Islam and the state: Indonesian mosque administrators’ perceptions of Pancasila, Islamic sharia and transnational ideology

In many cases, mosques have been accused by anti-terror agencies as a potential place to spread transnational Islamic ideologies. This study examines the perceptions of mosque administrators (ta’āmir) about Pancasila, Islamic sharia and transnational ideology. This research took place in South Tambun, a densely populated subdistrict in Bekasi, West Java. Mostly populated by urbanites, it has heterogeneous religious understanding. A qualitative research method with descriptive statistics is used in this study to analyse the results of the survey conducted. Furthermore, a qualitative technique is carried out through a series of interviews conducted with the respondents. Triangulation is carried out to increase the validity and credibility of the findings. The results showed that 40% of mosque administrators surveyed thought that transnational ideologies were not in accordance with the spirit of Pancasila. Meanwhile, the remaining 40% and 20% of respondents, respectively, consider transnational ideologies to be dangerous to social order, and divisive. The qualitative analysis shows that the respondents do not want the implementation of Islamic sharia and an Islamic state within the Indonesian constitutional framework.

Contribution: This research can be used by policymakers and anti-terror agents to proportionally and participatively involve mosque administrators to narrow the wiggle room for the spread of transnational ideology.

Keywords: transnational ideology; sharia; Pancasila; constitution; mosque administrators; Indonesia.

Introduction

Indonesia has a comprehensive level of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is evident in terms of religion. Before officially becoming a state, the Indonesian territory inherited the greatness of many kingdoms, including both the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom and the Islamic kingdom (Elson 2010). Pancasila as the state ideology was appropriate and relevant to Indonesia’s heterogeneous conditions and the synthesis of two extreme points (tathāraṣṭva) of theocratic and secular states. As a pluralistic and Muslim majority country, Indonesia faces huge challenges, especially with regard to political changes in the post-New Order era (1966–1988), which is marked by political openness. This openness brings a breath of fresh air to the improvement of political life, but also threats to Pancasila, whose position is being questioned. There is a demand for a return to the Jakarta Charter which specified the right for Muslims to enact their laws and the enforcement of Islamic sharia at the local level (Al-Barbasy 2018).

There are also what Alles (2015) calls three non-state actors from the influential Islamic camps. The first group includes Islamic organisations and political parties in favour of the state, which consists of Islamic, social and political organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, whose existence is recognised by and who are able to provide inputs to the government. The second group consists of ummah-oriented organisations, whose political narratives are limited by the local political context but with globally oriented narratives and systems. One example is the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [PKS]), an Islamic political party that is often cited as having relations and networks with the Muslim Brotherhood. The third group consists of local actors who transpose their agenda in the global reference system. An example is Laskar Jihad, an Islamic militia involved in the Ambon conflict in the late 1990s, whose political origins can be traced to veterans of the Afghanistan War (Hasan 2006).
In addition, transnational Islamic organisations with local colour were born, such as the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin [IM]), and Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia [MMI]) (Nashir 2007). These organisations most often advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state. They want to form an Islamic state and replace Pancasila as the state ideology (Al Amin 2012). In addition to the organisations mentioned above, there is another challenge for Indonesia, namely, the Shiites who are fully supported by Iran (Syihabuddin 2013).

During this time, mosques are considered as a fertile seedbed for the development of transnational organisations or ideologies. Certainly, the justification for this is very simple. A mosque is a symbol or identity (worship) of the Muslim community. Mosque administrators and Muslims who like to go to mosques are more easily invited to talk about Islamic issues, including ideological and political issues, because most mosque administrators and their worshippers have better Islamic awareness compared to other Muslim communities.

This study examines the perceptions of mosque administrators about Pancasila, Islamic sharia and transnational ideology. Three aspects are explored in this study. The first is the perception of mosque administrators about the position of Pancasila as a state ideology. The second is the perception of mosque administrators about the enactment of sharia law. The third is the perception of mosque administrators about transnational ideology.

