Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Historia]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=0018-229X20140001&lang=pt vol. 59 num. 1 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b><i>De Zuid-Afrikaan</i></b><b> se standpunt oor stemreg vir bruin mense voor die totstandkoming van die Kaapse koloniale parlement in 1854</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100001&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Die koerant De Zuid-Afrikaan, wat in 1830 opgerig is om veral as mondstuk te dien van die Nederlandstalige inwoners van die Kaapkolonie, het hom beywer vir die totstandkoming van 'n wetgewende liggaam as deel van 'n verteenwoordigende bestuurstelsel vir die kolonie. Die blad het 'n opvoedingskwalifikasie bepleit om te bepaal watter inwoners die lede van hierdie parlement moet aanwys. Die vernaamste koloniale amptenare en leiersfigure onder die koloniste was egter ten gunste van 'n eiendomskwalifikasie. Onder hulle was daar diegene wat 'n hoë eiendomsvereiste wou hê en ander wat ten gunste van 'n laer vereiste was. De Zuid-Afrikaan het 'n lae eiendomskwalifikasie voorgestaan en het as vernaamste argument daarvoor aangevoer dat bruin mense anders feitlik heeltemal van stemreg uitgesluit sou wees. Toe die Britse regering in 1853 'n Grondwet vir die kolonie goedkeur met insluiting van 'n lae eiendomsvereiste vir stemreg, het die blad die Grondwet verwelkom as "liberaal bo verwagting" en die hoop uitgespreek dat in die nuwe parlement oorwegings van klas of kleur geen rol sal speel nie.<hr/>The newspaper De Zuid-Afrikaan was founded in 1830 mainly to serve as a mouthpiece of the Dutch-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Colony. It was strongly in favour of the establishment of a legislative body as part of a system of representative government for the colony. De Zuid-Afrikaan advocated an educational qualification to determine which inhabitants should participate in the appointment of members of this body. The main colonial officials and leading colonists, however, were in favour of a property qualification. Some of them wanted a high property qualification while others preferred a lower property requirement. De Zuid-Afrikaan expressed itself in favour of a low property qualification, and advanced as its main argument that a high property requirement would almost completely exclude the coloured people from the franchise. In 1853 the British government approved a constitution for the colony which included a low property qualification for the franchise. De Zuid-Afrikaan welcomed the new constitution as "liberal beyond expectation" and expressed the hope that considerations based on class and colour would not play a role in the new parliament. <![CDATA[<b>J.H. Hofmeyr and the Afrikaner Bond: A challenge to William Milton's "Englishness" and the advance of the "coloured" cricketer</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100002&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt In the late nineteenth century, the Western Province CC - with William Milton dominant - strengthened its position as Cape cricket's controlling power. Their intention was to become the "MCC of southern Africa" in keeping with press-led initiatives to promote "Englishness". Such developments were opposed by J.H. "Onze Jan" Hofmeyr, who championed Afrikaner sport and wished to create a cricket administration that served as a chamber of fair debate for all white clubs. He challenged the hegemony of the Western Province CC through the establishment of the Cape Town CC, and then engineered a new governing body, the Western Province Cricket Union, which would be headed - controversially - by Milton. The developments mirrored the wider political events taking place. As leader of the influential Afrikaner Bond, Hofmeyr was able to secure the Cape premiership for Cecil John Rhodes. That Milton should be appointed as the prime minister's secretary helped consolidate a process through which Hofmeyr became the major force behind Cape politics and Western Province cricket. Milton would in turn ensure cricket's administration adhered to the official racist ideologies and policies of the Cape government, notably when threatened with plans to include a player of colour, "Krom" Hendricks, in the national cricket side.