FNLA en UNITA, waarvolgens 11 November 1975 as Onafhanklikheidsdag bepaal is. n Volskaalse burgeroorlog het egter teen Augustus 1975 tussen die UNITA-FNLA-bondgenootskap en die MPLA uitgebreek. Die MPLA het die alliansie tot so n mate verslaan dat daar oor die algemeen verwag is dat UNITA en die FNLA nie daarvan sou herstel nie, maar mettertyd sou verdwyn. UNITA het egter die nederlaag oorleef en weer van krag tot krag gegaan - in so in mate dat hulle 'n definitiewe bedreiging vir die MPLA ingehou het. Die voortgesette burgeroorlog het teen die agtergrond van die Koue Oorlog (1945-1990) afgespeel. Suid-Afrika, gesteun deur die VSA, het UNITA ondersteun, terwyl die USSR en sy satellietstaat Kuba die MPLA gesteun het. Laasgenoemde het die kommunistiesgesinde SWAPO ondersteun en hulle in staat gestel om Namibië vanuit Suid-Angola binne te dring. Die SAW het gevolglik sedert 1975 verskeie transgrensoperasies van stapel gestuur om enige insypeling in Suidwes-Afrika vanuit Suid-Angola in die kiem te smoor. Die fokus van hierdie artikel is n evaluering van die UNITA-SAW-alliansie tydens Operasies Chuva en Moduler (fase een), Mei tot Oktober 1987. Binne die SAW was daar uiteenlopende sienings oor UNITA as n bondgenoot: aan die een kant was daar die siening dat die samewerking "breedweg en algemeen gesproke" goed was, teenoor die siening dat UNITA n onbetroubare bondgenoot was. Die waarheid lê waarskynlik tussen hierdie uiterstes. UNITA was vertroud met die plaaslike omstandighede en is ondersteun deur die plaaslike bevolking. Hulle het, ondanks gebrekkige konvensionele vermoëns, geen geringe rol gespeel in die sukses van Operasies Chuva en Moduler (fase een) nie.<hr/>In July 1974, after the Portuguese Caetano government had been overthrown in a coup, Portugal announced that it was willing to negotiate on Angolan independence. On 15 January 1975, Portugal signed the Alvor Agreement with the three Angolan liberation organisations, namely the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, in terms of which 11 November 1975 was to be Angola's Independence Day. However, by August 1975 a full-scale civil war had broken out between the UNITA-FNLA alliance and the MPLA. The MPLA defeated the alliance to such an extent that it was generally expected that UNITA and the FNLA would not recover, but would gradually disappear. UNITA, however, survived the ordeal and then went from strength to strength, to the point that they presented a real threat to the MPLA. The prolonged civil war took place against the backdrop of the Cold War (1945-1990). South Africa, supported by the USA, assisted UNITA, while the USSR and its satellite state Cuba supported the MPLA. The latter supported the communistic SWAPO and enabled them to penetrate Namibia from South Africa. As a result, beginning in 1975, the SADF launched a number of transborder operations to thwart any infiltration of South-West Africa from Southern Angola. The focus of this article is an evaluation of the UNITA-SADF alliance during Operations Chuva and Moduler (phase one), May to October 1987. In the SADF there were different opinions of UNITA as an ally: on the one hand, the cooperation was described as mostly good in general terms; on the other hand, UNITA was seen as an unreliable ally. The truth is probable to be found somewhere between these extremes. UNITA was familiar with local conditions and was supported by the local population. In spite of their limited conventional abilities, they had no small part in the success of Operations Chuva and Moduler (phase one). <![CDATA[<b>Dabbling in History</b>: <b>More apprenticeship than sorcery</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200012&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt In Julie 1974, nadat die Portugese Caetano-regering in n militêre staatsgreep omvergewerp is, het Portugal aangekondig dat hy bereid is om oor Angolese onafhanklikheid te onderhandel. Op 15 Januarie 1975 het Portugal die Alvor-ooreenkoms gesluit met die drie Angolese bevrydingsorganisasies, die MPLA, FNLA en UNITA, waarvolgens 11 November 1975 as Onafhanklikheidsdag bepaal is. n Volskaalse burgeroorlog het egter teen Augustus 1975 tussen die UNITA-FNLA-bondgenootskap en die MPLA uitgebreek. Die MPLA het die alliansie tot so n mate verslaan dat daar oor die algemeen verwag is dat UNITA en die FNLA nie daarvan sou herstel nie, maar mettertyd sou verdwyn. UNITA het egter die nederlaag oorleef en weer van krag tot krag gegaan - in so in mate dat hulle 'n definitiewe bedreiging vir die MPLA ingehou het. Die voortgesette burgeroorlog het teen die agtergrond van die Koue Oorlog (1945-1990) afgespeel. Suid-Afrika, gesteun deur die VSA, het UNITA ondersteun, terwyl die USSR en sy satellietstaat Kuba die MPLA gesteun het. Laasgenoemde het die kommunistiesgesinde SWAPO ondersteun en hulle in staat gestel om Namibië vanuit Suid-Angola binne te dring. Die SAW het gevolglik sedert 1975 verskeie transgrensoperasies van stapel gestuur om enige insypeling in Suidwes-Afrika vanuit Suid-Angola in die kiem te smoor. Die fokus van hierdie artikel is n evaluering van die UNITA-SAW-alliansie tydens Operasies Chuva en Moduler (fase een), Mei tot Oktober 1987. Binne die SAW was daar uiteenlopende sienings oor UNITA as n bondgenoot: aan die een kant was daar die siening dat die samewerking "breedweg en algemeen gesproke" goed was, teenoor die siening dat UNITA n onbetroubare bondgenoot was. Die waarheid lê waarskynlik tussen hierdie uiterstes. UNITA was vertroud met die plaaslike omstandighede en is ondersteun deur die plaaslike bevolking. Hulle het, ondanks gebrekkige konvensionele vermoëns, geen geringe rol gespeel in die sukses van Operasies Chuva en Moduler (fase een) nie.