Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Historia]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/rss.php?pid=0018-229X20220001&lang=en vol. 67 num. 1 lang. en <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.za <![CDATA[<b>From the editor</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en <![CDATA[<b>Debating San provenance and disappearance</b>: <b>Frontier violence and the assimilationist impulse of humanitarian imperialism</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en This article examines how ideals of humanitarian imperialism informed debate over the provenance and future of Cape San following the Second British Occupation of the Cape Colony. The discussion explores the plight of San along the Cape frontier and how their demise became a focal point in a trans-colonial exchange over the desirability of the incorporation of indigenes as British colonial subjects. Prominent humanitarian protagonists, such as John Philip, called for the integration of San as colonial subjects, owing to the supposed protection this would afford them. The humanitarian campaign for the extension of subjecthood over Cape San was argued on the grounds that it would fend off the devastating consequences of settler colonialism. The principle also applied to indigenous peoples in settler colonies across the expanding empire. This view was not without its detractors, who opposed humanitarian representations of settlers as rapacious and responsible for frontier conflicts. The article argues that the fate of Cape San held a more prominent place in early nineteenth-century contestations over settler identity, frontier relations, and the effectiveness of missions to 'civilise' indigenes than has been recognised.<hr/>Hierdie artikel bestudeer die wyse waarop ideale rondom humanitêre imperialisme debatte oor die herkoms en toekoms van die Kaapse San beïnvloed het na afloop van die tweede Britse besetting van die Kaapkolonie. Die bespreking stel ondersoek in na die lot van die San op die Kaapse grens, en hoe hul ondergang die fokuspunt geword het in 'n transkoloniale gesprek oor die wenslikheid om inheemse mense as Britse onderdane op te neem. Vername humanitêre voorstanders, soos John Philip, het 'n beroep gedoen om die San as koloniale onderdane te integreer, ter wille van die veronderstelde beskerming wat dit hulle sou bied. Die humanitêre veldtog om onderdaanskap uit te brei om die San in te sluit is gevoer op die gronde dat dit die vernietigende uitwerking van setlaar-kolonialisme die hoof sou bied. Dié beginsel is ook op inheemse mense in setlaarkolonies dwarsoor die groeiende ryk van toepasinsg gemaak. Hierdie siening was nie sonder sy teenstanders nie, wat gekant was teen die filantrope se uitbeelding van setlaars as roofgierig en verantwoordelik vir konflikte op die grens. Die artikel voer aan dat die lot van die Kaapse San 'n belangriker plek ingeneem het in vroeë-negentiende eeuse geskille oor setlaarsidentiteit, grensverhoudinge, en die geslaagdheid van missies om die inheemse bevolking te "beskaaf", as wat daar tot dusver besef is. <![CDATA[<b>A well-intentioned impotence? The case of the Qing Dynasty Consuls in the Transvaal Colony</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en The place of South African Chinese within South Africa's history has almost always seen contestation. A striking example of this was the situation in the Transvaal between 1903 and 1911. In 1904 the Chinese Indentured Labour experiment propelled the small free Chinese community of the Transvaal into the realm of public debate. Whilst the Chinese in the Transvaal had never been treated well, the ensuing anti-Chinese backlash saw the community come into conflict with the government of the Transvaal. Although substantial work has been done concerning the resistance of the Transvaal Chinese, a neglected aspect of this conflict is the role played by the Qing Dynasty Consulate. Despite general assumptions that the Dynasty's attitude towards its subjects overseas remained apathetic, evidence indicates clearly that the Consulate played a role in supporting the Chinese community. Through an analysis of the actions taken by the Consuls-General the extent of their support becomes clear. Contrary to common assumptions that the Qing Dynasty was neglectful of the Chinese population in South Africa, the efforts of these Consuls-General demonstrated that the Dynasty did make serious efforts to assist the Chinese living in the Transvaal.<hr/>Die geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Sjinese in Suid-Afrika het altyd betwisting beleef. 'n Aangrypende voorbeeld hiervan is die situasie in Transvaal tussen 1903 en 1911. In 1904 het die Sjinese Ingeskryfde Arbeid-eksperiment die klein vrye Sjinese gemeenskap van Transvaal tot die gebied van openbare debat gedryf. Terwyl die Sjinese in Transvaal nog nooit goed behandel is nie, het die daaropvolgende anti-Sjinese terugslag die gemeenskap in konflik met die regering van Transvaal gebring. Alhoewel aansienlike werk gedoen is oor die weerstand van die Transvaalse Sjinese, was 'n verwaarloosde aspek van hierdie konflik die rol wat die Qing-dinastie-konsulaat gespeel het. Ten spyte van algemene aannames dat die Dinastie se houding teenoor hul onderdane oorsee apaties gebly het, dui bewyse duidelik daarop dat die konsulaat 'n rol gespeel het in die ondersteuning van die Sjinese gemeenskap. Deur 'n ontleding van die aksies wat deur die Konsul-Generaal geneem is, word die omvang van hul ondersteuning duidelik, wat dien as 'n voorbeeld van geskiedenis se dinamiese aard, as die behoefte om lang-gekoesterde aannames te hersien. In teenstelling met die algemene persepsie dat die Qing-dinastie die Chinese bevolking in Suid-Afrika nie genoegsaam bygestaan het nie, is daar inteendeel bewyse van ernstige pogings deur die Konsuls-Generaal aangewend om die Chinese, woonagtig in die eertydse Transvaal, te ondersteun. <![CDATA[<b>Reclaiming school athletics in Cape Town's underclass, 1933-1955</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100004&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en This article endeavours to make a significant contribution to the broadening of local school athletics history in Cape Town. By focusing on certain historical documents, the article explores the state and scope of athletics in black schools in Cape Town prior to 1956, a largely under-researched field in South African sport history. It does so by identifying prominent administrators, outstanding athletes, and participating schools. Many of these histories have disappeared or have been erased from public consciousness. The article shows how organised school athletics in Cape Town's oppressed communities have been shaped by a myriad of teachers, politicians, and sport administrators of varying political and social backgrounds. It also provides details of the Trafalgar High School's Wiener's Day competitions. Next, a history of the Central School Sports Union and its offshoots is unpacked. Finally, the early years of the Western Province School Sports Board are overviewed. The article concludes by suggesting why it is important to reclaim this particular history.<hr/>Hierdie artikel wil 'n beduidende bydrae tot die verruiming van die plaaslike skole-atletiekgeskiedenis in Kaapstad lewer. Deur op sekere historiese dokumente te fokus, ondersoek die artikel die stand en omvang van swart skole-atletiek in Kaapstad voor 1956, 'n grootliks onontginde navorsingsveld in die Suid-Afrikaanse sportgeskiedenis. Vele prominente administrateurs, uitmuntende atlete en deelnemende skole wie se geskiedenisse uit die openbare bewussyn verdwyn het of daaruit gewis is, word in die proses geïdentifiseer. Die artikel toon aan hoe georganiseerde skole-atletiek in Kaapstad se onderdrukte gemeenskappe deur 'n groot aantal onderwysers, politici en sportadministrateurs uit verskillende politieke en sosiale agtergronde gevorm is. Dit verstrek verder besonderhede oor die Trafalgar High School se Wiener's Day-kompetisies. Vervolgens word 'n geskiedenis van die Sentrale Skolesportunie en die vertakkings daarvan uiteengesit. Laastens word die beginjare van die Westelike Provinsie Skolesportraad oorsigtelik bespreek. Die artikel sluit af deur uit te wys waarom dit belangrik is dat hierdie spesifieke geskiedenis herwin word. <![CDATA[<b>'Liberal crusader': Zach de Beer, apartheid and liberalism 1950-1990</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en Zach de Beer's political career began in 1950 when as a student leader and a member of the Civil Rights League he addressed a public meeting in the Cape Town City Hall to protest the banning of the Communist Party. Forty years later, in February 1990, he was in parliament when President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the Communist Party, the African National Congress, and the Pan Africanist Congress. During the darkest years of the apartheid state he, along with others, kept liberal democratic ideals alive. In 1959 he helped to form the liberal Progressive Party, and in 1960 he opposed the banning of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. This was a courageous action that would cost him his parliamentary seat in the 1961 general election and led to years in the political wilderness. Outside of parliament, as a prominent figure in the financial world, he continued to encourage constitutional and political reform. In 1988, he became leader of the Progressive Federal Party and played a leading role in the founding of the Democratic Party in 1989. This article shows that the party's good performance in the general election of that year was a crucial factor in pushing De Klerk to initiate the dismantling of the apartheid state in 1990. In recognition of his contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle, President Nelson Mandela appointed him as South Africa's ambassador to the Netherlands in 1994.<hr/>Zach de Beer se politieke loopbaan het in 1950 begin toe hy as 'n studenteleier en as 'n lid van die Civil Rights League 'n protesvergadering teen die verbanning van die Kommunistiese Party in die stadsaal van Kaapstad toegespreek het. Veertig jaar later in Februarie 1990 was hy in die parlement toe president F.W. de Klerk die Kommunistiese Party, die African National Congres en die Pan Africanist Congress wettig verklaar het. Gedurende die donkerste dae van die apartheidstaat het hy saam met ander liberale die ideal van 'n liberale-demokratiese bestel lewendig gehou. In 1959 het hy gehelp om die liberale Progressiewe Party te stig, en in 1960 het hy die onwettig verklaring van die African National Congress en die Pan Africanist Congress teengestaan. Dit was 'n dapper daad wat hom sy parlementêre setel in die algemene verkiesing van 1961 gekos het, en jare in die politieke wildernis tot gevolg gehad het. Buite die parlement het hy as 'n leidende figuur in die sakewêreld deurentyd op grondwetlike en politieke hervorminge aangedring. In 1988 het hy die leier van die Progressiewe Federale Party geword, en die volgende jaar 'n leidende rol gespeel in die stigting van die Demokraties Party. Hierdie artikel toon dat die Demokratiese Party se goeie vertoning in die algemene verkiesing van 1989 'n belangrike faktor was om De Klerk te oortuig om met die aftakeling van apartheidstaat in 1990 te begin. In waardering van sy bydrae in die stryd teen apartheid het president Nelson Mandela hom in 1994 as Suid-Afrika se ambassadeur in Nederland aangestel. <![CDATA[<b>From minors to equals? Kalanga women and marriage legislation in post-colonial Botswana, 1966-2005</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100006&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en This article examines rural Kalanga women's reactions to marriage legislation in Botswana between 1966 and 2005. This legislation, it could be argued, fails to challenge the broader inequality which exists between women and men in Botswana. This becomes even more apparent when women are identified as belonging to a minority ethnic group and are resident in rural spaces. This article discusses how modernity, tradition-custom, and the law in Botswana converge today. It aims to demonstrate how some women reacted to the abolition of marital power, with a focus on how they perceive marriage. Focusing on rural Kalanga women, the study investigates reactions to Botswana's constitution of 1966, to the marriage laws of 1967, and the 2004 Abolition of Marital Power Act. Finally, it investigates the gendered impact of these laws - as well as the complex discourses surrounding marriage and human rights - on the lived experiences of Kalanga women. The article reflects on the divergent ways in which many women negotiated their struggle for recognition within their ethnic groups - while also circumventing their inferior position as wives under Botswana law and a patriarchal system. Some women in this study preferred to support a more 'traditional' form of inequality within the household. While this study cannot purport to represent all Kalanga women, it does ask important questions about the Botswana gender agenda and in so doing, raises questions of both the perpetuation of patriarchy and women's agency in Botswana.<hr/>Hierdie artikel bestudeer plattelandse Kalanga vroue se reaksies op huwelikswetgewing in Botswana tussen 1966 en 2005. Daar kan aangevoer word dat dié wetgewing nie daarin geslaag het om die breër ongelykheid tussen mans en vroue in Botswana uit te daag nie. Dit word selfs duideliker wanneer vroue geïdentifiseer word as lede van 'n etniese minderheidsgroep wat in die platteland woon. Hierdie artikel bespreek die wyse waarop moderniteit, tradisie en gebruike, en die wet, vandag in Botswana byeen kom. Die doel is om te wys hoe sommige vroue gereageer het op die afskaffing van huweliksmag, met 'n fokus op hul perspepsies van die huwelik. Met 'n fokus op Kalanga vroue, stel die studie ondersoek in na reaksies op Botswana se grondwet van 1966, die huwelikswette van 1967, en die Afskaffing van Huweliksmag Wet van 2004. Laastens word daar ondersoek ingestel na die geslagtelike impak van hierdie wette - sowel as die ingewikkelde diskoerse rondom die eg en menseregte - op die geleefde ervaring van Kalanga vroue. Die artikel besin oor die uiteenlopende wyses waarop vroue hul stryd om erkenning binne hul etniese groepering onderhandel het, en terselfdertyd ook hoe hulle hul minderwaardige posisie as vroulike eggenote onder beide Botswana se wetgewing en 'n patriargale orde omseil het. Sommige van die vroue in hierdie studie het verkies om 'n meer "tradisionele" vorm van ongelykheid binne die huishouding te steun. Alhoewel hierdie studie nie daarop kan aanspraak maak om om alle Kalanga vroue te verteenwoordig nie, stel dit wel belangrike vrae oor Botswana se gender agenda, en daardeur word verdere vrae gestel oor die voortsetting van die patriargie en vroue se agentskap in Botswana. <![CDATA[<b>Hunger and power: Politics, food (in)security and the development of small grains in Zimbabwe, 2000-2010</b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100007&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en White maize sadza is the most eaten food in Zimbabwe. Yet, over the decade of the 2000s, its consumption was threatened by drought and consequent acute food shortages. Small grains - sorghum and millet - offered a panacea to looming starvation and civil unrest. Yet, as we argue in this article, its access became rooted increasingly within political contestations between the ruling ZANU PF government, the budding opposition party and ordinary citizens. Using the story of small grains -sorghum and millet - between 2000 and 2010, we trace how food (in)security took a political form, stirring a pot of sometimes violent clashes between political and social contenders. We argue that through 'political grain', various political and social elites were able to amass wealth and power for themselves and grab control of sociopolitical discourse on food security during the crisis years. As the state imposed a series of seemingly well-intentioned and sometimes even widely welcomed food initiatives such as Operation Maguta and BACOSSI, these food security measures were often ad hoc, temporary and - as we argue - actually had an adverse long-term impact on local grain production and food availability. The government worked through key parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to allocate resources and food support to ruling party loyalists. In this period, the ZANU PF regime was concerned primarily with holding on to its waning political power and avenues for personal wealth accumulation at the expense of food security in the country. This paper demonstrates how an anthropogenically-induced 'hunger' effectively prolonged ZANU PF's control of society - but we also show how 'small people' fought back against President Robert Mugabe's 'big men' by embracing the growing and eating of traditional 'small grains'.<hr/>Witmielie-sadza is die stapelvoedsel van die meeste mense in Zimbabwe. Tog, oor die dekade van die 2000s, is die verbruik daarvan deur droogte bedreig met gevolglike akute voedseltekorte. Kleingrane - sorghum en rapoko - het uitkoms vir dreigende hongersnood en burgerlike onrus gebied. Maar soos in hierdie artikel geargumenteer word, het die toegang tot kleingrane toenemend verstrengel geraak in "n politieke stryd tussen die regerende ZANU PF-regering, die ontluikende opposisieparty en gewone burgers. Ons gebruik die verhaal van kleingrane tussen 2000 en 2010 om aan te toon hoe voedsel-(on)sekerheid 'n politieke vorm aangeneem het, wat gewelddadige botsings tussen politieke en sosiale aanspraakmakers / mededingers aangestig het. Ons argumenteer dat verskeie politieke en sosiale elites in staat was om rykdom en mag te bekom en beheer oor die sosio-politieke diskoers rondom voedselsekerheid tydens die krisisjare uit te oefen. Hoewel die staat 'n reeks oënskynlik goedbedoelde en soms selfs populêre voedselinisiatiewe soos Operasie Maguta en BACOSSI ingestel het, was hierdie voedselsekerheidsmaatreëls dikwels ad hoc, tydelik en het ironies genoeg 'n nadelige langtermyn-impak op plaaslike graanproduksie en voedselbeskikbaarheid gehad. Die regering het deur belangrike semi-staatsinstellings soos die Graanbemarkingsraad en die Reserwebank van Zimbabwe gewerk om hulpbronne en voedselondersteuning aan regerende partylojaliste toe te ken. In hierdie tydperk was die ZANU PF-regime hoofsaaklik gefokus op die behoud van sy kwynende politieke mag en manière vir persoonlike verryking ten koste van voedselsekerheid in die land. Hierdie artikel demonstreer hoe 'n antropogenies-geïnduseerde 'hongersnood' ZANU PF se beheer oor die samelewing effektief verleng het - maar ons toon ook aan hoe 'gewone mense' teruggeveg het teen president Robert Mugabe se 'groot manne/elite' deur 'kleingrane' te verbou en te verbruik. <![CDATA[<b>The Biography of an Unlikely International Lawyer - </b><b>Daniel Terris, <em>The Trials of Richard Goldstone</em></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100008&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en White maize sadza is the most eaten food in Zimbabwe. Yet, over the decade of the 2000s, its consumption was threatened by drought and consequent acute food shortages. Small grains - sorghum and millet - offered a panacea to looming starvation and civil unrest. Yet, as we argue in this article, its access became rooted increasingly within political contestations between the ruling ZANU PF government, the budding opposition party and ordinary citizens. Using the story of small grains -sorghum and millet - between 2000 and 2010, we trace how food (in)security took a political form, stirring a pot of sometimes violent clashes between political and social contenders. We argue that through 'political grain', various political and social elites were able to amass wealth and power for themselves and grab control of sociopolitical discourse on food security during the crisis years. As the state imposed a series of seemingly well-intentioned and sometimes even widely welcomed food initiatives such as Operation Maguta and BACOSSI, these food security measures were often ad hoc, temporary and - as we argue - actually had an adverse long-term impact on local grain production and food availability. The government worked through key parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to allocate resources and food support to ruling party loyalists. In this period, the ZANU PF regime was concerned primarily with holding on to its waning political power and avenues for personal wealth accumulation at the expense of food security in the country. This paper demonstrates how an anthropogenically-induced 'hunger' effectively prolonged ZANU PF's control of society - but we also show how 'small people' fought back against President Robert Mugabe's 'big men' by embracing the growing and eating of traditional 'small grains'.<hr/>Witmielie-sadza is die stapelvoedsel van die meeste mense in Zimbabwe. Tog, oor die dekade van die 2000s, is die verbruik daarvan deur droogte bedreig met gevolglike akute voedseltekorte. Kleingrane - sorghum en rapoko - het uitkoms vir dreigende hongersnood en burgerlike onrus gebied. Maar soos in hierdie artikel geargumenteer word, het die toegang tot kleingrane toenemend verstrengel geraak in "n politieke stryd tussen die regerende ZANU PF-regering, die ontluikende opposisieparty en gewone burgers. Ons gebruik die verhaal van kleingrane tussen 2000 en 2010 om aan te toon hoe voedsel-(on)sekerheid 'n politieke vorm aangeneem het, wat gewelddadige botsings tussen politieke en sosiale aanspraakmakers / mededingers aangestig het. Ons argumenteer dat verskeie politieke en sosiale elites in staat was om rykdom en mag te bekom en beheer oor die sosio-politieke diskoers rondom voedselsekerheid tydens die krisisjare uit te oefen. Hoewel die staat 'n reeks oënskynlik goedbedoelde en soms selfs populêre voedselinisiatiewe soos Operasie Maguta en BACOSSI ingestel het, was hierdie voedselsekerheidsmaatreëls dikwels ad hoc, tydelik en het ironies genoeg 'n nadelige langtermyn-impak op plaaslike graanproduksie en voedselbeskikbaarheid gehad. Die regering het deur belangrike semi-staatsinstellings soos die Graanbemarkingsraad en die Reserwebank van Zimbabwe gewerk om hulpbronne en voedselondersteuning aan regerende partylojaliste toe te ken. In hierdie tydperk was die ZANU PF-regime hoofsaaklik gefokus op die behoud van sy kwynende politieke mag en manière vir persoonlike verryking ten koste van voedselsekerheid in die land. Hierdie artikel demonstreer hoe 'n antropogenies-geïnduseerde 'hongersnood' ZANU PF se beheer oor die samelewing effektief verleng het - maar ons toon ook aan hoe 'gewone mense' teruggeveg het teen president Robert Mugabe se 'groot manne/elite' deur 'kleingrane' te verbou en te verbruik. <![CDATA[<b>The British Empire's Swan Song in South Africa - Graham Viney, <em>The Last Hurrah: South Africa and the Royal Tour of 1947</em></b>]]> http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2022000100009&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en White maize sadza is the most eaten food in Zimbabwe. Yet, over the decade of the 2000s, its consumption was threatened by drought and consequent acute food shortages. Small grains - sorghum and millet - offered a panacea to looming starvation and civil unrest. Yet, as we argue in this article, its access became rooted increasingly within political contestations between the ruling ZANU PF government, the budding opposition party and ordinary citizens. Using the story of small grains -sorghum and millet - between 2000 and 2010, we trace how food (in)security took a political form, stirring a pot of sometimes violent clashes between political and social contenders. We argue that through 'political grain', various political and social elites were able to amass wealth and power for themselves and grab control of sociopolitical discourse on food security during the crisis years. As the state imposed a series of seemingly well-intentioned and sometimes even widely welcomed food initiatives such as Operation Maguta and BACOSSI, these food security measures were often ad hoc, temporary and - as we argue - actually had an adverse long-term impact on local grain production and food availability. The government worked through key parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to allocate resources and food support to ruling party loyalists. In this period, the ZANU PF regime was concerned primarily with holding on to its waning political power and avenues for personal wealth accumulation at the expense of food security in the country. This paper demonstrates how an anthropogenically-induced 'hunger' effectively prolonged ZANU PF's control of society - but we also show how 'small people' fought back against President Robert Mugabe's 'big men' by embracing the growing and eating of traditional 'small grains'.<hr/>Witmielie-sadza is die stapelvoedsel van die meeste mense in Zimbabwe. Tog, oor die dekade van die 2000s, is die verbruik daarvan deur droogte bedreig met gevolglike akute voedseltekorte. Kleingrane - sorghum en rapoko - het uitkoms vir dreigende hongersnood en burgerlike onrus gebied. Maar soos in hierdie artikel geargumenteer word, het die toegang tot kleingrane toenemend verstrengel geraak in "n politieke stryd tussen die regerende ZANU PF-regering, die ontluikende opposisieparty en gewone burgers. Ons gebruik die verhaal van kleingrane tussen 2000 en 2010 om aan te toon hoe voedsel-(on)sekerheid 'n politieke vorm aangeneem het, wat gewelddadige botsings tussen politieke en sosiale aanspraakmakers / mededingers aangestig het. Ons argumenteer dat verskeie politieke en sosiale elites in staat was om rykdom en mag te bekom en beheer oor die sosio-politieke diskoers rondom voedselsekerheid tydens die krisisjare uit te oefen. Hoewel die staat 'n reeks oënskynlik goedbedoelde en soms selfs populêre voedselinisiatiewe soos Operasie Maguta en BACOSSI ingestel het, was hierdie voedselsekerheidsmaatreëls dikwels ad hoc, tydelik en het ironies genoeg 'n nadelige langtermyn-impak op plaaslike graanproduksie en voedselbeskikbaarheid gehad. Die regering het deur belangrike semi-staatsinstellings soos die Graanbemarkingsraad en die Reserwebank van Zimbabwe gewerk om hulpbronne en voedselondersteuning aan regerende partylojaliste toe te ken. In hierdie tydperk was die ZANU PF-regime hoofsaaklik gefokus op die behoud van sy kwynende politieke mag en manière vir persoonlike verryking ten koste van voedselsekerheid in die land. Hierdie artikel demonstreer hoe 'n antropogenies-geïnduseerde 'hongersnood' ZANU PF se beheer oor die samelewing effektief verleng het - maar ons toon ook aan hoe 'gewone mense' teruggeveg het teen president Robert Mugabe se 'groot manne/elite' deur 'kleingrane' te verbou en te verbruik.