**Literature review**

**Pancasila and state ideology**

As the essence of national ideology, Pancasila with its five precepts occupies a central position in the life of the Indonesian nation. Pancasila has served as a guide for policymaking, as well as a political tool of various regimes to sustain their power since the national independence. In the last two decades, Pancasila has been used as a filter for policymaking, as well as a political tool of various regimes to sustain their power since the national independence. In the last two decades, Pancasila has been used as a filter for policymaking, as well as a political tool of various regimes to sustain their power since the national independence. In the last two decades, Pancasila has been used as a filter for policymaking, as well as a political tool of various regimes to sustain their power since the national independence. In the last two decades, Pancasila has been used as a filter for policymaking, as well as a political tool of various regimes to sustain their power since the national independence.

Pancasila has a strong position as the basis of the state. The presence of Islam should not be contrasted with Pancasila. Instead, Islam should be a reference source of values to regulate the order of a better life. In this context, there needs to be a new mode of relationship between Islam and Pancasila, namely, by putting their respective roles in place, unlike the debate that took place ahead of independence (Suryadinata 2018). At that time, there were two camps that were extremely involved in the debate: the nationalist camp who wanted Pancasila as the basis of the state and the Islamic camp who wanted Islam as the basis of the state. The debate between the two camps was because of the lack of awareness that Pancasila and Islam are two entities which cannot contradict each other (Hilmy 2010).

The values of Islam and Pancasila need to be grounded in the life of the people of Indonesia. This is important so that this nation does not get caught up in the symbolic struggle between Islam and Pancasila (Baswedan 2004). Both need not be disputed because both have different positions. Islam was born in a religious context and Pancasila was born in the context of nationalism. With this awareness, it is possible for a Muslim to become a nationalist with Pancasila as the state ideology, without having sacrificed their religious beliefs. In the framework of grounding the symbolic values of Islam and Pancasila into operational values, the practice of Pancasila must not be based on just one precept. The five precepts of Pancasila are an inseparable unity, and therefore must be taken into consideration in making any policy. Moreover, within the framework of practising Islam and Pancasila, Muslims and the state are required to think and act on issues that are directly related to the community (Ismail 1995), such as poverty, illiteracy, an erratic law enforcement, as well as an economic development which is still far from equitable.

Indonesian Muslims now generally accept democracy adopted in the Indonesian political system. Furthermore, in order to avoid the endless polemic of Islam and Pancasila, with all its wisdom, this nation needs to give 'special gifts' to Muslims. This can be done not by returning to the Jakarta Charter, but in the form of political will and political action of the state in order to accommodate the interests of Muslims as part of local wisdom (Al-Hamdi 2016). This gift is important, because it will create a wide-ranging impact on society. This local wisdom must keep in mind each precept of the Pancasila. If, for example, the presence of the sharia regional regulation is an expression of local wisdom, the sharia regional regulation must be carried out not only by considering the first precept, but also other precepts. However, sharia-based regulations have so far been considered partisan-based and as having less respect for religious diversity as an important point (Bush 2003; Parsons & Mietzner 2009).

Through the new format of the relationship between Islam and Pancasila, the conflict between Islam and Pancasila can be ended. It is time for Islam and Pancasila to be used as inspiration and a source of value in the process of making state policies, especially those that are directly related to the community. It is time for the energy of the Muslims and this nation to no longer be devoted to things that do not bring benefits to the nation and state. Moreover, until now this country to no longer be devoted to things that do not bring benefits to the nation and state. Moreover, until now this country to no longer be devoted to things that do not bring benefits to the nation and state. Moreover, until now this country to no longer be devoted to things that do not bring benefits to the nation and state. Moreover, until now this country to no longer be devoted to things that do not bring benefits to the nation and state.

Countries at all bureaucratic levels need to encourage inclusive policies to bridge patterns of harmonious relations between beliefs. In addition, rules that discriminate and limit minority groups and social exclusion need to be eliminated from public policy. Decisive action also needs to be adopted to prevent religious fundamentalism that threatens plurality values, such as the persecution of adherents of indigenous
beliefs and religious minority groups. This, in a broad sense, can encourage inclusiveness of social policies in the public sphere as well as create a narrative of a harmonious relationship between the state and religion. The task of the state is to strengthen the position of the Pancasila, rather than trying to weaken it. Pancasila is a ‘middle ideology’. Pancasila is neither a theocratic state nor a secular state (Latif 2018). The Pancasila places religion an important position. The policy offers related to the elimination of the ‘religion column’ and the ‘prayer at school’ lawsuit are concrete examples understood by Muslims as an effort to weaken the position of the Pancasila. The state is trying to drag Pancasila in a more secular direction by trying to intervene and reduce religious values that actually become a characteristic of Indonesia (Robet 2010).