<hr/>In July 1974, after the Portuguese Caetano government had been overthrown in a coup, Portugal announced that it was willing to negotiate on Angolan independence. On 15 January 1975, Portugal signed the Alvor Agreement with the three Angolan liberation organisations, namely the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, in terms of which 11 November 1975 was to be Angola's Independence Day. However, by August 1975 a full-scale civil war had broken out between the UNITA-FNLA alliance and the MPLA. The MPLA defeated the alliance to such an extent that it was generally expected that UNITA and the FNLA would not recover, but would gradually disappear. UNITA, however, survived the ordeal and then went from strength to strength, to the point that they presented a real threat to the MPLA. The prolonged civil war took place against the backdrop of the Cold War (1945-1990). South Africa, supported by the USA, assisted UNITA, while the USSR and its satellite state Cuba supported the MPLA. The latter supported the communistic SWAPO and enabled them to penetrate Namibia from South Africa. As a result, beginning in 1975, the SADF launched a number of transborder operations to thwart any infiltration of South-West Africa from Southern Angola. The focus of this article is an evaluation of the UNITA-SADF alliance during Operations Chuva and Moduler (phase one), May to October 1987. In the SADF there were different opinions of UNITA as an ally: on the one hand, the cooperation was described as mostly good in general terms; on the other hand, UNITA was seen as an unreliable ally. The truth is probable to be found somewhere between these extremes. UNITA was familiar with local conditions and was supported by the local population. In spite of their limited conventional abilities, they had no small part in the success of Operations Chuva and Moduler (phase one). <![CDATA[<b>The ANC's 100 years</b>: <b>Some recent work on its history in historiographical context</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200013&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Much has now been written about the history of the African National Congress (ANC) over its hundred years, but surprisingly there is no survey of this literature. This article surveys some of this historiography before proceeding to discuss two major recently-published monographs, by Peter Limb on the early years of the ANC and by Susan Booysen on the eighteen years since it took office. Limb's book is characterised by its use of new sources to tell the detailed story of what the ANC did at the local level, and is a book that will long retain its importance. Booysen's book is equally detailed, but is not based on the same kind of source-material, and is therefore inevitably unable to see the ANC in recent years in the same kind of perspective. We will learn more about the ANC in its years in power from the memoirs of key figures becoming available, one of which, by the late Kader Asmal, inter alia recounts his experiences as Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry under Mandela and then as Minister of Education in the Mbeki cabinet.<hr/>Heelwat is nou al geskryf oor die geskiedenis van die African National Congress (ANC) in sy honderdjarige bestaan, maar verbasend genoeg bestaan daar geen oorsig van hierdie werk nie. Hierdie artikel verskaf 'n oorsig van sommige van hierdie historiografie waarna dit oorgaan na 'n bespreking van twee belangrike onlangs-verskene monografieë, een deur Peter Limb oor die vroeë jare van die ANC en die ander deur Susan Booysen oor die 18 jaar wat dit aan bewind is. Limb se boek word gekenmerk deur die gebruik van nuwe bronne om 'n gedetailleerde verhaal te vertel van wat die ANC op plaaslike vlak verrig het, en dit is 'n boek wat lank sy belangrikheid sal behou. Booysen se boek is ewe gedetailleerd, maar is nie gebaseer op dieselfde tipe bronmateriaal nie, en is daarom gevolglik nie in staat om die ANC van die onlangse verlede in dieselfde perspektief te sien nie. Ons sal meer leer oor die ANC se bewindsjare uit die memoirs van sleutelfigure wat beskikbaar word, waarvan een deur wyle Kader Asmal, wat onder andere vertel van sy wedervaringe as Minister van Watersake en Bosbou onder Mandela en toe as Minister van Opvoeding in die Mbeki-kabinet. http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200014&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt