Emotions in the Hebrew Bible: A Few Observations on Prospects and Challenges*

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ABSTRACT

Although there has been significant progress in the study of emotions in the HB in recent years, a variety of matters still need attention or serious reflection. This article addresses some of these. Aspects that are focused on include: (1) the designation “emotion” and what it entails in a HB context; (2) the limitations of the original psychophysical approach; (3) the cognitive approach and the question of a dominant conceptual metaphor; (4) the social-constructionist view of emotions and the problems of translating emotional communication; and (5) some issues related to gender and emotion.

Keywords: psychophysical approach, cognitive approach, dominant conceptual metaphor, social-constructionist view, gender and emotions

A INTRODUCTION

The topic of emotion has lately become a popular theme for research. Disciplines across the spectrum of the social sciences have each come up with their view on the subject, conducted in terms of their specific scientific perspective. One often comes across titles relating to anthropological, sociological, and cultural issues dealing with emotions. Studies focusing attention on emotions in the HB, the deuterocanonical literature, other related ANE and classical

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disciplines have also not lagged behind. A wide variety of issues are addressed in which not only textual evidence has been investigated, but also iconographical sources.

A major problem in the study of emotions in a “dead” language such as Biblical Hebrew, though, is that most of the emotion scenarios (mostly attested in the poetic books) are cast in highly figurative language. Attempts to determine which specific emotion is being described or communicated in any given case are extremely difficult or even impossible. Ortony and Fainsilber regard this as a typical peculiarity of “emotion talk” where an intense feeling or sentiment is so difficult to convert into a literal description that the only option seems to be to resort to metaphorical speech. In their view:


Recent publications include a 2003 doctoral dissertation submitted at the University of Göttingen by María Isabel Toro Rueda, “Das Herz in der ägyptischen Literatur des zweiten Jahrtausends v. Chr. Untersuchungen zu Idiomatik und Metaphorik von Ausdrücken mit jb und ḫṣtj.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Göttingen, 2003) [cited 28 May 2015]. Online: http://d-nb.info/972097295/34. This study investigates metaphors, idioms and emotions relating to the heart in the Egyptian culture. For the Ugaritic culture, cf. Mark S. Smith and Wayne T. Pitard, Introduction with Text, Translation and Commentary of KTU/CAT 1.3-1.4 (vol. 2 of The Ugaritic Baal Cycle; Leiden: Brill, 2009), especially the paragraph: “Excursus I: Liver/Innards (kbd) and heart (lb) in West Semitic Expressions of Emotions,” 164–174; for Mesopotamia, see Ulrike Steinert, Aspekte des Menschseins im Alten Mesopotamien: Eine Studie zu Person und Identität im 2. und 1. Jt. v.Chr. (CunM 34; Leiden: Brill, 2012), who often refers to the close connection between body parts and the expression/experiencing of emotions. Especially enlightening is her extensive chapter of more than 100 pages on the emotion of shame (405-509); see also the brief summary of some of the findings of this book in Ulrike Steinert, “‘Zwei Drittel Gott, ein Drittel Mensch’: Überlegungen zum altmesopotamischen Menschenbild,” in Janowski, Der Ganze Mensch, especially 70-74.


There seem to be two possible ways in which people might try to communicate the quality of an emotional state. First, a speaker might use literal language to describe the events that triggered the emotional state . . . In such a case, the literal description would not describe the quality of the subjective state itself but would merely identify its eliciting conditions . . . Alternatively, a speaker might use a metaphor in an attempt to describe the quality of an emotional state. For example, one might say that one felt as though one’s insides were a butter churn. Here, the metaphorical description does represent an attempt to characterize the quality of a subjective state.\footnote{Andrew Ortony and Lynn Fainsilber, “The Role of Metaphors in Descriptions of Emotions,” in \textit{Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing} (ed. Yorick Wilks; Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1989), 181-182.}

Given that it is virtually impossible to encapsulate the true nature of an emotional state, one can perfectly understand why the writer of Lamentations (2:11) rather takes recourse to metaphorical discourse to convey the profundity of the experience of grief. A literal description would just not have been sufficiently intense to serve this specific purpose:

> My eyes are worn from tears,  
> my guts are in ferment,  
> my liver/innards are poured out on the ground,  

The same applies to the many emotional outbursts in the Psalms. There too the physiological and psychical components of, for example, an experience of distress are so intertwined that a proper decoding of emotion terminology is almost impossible.\footnote{See also the following statement by Risto Lauha, \textit{Emotionen} (vol. 1 of \textit{Psychophysischer Sprachgebrauch im Alten Testament: Eine struktursemantische Analyse von צָה, ויָסַם und עֵרֵב}; AASF 35; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1983), 125: “Tatsächlich sind das Psychische und das Physische, die Wirklichkeit und das Bild, oft miteinander zu einem untrennbaren Ganzen verschlungen.”} Barth is correct in claiming:

> Die poetische Sprache der Psalmen bringt es mit sich, dass nur in wenigen Fällen Bestimmtes über die vorausgesetzte Situation gesagt werden kann. Oft werden Ausdrücke für eine Bedrängnis auf andere übertragen; oft scheint die Tendenz zu bestehen, ein begrenztes Leiden durch Anhäufung ganz verschiedenartiger Symptome zu totalisieren . . \footnote{Christoph Barth, \textit{Die Errettung vom Tode in den individuellen Klage- und Dankliedern des Alten Testaments} (2nd ed.; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1987), 93.}
However, where does one then start investigating such a multifaceted theme in the HB? Some would start from an etymological point of departure in an attempt to understand what is in fact signalled by the designation “emotion.” But in such a case the danger lurks that our view of the term “emotion” is shaped in terms of our own language peculiarities. Furthermore, when consulting an English etymological dictionary such as *Word Origins: the Hidden Histories of English Words from A to Z* (2008), it appears that the word “emotion” is fairly recent (16th century). Semantically it denotes the following:

The semantic notion underlying emotion – of applying “physical movement” metaphorically to “strong feeling” – is an ancient one: Latin used the phrase *mōtus animā*, literally “movement of the spirit,” in this sense. Emotion itself is a post-classical Latin formation; it comes ultimately from Vulgar Latin *exmovēre*, literally “move out,” hence “excite,” . . .

In view of this definition it is interesting to note that the Egyptologist, Altenmüller, in her survey on the nature of emotions in Egyptian culture opts for a similar term “Gefühlsbewegungen” to bring this nuance of “physical movement” – “strong feeling” to the fore. This is significant, since until very recently in HB studies, for example, there was no need to define the designation “emotion”; it was apparently obvious what this label refers to. Therefore one searches in vain in earlier studies on “emotions” like those of Johnson (1949),

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Wolff (1973),\(^\text{17}\) or more recently Lauha (1983),\(^\text{18}\) to find some kind of definition. The first attempt by a biblical scholar to put a proposal on the table as point of departure is by Kruger.\(^\text{19}\)

What is more, it appears that defining the concept “emotion” is a rather complicated enterprise; it is not just a “feeling.” Add to this the fact that the term “emotion” is not present in all the languages of the world:

Languages all seem to have a word translatable as “feelings,” but this is a more general term that subsumes sensations, drives, moods, and pains along with emotions. The idea that there is a certain class of feelings, the emotions, that constitutes a coherent domain of inquiry is not codified in every language. Indeed the word “emotion” was only introduced in English at the end of the sixteenth century.\(^\text{20}\)

According to current social scientific studies, an emotion episode could include a number of components: “There are thoughts, bodily changes, action tendencies, modulations of mental processes such as attention, and conscious feelings. But which of these things is emotion?”\(^\text{21}\) One possibility would be to argue that the most characteristic element of an emotion is its “bodily appraisal” and to claim that “all emotions potentially occur with feelings of bodily changes.”\(^\text{22}\) However, some emotions, such as jealousy or guilt, are not necessarily accompanied by any characteristic physiological expressions.\(^\text{23}\) In the case of an emotion such as anxiety/distress, again, no specific cause can be identified as triggering that emotion.\(^\text{24}\) The fact remains that any scholar today who intends to investigate any given corpus of emotions or emotion language needs a wide array of competencies (linguistic, social, anthropological, psychological, philosophical, religious, etc.) to make sense of this phenomenon:

The ideal scholar in this area would therefore be well acquainted with findings from various fields, from biophilsoply . . . to neurobiology . . . personal theory . . . developmental psychology and psy-

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\(^{18}\) Lauha, *Emotionen*.


\(^{21}\) Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, 3; italics in original.

\(^{22}\) Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, 91.

\(^{23}\) Konstan, *Emotions*, 27.

\(^{24}\) Konstan, *Emotions*, 27.
Another controversial issue which has been prominent in emotion studies right from the beginning is the number of basic emotions identifiable. For example, in 1971 Izard wrote that there are ten basic emotions: anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, interest, joy, shame, and surprise. In 1999 Ekman added some more items to this list and eventually came up with fifteen basic emotions: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure and shame. Noteworthy is the absence of emotions such as love and hate, which Ekman explains as “emotional plots, more specific, more enduring than the basic emotions”.

Up to now the issue of how many basic emotions could be distinguished in an ANE text such as the HB has not been addressed. In a recent popular publication Schroer and Staubli start their article with the following general claim, without any further substantiation:


But back to the term “emotion” as it applies to the HB. In view of what has been observed above about the history of the word “emotion,” it is obvious that this designation (“emotion”) could not have been used in that context. One way of expressing the presence of this notion was to employ the label נפש (“feeling”), as was done in Exod 23:9: “You shall not oppress a foreigner, since you yourself know the feelings (נפש) of a foreigner, for you were foreigners in the land of Egypt.” However, a search for the translation

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28 Ekman, “Basic Emotions,” 55; italics in original.
29 Schroer and Staubli, “Biblische,” 44.
30 The translation is by Johnson, *The Vitality*, 14; see also Wolff’s remark on this passage in Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 35: “Denn es nicht nur an die Bedürfnisse und Wünsche des Fremden gedacht, sondern an die ganze Skala seiner Empfindungen . . .” Interestingly enough also to animals in the biblical world some kind of “feeling” is
equivalent “Gefühle” (feeling) in a literal translation of the HB such as Die Elberfelder Bibel yields only one passage: “Mein Geliebter streckte seine Hand durch die Öffnung, da wurden meine Gefühle ( paypal) für ihn erregt ” (The Song of Songs 5:4). It is known that the “inner parts” ( paypal) of the body are frequently associated with different “emotional” states (e.g., Isa 16:11; 63:15; Jer 4:19; 31:20; Ps 22:14; Job 30:27; Lam 1:20; 2:11). What is significant, however, in these descriptions is something that has not been taken seriously enough in the past, namely the register of lexical terms associated with these “emotion” scenarios and the nuances of meaning they most probably suggest. Such associative terms could perhaps provide a better idea of how emotions/feelings were conceptualised in ancient times. I will come back to this aspect later.

A few observations will be made below on some issues central to the present debate on emotions in the HB. These aspects are: (1) the limitations of the original psychophysical approach; (2) the cognitive approach and the question of a dominant conceptual metaphor; (3) the social-constructionist view of emotions and translation issues, and (4) a few brief comment on gender and emotions.

B THE TRADITIONAL MIND – BODY PARADIGM AND THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL APPROACH

In summarising the basic idea in the HB that humankind is a “psycho-physical organism,” Johnson claims that “the various members and secretions of the body, such as the bones, the heart, the bowels, and the kidneys, as well as the flesh and blood, can all be thought of as revealing psychic properties.” Some 20 years later still operates with a similar “synthesising” notion when speaking of the “Stereometrie des Gedankenausdrucks:”

So setzt das stereometrische Denken zugleich eine Zusammenschau der Glieder und Organe des menschlichen Leibes mit ihren Fähigkeiten und Tätigkeiten voraus. Es ist synthetische Denken, das mit der Nennung eines Körperteils dessen Funktion meint.