Sharia and politics

Rahman (2002) defines sharia as religious values expressed functionally and in real terms to direct human life. The sharia, for its supporters, covers all aspects of their life: spiritual, mental and psychological. An-Na‘im (1996) mentions the difference between sharia and sunna by distinguishing them as ‘message’ and ‘prophecy’, respectively. This difference in meaning reflects how the adoption of Islamic law may differ in each context. Sunna is related to the personal practice of the Prophet, while sharia refers to the rules for Muslims to direct them according to their level of ability and expect them to act according to their capacity. In Taha’s (1987) rhetoric, sunna is in prophethood, while sharia is in its message.

Shaltut (1967) calls sharia as God’s provision or the result of reasoning on the basis of these provisions to be used as a guide for human life in their relationships with God, humans and the natural surroundings. This view has separated religion from sharia. According to Shaltut (1967), religion consists of two main teachings: theology (aqīda) and law (sharia). Zahrah (1999) formulated aqīda as the foundation on which sharia grows and develops, and the sharia as something that must grow from that self of aqīda.

An-Na‘im (1996) favours the interpretation that sharia is formed through the interpretation of the fundamental sources: the Qur’an, the Sunnah and their interpretation by Islamic jurists. An-Na‘im (1996) justifies that although the codification of the Qur’an was recorded during the reign of the third Caliph, Uthman ibn ‘Affan (579–656), the second source of Islamic law, al-Sunnah, was only recorded in the 2nd to 3rd centuries after hijra. The first few generations of Muslims accepted the moral authority of the companions of the Prophet and passed the knowledge regarding it to the next generation through oral tradition (Taha 1987).

After the Prophet’s death and the Muslim community expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula, the Sunnah was deemed insufficient to regulate Muslims (Shiddiqi 1993). Some scholars of ahl al-hadith or sunna jama’a state that the adoption of Islamic law must fully adhere to the principles of the ummah as a single unit. Any influences from outside the ‘sunna jamā‘a’ were considered to deviate from the model and could not be accepted.

Various schools then emerged that influenced the way in which the ulama imagined the ideal Muslim society, including positioning the relationship between sharia and politics (Kurzman 1999). There are many opinions among Muslims about how best to adopt Islamic law in the context of modern democratic practice. There is a view that calls Islam a religion and a state (Islam al-dīn wa al-dawlah), such as Abul A‘la al-Maududi (Al-Maududi 1995, 1996). However, there are also views that call for a separation between Islam and the state, such as ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq in al-Islām wa l-Ushul al-Hukm (Al-Rāziq 1985). In the context of democracy, for example, there are groups who think that Islam requires the presence of democracy, as reflected in the view of Khalaf-Allah (1973).

The problems of sharia relations and dichotomous politics are also felt in the modern politics. Not only does the dichotomy occur in the context of the feud between the secularist and Islamist camps (Baran 2013; Shehata 2009; Zeghal 2013), but also the dichotomy on the interpretation of sharia between those who interpret sharia in the general sense (‘ām) and those who interpret the sharia in a special sense (khās) with its emphasis on the role of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). In the Indonesian context, the dichotomy occurred between Islam and the nationalist camp (Menchik 2014).

In the context of Indonesia which is inhabited by a majority of Muslims, there always occurs debate regarding the application of Islamic law as history records that Islamic sharia was once applied in the archipelago in many Islamic kingdoms and sultanates (Ricklefs 2008). This dichotomy emphasises the double face of sharia. This dichotomy can be interpreted as a weak point in the relationship between sharia and politics. In the Islamic view, sharia and politics have the same goal: the realisation of the common good (maslahah, public good) (Ghofur & Susilo 2017). Maslahah, according to Asad (1961), is aimed at advancing society to achieve equality and justice to implement a divine order to achieve the right cases and oppose those which violate God’s law. Salim and Azra (2003) said that the goal of Islamic state is to realise sharia law. Therefore, the comprehensive application of Islamic sharia at the individual or societal level becomes a necessity for its proponents.

Transnational Islamist movements

According to Kaminski (2014), the transnational Islamic movement is a movement that does not limit itself to certain national or government boundaries, and seeks to impose its worldview on an area that is not limited to the territorial boundaries of countries that are legally restricted. For many Islamic organisations, the evolution from national organisations to transnational organisations is mainly a result of tactical rather than strategic choices designed to ensure the survival
and legitimacy of the movement. The movement of transnational organisations consists mainly of ethnically homogeneous populations who consider themselves oppressed by foreign powers (Burrows-Johnson 2013). According to Meham (2006), there are three special conditions that cause the Islamic movement to become transnational:

In particular, Islamic movements are likely to become increasingly transnational under three principal conditions: a) when members of the domestic Islamic movement become linked to participation in external conflicts through training activities; b) when the movement’s funding is transnational and the funding party creates organizational incentives for transnational ties; and c) when geographic resources are needed for sustained mobilization in repressive contexts to become external to state boundaries. (p. 2)

Transnational Islamic movements tend to be on the margins of political society and generally do not have direct access to political processes at national level. As a result, their movements often have little or even no interest in cooperating and making concessions with formal entities led by the state. Their movements also tend to be oscillated between violence and non-violence, depending on circumstances in the external sphere. They are focused on domestic issues, but at other times more concerned with global problems.

In contemporary Islamic studies, examining transnational ideology according to Karam (ed. 2004) means to examine political Islamic ideology. It is associated with Shia, Wahhabi, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and sometimes al-Qaeda, which El Fadl (2001) calls the ideology of doctrinaire jihadism, and Salafism which Hasan (2006) called neo-Wahhabism which was re-formed. The birth of Wahhabism was marked by its concerns with issues of trust and morality, such as strict monotheism, purification, anti-Sufism and developing individual moral integrity (Al-Rasheed 2010; Hasan 2018; Husni 2020).

Meanwhile, Singerman (2004) stated that most Islamic organisations that evolved into transnational organisations are mainly the result of strategic choices designed to ensure the survival and legitimacy of the movement. The activism of transnational movement is influenced by some factors such as informal networks, political exclusion and repression, and strong collective identity (Salem 2015).

Results

Mosque administrators’ perceptions regarding Pancasila as Indonesia’s single ideology

The results showed that as many as 80 respondents agreed on Pancasila as the state ideology, although they realised that its position was beginning to weaken. The reason was that some Indonesian people, especially those in the elite circles, did not practise Pancasila values well. Statistical measurement showed that 80% of respondents agreed that Pancasila becomes the state ideology on the grounds that it is needed as a unifying pluralistic nation. Pancasila is still important; it only needs strengthening, especially in the Muslim community. On the contrary, Muslims are the majority and they are involved in the discussion of Pancasila as the state ideology.

As a state ideology, Pancasila not only unifies the nation, but also does not conflict with Islam, that is, it is in harmony with Islam. Certainly, it is natural because Pancasila is extracted from the values that exist in the majority of Muslim community. Therefore, Pancasila is in line with Islam.

As many as 10% of informants from an Islamic party stated that Pancasila is still needed. Unfortunately, in the life of the state it is precisely by most political elites that Pancasila is often misused to rake in personal and group profits under the guise of Pancasila.

http://www.hts.org.za
There is a prevalent view among some people that the government has failed to improve the country by implementing the secular law since Indonesia’s independence. Thus, some people demand a return to the Jakarta Charter. There is nothing wrong with the Jakarta Charter. The Jakarta Charter is the ‘great decision’ of the nation’s founders and not the decision of 18 August 1945 which was only agreed on by a few national figures. There are 20% informants who are of the view that Pancasila can still resolve the current challenges, but if asked as a person, this informant would agree to return to the Jakarta Charter. Pancasila firmly protects every citizen and helps them in carrying out their religious obligations; therefore, it is necessary to uphold Islamic sharia as stipulated in the Jakarta Charter. Observing Islamic laws is the right of every Muslim and this right is protected by Pancasila and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. The precepts of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are not violated when Muslims demand for the application of Islamic law, including sharia regulations.

As 20% of informants are of the view that Indonesia is a pluralistic nation, precisely on the pretext of Pancasila, the laws produced are actually contrary to the wishes of the people. The answer of this situation is to apply Islamic law. There is no need for a phobia against Islamic law. This group view Pancasila as no longer relevant to face Indonesia’s challenges in the future:

‘From the first precepts of the Almighty God, many people who have strayed do not want to carry out predetermined Islamic laws and distort the meaning of the verses of the Qur’an. For the second principle, of course we have heard and seen a lot of examples on social media, many are already inhumane. And the third precept we see for unity has been greatly reduced by conditions like this, Indonesia is crisis of unity. For the fourth precept, many leaders have forgotten or did not prioritize the aspirations of the ordinary people. And in the fifth precept, a sense of justice is no longer present in the conversation; always the weak lose.’ (Muh, male, 46 years old)

The study found that 10% of informants are of the view that Pancasila is no longer relevant, and that the position of Pancasila as an ideology of the state is not significant. It is no longer necessary to suspect groups in the community as being anti-Pancasila.

**Mosque administrators’ perceptions regarding the enactment of Islamic sharia as a basis for Islamic state**

There are two basic questions that will be described below, which are related to the perceptions of mosque administrators about sharia regulations and the application of Islamic law in the state of Pancasila. The first group involves those who reject the application of the sharia law, even though it remains within the Pancasila framework. In the view of this group, the application of the sharia law is deemed inappropriate as it might erupt in ideological clashes with the Pancasila. However, they emphasised the need for serious implementation in carrying out Pancasila so that it was in accordance with the principles of justice taught in Islam. This means that the state needs to continue to advocate for human values, justice, democracy and economic equality in the public domain. For them, Pancasila is actually the core of Islamic values, so that the implementation of Pancasila is the implementation of the application of Islam itself.

Most informants (80%) who rejected the sharia regional regulations made similar arguments that the sharia-based regulations in the context of Indonesia’s pluralism were not yet needed because they could threaten unity and integrity (Figure 1). Islamic sharia regulations cannot be applied because they could cause turmoil. This is especially evident now, where countries with Islamic ideology often experience turmoil, civil war and other unfavourable situations; therefore, strengthening of Pancasila is a necessity.

The second group agreed on the implementation of sharia laws. In the view of this group, there needs to be a contextualisation in adopting the sharia and Islamic laws in contemporary politics. During this time the secular laws of the Dutch heritage were applied and the results did not have a positive impact. Therefore, 20% of informants stated the need for the application of Islamic law in Indonesia while still within the Pancasila framework. There was an informant (10%) who stated that the sharia-based regulations needed to be enforced throughout Indonesia so that the community would be well in accordance with Islamic rules or sharia.

There are also those who state that the regions can implement sharia law by first adapting to Pancasila as the basis of the state. If currently Islamic sharia is applied, it can cause problems because there are some people who are non-Muslims. Another similar view states that Pancasila accommodates Islam, and therefore the application of sharia-based regulation is not problematic as long as its content does not conflict with Pancasila:

‘I think it is time for Indonesia to make changes. By implementing the sharia law, the Indonesian state will prioritize law and justice’. (Ahd, male, 51 years old)

For the supporters of sharia, the implementation of Islamic sharia is not meant to punish non-Muslims. The application of sharia is only intended to make Muslims more free to
practice their religion. Sharia-based regional regulations are considered for the proponents capable of answering the nation’s problems and produce pious individuals, community control, and pious leaders. The adoption of sharia-based regulations is deemed to create a deterrent effect for Muslims in order to uphold the principles of life that are anti-corruption, collusion, nepotism and other immoral acts.

While related to the application of Islamic sharia, most of the informants (53%) expressed their approval for the application of Islamic sharia. They firmly stated that the law must be strict for those who violate the provisions of Allah. In that way people will be more careful in doing everyday actions. They also mentioned that sharia based on Pancasila would create order in the community. The country will also be safe and secure. There are also 20% of informants who argued that because the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, Islamic sharia should be implemented, including the application of sharia-based regulations.