<hr/>In die laat negentiende eeu, het die Westerlike Provinsie KK - met William Milton dominant - hulle posisie versterk as die beherende mag in Kaapse krieket. Hul doelwit was om die "MCC van suidelike Afrika" te word in ooreenstemming met pers-gelei inisiatiewe om "Englishness" te bevorder. Sulke ontwikkelinge is teengewerk deur J.H. "Onze Jan" Hofmeyr, wat Afrikaner sport ondersteun het, en hy wou'n krieket administrasie vorm wat diens sou gee as'n raad vir eerlike debat vir alle wit klubs. Hy het die heerskappy van die Westerlike Provinsie KK uitgedaag deur die verstiging van die Kaapstad KK, en dan het hy 'n nuwe beheerliggaam ontwerp, die Westerlike Provinsie Krieket Unie, wat onder die omstrede leiding van Milton sou wees. Die ontwikkelinge het die breër politieke gebeure weerspieël. As die invloedryke leier van die Afrikaner Bond kon Hofmeyr die posisie van die Kaapse Premier, Cecil John Rhodes, beinvloed. Die feit dat Milton aangestel was as die eerste minister se sekretaris het gehelp om Hofmeyr te konsolideer as die groot krag agter Kaapse politiek en Westerlike Provinsie krieket. Op sy beurt sou Milton verseker dat die administrasie van krieket sou vasklou aan die amptelike rassistiese ideologieë en beleid van die Kaapse regering, veral wanneer dit bedreig is met planne om 'n gekleurde speller, "Krom" Hendricks, in die nasionale krieket span in te sluit. <![CDATA[<b>The formal education journey of Cassim Dangor, 1963-1985: Reflections on education challenges in apartheid South Africa</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100003&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Most students who attended the University College, Durban, which was established on Salisbury Island in 1961, were pioneers in two important senses: they were amongst the first to attend a racially exclusive university for Indians, as well being first generation students. Both scenarios presented challenges. This article focuses on the experiences of the Transvaal-born Cassim Dangor who, as an "Indian", faced many restrictive segregationist policies in his attempts to acquire tertiary education. While apartheid is often portrayed as a totalising institution, and despite the fact that individual stories can be esoteric, anecdotal and unrepresentative, a life history methodology provides a means to examine how individuals understood apartheid; how they were affected by it; the ways in which they attempted to make sense of their lives; and how they sought spaces in the system. The article also charts the growth of Pharmacy as a discipline at the university.<hr/>Die meeste studente wat die Universiteits Kollege, Durban, wat in 1961 geskep is, bygewoon het was pioniers op twee belangrike wyses: hulle was die eerstes wat aan 'n universiteit wat eksklusief vir Indiërs geskep gestudeer het en hulle was ook die eerste geslag universiteits studente. Beide die scenarios het uitdagings geoffer. Die artikel fokus op die ervaringe van die Transvaals gebore Cassim Dangor wie, as 'n Indier, vele beperkende apartheids wetgewings beleef het in sy strewe na tersiêre onderwys. Hoewel apartheid gereeld voorgehou word as 'n totaliserênde instelling, en ongeag die feit dat sommige stories esoteries, eensydig en onverteenwoordigend kan wees, laat 'n lewensgeskiedenis metodologie 'n eksaminering toe van hoe enkelinge apartheid ervaar het, hul daardeur beinvloed is, hoe hulle probeer sin maak het van die stelsel en hoe hulle hul plek daarin gesoek het. Die artikel karteer oof die ontwikkeling van Farmasie as 'n vakgebied aan die universiteit. <![CDATA[<b>A social and economic history of the African people of Gcalekaland, 1830-1913</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100004&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt This article examines the history of the people of Gcalekaland from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. Primacy is given to factors which led to abject poverty and the subjection of the Gcaleka kingdom by the colonial governing authorities, such as the social and economic consequences of the wars of dispossession; the interference of the colonial government and the missionaries in the relations between amaGcaleka and amaMfengu; the rinderpest of 1896-97; the South African War of 1899-1902; and the Natives Land Act of 1913. All these factors contributed to the demise of the House of Gcaleka.<hr/>Hierdie artikel ondersoek die geskiedenis van die Gcalekaland se mense vanaf die negentiende eeu tot die vroeër deel van die twintigste eeu. Die fokus val op die faktore wat tot kruipend armoede en die onderdanigheid van die Gcaleka koningryk deur die koloniale regering gelei het, soos die sosiale en ekonomiese gevolge van die oorloë van onteining; die tussenkoms van die koloniale regering en die sendelinge in die verwantskap tussen amaGcaleka en amaMfengu; die runderpes van 1896-97; die Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog van 1899-1902; en die "Wet of Naturellegrond" van 1913. Hierdie faktore het tot die ondergand van die Huis van Gcaleka bygedra. <![CDATA[<b>"Tell me where I can find the condom!" Catholic AIDS discourses in South Africa during the 1990s</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100005&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Imagine a male celibate priest trying to talk about sex and AIDS to a church congregation whose majority is women! It is naturally embarrassing and challenging. This is the situation that most Catholic lay, religious, and the hierarchy had to deal with in South Africa during the 1990s.The article is an attempt to use archival and oral history materials collected between 2007 and 2010 to analyse how the Catholic Church spoke about HIV and AIDS and how that discourse influenced South African society during the 1990s. Here I argue that although the church's statements on AIDS, condoms, sex and sexuality during this period were openly defensive, often ambivalent, and characteristically passive, it was what the church said and how it said it that created controversies, more than anything else.<hr/>Verbeel jou dat 'n selibate priester probeer praat oor seks en VIGS en die gehoor is 'n gemeente waarvan die lede grootliks vroue is! Dit is uiteraard uitdagend en vernederend. Dit is die situasie wat die meeste Katolieke leke, gelowiges en die hierargie mee moes omgaan in Suid-Afrika in die 1990s. Hierde artikel poog om argivale en orale bronne, versamel tussen 2007 en 2010, te gebruik om te analiseer hoe die Katolieke Kerk oor HIV en VIGS gepraat het en hoe hierdie diskoerse die Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap tydens die tydperk beinvloed het. Ek argumenteer dat hoewel die kerk se uitsprake oor VIGS, kondome, seks en seksualiteit tydens die periode passief, openlik verdedigend en soms teenstrydig was, was dit wat die kerk gesê het hoe dit gesê is wat meer as enige iets anders wat kontroversies geskep het. <![CDATA[<b>"They have opened their doors to black children at our expense": The chronicle of Inanda Seminary during the 1990s</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100006&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt During the 1990s, institutional rot festered because Inanda Seminary failed to adapt to the changing nature of education in the post-apartheid era. The decline's source can be traced to the negative ramifications of apartheid's Bantu Education, first implemented during the 1950s. Over the decades, Bantu Education fostered a widening investment disparity between private and state schools designated only for Whites and the Seminary. As the strictures of Bantu Education relaxed during the 1980s, the Seminary's most academically and financially capable students sought education at the historically advantaged, now multiracial, schools. In the new political environment of the 1990s, the Seminary could not compete with more privileged schools and it therefore lost its market niche of providing quality education for black girls. The disparity caused by apartheid combined with educational "freedom" resulted in a "brain drain" from the Seminary. The school hemorrhaged. As damaging as Bantu Education was, the Seminary and its leadership were its own worst enemies. The school became a nest of conflicting constituencies and a kleptocracy. A frugal church and an uncreative Governing Council were together guilty of culpable inertia. This article chronicles the demise of the Seminary from 1990 to 1996, before its closure in 1997.<hr/>Gedurende die 1990's, het die sweer van institutionele verotting versprei soos die Seminarie gesukkel het om aan te pas by die veranderende natuur van opvoeding tydens die post-apartheid era. Die oorsprong van die verotting was die toenemende komplikasies van Apartheid se Bantoe-onderwys. Laasgenoemde was gedurende die 1950's geïmplementeer. Groot gapings is tussen staat asook privaatskole (slegs vir blankes) en die Seminarie oor die dekades geskep en aangemoedig deur Bantoe-onderwys. Soos die strukture van Bantoe-onderwys verslap het gedurende die 1980's, het die Seminarie meeste van haar finansieël en akademies bekwame student verloor. Hierdie leerders is na voorheen bevoordeelde, huidig multi-kulturele, skole. In die nuwe politieke klimaat van die 1990's, kon Inanda Seminarie nie meeding met die bevoorregte skole nie en verloor dus haar eksklusiwiteit as voorsiener van kwaliteit opvoeding vir swart meisies. Ongelykheid wat deur Apartheid veroorsaak is, gekombineer met die feit dat leerders self kon kies by watter skool hul onderrig wou word, het veroorsaak dat die Seminarie van al haar top leerlinge gestroop is. Tesame met