The intimate soul-body connection, however, had already been emphasised many years earlier by Pedersen, who held that

assigned: “The righteous knows the feelings (נפש) of his animals, but the compassion (רחמים) of the wicked is cruel” (Prov 12:10).

31 But even the term “feeling” is problematic according to Prinz, Gut Reactions, 79, since “this is a more general term that subsumes sensations, drives, moods and pains along with emotions.”

32 Johnson, The Vitality, 88.

33 Wolff, Anthropologie, 22; italics in the original.

34 Wolff, Anthropologie, 23; italics in the original.
The bodily sensations are felt right through the soul. . . . The feelings are like a gnawing anxiety in the bowels. The bowels . . . roar like waves in violent motion, whether for terror . . . or pity . . . or anger . . . They (the bowels: PAK) ‘ferment’ . . . or ‘boil’ . . . with the person in despair.\textsuperscript{35}

Johnson (1949), though, was the first to connect metaphorical references to body parts and the physiological changes brought about by the experiencing of certain emotions. He refers, for instance, to metonymy in the case of the term אף, which he claims “has the primary meaning of ‘nostril,’ but is used secondarily and more frequently of that quick nasal breathing or explosive snort which is indicative of anger.”\textsuperscript{36} Elsewhere (with regard to Judg 8:3) he makes use of this conceptual metaphor to link an abstract domain (“the calming down of anger”) with a more concrete domain (a phenomenon in nature). The passage recounts Gideon’s successful attempt to soothe the angry feelings of the Ephraimites, which led to “their anger (רוחם) subsiding (רפה).” Regarding the latter statement, Johnson remarks: “their רוח sank (רפה) just as we say of a wind that it sinks or dies down.”\textsuperscript{37}

Lauha, a few years later (1983),\textsuperscript{38} focused on the body parts לב, נשף and רוח in classifying different emotional experiences. He typifies these components as “psychophysical lexemes,” which describe both the psychic and physical qualities of humans. With the help of a semantic field analysis he draws up a comprehensive list of concepts and their associative terms in order to determine how they are linguistically used to express the emotions of joy, sorrow, courage, fear, pride, humility, love and hatred. “However, since he was primarily interested in the semantics of נשף, רוח and לב, he showed little interest in the possible conceptual content that these might have had.”\textsuperscript{39} Occasionally, however, he makes useful remarks on the metaphorical conceptions of particular emotions. For instance, when analysing words belonging to the same semantic field as sadness/grief/anxiety – such as מרר and חמצ, which basically denote “to be bitter” and “to be sour,” respectively – he asserts that although these terms are primarily at home in a context of taste, they could likewise depict “andersartige Wahrnehmungen . . . die durch physische Schmerzen oder psychische Faktoren und Erfahrungen veranlasst sind . . . So wird z.B. der Stamm MAR hauptsächlich zur Schilderung von Gefühlen verwendet.”\textsuperscript{40} Referring to two other terms which belong to the same semantic field, namely צער

\textsuperscript{35} Johannes Pedersen, Israel, Its Life and Culture (vol. 1-2; London: Oxford University Press, 1943 [1926]), 173; italics in the original.
\textsuperscript{37} Johnson, The Vitality, 29.
\textsuperscript{38} Lauha, Emotionen.
\textsuperscript{39} Kotzé, “Cognitive Linguistic,” 854.
\textsuperscript{40} Lauha, Emotionen, 114.
(“to restrict”/“to bind”) and צוק (to constrain”), he states: “Trauer und Betrübtheit können auch beängstigend sein. Die Stämme צוק und צוק bezeichnen Enge und damit eng verbundene Angst und Bedrängt–Sein.” Unfortunately he does not explore these conceptual ideas further. In general, he is most sceptical about the significance of the metaphors and metonymies associated with these emotion scenarios. In summarising the results of his study, he concludes:

Wenn Metapher und Metonymie in der Prosa und zumal in der Alltagsprache vorkommen, sind sie meistens schon verblasste Sprachbilder. Sie sind “tot” und sind in dem Masse zu regelmässigen Teilen der Sprache geworden, dass der Sprachteilhaber aufgehört hat, sie sich als Metaphern oder Metonyme vorzustellen.42

But it is precisely these “verblasste Sprachbilder” that became the focus of attention in the cognitive linguistic approach where this type of metaphoric speech is not deemed as insignificant, but as an essential “window to the mind.”

C THE COGNITIVE APPROACH AND THE ISSUE OF A DOMINANT CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR

The “conceptual turn” in the worldwide study of emotions is a recent phenomenon. The first cognitive linguists to link the body and emotions are Lakoff and Johnson (1980).43 They proceed from the basic notion of the universality of the language of emotion.44 They argue that “our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature.”45 Furthermore, these metaphors are not arbitrary: “They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience.”46 With regard to the emotion of joy, for example, they claim that the orientational metaphors HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN have their basis in what we experience physically and culturally.47 It is interesting to note, however, that many years earlier (1932) Vorwahl,48 in one of the first attempts to make conceptual sense of emo-

41 Lauha, Emotionen; my italics.
42 Lauha, Emotionen, 241.
43 See the seminal study by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
44 For criticism of Lakoff-Kövecses’s paradigm, which advocates essential similarities in universal human physiology, compare the viewpoint of scholars who recognise a phenomenon that may be called “local biologies.” It operates with the notion of the uniqueness or specificity of cultural metaphors; see, e.g. Wilce, Language, 41.
45 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors, 4.
46 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors, 14.
47 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors, 14.
48 Heinrich Vorwahl, Die Gebärdensprache im Alten Testament (Berlin: Dr. Emil Ebering, 1932).
tion language in the HB, had already appealed to *orientational metaphors* in his understanding of a “positive” emotion such as joy and a “negative” emotion such as depression: the emotion of joy is UP, whilst depression/sadness is typically characterised by a DOWNWARD movement. With regard to joy, he claims:

Nach Klages sind die Ausdrucksbewegungen der Freude durch die Richtung nach *oben* beherrscht. Das gehobene Ich-gfühl geht auf Vergrößerung, worauf die Mittelpunktsflüchtigkeit der Bewegungen beruht. Darum heißt es in einem beliebten Bilde: “Du liebest mein Horn hoch erhoben sein.”

Depression, on the other hand, he holds, is characterised “durch den Zug nach *abwärts* . . .”

Other recent studies also illustrate convincingly that *orientational/spatial metaphors* elsewhere in the HB are equally helpful in terms of which emotion imagery, especially that describing distressful situations, could be conceptualised. Compare, for example, the recent study by King, who investigates the most important image schemas and primary metaphors portraying distress in classical Hebrew. One of the conceptual metaphors he identified as best expressive of this type of imagery is the image schema *verticality*. Another recent example, conducted along similar lines, is an article by Eidevall that focuses on *spatial metaphors* in Lam 3:1-9. He persuasively maintains that *width/confi nement metaphors* (“imprisoned/encircled/besieged”) play a fundamental role in depicting extreme distress in that passage.

Another conceptual metaphor Lakoff and Johnson suggest in terms of which experience, and specifically emotional experience, is structured, is *container metaphors*. In this respect one of the body parts most often associated with emotional states are the eyes, producing a conceptual metaphor such as:

THE EYES ARE THE CONTAINERS OF THE EMOTIONS:

I could see the fear *in* his eyes. His eyes were *filled* with anger. There was passion *in* her eyes. His eyes displayed his compassion.

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49 Vorwahl, *Gebändernde Sprache*, 9; my italics.
50 Vorwahl, *Gebändernde Sprache*, 14; my italics.
She couldn’t get the fear out of her eyes. Love showed in his eyes. Her eyes welled with emotion.53

After analysing a representative example of anger scenarios in the HB, Kruger found that the same dominant metaphor likewise applies to the conceptualisation of anger: ANGER IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER.54 Interestingly enough a similar conceptual metaphor is also encountered in other ANE literary texts. Compare, for example, the following Sumerian proverb describing the distinctive qualities of a leader, one of which is to “control anger like fluid in a container”: “Fliesst das Herz über, (ist es ein) Jammer. Wer (es) im Herzen behält, (der ist) ein Prinz.”55 In HB wisdom literature too the capacity to “manage/contain” emotions is of essential importance.56

The appeal to the container metaphor in attempting to make conceptual sense of certain emotion scenarios, has, however, lately come in for some criticism. According to Wagner, such imagery is rather typical of the later Greek-Western world, where one often encounters references such as “I am full of love/hate.”57 In the HB, according to Wagner, this conception is not significant at all:

Im Alten Testament findet sich die Behältermetapher so gut wie nicht. Gefühle erscheinen hier als etwas, das (von aussen) über den Menschen kommt . . . Für Gefühle und Emotionen gibt es plausible Gründe; man kann sich ihnen “naturgemäss” kaum entziehen und viel weniger eine “innere Kontrolle” ausüben, weil sie ja auch nicht als im Innern des Körpergefässes entstehend gedacht werden.58

According to this view, emotions should rather be seen as forces “coming from the outside” taking control of a person, as is, for instance, reported in Num 5:14/30: “and the spirit of jealousy comes over (עלעבר) him.” Numbers 5:14/30 is, however, the sole passage in the HB where the combination עלעבר (“to come over”) is linked with an emotion, in this case jealousy. In order to make sense of this description, it is important to determine (1) which specific eventuality in real life often gives rise to this emotion, and (2) how it is conceptualised in the given passage. The triggering of jealousy in this context is attributed to a situation which may universally – and not only in the HB – be seen as one of the root causes of its activation, namely strife between husbands and wives: “Jealousy typically involves an attempt to protect a valued relationship (especially marriage) from a perceived threat (especially adultery).”\(^{59}\) Such a situation could prompt certain feelings and actions, one of which may be the emotion of anger.\(^{60}\) Examples of such feelings and actions are also attested in the HB, for instance, Prov 6:34: “For jealousy (קנאה) (arouses) the fury (חמה) of a husband. He will show no mercy on the day of revenge.”

But to return to the conceptual metaphor underlying the pronouncement in Num 5:14/30: “jealousy comes over him (עלעבר):” if the combination עלעבר is examined, it appears that it is mostly attested in a “spatial” sense, namely the “passing” from one geographical position to another. Applying this notion to the statement in Num 5:14/30 leads Wagner to argue that this passage provides clear evidence that the emotion of jealousy could here be seen as “external to the person” (“personenextern”). He defends this position as follows:

Klar ist dagegen, dass das Gefühl der Eifersucht als etwas von aussen Kommendes aufgefasst wird. Dieses Bild stellt damit – typologisch gesehen, ohne polemischem Unterton – eine Art “Gegenbild,” zur Behältermetapher dar . . . \(^{61}\)

However, in this context an alternative explanation is also likely, something Wagner himself hints at in maintaining “Sicher ist es zum einen so, dass damit die Unwiderstehlichkeit des Gefühls thematisiert werden soll . . .”\(^{62}\) Indeed the phrase “to come over” has to do with an “external” element/force “coming over” a person, but there is an extra conceptual dimension attached to this metaphor, namely the reality that such an “external force” is so difficult or even impossible to resist/to keep in check that it just “overpowers/comes over someone like a raging torrent.” It is precisely this shade of conceptual meaning

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(“overpowering force”) that is communicated by a comparable passage such as Ps 124:4, where the same semantic construction is employed (רעב עָלֹה) in parallel to the idea “to be washed away” (שָׁפַע): “The waters would have washed us away (שָׁפַע); the torrent would have overwhelmed (רעב עָלֹה) us.” This implies that the root metaphor of the emotion of jealousy in Num 5:14/30 is not so much its trait as “personenextern,” as Wagner claims, but that this description is rather another example of the conceptual metaphor: EMOTION IS A FORCE.

Furthermore, Wagner is correct in holding that, as far as the emotion jealousy (קְנָא) is concerned, no occurrence is found in the HB of the container metaphor. The same applies to hate (שָׁאָה), but he is not correct in his assertion: “Weiteres Untersuchen bleibt zwar noch abzuwarten, aber es scheint auch bei den meisten anderen Emotions- und Gefühlswörtern so zu sein, dass die Behälter-/Gefässmetapher nicht bzw. kaum verwendet wird.” Although Kruger was perhaps a bit too optimistic in believing in the dominance of the container metaphor in the conceptualisation of anger, a few passages in the HB relating to this emotion would be hard to make sense of, if some or other kind of container metaphor is not presupposed. In 2 Sam 11:20 one reads, for example, that “the anger (חֵם) of the king rises (עלה).” If it is accepted that the root עָלֹה in its basic meaning “die Bewegung nach oben bezeichnet,” what then is the conceptual metaphor underlying this statement, if not that of a “rising substance in some or other kind of container”? Furthermore, how should the conceptual image in Jer 15:17 be understood, if not along the same lines as the previous one: “Because of your hand I sat alone, since you filled (מלא) me with rage (זעם; a synonym for חֵם/אֶפֶן ‘anger’)? And what about another Jeremiah passage (10:10), where it is abundantly clear that the source of anger does not have its source “outside” the experiencing subject, but “within” the person him/herself: “Due to his wrath (קִצָּף; another synonym for ‘anger’) the earth trembles. The nations cannot contain (حامل) his rage (זעם).” It is exactly this same container metaphor underlying the pronouncement of the priest Amaziah in Amos 7:10, when he warns Israel: “The country cannot ‘contain/endure’ (כול) his (Amos’: PAK) words.” According to Baumann: “Hier ist das Land als ein grosses Gefäss vorgestellt, das durch die aufrührerischen Worte des Amos in Gefahr geraten ist, zu bersten . . .”

What about a few other similar examples, further afield (from the Ugaritic and Akkadian languages), where the container metaphor likewise appears to be dominant in the conceptualisation of certain emotions? Compare, for

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63 Wagner, “Eifern,” 86.
64 Wagner, “Eifern,” 86.
65 See Kruger, “A Cognitive Interpretation of the Emotion of Anger.”
67 Arnulf Baumann, “כול” in ThWAT 4: 94.
instance, the following passage from the Ba’lu Myth (KTU 1 3 II 25-27) describing the joy felt by ’Anatu when fighting and slaughtering warriors:

\[
\text{tgdd. kbdh. bşhq.} \quad \text{Her liver shook with laughter,}
\]
\[
\text{yml’u. lbh. bšmhṭ.} \quad \text{her heart was filled with joy,}
\]
\[
\text{kbd. ’nt. tšyt.} \quad \text{the liver of ’Anatu with triumph.}
\]

Nowhere in the HB, though, does one encounter the metaphoric expression that someone “is filled with (מלא/mal) joy.” In this corpus the conceptual metaphor associated with this emotion is rather: JOY IS LIGHT: “The light of my face (אור פתי) they could not cast down” (Job 29:24); “The light of the eyes (מאור עינם) brings joy to the heart” (Prov 15:30).

But back to container metaphor, which is, as noted above, likewise encountered in the Mesopotamian world. Similar to the HB, someone could also be “filled” (malū) with anger, as becomes clear from Steinert’s summary of the conceptual representations of this emotion in the Akkadian language:

\[
\text{Das Herz kann . . . vor Zorn „brennen“ (libbu/kabattu + ḫamātu),}
\]
\[
\text{sich mit Zorn „füllen“ (malū) wie ein Gefäss. Hat sich der Zorn}
\]
\[
\text{entladen, atmet das Innere erleichtert auf (libbu/kabattu + napāšu),}
\]
\[
\text{ist „gelöst“ (pašāru, paṭāru) oder „beschwichtigt“ (nāḥu) wie ein}
\]
\[
\text{Sturm, der sich legt.}
\]

The latter conceptual metaphor (“the allaying of anger”) is reminiscent of the passage referred to above (Judg 8:3), where mention is made of the “subsiding (רפה) anger” of the Ephraimites against Gideon: “their (רוח) ‘sank’ (רפה) – just as we say of a wind that it sinks.”

In view of these few random examples from the HB, Ugarit and Mesopotamia, it appears that Wagner’s claim that the container metaphor is hardly used in the HB (and for that matter also in the neighbouring cultures of Ugarit and Mesopotamia, had he included them in his analysis), cannot be upheld. On the contrary, it would be almost impossible to make conceptual sense of espe-

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69 In the same vein, see the colourful description of Dani’ilu’s experiencing of joy in the ’Aqhatu Legend (KTU 1 17 II 9-11): “Dani’ilu’s face lit up with joy, his countenance glowed. Signs of worry disappeared from his forehead, as he laughed, he (relaxed as he) put his feet on the footstool.” The translation is by Dennis Pardee, “The ’Aqhatu Legend,” in The Context of Scripture (vol. 1; ed. William W. Hallo; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 345.
70 Steinert, “Zwei Drittel Gott,” 73.
71 Johnson, The Vitality, 29.
cially the emotions of anger, and to a lesser degree also that of joy, if the container metaphor is not presupposed in some or other form.

Elsewhere in the HB other conceptual metaphors present themselves as similarly fundamental in the metaphorical expressions of emotions. For example, if one undertakes a conceptual analysis of the emotion of fear in the HB, it emerges that one of the most productive metaphors is: FEAR IS AN ENEMY/OPPONENT. It provides the basis for the following entailments:

Fear and dread *fall upon* (עֵלָי) them (Exod 15:16; see also Gen 15:12; Josh 2:9; Ps 55:5; Job 13:11).

Agony *grips* (חֲצָק, *hip’il*) us, anguish like a woman in labour (Jer 6:24; see also 49:24; 50:43; Mic 4:9).

When distress and anguish *come upon* (ובא) you (Prov 1:27).

In Akkadian literature, likewise, a similar ENEMY/OPPONENT metaphor is utilised for the conceptualisation of the same emotion. Compare the following description in the annals of Sennacherib when fear (*puluḫtu*) takes possession of the adversary:

As for the king of Babylon and the king of Elam, the chilling terror of my battle overcame (*saḫāpu*): PAK them, they let their dung go into their chariots, they ran off alone.

Other related examples in the Akkadian language for conceptualisations of fear (*puluḫtu*) include that it can “go into” (*erēbu*) the heart/body like a

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73 For חֲצָק (*hip’il*) in a hostile context, see Dan 11:21.

74 For בָּא יָבוּעַ in a context of enmity, see e.g. Gen 34:27.

75 For *saḫāpu* in the sense of evil powers or demons “overtaking/overcoming” someone, cf. *CAD saḫāpu* 1e, 33. See also Steinert, *Aspekte*, 246.

76 Lines 53-54; the translation is by Daniel D. Luckenbill, *The Annals of Sennacherib* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924), 89. The latter pronouncement is in line with one of the metonymies associated with the experiencing of the fear emotion elsewhere, viz. “the involuntary release of bowels and bladder.” Cf. the following cases in the HB and the apocryphal literature, respectively: “When it comes, every heart will melt and all hands will grow weak. Every spirit will faint and every man will wet himself” (lit. “all knees will run with water,” מְמָר הָרֶךֶם מִמַּי; Ezek 21:12; for the translation, see Dilbert R. Hillers, “A Convention in Hebrew Literature: The Reaction to Bad News,” *ZAW* 77 (1965): 88; “(Then) a great trembling and fear seized me and my loins and kidneys lost control” (1 En 60:3; the translation is by Ephraim Isaac, “1 Enoch,” in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (vol. 1; ed. James H. Charlesworth; New York: Doubleday, 1983), 40; see also Kruger, “A Cognitive Interpretation of the Emotion of Fear,” 84, for more examples.)
disease, that it can “fall upon” (maqātu\textsuperscript{78}) a person, or that it can be “poured over” (tabāku) someone.\textsuperscript{79}

In the case of depression, again, it emerges that the principal orientational/spatial metaphor is: DEPRESSION IS DOWN. We often read of the typical “downward posture” of depressive persons in the HB, especially in the Psalms: “I wandered about as one who laments for a mother, I was gloomy (and) bowed down” (Ps. 35:14); “I am utterly bowed down and prostrate (שחח), all day long I go around gloomy” (Ps 38:7).\textsuperscript{80}

Similarly, Akkadian literature bears evidence of several instances of this “downward posture” of the body in the state of sadness/depression. Babylonian wisdom poem \textit{Ludlul bēl nēmeqi}, Shubshi-meshre-Shakkan, discovers that he has fallen into disfavour in public and private life, he reacts first and foremost in an emotional fashion expressive of depression. The text (Tablet 1, lines 73-74) reports: “My proud head bowed to the ground, terror weakened my stout heart.”\textsuperscript{81} In one of the Amarna letters (EA 7) comparable imagery is present. It tells about the Babylonian king Burra-Buriyaš complaining to the Egyptian king of the neglect by his relatives during his illness/depression (“head down”) (Lines 14-17):

\begin{quote}
Als ich krank war (wörtl. mein Fleisch mir nicht wohl war), hat mein Bruder mich nicht ermutigt (wörtl. mein Kopf nicht gehoben). Ich wurde voller Zorn gegenüber meinem Bruder (und sagte) wie folgt: “Als ich elend war, hat mich mein Bruder nicht (an)gehört. Warum hat er mich nicht getröstet (meinen Kopf nicht gehoben)?”\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}

In another context a related orientational/spatial metaphor is utilised to signal a similar emotional condition, but this time associated with another body

\textsuperscript{77} For a similar conceptual metaphor FEAR AS AN ILLNESS, cf. Ps 55:6: “Fear and trembling entered into me” (ב הוב).

\textsuperscript{78} Cf., e.g. the following examples in Donald J. Wiseman, \textit{Chronicles of Chaldaean Kings} (626-556 B.C.) in the British Museum (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1956): “Fear of the enemy fell upon (maqātu; PAK) them” (Chron 62 r.62), or “Fear fell on (maqātu; PAK) the city” (52:18).

\textsuperscript{79} Steinert, \textit{Aspekte}, 246.


\textsuperscript{81} The translation is by Amar Annus and Alan Lenzi, \textit{Ludlul bēl nēmeqi: The Standard Babylonian Poem of the Righteous Sufferer} (SAACT 7; Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Corpus Project, 2010), 33.

\textsuperscript{82} Steinert, \textit{Aspekte}, 199.
part, the heart. It is said that the heart “has fallen” (miqit libbi), or that it has been “lowered” (šapālu). 83

To sum up: it appears that there is no such thing as a dominant conceptual metaphor in the understanding of emotions. The type of metaphor to be employed in a given emotion scenario depends on the cultural conception of that specific feeling. For example, in the case of the conceptualisation of anger, as far as the HB is concerned, the container metaphor seems to be more pervasive than other conceptual metaphors. This differs with respect to an emotion such as fear, where other conceptual metaphors appear to be more prevalent, like: FEAR IS AN ENEMY/OPPONENT. In the expression of the emotions of joy and sadness/depression, again, it emerges that orientational metaphors (HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN) are predominant.

D THE SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW OF EMOTIONS AND TRANSLATION ISSUES

In a recent volume on philosophical theories about the emotions, the following instructive remark is made in the introduction:

Gefühle hatten Menschen schon immer . . . Differenzen – und damit verbunden: die Notwendigkeit von Differenzierungen – setzen indes dort ein, wo sich die Frage stellt, welche Emotionen Menschen genau haben und wie man diese unterscheiden, beschreiben oder erklären will . . . Ist, was unsere Alltagssprache suggeriert, Eifersucht fast dasselbe wie Neid . . . Ist das Phänomen der Angst von dem der Furcht verschieden . . . Ergreift uns heute immer noch Melancholie, oder leiden wir schlicht unter depressiven Verstimmungen? Es stellt sich die Frage, ob die Menschen vergangener Epochen Anderes fühlten oder ob es sich hier um blosse Übersetzungsprobleme handelt. 84

Or to put it slightly differently, in the words of the anthropologist Lutz, who holds that “emotional meaning is fundamentally structured by particular cultural systems and particular social and material environments. . . . emotional experience is not pre-cultural but preeminently cultural.” 85 If adopting this social-constructionist angle as point of departure, it is furthermore true that

The process of coming to understand the emotional lives of people in different cultures can be seen first and foremost as a problem of

83 Steinert, “‘Zwei Drittel Gott,’” 73.
85 Catherine A. Lutz, Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988), 5; emphasis in the original.
translation... The interpretive task, then, is to translate emotional communications from one idiom, context, language, or socio-historical mode of understanding into another.  

However, in a “dead” language such as that of the HB, such a “translation” enterprise is extremely complicated. The linguistic equivalents that translators had at their disposal in “decoding” given emotion words or emotion experiences were dependent on the lexical items available at that point in time. For example, in the case of the earliest translation of the HB, the LXX, it is natural to expect that the translation equivalents of certain emotion words would have been coloured by the cultural conventions deemed appropriate at that specific historical period. As a random example, consider, for instance, the use of the Greek verb λυπεῖν and its noun form, λύπη, of which, according to Muraoka, the primary meanings are “to grieve, cause grief” and “grief, sadness,” respectively. Occasionally, though, they are utilised in the LXX to render terms which in the MT primarily belong to the semantic domain of “anger”: קצף (seven times: 1 Sam 29:4, 2 Kgs 13:19, Isa 57:17 (2x), Esth 1:12, 2:21 [all in the qal and Isa 8:21 [in the hitpaʿel]), והרה (5x: Gen 4:5, Jonah 4:4, 4:9 [2x]), Neh 5:6 and ורגז (2x: Isa 32:11, Ezek 16:43) This seems to correspond to the fact that the Greek λύπη/λυπεῖν covers a broader/different range of semantic nuances in comparison with Hebrew. In some contexts this Greek combination could even be employed to capture a feeling/emotion which in Hebrew would belong in the semantic domain of anger.

One may continue along the same lines and refer to the emotion vocabularies available for the same emotion (“anger”) in modern languages such as, for example, those in German and English. For the ten terms employed for “anger” in the HB (רוח, רגש, 넘어, זעם, קצף, עזב, החמה, זעף, זעם, אֶפֶם), German Bible translations mostly opt for three lexical equivalents, viz.

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86 Lutz, Unnatural Emotions, 8.
87 Takamitsu Muraoka, A Greek–English Lexicon of the Septuagint (Louvain: Peeters, 2009), 436.
89 For this example, see Petra von Gemünden, “Methodische Überlegungen zur Historischen Psychologie exemplifiziert am Themenkomplex der Trauer in der Bibel und ihrer Umwelt,” in Der Mensch im Alten Israel: Neue Forschungen zur alttestamentlichen Anthropologie (ed. Bernd Janowski and Kathrin Liess; HBS 59; Freiburg: Herder, 2009), 41-68.
90 See Bruce E. Baloian, Anger in the Old Testament (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 5. The term used most often (210 times) is אֵפֶם, which is connected with both divine and human anger. The verb derived from אֵפֶם, אָפַה, is apparently only used for divine wrath; see Stefan H. Wälchli, Gottes Zorn in den Psalmen: Eine Studie zur Rede vom Zorn Gottes in den Psalmen im Kontext des Alten Testamentes und des Alten Orients (OBO 244; Fribourg: Academic Press, 2012), 29. The second most used term to des-
“Zorn,” “Wut” or “Ärger.” To match these German terms in an English translation, the equivalent “anger” is mostly utilised. Yet none of these German words is a perfect counterpart for the English term “anger.”

The translation of the Hebrew root קנא may serve as another case in point. So one will find in English Bible translations, for example, that three terms, namely “zeal,” “jealousy” and “envy,” are usually opted for in an attempt to denote the different semantic variations of the one root (קנא) in Hebrew. According to Elliott, however, these three emotion terms (“zeal,” “jealousy” and “envy”) differ in Western thought with regard to the social situations giving rise to them, the social relations and the social dynamics:

Zeal marks the intensity of feeling one person or group has in regard to something or someone or some other group . . . Jealousy is intense feeling concerning one’s possessions and rivalry with others . . . Envy is an intense feeling like zeal and jealousy, and, like jealousy, concerns the possession of someone or something, but has no positive quality.

A literal German translation, such as Die Elberfelder Bibel, in the majority of occurrences of the different variations of קנא, chooses “eifern/eifersüchtig” (“jealous”/“jealousy”) as a suitable translation equivalent. In a few cases, however, the counterpart “beneiden” (“to envy”: Gen 26:14, Ezek 31:9, Ps 37:1, 73:3 and Prov 3:31) or “neidisch” (“envious”: Prov 24:1) is suggested. In two cases (Prov 14:30, Song of Songs 8:6), though, the rendering “Leidenschaft” (“passion”) is selected as the term best capturing the specific nuance of meaning in those contexts. Luther, on the other hand, prefers in 56 of the instances of the root קנא, the translation equivalent “Eifer” (“zeal”).

While the Die Elberfelder Bibel in the case of Song of Songs 8:6 renders קנא as Leidenschaft (“Denn stark wie der Tod ist die Liebe, hart wie der Scheol die Leidenschaft”), Luther translates: “Die Liebe ist stark wie der Tod, und der ignite anger is החבר, which could be translated as “blazing anger” (“Zornesglut”); see Wälchli, Gottes Zorn, 49.

91 For the semantic differences between these terms in German and the corresponding terms in English for “anger,” cf. Uwe Durst, “Why Germans Don’t Feel ‘Anger,’” in Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective (ed. Jean Harkins and Anna Wierzbicka; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), 115-148.

92 The verb occurs 34 times in the HB, the noun 43 times and the adjective 6 times; see John H. Elliott, “Envy, Jealousy, and Zeal in the Bible: Sorting out the Social Differences and Theological Implications – No Envy for YHWH,” in To Break Every Yoke: Essays in Honor of Marvin L. Chaney (ed. Robert B. Coote and Norman K. Gottwald; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2007), 344-364.


Eifer ist fest wie die Hölle.”

Over and against Die Elberfelder Bibel where the translation equivalent “Eifersucht” often occurs to match some or other semant-ic shade of the root קנא, this concept is nowhere attested in Luther’s translation. The reason may be that Luther, at that stage of the historical development of the German language, did not have the designation “Eifersucht” available, since this term dates from later times.

E GENDER AND EMOTIONS

In a recent book entitled Gender Feelings the observation is made that in a modern world the concept “emotionality” invokes certain associations that are often attributed to either men or women. The attitudes emotional, sensitive and loving are associated with femaleness, whilst rational, aloof, insensitive, etcet-era are associated with maleness. Earlier the anthropologist Lutz had expressed a similar sentiment by saying that in everyday terms “to be emotional” means not only to be “female,” but also displaying a weakness that should be controlled:

As both an analytic and an everyday concept in the West, emotion, like the female, has typically been viewed as something natural rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather than ordered, subjective rather than universal, physical rather than mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and hence often dangerous.

Given this perception that “emotionality” is mostly associated with “femaleness,” the question arises whether this is also applicable to HB evidence. Were certain forms of emotional behaviour, for example, less acceptable for women, due perhaps, to their social status? It is interesting to note that, apart from anger and perhaps love, it seems that the HB is predominantly “gender neutral.” For instance, regarding the emotion displaying sadness, crying, which in a modern and also in the classical worlds is typically viewed as a female characteristic, the HB makes no distinction between the sexes: both males and females are reported to express this sentiment (for men crying, cf. Gen 45: 14-

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95 Hildegard Baumgart, Eifersucht: Erfahrungen und Lösungsversuche im Beziehungsdreieck (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985), 96.
96 Baumgart, Eifersucht, 125-126.
97 Daniela Rippl and Verena Mayer, eds., Gender Feelings (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2008).
While mercy and compassion (רחמים) are connected in a terminological and metaphoric sense with the womb (רחם), the HB ascribes this emotion to both sexes: Joseph (Gen 43:30), as well as mothers (1 Kgs 3:26), could experience this emotion. However, with reference to the emotion of anger, no trace is found of women getting angry or of anger being directed against women. One reason could be, as Van Wolde claims: “The fact that anger is conceived as uncontrollable aggression addressed to some other person makes it probably an unsuitable characteristic for a woman.” Furthermore, it appears that also love (if it could count as an emotion), when it comes to the relationship between a man and a woman, especially in the patriarchal Israelite society, is expressed in terms of hierarchical positions. Several passages bear testimony to the fact that the man is the socially superior person in this relationship; he is the one taking the initiative (e.g., Gen 24:67; 29:18, 30; 34:3; Deut 21:15 (2x); Judg 14:16; 16:4, 15; 2 Sam 13:1, 4, 15; 1 Kgs 11:1, 2, etc.). Apart from passages in the poetic books (e.g., Prov 5:19 and instances in Song of Songs, e.g., 2:5; 5:8), the sole instance in the narrative parts of the HB where mention is made of the “love” of a woman for a man is 1 Sam 18:20 (see also v. 28). Here it is said: “Michal, Saul’s daughter, loved (אהבה) him (= David).” Given the fact that she is the daughter of king, it is natural to suspect that “she takes on the hierarchically superior position in this relationship.” Furthermore, the nature of this love relationship between a man and a woman is likewise different from the cultural notion in contemporary Western civilisation. Whereas in the latter “love” is viewed as romantic and reciprocal, in the HB it is “the sentiment, attitude and behaviour of a man towards a woman.”

**F CONCLUSION**

Although there has been considerable progress in recent years in the study of different facets of the emotions in the HB, a variety of aspects still need attention or serious reflection, of which the following may be the most important.

1. Very little has been done on what the term “emotion” exactly entails in the context of the HB. Closely connected with this matter is the question of the

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100 See also Schroer and Staubli, “Biblische Emotionswelten,” 46.
number of basic emotions that could be identified. (2) The recent advent of the
cognitive turn in emotion studies poses several challenges for the study of
emotions in the social sciences in general, and in the HB in particular. One of
the basic aspects is how the notion of the universality of emotion language fun-
damental to this approach is to be reconciled with the social-constructionist
principle, which depends on the view that cultural items are unique or cultural
specific. This question is especially pertinent in the study of emotions in a
“dead” language such as Biblical Hebrew, where the researcher has no other
option but to rely on modern comparative social-scientific evidence in order to
make sense of emotion language. (3) Another issue has a bearing on the trans-
latability of emotion terms. In HB translations one usually encounters the ten-
dency to shy away from the complexity of emotion vocabularies and to resort
to stereotypical and traditional translation equivalents. Such linguistic choices
need to be reconsidered and refined. (4) A last matter, of fairly recent date,
relates to the theme of gender and emotions in the HB and also on this the last
word has not yet been spoken.

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