Secondly, a small number of informants (30%) stated that they disagreed with the application of sharia in Indonesia. The reason was that Indonesia is a pluralistic country, in terms of religion. There are also those who argue that the existing law should be maximally applied. They argue that no one knows more about human desires except Allah. Although man-made laws sometimes favour certain groups, Islamic sharia is better not to be applied. They also do not agree with the application of Islamic sharia but are more related to the various interpretations of Islamic law. They consider the need for reinterpretation and contextualisation of various classical interpretations in order to be able to adopt Islamic law in the modern era:

‘There is no problem of Islamic sharia being applied if Muslims in Indonesia have the same interpretation of the Al-Qur’an and Al-Hadith, but if the Muslims still have multiple interpretations and each feels the most correct then this can cause divisions within the Islam Ummah. If this is forced there will appear Khawârij who can kill fellow Muslims because of differences in interpreting the Qur’an and the Hadith.’ (Bsr, male, 48 years old)

Mosque administrators’ perceptions regarding transnational ideology

Related to the perception of transnational ideology in the context of the Pancasila state in which Islamic sharia trinkets are also applied, the perception of mosque administrators is divided into two large poles. The first are those who think that there is no contesting issue between state and religion. If Pancasila is properly socialised and implemented, then transnational ideology will be filtered out and those that are incompatible with Pancasila will be rejected by the community. There is also a mention of several transnational ideologies which are not problematic as long as they do not conflict with Pancasila. The first group argued that HTI and Wahhabism are not a problem as long as they do not conflict with Pancasila. They also stated that almost all ideologies in Indonesia are transnational; even Islam is also a transnational religion. The issue of transnational ideology with actors and processes has led to concerns about Islamophobia in Western societies (Esposito 2019; Horsti 2017; Mondon & Winter 2017). In this regard, 20% of informants highlighted transnational ideology in terms of its benefits for Muslims and other human beings:

‘Transnational ideology is an ideology that can prosper citizens in matters of a basic nature, such as the guarantee of house, clothing, food, health, education, security, and the beliefs of these diverse societies, and this is nothing but an ideology that carries the concept of applying Islamic sharia, which is adopted in part [by] a large majority of Indonesian citizens. Of course, an ideology like this should be fought for, because the scholars and founders of the nation have tried to implement it since the days of struggle for independence.’ (Rhm, male, 29 years old)

Another informant expressed that:

‘If it is in accordance with the culture of Indonesian citizens who are predominantly Muslim who want to be a nation and state by embracing all components of society, both Muslims and non-Muslims who refer to the goal of servitude to Allah, not the interests of groups such as the dark events in Islamic history, of course that is what all Indonesians want.’ (Srf, male, 37 years old)

There is also a view from 20% of respondents that states that a transnational ideology is legitimate as long as it is beneficial for society, maintains peace and unity, as the Qur’an teaches to avoid division and maintain unity, and do not become a source of division. The presence of transnational ideology is just as long as there are no temporary personal or group interests. The supporters of this view associate it with globalisation:

‘The existence of transnational organizations is normal, normal as the impact of the development of international relations and globalization. As long as the organizations are promoting rahmatan lil-alamin, it has no problems. Transnational ideology was born from different regions and cultures from the Indonesian people, so the background of their emergence will be different. If its emergence is part of the diversity of Islamic thought, I agree. But if the transnational ideology is to justify its thinking in Indonesia, it is feared that there will be divisions of Muslims in Indonesia.’ (Ltt, male, 43 years old)

Secondly, 40% of respondents rejected the presence of transnational ideology and did not agree with the hardliners who are not in accordance with Islam and Pancasila (Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Mosque administrators’ perceptions about transnational Islamic ideology.](http://www.hts.org.za)
The government must strictly prohibit all organisations, including religions that are not in accordance with Pancasila, whatever the reason. Transnational ideology can endanger the nation and the state. It can divide the unity and integrity of the nation. There are also informants (40%) who did not agree with transnational ideology:

‘It is very dangerous [transnational ideology], therefore it is necessary to strengthen the community, especially Muslims, with religious knowledge, understand and at the same time remind people of the dangers of the ideology [transnational]. We must be careful not to be influenced, let alone enter or join it. We must stand firm in accordance with our teachings.’ (Izz, male, 34 years old)

Other informants (40%) stated that the presence of transnational ideology was not right, but if it could be relevant and in line with Pancasila, its presence could also be considered. As a state ideology, Pancasila needs ongoing socialisation to the younger generation, especially Muslim youth as an attempt to prevent and reduce the effect of the transnational ideology (Anwari 2022; Hamid 2011; Kusuma & Susilo 2020; Suharto 2018):

‘Transnational organizations such as Shia, al-Qaidah, Boko Haram, ISIS, and Ahmadiyah must be banned from living and developing in Indonesia. And the preachers, clerics, and religious teachers must strengthen ukhwah islamiyah and national unity. Of course, we do not want Indonesia like the countries in the Middle East. The presence of transnational ideology will actually weaken the Indonesian government and lack a sense of justice for the people in Indonesia.’ (Hrs, male, 51 years old)

**Discussion**

In terms of the first question regarding Pancasila as a national ideology, mosque administrators have two perceptions relating to the position of Pancasila as an ideology of the state. Firstly, most of them still acknowledge Pancasila as the best ideology and suggest that it should be maintained in the country for various reasons. If people are willing to practise its principles in their daily lives, Pancasila will prove to be the perfect ideology when compared to other ideologies, such as capitalism and communism. Pancasila is ideal to be the basis for policymaking, state, community and religious activities.

The statistical descriptions showed that 80% of respondents agreed with Pancasila as the sole ideology of Indonesia. However, about 20% of respondents called for a return to the Jakarta Charter, which was judged as a form of compromise between the Islamic and nationalist camps (Anshari 1997; Boland 1985; Hasym 2013; Hilmy 2010; Maarif 1984; Madinier 2015). With the current conditions and Indonesia’s position as a Muslim majority country, there needs to be an adjustment to Pancasila by returning to the Jakarta Charter. Regarding whether Indonesia has to return to the Jakarta Charter, in some of the reasons, 10% of informants concerned about the current conditions of Indonesia, as well as the reality of Indonesia as a Muslim majority country; therefore, it is natural to return to the Jakarta Charter.

Related to the relevance of Pancasila as a state ideology, as 80% of informants stated that Pancasila is still relevant to address current and future challenges, therefore it must be maintained, certainly by correctly understanding and engraving Pancasila in every soul of the nation and realising it in every decision-making that has an impact on the lives of people. This group argued that Pancasila is considered appropriate to answer the diversity of Indonesia and the symbol of Indonesian unity and integrity, and is considered able to answer the challenges of the times. The results also showed that 40% of informants answered that Pancasila was quite relevant as a foundation for the state and the nation. If there was something that disturbed inter-religious harmony, it was true because they left Pancasila. There are also those who endorse the relevance of Pancasila, but relate it to Islamic law. Some others, although non-mainstream, said that Pancasila was no longer relevant to the Indonesian people. Meanwhile, respondents who reject Pancasila argue that Pancasila is no longer well practiced by the community in everyday life.

Since it was given the discretion to carry out decentralisation in accordance with Law No. 22 of 1999, which included provisions that local governments were given the authority to regulate their regions in accordance with the aspirations of their people, in many Muslim majority areas, this was realised in the form of sharia laws. Some regions have made sharia laws (Al-Barbasy 2016). Sharia-based regional regulation is an effort made by a number of Islamic groups to influence local government’s policy to Islamise legal products at the regional level (Nashir 2007; Sahrasad & Chaidar 2017).

In addition to being illustrated from the many regions that want the application of Islamic law, the research results also showed a positive response related to the application of sharia. For example, Nur (2008) stated that of the 597 respondents who were asked for opinions on the implementation of the local regulation which regulates the circulation of alcoholic beverages, most stated ‘strongly agree’. Likewise, the enactment of the regional regulation on reading and writing of the Qur’an and on Muslim dress received positive responses from the community.

Regarding the enactment of sharia laws in Indonesia, the results of this study are supported by previous research. Research by Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM), State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta has also published data related to sharia regulations. The research results in 2001 stated that people who wanted Islamic laws comprised 61%. Meanwhile, in 2002 it rose to 71%, and in 2003 it increased to 75% (SEM Institute 2014). Pew Research Center (2013) survey results in various Muslim countries from 2008 to 2012 showed that the majority of Muslims want the application of Islamic sharia, including in Indonesia, where 72% of Muslims want the application of sharia. The survey conducted by the SEM Institute also showed the same result. The survey was conducted between 25 December 2013 and 19 January 2014, with 1498 respondents in 38 cities.
The result showed that 72% of respondents agreed with Islamic law, 14% did not respond, and 14% disagreed with Islamic law. The majority of the participants (73%) agreed that the various problems experienced by this nation are because of ignoring Islamic laws in various aspects of the lives of people (Pew Research Center 2013).

In Indonesia, there is a dialectical relationship between Pancasila and Islam. Muslims generally accept Pancasila as part of their national identity. They believe that Pancasila is the elaboration of Islamic values. As for the disagreement between Pancasila and Islam, it occurs due to a lack of comprehensive knowledge about the relationship between two ideologies. So far, Indonesian democracy has been able to guarantee the rights, space, and freedom for each religious community to practice their beliefs. Pancasila is considered to be in line with Islamic values (Iskandar 2016). Both Pancasila and Islam are fighting for justice and equality. In this case, the state needs to fight poverty, corruption, and injustice. In addition, the state needs to advocate for equitable distribution of income and strengthen democratic institutions.

For this reason, efforts to involve mosque administrators in a participatory manner in various activities to combat radicalism need to be pursued. Furthermore, their participation is useful in dealing with issues related to transnational Islam that uses mosques as part of educational networks and venues. In addition, as managers, mosque administrators have full authority to regulate activities, uses, recitations and public lectures (Bagby 2009; Öcal & Gökarıksel 2022; Qurtuby & Aldamer 2021). For this reason, their involvement in education, socialisation, and citizenship activities can be useful in dealing with problems related to the revival of Pancasila as well as avoiding the Muslim community from taking part in radical movements.

Conclusion
As to reveal the conclusion, it is worth noting to emphasise three things that are studied, namely, the perception of mosque administrators about the position of Pancasila as the state ideology, the perception of the mosque administrators regarding the enforcement of Islamic sharia in the context of the Indonesian state and their perceptions about transnational ideology. The results show that regarding the mosque administrators’ perceptions of Pancasila as the only ideology in Indonesia, the majority of informants (80%) agreed that Pancasila became the state ideology. The fundamental weakness of Pancasila is not in its position as an ideology, but lies in the aspect of applying its values. However, as many as 20% of informants are sceptical about Pancasila as the state ideology. In this regard, the doubt is not on the position of Pancasila as an ideology, but on the practical aspects of the application of Pancasila.

Regarding the application of Islamic law as a basis for Islamic state, the results showed that as many as 20% of mosque administrators wanted the application of Islamic laws, both in the form of sharia regulations and the application of Islamic sharia in the national context. In this context, most of the informants (53%) wanted the application of Islamic sharia in the framework of Pancasila and Indonesia’s constitution.

Lastly, regarding the issue of transnational ideology, the respondents from mosque administrators are of a proportional view. They do not necessarily reject but do not take it for granted. While transnational ideology is in line with the principles of national and state life, there is no reason to reject it. On the other hand, if transnational ideologies bring bad and divisive effects, there is no other choice but to reject them. Most of the respondents’ views are actually typical of Indonesians, who do not easily hold rigid or extreme (tatharruf) attitudes in responding to anything related to national and state life.

In terms of responding to transnational ideology, the respondents showed a proportional view by accepting principles that are in line with Pancasila and the constitution. On the other hand, they firmly reject the teachings and principles contained in transnational ideologies that are potentially harmful to public life. This finding practically underscores the critical role of mosque administrators in spreading moderate Islam, Pancasila, and the Indonesian constitutional system, and in preventing fundamentalist ideas through their absolute role in allocating and directing the use of activities, sermons, recitations, and the educational and social functions of mosques.

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Authors’ contributions
M.M. contributed to the conceptualisation, methodology, formal analysis, writing of the original draft, review and editing, validation and data curation. E.S. contributed to formal analysis, investigation, project administration, software, validation and data curation. D.G. contributed to formal analysis, validation and data curation. H.S. contributed to formal analysis, investigation, validation and data curation. M.A.M. contributed to formal analysis, investigation, and validation.

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