Bantoe-onderwys, was die skool se ondergang deels veroorsaak deur die leierskap van die skool se finansiële wanbestuur. Die beheerliggaam het ontaard in 'n nes van konflik en selfverryking. Die spaarsamige kerk en 'n beheerliggaam sonder kreatiwiteit was gesamentlik skuldig aan besluitloosheid en passiwiteit. Hierdie artikel vertel die historiese gebeure van die ondergang van Inanda Seminarie gedurende 1990 tot 1996, voordat die skool se hekke gesluit is in 1997. <![CDATA[<b>Pioneering regional history studies in South Africa: Reflections within the former Section for Regional History at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100007&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt In the early 1970s, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) explored the possibility of establishing a regional history studies section within the Institute for Historical Research (IHR), which was founded in 1969. At the helm as director was a military historian, Commandant C.M. Bakkes. After the institute had been founded, a few young upcoming historians were appointed under his leadership. One of the early appointments was Mr (later Dr) Arie Oberholster. He was expected to be the driving force behind the IHR's planned regional studies section. Because the initiative was only a proposal (although passionately driven) in a still empty vessel, the IHR tasked Oberholster to explore, observe and learn from the international community in Europe and the USA. He did so for three months in 1974. Oberholster's insights, and the efforts of his counterpart Dr C.C. (Callie) Eloff, formed the cornerstone upon which the IHR's Section for Urban and Regional History was based shortly after July 1974. This discussion is in essence a recapitulation of this first formal initiative in South Africa to pioneer research in the field of regional history studies. It reveals how international thinking and doing helped to shape the early leadership's thinking about research in this comprehensive and challenging but exciting field of regional history. It is unfortunate that the IHR and all its activities were closed down in the early 1990s. This action brought constructive regional history studies to a standstill, and ended an initiative which could have flourished in the modern social history of South Africa. It has been suggested that the firm foundation from which regional history studies departed in the former IHR of the HSRC (ideas, planning, research capacity, networking, publication, education and methodology) should be re-instated and continued in a newly created historical institute or regional institute with a much broader and deeper scope of regional history studies than any effort that has been made since the IHR was closed. If this is not done, South Africa will continue to lose valuable historical memory daily among black, white, coloured, Indian and other communities in all the provincial regions of the country.124<hr/>In die vroeg sewentigerjare het die Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing (RGN) ondersoek ingestel na die moontlikheid van die vestiging van 'n afdeling streeksgeskiedenis aan die Instituut vir Historiese Navorsing (IHN). Laasgenoemde is reeds in 1969 gestig. As direkteur is aangestel 'n militêre historikus, kommandant C.M. Bakkes. Onder sy leiding is 'n paar jong opkomende navorsers in Geskiedenis in diens geneem. Een van die eerste benoemings was mnr (later doktor) Arie Oberholster. Met verloop van tyd was Oberholster die dryfkrag agter die IHR se streeksgeskiedenis inisiatief. Omdat die moontlikheid vir 'n streeksgeskiedenis afdeling nog net 'n voorstel was, het die IHR vir Oberholster getaak om wyd te verken, waar te neem en te leer van die internasionale gemeenskap in Europa en die VSA. Dié opdrag het hy vir drie maande in 1974 uitgevoer. Oberholster se insigte voortvloeiend hieruit, en die pogings van sy eweknie dr C.C. (Callie) Eloff, sou die hoekstene vorm waarop die IHR se Afdeling Stads- en Streeksgeskiedenis kort na Julie 1974, tot stand gekom het. Hierdie bespreking is in wese 'n kritiese en analitiese samevatting van die eerste formele inisiatief in Suid-Afrika om streeksgeskiedenisnavorsing te vestig. In die gesprek word uitgewys hoe eertydse internasionale denke en aktiwiteite in die praktyk daartoe bygedra het om die vroeë leierskap in die Afdeling Stads- en Streeksgeskiedenis se denke te help vorm oor navorsing in hierdie omvattende en uitdagende maar opwindende terrein. Dit is jammer dat die IHR en al sy aktiwiteite in die vroeë 1990's beëindig is. Hierdie aksie het konstruktiewe en kontinue navorsing in streeksgeskiedenis navorsing 'n besliste knou gegee. Dit in 'n tydperk waarin moderne sosiale geskiedenis in Suid-Afrika ook binne hierdie subveld van geskiedenis kon floreer het. In die bespreking is voorgestel dat die stewige fondament waarop die Afdeling Stads- en Streeksgeskiedenisstudies eertyds funksioneer het voor hulle sluiting (idees, beplanning, navorsingskapasiteit, netwerke, publikasie, onderrig en metodiek) eerder herstel behoort te word, en voortgesit behoort te word in 'n nuutgeskepte historiese instituut van 'n aard. As voorbeeld hiervan dalk die gedagte van 'n streeksgeskiedenisinstituut met as fokus 'n baie breër en dieper omvang van streekhistoriese studies as enige poging tevore wat gemaak is in Suid-Afrika sedert die IHR is gesluit het. As dit nie gedoen word nie, sal die land steeds waardevolle historiese geheue onder swart, wit, bruin, Indiër en ander gemeenskappe in al die provinsiale streke van die land op 'n daaglikse tempo verloor. <![CDATA[<b>The SADF/UNITA partnership in action: Operation Moduler (phases 2, 3 and 4), October to December 1987</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100008&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Vroeg in 1987 het die SAW inligting bekom dat FAPLA en die Kubane besig was met intensiewe voorbereidings om UNITA uit Suidoos-Angola te verdryf. Op versoek het die SAW in Junie 1987 formeel besluit om UNITA te ondersteun met die doel om die FAPLA-offensief genaamd Operasie Saludando a Octubre (Salueer Oktobermaand) te stuit. Die Slag van die Lomba-rivier van 3 Oktober 1987 het, vanuit n SAW/UNITA-oogpunt beskou, die suksesvolle afsluiting van fase 1 van Operasie Moduler verseker: die FAPLA-opmars na Mavinga is effektief gestuit. Die SAW/UNITA-bondgenote was egter deeglik daarvan bewus dat die FAPLA-magte in staat was om binne die afsienbare toekoms die aanslag op Mavinga te hervat. Daarom is beplan om die FAPLA-brigades oos van die Cuito-rivier te vernietig. Die primêre oogmerk kon egter nie naastenby verwesentlik word nie, aangesien die SAW/UNITA-bondgenote nie daarin kon slaag om die FAPLA-magte uit hulle stellings te verdryf nie. Die laaste SAW/UNITA-offensiewe van 25 en 26 November 1987, waartydens UNITA-bataljons as die hoofmag aangewend is, was 'n klaaglike mislukking. Die gemeganiseerde SAW-veggroepe is futiel in die onherbergsame terrein teen die deeglik verskanste FAPLA-stellings aangewend. Die SAW-elemente kon gevolglik nie die onontbeerlike ondersteuning aan UNITA bied nie. Hierdie artikel fokus op die bydraes van UNITA tot die bondgenootskap. Ondanks kritiek deur die SAW op UNITA as 'n bondgenoot is die positiewe aspekte van hulle bydrae tot Operasie Moduler van veel groter omvang as die negatiewe aspekte. 'n Wydgeskakeerde terrein, hoofsaaklik in 'n ondersteunende rol is gedek, soos die afvuur van lugafweer-Stingermissiele; insameling van inligting; optrede as ligte infanterie, voorhoede of skermmag tydens aanvalle; en misleidings- en steekaanvalle. In die proses het UNITA hewige lewensverliese gely. Sonder hierdie bydraes sou die beperkte SAW-mag van 'n skamele sowat 2 500 man 'n veel moeiliker taak gehad het.<hr/>Early in 1987 the SADF received information that FAPLA and the Cubans were busy with intensive preparations to force UNITA out of southeast Angola. Upon request, the SADF formally decided to support UNITA in June 1987 with the intention of stopping the FAPLA offensive named Operation Saludando a Octubre (Salute October). From an SADF/UNITA point of view, the Battle of the Lomba River on 3 October 1987 ensured the successful conclusion of phase 1 of Operation Modular: the FAPLA advance to Mavinga was effectively stopped. However, the SADF/UNITA allies knew very well that the FAPLA forces were able to resume their assault on Mavinga in the near future. They therefore planned to destroy the FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito River, but this primary goal could not be realised because the SADF/UNITA allies were unable to force the FAPLA forces from their positions. The last SADF/UNITA offensives of 2 and 26 November 1987, during which UNITA battalions were applied as the principal force, were a total failure. The mechanised SADF battle groups were deployed in vain in the inhospitable terrain against the well entrenched FAPLA positions. This also prevented the SADF elements from providing indispensable support to UNITA. This article focuses on the contributions of UNITA to the alliance. Despite the SADF's criticism of UNITA as allies, the positive aspects of their contribution to Operation Modular far exceed the negative aspects. They were deployed primarily in a supporting capacity, but their contribution was multi-faceted, such as firing anti-aircraft Stinger missiles; collecting information; acting as a light infantry, vanguard or a shield force during attacks; and deception and sting attacks. In the process, UNITA suffered a severe loss of lives. Without these contributions, the limited SADF force of about 2 500 men would have faced a far more difficult task. <![CDATA[<b>Soviet "special depository" facilities for South African history: Research experiences in the Soviet Union on the preparation of candidates for the submission of academic theses on South Africa</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100009&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Vroeg in 1987 het die SAW inligting bekom dat FAPLA en die Kubane besig was met intensiewe voorbereidings om UNITA uit Suidoos-Angola te verdryf. Op versoek het die SAW in Junie 1987 formeel besluit om UNITA te ondersteun met die doel om die FAPLA-offensief genaamd Operasie Saludando a Octubre (Salueer Oktobermaand) te stuit. Die Slag van die Lomba-rivier van 3 Oktober 1987 het, vanuit n SAW/UNITA-oogpunt beskou, die suksesvolle afsluiting van fase 1 van Operasie Moduler verseker: die FAPLA-opmars na Mavinga is effektief gestuit. Die SAW/UNITA-bondgenote was egter deeglik daarvan bewus dat die FAPLA-magte in staat was om binne die afsienbare toekoms die aanslag op Mavinga te hervat. Daarom is beplan om die FAPLA-brigades oos van die Cuito-rivier te vernietig. Die primêre oogmerk kon egter nie naastenby verwesentlik word nie, aangesien die SAW/UNITA-bondgenote nie daarin kon slaag om die FAPLA-magte uit hulle stellings te verdryf nie. Die laaste SAW/UNITA-offensiewe van 25 en 26 November 1987, waartydens UNITA-bataljons as die hoofmag aangewend is, was 'n klaaglike mislukking. Die gemeganiseerde SAW-veggroepe is futiel in die onherbergsame terrein teen die deeglik verskanste FAPLA-stellings aangewend. Die SAW-elemente kon gevolglik nie die onontbeerlike ondersteuning aan UNITA bied nie. Hierdie artikel fokus op die bydraes van UNITA tot die bondgenootskap. Ondanks kritiek deur die SAW op UNITA as 'n bondgenoot is die positiewe aspekte van hulle bydrae tot Operasie Moduler van veel groter omvang as die negatiewe aspekte. 'n Wydgeskakeerde terrein, hoofsaaklik in 'n ondersteunende rol is gedek, soos die afvuur van lugafweer-Stingermissiele; insameling van inligting; optrede as ligte infanterie, voorhoede of skermmag tydens aanvalle; en misleidings- en steekaanvalle. In die proses het UNITA hewige lewensverliese gely. Sonder hierdie bydraes sou die beperkte SAW-mag van 'n skamele sowat 2 500 man 'n veel moeiliker taak gehad het.<hr/>Early in 1987 the SADF received information that FAPLA and the Cubans were busy with intensive preparations to force UNITA out of southeast Angola. Upon request, the SADF formally decided to support UNITA in June 1987 with the intention of stopping the FAPLA offensive named Operation Saludando a Octubre (Salute October). From an SADF/UNITA point of view, the Battle of the Lomba River on 3 October 1987 ensured the successful conclusion of phase 1 of Operation Modular: the FAPLA advance to Mavinga was effectively stopped. However, the SADF/UNITA allies knew very well that the FAPLA forces were able to resume their assault on Mavinga in the near future. They therefore planned to destroy the FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito River, but this primary goal could not be realised because the SADF/UNITA allies were unable to force the FAPLA forces from their positions. The last SADF/UNITA offensives of 2 and 26 November 1987, during which UNITA battalions were applied as the principal force, were a total failure. The mechanised SADF battle groups were deployed in vain in the inhospitable terrain against the well entrenched FAPLA positions. This also prevented the SADF elements from providing indispensable support to UNITA. This article focuses on the contributions of UNITA to the alliance. Despite the SADF's criticism of UNITA as allies, the positive aspects of their contribution to Operation Modular far exceed the negative aspects. They were deployed primarily in a supporting capacity, but their contribution was multi-faceted, such as firing anti-aircraft Stinger missiles; collecting information; acting as a light infantry, vanguard or a shield force during attacks; and deception and sting attacks. In the process, UNITA suffered a severe loss of lives. Without these contributions, the limited SADF force of about 2 500 men would have faced a far more difficult task. http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2014000100010&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt